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 Abstract 
 
The thesis explores the genealogy of the discourse on nuclear testing in Australia 
during the 1950s. In this analysis of publicly available sources, it seeks to understand 
why certain myths emerged in relation to the tests, and to examine the persistence of 
some myths and speculative accounts, while others have been totally rejected. The 
thesis uses the methodology of documentary analysis of a wide range of texts, 
including newspapers, Hansard, official histories, reports of enquiries and pop- 
cultural sources. Many of the 1950s sources reflect the prominence of the ‘realist’ 
perspective to international relations in the Menzies era.  A key theoretical impact on 
the shaping of the discourse comes from post-modernist critiques of ‘truth and the 
facts’,  though it must be stated that though the research itself does not have a ‘post-
modernist’ theoretical foundation, despite responding to the challenges post-
modernism has presented to our understanding of knowledge and truth.  The thesis 
finds that throughout the more than half century of  commentary upon the nuclear 
tests, authors have sought to manipulate public opinion, either for the purpose of 
assuring the public that the tests were safe and in the national interest, or for the 
opposite aim of exposing the liability of governments for environmental and human 
damage. The discourse has always been clouded by the lack of access to official 
information, which remains shrouded in secrecy despite much emerging during the 
McClelland Royal Commission of 1984-5 as the process of releasing archival 
materials to help inform the public discourse begun. But with the release of much 
official data and new studies, commentators have continued to, knowingly or 
unknowingly, dispense technical inaccuracies and repeat speculations that are not 
evidenced or have been clearly discredited
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Chapter One: Introduction. 
 
British atomic testing in Australia, like other areas of history, is an issue 
shrouded with contentious debates. This thesis examines how the issues concerned 
with British atomic testing in Australia have been presented in sources in the public 
domain.  It seeks to examine the genealogy of this discourse by considering the nature 
and consistency of commentaries pertaining to the tests. It also seeks to explore 
instances where allegations about the tests are not agreed upon by other sources or 
supported by evidence. There remain many mysteries concerning Australia’s 
experience with atomic testing. Much has not been, and will never be, disclosed.  
What is on the public record is often inaccurate, with speculative information often 
being presented as an uncontested historical record.  Numerous falsehoods have 
become established within the collective Australian public consciousness and, despite 
the large amount of information available, the tests are a poorly understood series of 
events. No one is situated to offer a final assessment of the accuracy of reportage of 
the tests, though instances where errors have been presented as factual can be 
highlighted. This thesis serves to explore the discourse of representations of the 
atomic tests, as an examination of why certain falsehoods became accepted, why and 
if they still have currency and how this debate has developed throughout the years 
since the tests.  In exploring this debate, the history of the tests themselves, and 
related issues, is examined. This narrative will be explored with a focus on how it has 
been developed and been represented.  
Several prominent contested issues are associated with the tests, these include 
the beliefs that: 
 
1) …the tests would result in no harm to servicemen associated with the tests or to 
the general Australian population, including Aboriginal people. 
2) ..there is strong medical evidence to suggest that the tests resulted in widespread 
ailment among the Australian populace. Linked to this is belief the tests resulted 
in widespread contamination from strontium 90 (Sr-90), which is absorbed by the 
human body though dairy products. Significant to the debates were biochemist 
Hedley Marston’s finding on this subject.  
3) …the early belief that the British had somehow surpassed the US in technical 
matters pertaining to nuclear weapons 
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4) …an Australian location may have been intended as a possible testing site for a 
‘cobalt bomb.’ This issue would later be linked to the inclusion of cobalt metal 
pellets in the test code named ‘Tadje’ in ‘Operation Antler of’ 14 September 1957. 
5) … fallout in the form of a ‘Black Mist’ from the ‘Totem 1’ test of 26 October 
1953 positively resulted in the blindness of Aboriginal man Yami Lester. 
6) … following this or a subsequent test there was a hurried departure of personnel 
from a ‘village’ at the testing site, X200, at Emu Field, South Australia, due to 
contamination from radioactive fallout. 
7) …the yield of the test ‘Mosaic G2’ of 19 June1956 was far higher than expected. 
(reportage of the yield of this test, as will be explored, is varied) 
8) …the tests were staged as a means to gauge the effects of ionising radiation on 
service personnel and the general populace. 
9) …the tests resulted directly in immediate loss of human life. 
 
Other beliefs associated with the tests are discussed in this thesis, some are 
easily verified, such as the fact that areas of desert were contaminated and that 
Aboriginal people were found in such areas.  Many claims regarding the tests were 
subject to the investigations of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia of 1984 and 1985 which has become known as the McClelland Royal 
Commission after its chairman, ‘Diamond’ Jim McClelland.   
The tests captured the public imagination. They have received considerable 
attention from historians, visual and musical artists, writers and all kinds of thinkers. 
They have been referenced in numerous books, journal articles, films, reports and in 
music. The ‘voices’ that contribute this information can be said to have their own 
agendas, and the sources on atomic testing convey numerous different messages. 
 This dissertation does not attempt to defend the decision to allow the tests, or 
how they were conducted, nor is it a means to criticise.  It is generally agreed that the 
tests were a negative chapter in Australia’s history. There is no way that atomic 
devices can be detonated without environmental impact, and there are also clear, 
uncontested, examples of human impact.  Instead this thesis seeks to trace the official 
and public responses to the tests and to explain how certain falsehoods have become 
established in popular belief. The tests were unfortunate, as was the entire Cold War. 
Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding them warrant scrutiny and an analysis of 
the developments in debates surrounding the tests is required.  
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This chapter overviews the theoretical perspectives of the study, the political 
situation leading up to the tests, the types of weapons discussed and the events of the 
tests themselves. The chapter also outlines the structure of the thesis and introduces 
some of the sources examined. 
  
Theory and methodology: 
 
The problem with facts, historical narratives and responses to the ‘post modern 
challenge to historiography’: 
 
History is a discipline which is premised on a subjectivist epistemology: 
though there are underlying truths such as hard facts and dates, there is no innate 
meaning awaiting discovery. Rather, we strive to interpret how meanings are agreed 
upon. In the case of Australia’s experience with the atomic tests, these meanings are 
heavily contested. This is a barrier to forming an accurate understanding of our past 
and thus it is a problem in need of solving. The answers will not be found 
immediately in some dusty archive, but an understanding of the development of the 
historical debates surrounding the tests can be formed through a comparative, critical 
analysis of a wide variety of sources. 
In attempting this, value judgements about the kinds of sources being 
reviewed have been avoided. All mediums for conveying data, all means of 
communication have been considered ‘text,’ from a university-sponsored health study, 
a government report with multiple expert authors, to the song Maralinga by Paul 
Kelly1 or the conspiracy-oriented 1987 motion picture Ground Zero.2
The sources examined in this dissertation are all elements of the British atomic 
testing ‘discourse.’ This dissertation is an analysis of discourse, related to the ‘post-
modern challenge to historiography’. This term is employed here as it was used in the 
 They can all be 
said to have continued to potentially influence public opinion, thus such texts are all 
valid in some sense for this review. The extent of their influence and acceptability 
may vary, but each reveals its author’s concerns and reasoning about relevant issues. 
                                                 
1 Festival Mushroom, Paul Kelly Gossip, 1987. 
2 Avenue Pictures, Ground Zero, directed by Bruce Myles and Michael Pattinson, 1987. 
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work of historiographer Georg Iggers.3
 The implication of the post-modern challenge is that historical facts can only 
be recognised by signifiers and, as such, historical knowledge is a consequence of the 
interpretation of language. The post-modern challenge is typified by a blurring of the 
distinctions between history and literature. Influential works include Hayden White’s 
Metahistory-the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe,
 The ‘post-modern challenge’ refers to the 
impact of theories that have arisen in response to modernity on previously accepted 
notions that historical study can be situated on an objective, ‘hard science’ 
epistemology. It needs to be firmly stated that the thesis is not situated on a post-
modernist theoretical foundation. However, the source analysis has been conducted in 
a manner which takes into account the consequences of the post-modern challenge. 
That is, it is not possible to form an objectivist analysis of the facts about the atomic 
tests and that researchers must analyse how the narrative of Australia’s testing 
experience is generally agreed upon.  
4 which uses 
prominent historical events of the nineteenth century as examples to demonstrate how 
historical knowledge is known to the researcher via elements of language known as 
tropes: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony.5
 Iggers suggests that Lawrence Stone’s article ‘The Revival of Narrative’
 
6 is a 
salient example of how the distinctions between fact and fiction have been blurred in 
response to the works of modern literary theorists.7  Later responses include Keith 
Windschuttle’s The Killing of History; How A Discipline is Being Murdered by 
Literary Critics and Social Theorists, 8 which is largely a claim that the incorporation 
of literary methods into the historiographical framing context is effectively causing 
the ‘death’ of history as a ‘science’.9
                                                 
3 Georg Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Post-
Modern Challenge, Wesleyan University Press, Hanover, 1997. 
 
4 Hayden White, Metahistory: Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1973. 
5 This ‘trope theory’ is outlined and then critiqued in the chapter entitled ‘History as Literature: Fiction, 
Poetics and Criticism’ from Keith Windschuttle,  The Killing of History: How A Discipline is Being 
Murdered by Literary Critics and Social Theorists, Macleay Press, Sydney, 1994, pp 227-251. 
Windschuttle claims there exists an ‘incoherence of trope theory’ as certain historical writings cannot 
be singularly linked to a given ‘trope’. Also, he states that those adopting an ‘ironic’ approach do not 
place an adequate emphasis on knowledge (pp 239-241).   
6 Lawrence Stone, ‘The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History’ Past and Present, 
No .85, November 1979, pp. 3-24. 
7 Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century, pp. 97-100. 
8  Windschuttle, The Killing of History. 
9 Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century, pp. 97-100. 
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 The end of popular belief in scientific objectivity within history is an element 
of the so-called ‘history wars’.10
In truth, there is far too much of the human influence in the construction of 
histories for the discipline to be considered an objective science, especially where 
such emotional issues as massacres of indigenous people are concerned. This caused a 
re-evaluation of the nature of historical representation and how knowledge is a 
product of language. In terms of this language, an uninformed public at times lacks 
access to the relevant ‘text.’ 
 This is a debate among Australian historians that has 
its origins in disputes over the true nature of European interaction with the Australian 
indigenous populace, specifically the factuality of sources citing massacres.  This 
issue soon resulted in heated discussion of what constitutes historical knowledge. This 
argument over historical facts again raised the problem of attempting to address 
history as though it were an objective science.  
The issue of how we form understanding of history and how we identify with 
our heritage was discussed in a 2006 Essay by Inga Clendinnen: ‘The History 
Question-Who Owns the Past?’ Clendinnen stated that during the speech of Prime 
Minister John Howard of Anzac Day 2006, Howard expressed concern that Australian 
history has succumbed to a ‘post-modern culture of relativism where any objective 
record of achievement is questioned and repudiated’.  Clendinnen analyses this issue 
in light of the perceived need for a structured Australian identity, drawing on the 
portrayal and reality of archetypal images such as swagmen and Australian soldiers to 
illustrate her point. An element of this debate was the comparison between history and 
fiction and the way literary theory and methodology links to historical study. 11
 In addition to debates surrounding the relationship between history and fiction, 
there are differing options for enquiry available for historians and the attempts to 
reconcile these approaches has also resulted in debate.  In reference to this study, 
reports that have been compiled using a ‘natural science’ methodology have not, for 
example, clearly linked the tests to widespread physical ailment. This does not sit well 
with the anecdotal evidence contained in numerous studies and commentaries I have 
termed ‘exposés.’  
  
                                                 
10 Stuart MacIntyre and Anna Clark, The History Wars, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2003. 
11 Inga Clendinnen ‘The History Question-Who Owns the Past?’  Quarterly Essay, Issue 24, October 
2006, pp. 77-88. An important text exploring the relationships between fact-based historical record and 
fictional narratives is Anne Curthoys and John Docker, Is History Fiction? University of NSW Press, 
Sydney, 2005. 
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There is a divide between the epistemological perspectives of sources which 
explore the observable, scientific phenomena associated with an event with an 
objective distance from it (such as a blind trial), and those which aim to consider the 
human element.12
Throughout this dissertation are examples of aspects to do with the tests not 
being agreed upon by various commentators. It is common to see speculation 
presented as fact and untruths entering the public consciousness. This is, in part, a 
consequence of the poverty of information pertaining to the tests which resulted from 
the security concerns of the 1950s. It is also common for those who offer comment on 
the negative consequences of the tests to draw from inaccurate material to support 
their points. This has the unintended consequence of lessening their credibility. 
Instances where historical meanings are not agreed upon, and are widely believed to 
be inaccurate, can be highlighted, but in the end there is no final truth as our 
understanding of the tests, and indeed all historical events, is ever-changing.  
 In the context of atomic testing, such phenomena may include the 
design and function of the device, likely weapons effects and evaluation of the 
occurrences of illness.  While always being mindful that much is unknown and new 
material is emerging, this study endeavours to consider how sources concerned with 
the consequences of the tests have responded, or failed to respond, to reports and 
studies that are on the public record.  
  
The Balance between the human and the strategic, ‘realism’ and nuclear 
weapons as an element of the pursuit of power: 
 
In this study of the representations of debates surrounding the tests it is 
important to consider the balance of the assessment of strategic factors as opposed to 
the human factors.  By the ‘strategic’ I refer to the factors which provide ‘security’ in 
terms of defence capability. These include such issues as numbers of strategic and 
tactical weapons, numbers of soldiers, the size of a nation’s coastline and what assets 
are in need of protection. This defence accounting approach to Australian history is 
pervasive and influential. Large amounts of such data is freely available and forms the 
basis of numerous educational curricula. Much existing source material may not 
                                                 
12 The debates surrounding the options of enquiry for scholars as successors to what has been termed 
‘positivism’, and the implications of these responses for social research is discussed in Egon G. Guba 
(ed), The Paradigm Dialogue, Sage Publications, California, 1990. 
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impact on popular perception as it is kept in unseen archives or contained in the pages 
of texts seldom accessed by a general audience. The enterprise of this dissertation, 
however, is to focus primarily on the information that has been freely available and 
has been known to be influential in order to characterise the general public’s 
understanding of the events of the tests and the development of debates and issues 
related to them.  
 By the ‘human ’I refer to the experiences of those directly involved in an issue 
of strategic significance. This means their thoughts, feelings, attitudes and so forth.  In 
an article titled ‘On Writing about Australian Military History after the Second World 
War: the Need for Integration’,  historian Wayne Reynolds discussed how numerous 
histories of Australian military issues after the Second World War focus on the 
conflicts that occurred in Southeast Asia without an integrated assessment of 
Australian strategic capacity, Australian involvement in the development of strategic 
weapons such as long range missiles, or an assessment of Australia’s likely role had 
the Cold War escalated into full-scale conflict. The article begins with the statement 
‘So much writing of Australian military history has been about what happened-and to 
whom.’13
The debates surrounding the tests in Australia, through the decades, can be 
considered in light of the balance between Australia’s role in the global strategic 
equation and the human and environmental consequences which resulted from the 
tests.  A similar consideration is seeking to find a balanced consideration of sources 
which examine the objective science behind the tests (evaluations of types of weapons, 
resulting health complaints and contamination) with sources that seek to examine the 
experiences of those affected.  
  This differs from an assessment of Australia’s broader strategic outlook, or 
indeed the nation’s strategic capacity.   
As will be discussed further in this chapter, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 
known as the McMahon Act, stopped mutual co-operation between the US and UK on 
matters pertaining to nuclear weapons,14
                                                 
13  Wayne Reynolds, ‘On Writing about Australian Military History after the Second World War: the 
Need for Integration’ Australian Historical Studies, No.121, April 2003, pp. 169-172.  
 and this lack of co-operation framed the 
political situation leading to and during the tests.  Wayne Reynolds has written 
extensively on the possibility that it was the intention of the Australian government to 
14  This rivalry between allies is the subject of Septimus Paul, Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic 
Relations, 1941–1952, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000. 
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acquire its own atomic weaponry15 in order for the nation to serve as a strategic 
outpost in a new post-war British ‘fourth empire’.16 A great deal changed with the 
later detonation of the first British hydrogen device. It was then deemed appropriate 
by the United States that Britain gained access to American atomic technology under 
the strict provision that such data not be shared with other allies. This effectively 
ended the need for an independent British testing programme17
Reynolds suggests that following this, steps were taken for the development of 
an independent Australian programme, yet this is open to debate. The acquisition of 
large land-based bombers and the development of a joint British-Australian missile 
programme in the desert at Woomera lend weight to this theory.
 and Australia’s 
involvement.  
18
As the thesis is concerned with nuclear weapons during the Cold War, and 
thus the pursuit of power by nations, the ‘realist’ perspective to international relations 
is evident in much of the source material examined. The term ‘realism’ is attributed to 
theorist Hans Morgenthau, who was a Professor of Political Science at the University 
of Chicago.  Central to his perspective is that international politics primarily consist of 
a struggle for power. A prominent early work on the subject, based on his lectures 
since 1943, was Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, of 
1949.
 Of course, this 
discourse was far from the grasp of the Menzies-era populace, yet it is of interest to 
consider it as it frames current understanding of the subject. 
19
 
 Morgenthau, in later years, stated of international politics: 
International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of 
international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may 
ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in 
terms of a religious, philosophic, economic or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal will 
materialise through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural 
development of human affairs. They may also try to further its realization through non-
political means, such as technical co-operation with other nations or international 
                                                 
15 Wayne Reynolds, Australia’s Bid For the Atomic Bomb, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 
2000.  
16 Wayne Reynolds, ‘Loyal to the end: The Fourth Empire, Australia and the Bomb’ Australian 
Historical Studies, vol 119, April 2002, pp. 38-57. 
17 Paul, Nuclear Rivals. 
18 Peter Morton, Fire Across the Desert: Woomera and the Anglo- Australian Joint Project 1946-1980, 
AGPS Press, Canberra, 1989. 
19 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, Alfred A. Knopf 
Inc, New York, 1949. 
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organizations, But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, 
they do so by striving for power.20
 
 
This notion that power is the goal of all exercises in international relations has 
been extremely influential. The links between this perspective and Australia’s 
decision to allow and continue to allow British atomic tests are clear, as the atomic 
bomb became a defining symbol of power in modernity and this symbol has been 
prominent in the discourse of responses to the tests.  
The ‘realist’ perspective is evident in statements made by members of the 
Liberal Party during the Menzies era. In a 1981 article titled ‘Political Realism 
Revisited’, political scientist John H. Hertz wrote of a ‘security system’ or even ‘war 
system’ out of control in the nuclear age. Nuclear powers expect security from a 
system of mutual deterrence and a retaliatory capacity, though any sense of security 
provided by this is clouded by the fear of strategic inferiority. Hertz suggests that non-
nuclear nations are dependent on ‘nuclear umbrellas’, in effect the willingness of 
superpowers to provide protection. In this system, ‘everybody’s security is constantly 
insecure.’21
 Due to the complex mixed loyalties of Australia to the UK and US, and their 
lack of mutual co-operation, it is apparent that it was not under a single ‘nuclear 
umbrella’ which the country wished to take shelter.  This situation is complicated 
further by Australian desires to obtain small fission weapons (also discussed in 
Chapter Two), though these are far less destructive than the hydrogen bombs which 
 At the time of Australia’s experience with nuclear testing, a system of 
possible ‘mutual deterrence’ between the superpowers was developing, in the broader 
context of the emerging Cold War.  That human and environmental consequences 
from nuclear testing were accepted (and publicly denied), should be considered in 
terms of the lengths that Australia was apparently willing to go to ensure that an allied 
power in the form of the UK remained a powerful strategic entity. This is evident not 
merely in the willingness to allow the initial tests, but to allow their continuance 
(though this issue was hotly debated as can be seen in Chapter Two) and in later 
responses which sought to defend their conduct. 
                                                 
20 Hans Morgenthau in the section entitled ‘Political Power and International Morality’ in David 
Kinsella and Craig L Carr (eds), The Morality of War: A Reader, Lynne Rienner, Colorado, 2007, pp. 
24-32, quotation on p. 24. 
21 John H. Hertz, ‘Political Realism Revisited’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol 25, No. 2, 
Symposium in Honor of Hans J. Morgenthau, June 1981,  pp.182-197,  specific references on p. 188.  
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would be possessed by the superpowers, and the Australian role in the development of 
missile technology at Woomera.   
It is widely held that ‘realism’ is the dominant perspective in international 
relations. Theorist Anthony Burke discussed this in 2001:  
 
Realist frameworks for thinking about security have been remarkably powerful- it would be 
no exaggeration to say that, notwithstanding the hopes that were raised by the end of the Cold 
War, they remain the cornerstone of defence and foreign policies around the globe. 22
 
 
Yet there have been reactions against realism which my study of the 
genealogy of the discourse of nuclear testing in Australia records. International 
relations have seen a debate between the perspectives known as ‘realism’ and 
‘internationalism.’ Burke comments upon ‘realism’ in the Menzies era, discussing 
how theories of international relations exist as a ‘binary code’ between these 
perspectives, though at times they overlap. He reports that Menzies was generally 
regarded as a ‘realist’ and opposition leader H.V. Evatt of the Australian Labor Party  
(ALP), as an ‘internationalist’.23 According to J.A Camilleri in An Introduction to 
Australian Foreign Policy, the ‘internationalist’ approach to foreign relations is 
‘designed to promote the interests of the international community.’24 Hugh Smith, 
writing in Australia in a Changing World, New Foreign Policy Directions (1992) 
suggests that the ‘internationalist’ approach, as it has been associated with the ALP, 
‘produces sympathy for the ideals of the United Nations and for the objectives of 
Peace and Disarmament.’25
                                                 
22Anthony Burke, In Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety, Pluto Press, Annandale NSW, 
2001 pp. 234-235. 
  This perspective clashes with the notion of ‘power at all 
costs’ which has become associated with ‘realism’, though one can see the potential 
for overlap in any instance in which what is best for the international community also 
serves to further the power base of an individual nation.  
23 Ibid, p. 226. The rise and fall of realism in the interwar years is explored in the section entitled 
‘Classical realism, Carr, Morgenthau and the crisis of collective security.’ in Stefano Guzzini, Realism 
in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death 
Foretold, Routledge, London, 1998,  pp. 15-32 
24 J.A. Camilleri,  An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, Jacaranda Press, Milton, Queensland, 
1973, p. 10.  Camilleri outlines two alternate perspectives; ‘elitism’, where the interests of a small 
‘elite’ group within a nation take priority, and ‘nationalism’ which puts the interests of a single nation 
first and foremost.  
25 Hugh Smith, ‘International Politics and Foreign Policy’ in F.A. Mediansky (ed) Australia in a 
Changing World: New Foreign Policy Directions, Maxwell MacMillan, Botany, NSW, 1992, p. 30. 
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An example of a prominent ‘realist’ in the Liberal Party at the time of the tests 
was R.G. Casey, the Australian Minister for External Affairs from 27 April 1951 to 
4 February 1960. In an article titled ‘Casey: Four Decades in the Making of 
Australian Foreign Policy’ historian Christopher Waters comments on Casey’s views 
that promoting Anglo-American co-operation was vital to Australian security during 
the Cold War, as was maintaining close ties to both these allies. Waters contends that 
this was consistent with ‘realism’ and that this perspective was prominent in the 
Liberal politics of the Menzies era.26 He writes: ‘the great theoretical debate within 
international relations during Casey’s four decades in making foreign policy was 
based around the binary opposition of realism against idealism. Casey consistently fell 
within the realist camp.’27
The debates surrounding the tests can be viewed in terms of both their 
relevance to the struggle for power and in terms of the implications of the post-
modern challenge.  Regarding the tests, ‘power’ is not limited to the decision to allow 
and continue testing, the relationship between atomic bombs and the missiles tested at 
Woomera and of the complex nature of Australia’s relationship to allies. Power 
relates also to the control of source material.  Historical knowledge is dependant not 
only on the interpretation of language but is also dependant on the availability of 
information. The control of media coverage indicated a control of how the ‘text’ of 
the atomic experiments in Australia was initially represented. Pro-test commentaries 
were met with opposing viewpoints and the search for an understanding of the tests 
has perpetuated a debate down through the decades. In the context of the Cold War, 
nuclear tests could in themselves be seen as an element of communication: by taking 
care to ensure what details were accessible, each experiment could be utilised as a 
controlled announcement to rivals and allies of what new accomplishments in the 
field of weaponry had been achieved.   
 The careful maintenance of the balance between 
Australia’s relationship with its allies and the promotion of their renewed co-
operation are thus indicative of the ‘realist’ perspective. Such concerns can be seen in 
the parliamentary debates explored in this thesis, and in related press releases.  
                                                 
26 Christopher Waters, ‘Casey: Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign Policy’ Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, Vol 51, No. 3, 2005, pp. 380-388. 
27 Ibid, p.387. In particular Waters writes that Casey’s realism meant he believed: ‘...that power and 
resources determined outcomes, that the rule of law has limited effectiveness in the international sphere, 
and that multilateral institutions have limited value in settling disputes’ 
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This study challenges the notion that history is only concerned with delving 
into long-lost archives to, as one might say, ‘discover what really happened’. This is 
one key aspect of historical study. It is likewise important to consider how sources 
that were developed from such data have or have not impacted on public opinion. To 
understand the nature of public debate it is important to consider the range of 
interpretations which have been offered. 
 
 
Overview of the political situation leading to and during the tests: 
 
 Australia’s international relations exhibit the tension between history and 
geography, as the nation can be seen as one with a strong western heritage but situated 
in a south-east Asian context. Though the populace is comprised of people from many 
nations there is a strong historical link to Britain.  Factors such as Australia’s small 
population, large coastline and geographical distance from significant strategic allies 
have impacted significantly on perceptions of local security.  
 There is a widespread belief that relationships with powerful allies have 
formed the basis for Australian security in defence terms.28 How the Australian 
Government has maintained strong ties to powerful allies remains a significant 
element of Australia’s position in the geopolitical and global arena. The historical ties 
to Britain are very clearly evident in the Australian system of government, 
maintaining the British monarch as the official head-of-state, the Union Jack in the 
national flag and membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations.29
                                                 
28 How the term ‘security’ has been appropriated to represent defence matters as opposed to notions 
such as ‘environmental security’ is on its own a significant debate and such discussion forms a large 
basis of:  StJohn Kettle and Gary Smith, Threats Without Enemies: Rethinking Australia’s Security, 
Pluto Press, Leichardt, 1992. Similar themes are to be found in Burke, In Fear of Security. The impact 
of these security anxieties on Australian defence arrangements are discussed within Norman Harper, A 
Great and Powerful Friend: a Study of Australian and American Relations Between 1900 and 1975, 
University of Qld Press, St Lucia, 1987 and Australia and The United States, Thomas Nelson, 
Melbourne, 1971. Also Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1988. Analysis of the subject can be continually found from: Australian 
National University (ANU), Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
 
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/sdsc/, site 
accessed 25/08/09. 
29 Leslie Finlay Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, Longmans 
Green, London, 1949. The full text of the Australian Constitution can be found at Australian 
Politics.com, section entitled The Australian Constitution, 
http://www.australianpolitics.com/constitution/, site accessed 25/08/09. A relevant overview of the 
major historical events which have influenced Australian identity and foreign policy can be found in 
Peter Edwards, ‘History and Foreign Policy’ in  F.A. Mediansky (ed), Australian Foreign Policy into 
the New Millennium, Macmillan Education Australia, Melbourne, 1997, pp. 3-12 
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 At the time of Australia’s Federation in 1901, the British Empire was still 
perceived as the most powerful strategic entity in the world, although its role was 
challenged by the growing strength of the USA, Germany, Japan and other powers. 
However, the strategic significance of a nation, even an empire, is not a constant. 
With the imminent Japanese threat in the Second World War, there is a popular belief 
that Australian ‘loyalty’ shifted primarily from the United Kingdom to the United 
States. This is evident from Prime Minister John Curtin’s  message to the Australian 
public in December 1941 when he explained:  ‘without any inhibitions of any kind, I 
make it quite clear that Australia looks to America; free of any pangs as to our 
traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.’30 In many ways, historical 
sources reinforce this notion. Yet Australian involvement in numerous events such as 
the Malayan Emergency,31 the Suez Crisis,32
 This mixed loyalty is a complex picture. While Australian troops assisted 
British forces in Malaya and Borneo, others were deployed to aid the Americans in 
Korea. The ANZUS treaty signed on 1 September 1951
 the development of British missile 
technology at Woomera and the testing of British atomic devices on Australian soil, 
lend weight to the notion that the Australian Government was willing to take drastic 
steps to continue and to strengthen anew defence ties with the United Kingdom in the 
post-war era. 
33
                                                 
30 From PM Curtin's ‘The Task Ahead’ First published Sydney Morning Herald, 27 December, 1941.  
The significance of this speech is reviewed in Peter Cochrane, Australians at War, ABC Books, 
Sydney 2001, pp. 129-131. 
  was also a clear sign of the 
importance of the USA to Australia and, at the time, New Zealand. Questions arise as 
to whether the examples of Anglo-Australian co-operation were evidence of a desire 
for a renewed British empire, or merely two countries attempting to enter into a 
31 Information about the Malayan conflict can be found in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey,  
Emergency and Confrontation-Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo, Allen & Unwin, 
1996. One Veteran’s experiences are recounted in R. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgence: 
Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam, Chatto & Windus, London, 1966. Also, Robert Nelson, et al, A 
Pictorial History of Australians at War, Paul Hamlyn, Dee Why West NSW, 1970, pp. 170-174. 
32 The details of the Suez Crisis can be found in  
Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair, Penguin Books, Ringwood Victoria, 1966. 
The significance of the crisis to Australian strategic defence is explored by Harper, A Great and 
Powerful Friend, pp. 269-278. The links between the Suez Crisis and the situation regarding atomic 
weapons in the West is explored in, Reynolds, Australia’s Bid For the Atomic Bomb,  
pp. 162-183. Stuart Ward discusses Australia’s security arrangements with Britain, including analysis 
of the significance of Suez, conflict in Malaysia and Australian support of British atomic testing in 
‘Security: Defending Australia’s Empire’ in Deryck M. Schreuder and Stuart Ward (eds) Australia’s 
Empire, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp.232-258. 
33 AustralianPolitics.com, section entitled The ANZUS Treaty, 
http://australianpolitics.com/foreign/anzus/anzus-treaty.shtml, site accessed 20/03/09. 
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relationship of mutual reward?34
In any case, Prime Minister Menzies was able to capitalise on this 
environment of fear, uncertainty and distrust so as to remain in power.
 Was an Australia under the staunchly anti-
communist Liberal Prime Minister Robert Menzies attempting to assist in any way the 
struggles of both its important allies against communism? This raises the question that 
if the communist powers were perceived in the West as so threatening, why were the 
USA and UK not co-operating on matters relating to nuclear weapons?  
35  Fear of the 
communist powers was further reinforced within the public consciousness by events 
such as the detonation of the first Soviet atomic device in August 194936 and the 
launch of Sputnik 1 in October 1957. 37
The atomic bomb was a device which was developed by the Allied powers 
during the Second World War in direct response to the threat of Axis conquest.  
Among scientists in the Allied countries there was a fear that Nazi Germany was well 
on the way to developing an atomic bomb. Such a device could turn the tide of the 
war in their favour. This provided the impetus for the British programme code named 
‘Tube Alloys’ and later the allied ‘Manhattan Project’ which was under American 
control. It would be the latter which would result in workable atomic bombs. Yet by 
this stage Nazi Germany lay defeated. It was also clear that at no stage were they 
close to a workable bomb.
  
38 Despite the protests of key ‘Manhattan Project’ scientists 
such as Leo Szilard and Joseph Rotblat, 39 two atomic bombs were dropped on 
another enemy, Japan. On 6 and 9 August 1945, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
were each devastated by an atomic weapon. Japan surrendered shortly after on 2 
September 1945.40
                                                 
34 Reynolds, ‘Loyal to the end.’ 
 
35 Former Diplomat Richard Broinowski states: ‘he (Menzies) exaggerated the Australian Labor Party’s 
real and imagined sympathies with socialists and its infiltration by communists from the trade unions.  
This tactic enabled Menzies to win every election until his retirement from Politics in 1966.’ Richard 
Broinowski, Fact or Fission?; The Truth About Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions, Scribe Publications, 
Carlton, 2003, p. 30. 
36 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled The Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/Sovwpnprog.html , site accessed 18/03/09. 
37  Soviet News Booklet No. 25, ‘Soviet Sputniks’, Soviet News, London, 1958.  
38 Thomas Powers, Heisenberg’s War; The Secret History of the German Bomb, Jonathan Cape, 
London, 1993. 
39 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Simon & Shuster, New York, 1986. 
40 Ibid. These issues are also explored within Robert Jungk, Brighter Than 1000 Suns; a Personal 
History of the Atomic Scientists, Penguin, Middlesex, 1960; Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices; 
Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, 
pp.3-33. 
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Whether or not the surrender was due to the atomic bomb, the reality and 
potency of these weapons was no longer secret. Soon, other nations would seek out 
this technology and meet with success in manufacturing their own atomic weapons, 
leading to the development of even more powerful weapons in the form of hydrogen 
bombs.41
 
 
The sharing and control of nuclear weapons technology: 
 
An issue relevant to Australian involvement in the testing of British nuclear 
weapons is the sharing, or lack of sharing, of American strategic weapons technology 
with its allies. Significant research that was to lead to the eventual development of the 
atomic bomb had occurred in the United Kingdom. Indeed it was a memorandum 
written in Birmingham in 1940 by the refuge German physicist Rudolf Peierls and his 
Austrian colleague Otto Frisch, also a refugee, that had clearly highlighted to allied 
authorities that an atomic explosion was possible if a sufficient mass of enriched 
uranium was assembled. The memorandum suggested that this mass would be 
small.42
This led to the formation of a British committee to explore the feasibility of 
the atomic bomb.  The Committee was named MAUD, 
  
43 and a report from this 
committee lead to the formation of an organisation into bomb research named ‘Tube 
Alloys.’  On 19 August 1943 an agreement was signed in Quebec, Canada, by the UK, 
the US and Canada. This was the ‘Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration 
Between The Authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the Matter of Tube Alloys’, 
known as the Quebec Agreement and it centred on co-operation among the allied 
powers in the pursuit of an atomic weapon.44
                                                 
41 Herken, Cardinal Choices. For analysis of the role of the atomic bomb as a deterrent in the early 
years of the cold war, see also Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon; The Atomic bomb in the Cold War 
1945-1950, Vintage Books, New York, 1982. 
 After this agreement, nearly all British 
42 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 74. 
43Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-45, MacMillan, London, 1964, p.45. The name 
of the committee was due to an apparent misunderstanding of Frisch, who had received a telegram 
from Danish Physicist Niels Bohr, with whom he had worked in Copenhagen. Bohr’s telegram advised 
that Denmark had fallen to the Germans and to tell British Physicist John Cockcroft ‘and Maud Ray 
Kent.’ Frisch was not aware that the Governess of Bohr’s children, Maud Ray, lived in Kent, England, 
and MAUD came to Frisch’s mind when a non-informative name for the committee was required.  It 
has also been reported that the telegram was sent via Bohr’s colleague, Lise Meitner, following her 
passage from Denmark to Sweden. Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 76.  
44 The Atomic Archive, section entitled Quebec Agreement, 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/ManhattanProject/Quebec.shtml, site accessed 23/07/10. 
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scientists involved in bomb research conducted their work in the US as part of the 
‘Manhattan Project.’ 
Following the war, although British scientists had been important contributors 
to the ‘Manhattan Project’, the ‘Atomic Energy Act of 1946’, which became known 
as the McMahon Act, restricted the sharing of information pertaining to atomic 
weapons even to allied nations.45  The act was sponsored by Connecticut Senator 
Brien McMahon of the Democrat Party. McMahon was the chairman of the United 
States Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy. The act was signed by President 
Truman on 1 August 1946, going into effect on 1 January 1947.46
  Senator McMahon wished for the United States to preserve its lead in nuclear 
weapons technology to the extent that he was of the opinion that then US president 
Harry Truman should be impeached if he recommended that hydrogen bombs not be 
put into full production following the first test of such a device by the US in 1952.
 The restrictions on 
the sharing of weapons technology stipulated by the McMahon Act were far from 
consistent with the earlier ‘Quebec Agreement’ which had been made during a frantic 
race to beat the axis powers to the development of the bomb.  
47
On 16 Marsh 1946 the ‘Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy’ 
was presented to the US State Department. The report came to be known as the 
Acheson-Lilienthal Report after the chairmen of the committee responsible, Under 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal. The report recommended that 
fissile material should be made available to suitable nations, for peaceful purposes, 
under international control.
 
48
                                                 
45 Reynolds, Australia’s bid for the Atomic Bomb,  p.16. Also, Paul, Nuclear Rivals, p 94. 
 The 24 January 1946 had seen the formation of the 
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). On 14 June 1946, an advisor 
to President Truman, Bernard Baruch, presented to the UNAEC a recommendation 
based heavily on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. This became known as the ‘Baruch 
Plan’ and it recommended international control of fissile material and atomic 
technology to ensure its use solely for peaceful purposes.  According to Ken Buckley, 
Barbara Dale and Wayne Reynolds in their 1994 book Doc Evatt; Patriot; 
46Council on Foreign Relations, section entitled Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21415/atomic_energy_act_of_1946_mcmahon_act_pl_585.html?breadc
rumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype%3Dessential_document%26page%3D98, site 
accessed 23/07/10 
47 Herken, Cardinal Choices, pp. 62. 
48 The International Panel on Fissile Materials, section entitled The Acheson-Lilienthal Report, 
www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ach46.pdf, site accessed 23/07/10. 
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Internationalist, Fighter and Scholar, then chairman of the UNAEC and future leader 
of the ALP, Dr.  H.V. Evatt was publicly in support of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, 
but held fears that it had been drafted to protect the United States from atomic attack 
and preserve American strategic supremacy.49  Wayne Reynolds also wrote in his 
2000 book Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb that Baruch’s proposal to the 
UNAEC ‘…itself spelt Washington’s determination to hang onto Atomic 
monopoly’50
Septimus Paul wrote in his 2000 book Nuclear Rivals; Anglo- American 
Atomic Relations 1941-1952 that Lilienthal was not pleased by the appointment of 
Baruch as the US representative in the presentation of this issue to the UNAEC.  Paul 
suggests that it was Baruch’s added ‘stringent enforcement measures’ to the original 
Acheson-Lilienthal Report that contributed to the plan being rejected by the USSR.  
These measures included that violators of the proposed agreement would ‘...be liable 
to immediate, swift and sure punishment.’ Paul suggests that Lilienthal and also 
representatives from the USSR were not impressed by the discussions of sanctions 
and penalties. The terms of the plan, Paul suggests, were also not deemed satisfactory 
by representatives from Britain. Soviet representative Andrei Gromyko submitted an 
alternative to the Baruch Plan to the UNAEC. Paul states that on 31 December 1946, 
ten nations voted in support of the plan, with the USSR and Poland abstaining. The 
plan could not proceed without Soviet support, Paul argues that: ‘the United States 
was not willing to destroy its atomic arsenal until it was satisfied that international 
control would work, and the Russians were not willing to consider international 
control until the United States agreed to destroy its weapons’
  
51
 
 Similarly, David 
Holloway writes in Stalin and the Bomb; The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-
1956 (1964): 
The Soviet Union wanted the United States to ban the production and use of atomic weapons 
before arrangements had been made for policing such an agreement.  The United States, for its 
part, wanted the Soviet Union to forgo the development of the atomic bomb, and accept the 
                                                 
49 Ken Buckley, Barbara Dale and Wayne Reynolds, Doc Evatt; Patriot; Internationalist, Fighter and 
Scholar, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1994, pp. 315-318. 
50 Reynolds, Australia’s bid for the Atomic Bomb, p. 65. 
51 Paul, Nuclear Rivals, pp. 104-107. 
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creation of a powerful international agency, before the United States surrendered its own 
atomic weapons52
 
  
In any case the Baruch plan was not implemented53 and further weapons 
development continued, eventuating in a nuclear arms race. The Soviet Union tested 
their first atomic device on 29 August 1949.54  Holloway notes that the Soviet bomb 
was a considerable achievement, in that it took about the same time frame to achieve 
as the American bomb project. Indeed, the Soviets had received a detailed description 
of the first American bomb via espionage, and that the feasibility of the atomic bomb 
had been demonstrated. However, the build up of industry required to obtain the 
necessary materials within this time frame was ‘a massive undertaking in an economy 
that had been devastated by the war.’55
Without access to American data on the construction of atomic weapons, 
Britain embarked on its own programme toward an atomic deterrent.  British requests 
for use of American testing sites, such as that at Nevada, were refused.
 
56 Britain 
announced its success in the quest for a nuclear weapon with its first atomic test off 
the West Australian coast on 3 October 1952.57 On 1 November of this year, the US 
had tested the world’s first ‘staged radiation implosion’ (i.e. thermonuclear or 
hydrogen) weapon.58 The Soviet Union would follow on 22 November 1955.59  By 8 
November 1957,60
                                                 
52 David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb; The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1964.  p.162.  
 Britain had also detonated a hydrogen weapon.  There remained no 
need for the United States to withhold information on weapons design and in October 
of 1958 the ‘Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America for 
53 Discussion of   the proposal to the United Nations, as well as the full text of the proposal, can be 
found in W.L. White, Bernard Baruch; Portrait of a Citizen, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 
1950, pp. 110-155. 
54Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p.214. 
55 Ibid, p220. 
56Robert Milliken, No Conceivable Injury: the Story of Britain and Australia’s Atomic Cover-up, 
Penguin, Ringwood, 1986, p.41; Lorna Arnold, A Very Special Relationship; British Atomic Weapon 
Trials in Australia, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1987, p.20. 
57 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Britain’s Nuclear Weapons: From MAUD to 
Hurricane, http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKOrigin.html, site accessed, 23/07/10 
58 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Operation Ivy, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/Ivy.html, site accessed 23/07/10 
59Ibid, section entitled The Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/Sovwpnprog.html , site accessed 23/07/10. 
60 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing: Operation Grapple, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 15/10/10. There is some public 
ambiguity surrounding which of the ‘Grapple’ tests was the first British test of a  ‘true’ hydrogen bomb. 
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Co-operation on the use of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes’, known as 
the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement was signed.61
Due to tension between atomic powers, the bomb would eventually be seen as 
a threat to humanity itself. Proliferation was a new reality in which Australia was to 
play a part. It is now clear that there was serious consideration given to the acquisition 
of small fission weapons for Australian defence.
  
62 This is discussed further in Chapter 
Two. Of relevance to the issue of Australian interest in such weapons are the 
viewpoints of chemical engineer Sir Phillip Baxter, who had contributed to the 
wartime project towards the atomic bomb in regard to the separation of fissile 
isotopes, and who, after 1957 became the chairman of the Australian Atomic Energy 
Commission (AAEC).63
 
  The following quotations spoken by Baxter, as featured in 
the ABC television documentary Fortress Australia: the Secret Bid for the Atomic 
Bomb broadcast on 22 August 2002, show his clear support of an Australian nuclear 
deterrent: 
The only way in which we can protect ourselves, I believe, is by having not machine guns and 
rifles but the most sophisticated weapons that we can devise and I put nuclear weapons in that 
too, and anything else which enables one man to hold off one hundred. 64
 
 
And also: 
  
Well, I’m horrified war at all [sic], I don’t like war, I’m not a war monger in any sense but if 
you are going to defend yourself in a country where the enemy will undoubtedly outnumber 
you by ten to one then in my view it’s wicked to send young men and young women out to 
fight armed with archaic weapons and inadequate training to be slaughtered in the field. In a 
situation where what is at stake is survival, any method is justifiable in my view.65
 
 
This line of thought - that atomic weapons had become the reality of modern 
warfare and that it was foolish or even immoral not to embrace them - is often seen in 
                                                 
61 British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, section entitled 1958 Mutual Defence agreement, 
www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/.../fco_pdf_usmilitarydefenceagmt537 ,site accessed 23/07/10. 
62 Reynolds, Australia’s bid for the Atomic Bomb. 
63 Australian Academy of Science, section entitled Biographical Memoirs of Deceased Fellows, 
http://www.asap.unimelb.edu.au/bsparcs/aasmemoirs/baxter.htm#atomic, site accessed 14/04/09. 
64 ABC Television, The Australian Story, Fortress Australia: the Secret Bid for the Atomic Bomb, ABC, 
directed, Written and Edited by Peter Butt, broadcast 22 August 2002. 
65 Ibid. Baxter’s continued advocacy of an Australian nuclear deterrent is also discussed in Roger Cross, 
Fallout: Hedley Marston and the British Bomb Tests in Australia, Wakefield Press, Kent Town, 2001, 
p.6. 
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examples of Menzies-era parliamentary debate, as explored in Chapter Two. Baxter’s 
position on atomic weapons, is also explored in Brian Martin’s text Nuclear Knights 
(1980).66 This book, as well as Fortress Australia67 also comment on Professor (later 
Sir) Ernest Titterton. The British-born Titterton was the former head of the 
Department of Nuclear Physics of the Australian National University in the years 
1950-1970 and was involved with the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee 
(AWTSC) from 21 July 1955.68 He was known to hold the belief that nuclear 
weapons saved lives in the case of ending the Pacific War. He also was of the view 
that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was ‘a worthless and ineffective bit 
of paper’ and that Australia should not sign away its ‘nuclear weapons option.’69
This treaty was signed in London, Washington and Moscow on 1 July 1968, 
and entered into force on 5 March 1970. Its intentions were to prevent any nuclear 
weapons state from allowing the spread of nuclear weapons to other states.
 
70 Australia 
signed the treaty on 2 February 1970.71 Titterton’s 1956 work Facing the Atomic 
Future clearly showed his support for nuclear technology.72 On the subject of the 
possible manufacture of Australian nuclear weapons, Titterton writes: ‘Australia has 
no atomic weapons project of its own, although once power reactors have been built 
in Australia it will be possible to enter into the weapons field should she so desire.’73
Historian Frank Cain has written extensively on the nature of intelligence 
operations and political surveillance in Australia, much of which is relevant to 
Australian defence arrangements with the UK and US.  In his 2008 book Terrorism & 
Intelligence in Australia; A History of ASIO & National Surveillance, Cain explored 
how from 1947 the Labor Government of Prime Minister Chifley had entered into a 
post-war re-armament campaign at a time when the United Kingdom was re-
establishing itself on the global market for military equipment and armaments. An 
element of this was the Woomera rocket range, from which Australia expected to gain 
 
                                                 
66Brian Martin, Nuclear Knights, Rupert Public Interest Movement Inc, Canberra, 1980, pp. 51-54. 
67 ABC Television, Fortress Australia. 
68 Australian Academy of Science, section entitled Biographical Memoirs of Deceased Fellows, 
http://www.asap.unimelb.edu.au/bsparcs/aasmemoirs/titterto.htm#british , site accessed 14/04/09. 
69 Martin, Nuclear Knights, p. 31.   
70 The Federation of American Scientists, section entitled Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm, site accessed 14/04/09. 
71 Ibid, section entitled Signatories and Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt3.htm, site accessed 14/04/09. 
72 E.W. Titterton, Facing the Atomic Future, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1956.  
73 Ibid, p.138. In this discussion, Titterton mentions the use of Australia as a test site for British 
weapons and the assistance of Australian scientists in these tests.  
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technical information.74 As explored in Fortress Australia an American intelligence 
operation code named ‘Venona’ had ascertained that 20 Australians were supplying 
information to the Soviet embassy in Canberra. The material was sourced from the 
Department of Defence and the Department of External Affairs. It was being 
encrypted at the Soviet Embassy and sent to Moscow in secret. However, unknown to 
the Russians, the transmissions were being intercepted by the British and passed to the 
Americans.75
In the 2000 article ‘Venona in Australia and its long-term Ramifications’, Cain 
explored how the ‘Venona’ decrypts had revealed that Soviet intelligence was 
accessing information via espionage from Australian nationals,
 
76 and that on 20 May 
1948, the Pentagon had announced that it would cease to provide the British 
government with technical information pertaining to military technology if such 
information was to be revealed to Australia. In an attempt to assure the US that 
Australia was capable of dealing with the threat of Soviet espionage and be a 
‘trustworthy recipient’ of defence technology data, on 12 July 1948 a new Australian 
counter-espionage body, the Australian Security Intelligence Agency (ASIO), was 
created.77  Cain writes that although the US withheld data on missiles from the UK, 
‘the Americans wished to know all about the British-Australian joint projects.’78
This complicated situation of mixed loyalty and security concerns framed the time 
period of the tests in Australia.  
 
 
Various types of nuclear weapons: 
 
Throughout this thesis, reference will be made to various types of weapons. 
This section aims to clarify the distinctions between these weapons as this is 
important in framing an analysis of the debates surrounding weapons testing. Many 
                                                 
74 Frank Cain, Terrorism & Intelligence in Australia; A History of ASIO & National Surveillance, 
Australian Scholarly Publishing Pty Ltd, North Melbourne, 2008, pp. 52-53. 
75 ABC Television, Australian Story, Fortress Australia. 
76 Frank Cain ,‘Venona in Australia and its long-term Ramifications’, Journal of Contemporary History, 
Volume 35, Number 2,  2000, pp. 231-248, p. 231 
77 Ibid, p.234. Also, Cain, Terrorism & Intelligence in Australia, p.74. 
78 Ibid, p. 113. Also, for analysis of the strained nature of the relationship between the respective 
British and Australian governments at the time the missile project was approved,  prior to Menzies’ re-
election 10 December 1949, see Christopher Waters, The Empire Fractures; Anglo-Australian Conflict 
in the 1940s, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 1995. 
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commentaries show a lack of consideration of this, despite the subject material which 
exists on the public record. 
 There exists some confusion regarding the uses of the word ‘atomic’ and 
‘nuclear’ and about the various types of such devices.  ‘Atomic’ pertains to the atom 
and ‘nuclear’ to the nucleus of the atom, thus the words are not exact synonyms as 
they refer to slightly different concepts. However, either word could be employed in 
reference to the weapons discussed in this dissertation: that is fission, boosted fission, 
‘salted’, enhanced radiation and thermonuclear (hydrogen) devices could all be 
described as either atomic or nuclear.  The use of the word ‘atomic’ is generally not 
used in association with thermonuclear devices, thus one might hear the phrase 
‘atomic and thermonuclear.’ Use of ‘atomic and nuclear’ is confusing, as either word 
could be used to describe a fission device.  
Australian testing sites were used for experiments with fission and boosted 
fission devices. The yield of energy is a consequence of a fission chain reaction. In 
the case of a boosted device, a small quantity of fusion ‘fuel’ (either heavy isotopes of 
hydrogen –deuterium or tritium- or compounds which will react in such a way as to 
release such hydrogen isotopes) is incorporated and some of the yield is due to a 
fusion reaction. This results in the release of very high energy neutrons which allows 
more efficient fission to occur. 
A ‘salted’ device is a theoretical idea never actually tested. It is a bomb 
featuring a jacket of one of several particular metals, including cobalt. Neutrons 
released within the reaction are intended to ‘breed’ a different radioactive isotope of 
this metal, which is scattered as fallout. This is discussed further in Appendix II. 
‘Enhanced radiation’ weapons (neutron bombs) are small thermonuclear 
devices intended to have little yield of explosive energy, little fallout but with a 
greater release of initial neutron radiation.  The intention is to kill those in the targeted 
area by the release of radiation, with little destruction to infrastructure or 
contamination.  
A thermonuclear device, like a boosted fission device, makes use of a fusion 
reaction. Such devices have been given the name ‘hydrogen bomb’ as the reaction 
involves isotopes of hydrogen. The term ‘thermonuclear’ is reserved for those devices 
which involve the process of ‘staged radiation implosion.’ A fission ‘primary’ stage 
generates the required radiation, pressure and heat (hence ‘thermo’ in ‘thermonuclear’) 
to ‘ignite’ a fusion reaction in a ‘secondary’ stage. Neutrons from this reaction may 
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cause further fission in a fissionable ‘tamper’ which acts as a ‘tertiary’ stage (devices 
with such a third stage are a subtype of thermonuclear bombs referred to as ‘fission-
fusion-fission.).’ Fusion reactions are achieved in ‘boosted’ weapons by the use of a 
design known as the ‘alarm clock’ or ‘layer cake’ using solid fusion ‘fuel’, yet 
another method is to ensure the presence of deuterium and/or tritium gas in a reservoir 
within the ‘core.’ These methods do not involve reactions occurring in different 
‘stages.’ 
The relevant units of measurement for the power of an atomic blast are the 
kiloton (kt) which is equivalent to the explosive force of 1000 tons of trinitrotoluene 
(TNT), and megaton (mt), equivalent to 1,000,000 tons of TNT, or 1,000 kt.79
 
 
 
Table of ‘Major Trials’ in Australia, Robert Milliken, No Conceivable Injury-The Story of Britain and 
Australia’s Atomic Cover-up, Penguin, Ringwood, 1986, p.ix.  
 
 
Overview of the tests in Australia: 
 
Great Britain tested twelve atomic devices in Australia. The tests were 
shrouded in secrecy; details of the construction, potential method of delivery, and 
application of the various types of nuclear weapons was of obvious use to potential 
                                                 
79 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Types of Nuclear Weapons, 
http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq1.html#nfaq1.5, site accessed 24/08/09. 
Discussion of the ‘cobalt bomb’ and other salted weapons can be found in Titterton, Facing the Atomic 
Future, pp. 253-254, fission-fusion-devices and their use of a uranium tamper is discussed in the same 
volume, pp. 240-242. 
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enemies and also as it was not deemed appropriate for Australia to have access to 
detailed information about Britain’s nuclear deterrent capacity.  A major issue was 
that Britain desired renewed co-operation with the United State on matters of nuclear 
weapons, and the United States perceived any sensitive material in Australian hands 
may leak to unfriendly nations. 80
The first British atomic test, code named ‘Operation Hurricane,’ took place off 
Trimouille Island, in the Monte Bello islands off the West Australian coast on 3 
October 1952. It was viewed as a triumph for British science. There has been 
considerable debate as to the reasons why the Menzies government allowed the 
testing programme to take place. One possible reason was to strengthen ties to the 
United Kingdom in areas other than security, such as trade or the development of new 
industries. The major reason appears to have been that Australia wanted to be seen as 
an integral part of the alliance between the western powers. 
 The twelve tests had some variances in their yields 
and intended purpose. Some tests aimed to explore different types of reactions and the 
effects of the presence of various nuclear isotopes, thus the yields were not always 
predictable.  
The effort to develop a British nuclear deterrent and the tests in Australia were 
conducted under the supervision of Dr. (later Sir) William Penney, who would also 
wield control over much of the conduct of testing in Australia. The project for a 
British bomb, initially based at the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich before being moved to 
a former Royal Air Force (RAF) airfield named Aldermaston, had been given the 
code name of ‘High Explosive Research’ (HER). The Aldermaston site would later be 
renamed the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE), on 1 April 1950. 81
Journalist Robert Milliken observed of Penney in his 1986 book No 
Conceivable Injury: the Story of Britain and Australia’s Atomic Cover-up, that 
Penney:  ‘… has been described as a reluctant weaponeer, a man who was roped into 
the role of Britain’s bomb chief when, as he says, he would have preferred the life of 
a mathematics professor.’
 
82
 
 Milliken also noted that during the 1950s tests Penney 
had publicly stated:  
                                                 
80 Reynolds, Australia’s bid for the Atomic Bomb, pp. 92-115 
81 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, p. 27; Denys Blakeway and Sue Lloyd-Roberts Fields of Thunder: 
Testing Britain’s Bomb, Unwin Paperbacks, London, 1985, p. 48. 
82 Ibid,  p. 28 
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Since I was asked to lead this work I have repeatedly asked myself if I was right to do what I 
have done. In all humility I can say I have never wavered in the belief that I was right. To 
claim I have never been worried about my action would, however, be very far from the truth83
 
 
Penney, in addition to being extremely well regarded in England, had 
evidently impressed the Americans in the course of his assistance to their programme 
towards the development of the first nuclear weapons.  Penney had played a role in 
ascertaining the yield of the first US test ‘Trinity’ and along with Group Captain 
Cheshire of the RAF was one of two British representatives on an observation plane 
during the atomic strike on Nagasaki. Later, in 1946, even with the McMahon Act 
imminent, Penney was invited to take part in the first peacetime nuclear tests at the 
new American test site at Bikini atoll.84
Earlier in the war, Penney had researched the effects of underwater 
detonations. This data was used to aid in predictions on the likely effects of 
underwater detonations on transportable harbours to be employed during the 1944 
allied invasion of Normandy.
  
85 Penney showed a preference that Britain’s first test of 
an atomic device would yield data on the effects of far larger underwater 
detonations.86
Testing in Australia was authorised by Australian Prime Minister Menzies,
 
87 
without seeking formal approval from his own Cabinet.88 The motives  behind 
Menzies’ approval of later testing in Australia, at the ‘permanent’ testing range at 
Maralinga, is discussed in Wayne Reynolds’  Australia’s bid for the Atomic Bomb 
with the observation  that: ‘far from being the product of his (Menzies) desire to 
please Englishmen, Maralinga was justified in terms of long-term assumptions about 
Australia’s regional role in empire defence.’89
In accord with Penney’s wishes, the first British device was exploded under 
the waterline of the hull of the British Warship HMS Plym and was similar to that 
  
                                                 
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid, p. 26.  
85 Ibid, pp. 25-26. 
86 Ibid, pp. 40-41.  
87 Frank Cain, Economic Statecraft during the Cold War; European Responses to the US Trade 
Embargo, Routledge, London, New York, 2007, p.16.  
88 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission  into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia,  Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1985, Vol  III,  p. 7.  
89 Reynolds, Australia’s bid for the Atomic Bomb, pp. 138-161, quote on p. 148. These ‘long term’ 
assumptions were an element of the testing discourse to which the general public was not granted 
access, and the ‘desire to please Englishmen’ appears to be the commonly accepted reason for which 
the tests were permitted. 
  
 
26 
tested by the United States at Los Alamos, on 16 July 1945 and also to the device later 
dropped in weaponised form on the Japanese city of Nagasaki on 9 August 1945.  
These were all implosion devices. Such bombs make use of carefully arranged 
explosive lenses. These lenses are shaped to focus their explosive power inwardly, 
like a glass lens will focus a beam of light. They are detonated simultaneously, 
‘imploding’ a ‘pit’ or ‘core’ of fissile material into a state that is ‘super critical.’ This 
allows the atomic explosion to take place. Some weapons feature a composite core of 
plutonium and uranium90 
 
Diagram showing how explosive lenses are arranged around the ‘core’, The Nuclear Weapon 
Archive, section entitled Implosion assembly, 
http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Library/Implsion.html, site accessed 20/03/09. 
 
The ‘Hurricane’ device differed slightly from the earlier American versions in 
that it featured a ‘levitated’ ‘core’ or ‘pit’. This means it featured an air gap around 
the pit which allowed for a more efficient implosion. It yielded the equivalent 
                                                 
90 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Implosion Assembly, 
http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Library/Implsion.html, site accessed 20/03/09. 
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explosive power of 25,000 tons of the conventional explosive TNT, or 25 kilotons (kt). 
The purpose of the test was two-fold: to ascertain whether the design was workable 
and to the effects of an underwater nuclear blast, or likely effects of a blast in shallow 
water near land, as in an atomic strike delivered by a ship against a port, which was a 
military concern.91
Due to the location of the test, large quantities of mud and water were drawn 
up with the atomic cloud. Thus it lacked the characteristic ‘mushroom’ shape and 
appeared more akin to a ragged ‘Z’.
  If the only purpose of ‘Operation Hurricane’ had been to ascertain 
whether Britain’s bomb would actually detonate, this purpose could have been served 
if the device had been weaponised, fused for an ‘airburst’ (thus preventing material 
from the surface being drawn upwards to return as fallout) and dropped from an 
aircraft far out to sea. Such measures would result in greatly lessened contamination 
and no direct risk to human life.  
92 The test demonstrated to the world that Britain 
had joined the ranks of the atomic powers. Yet perhaps of greater importance is that 
this would lead to the development of a British hydrogen bomb, an example of which 
would be successfully tested in 1957. This was not known at that stage, with then 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill deciding to embark on a British hydrogen 
bomb project on 16 June 1954. At this stage the USA had tested such a device but the 
Soviet Union had not.93
Surveys by the bushman and, later author, Len Beadell had paved the way for 
inland testing areas in South Australia. The first of these was attached to a village 
code-named X200 and the testing area was referred to as ‘Emu Field’. The second 
village was code-named X300, and the area was given the now-infamous name of 
‘Maralinga’, meaning ‘Thunder’ in an Aboriginal dialect, by Australian Ministry of 
Supply scientist Alan Butement.
  
94
                                                 
91 Ibid, section entitled Britain’s Nuclear Weapons: From MAUD to Hurricane, 
  The use of Emu Field would be short-lived, 
involving two major tests. Later commentators would speculate that the associated 
X200 village was hurriedly abandoned due to these tests going horribly wrong. This 
controversy will be explored in Chapter Five. 
http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKOrigin.html, site accessed 20/03/09. 
92Ibid, also pictures and descriptions of the test can be found in J.L. Symonds, A History of British 
Atomic Tests in Australia, AGPS Canberra, 1985, 88-105. 
93The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Galley of Nuclear Tests, 
http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/index.html, site accessed,  20/03/09 
94 Alan Parkinson, Maralinga: Australia’s Nuclear Waste Cover-Up, ABC Books, Sydney, 2007, pp. 1-
9. 
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Map showing the Maralinga and Emu Field Testing Sites, South Australia, Commonwealth of 
Australia, The Report into British Nuclear Tests in Australia, Australian Government Publishing 
Services, Canberra, 1985. Vol I, p. 274. 
 
The 1953 tests at Emu Field were code-named ‘Operation Totem’. One major 
element of their purpose was to explore the permissible quantities of the plutonium 
isotope Pu-240 in weapons grade material. Quantities of plutonium with amounts of 
this isotope were being produced at comparatively low cost by power reactors at 
Britain’s Calder Hall.95
Because of this, the yield of the two ‘Totem’ tests would be something of an 
unknown quantity, which would later add to speculation regarding their alleged 
disastrous consequences. Those in charge of the tests, however, did set minimum and 
maximum expected yields, and the yields did fall within these parameters.  The first, 
 If such material proved to be suitable for atomic weapons, 
then the likely cost of Britain’s atomic arsenal would be greatly reduced, as plutonium 
of higher Pu-239 content was far more expensive.  
                                                 
95 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing: Operation Totem 1953, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 20/03/09. 
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‘Totem 1’ was detonated on top of a tower on 15 October 1953, yielding 10 Kt. The 
second, ‘Totem 2’ of 27 October 1953, yielded 8kt. 96
‘Operation Totem’ also involved the RAF flying a Canberra jet bomber 
aircraft through the cloud following ‘Totem 1’.
 ‘Totem 1’ would later become 
linked to one of the most notorious episodes in Australia’s atomic testing experience;  
the alleged drift of a mysterious black cloud of radioactive or toxic material through 
Aboriginal settlements. This cloud, discussed in more detail in Chapters Five and Six, 
later became known as the ‘Black Mist.’ Another issue was that the scheduling of 
these tests involved delays due to weather conditions, as explored in chapters Two 
and Three. 
97 The cleaning of such aircraft by 
service personnel would later be discussed in many of the sources explored in Chapter 
Five in terms of the likelihood of exposure to harmful radiation.  During ‘Operation 
Totem’ occurred an incident involving army Warrant Officer William Jones. As 
further explored in Chapters Five and Six, Jones was required to drive a Centurion 
tank which had been exposed to the ‘Totem 1’ blast.98 As detailed by in the official 
Australian Department of Energy and Resources history of the tests, A History of 
British Atomic Tests in Australia by J.L. Symonds (1985), this tank and other 
examples of military hardware, such as mustang aircraft, were ‘target response items’ 
at this test.99
Following the 1953 experiments at Emu Field, a long delay was experienced 
before testing resumed in 1956, partly due to the unsuitability of the Emu Field site 
for prolonged testing due to its remoteness. An isolated site was needed, but one close 
to the transcontinental railway so that supplies could be brought in by rail rather than 
by air.
  
100  Another reason for this delay was to allow the developments of new 
proposed types of weapons and to ascertain how they might be deployed.101
Symonds’ history provides examples of correspondence  between Australian 
governmental departments in 1955 which show  that trials of ‘initiators’ and the 
 
                                                 
96 Ibid. 
97  Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia, pp. 139-148. 
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impending establishment of a permanent testing ground  provided the stimulus for the 
formation of a safety committee of Australian scientists to oversee the tests.102
On 21 July 1955 the AWTSC was established.  This committee was formed 
following discussions between Prime Minister Menzies and his Ministers for Defence 
(Sir Philip McBride) and Supply (Oliver Howard Beale, later Sir). The members were 
Australian scientists and meteorologists. They were Professor (later sir) L.H. Martin 
(Defence Scientific Advisor), Professor E.W. Titterton (Chairman) W.A.S Butement, 
Dr. C.E. Eddy and later Mr. L.J Dwyer.  The committee experienced some changes in 
its membership over the years. The Committee reported to Menzies through the 
Ministry for Supply. It aimed to ensure that adequate safety precautions were taken, 
related to the tests, so as to prevent injury to persons, property and livestock.
 
103
Though the ‘permanent’ testing range at Maralinga had not yet been 
established, 1956 saw an urgent perceived need for two tests to explore the behaviour 
of high-energy fusion neutrons.  The device incorporated a quantity of solid fusion 
‘fuel’, Lithium-6 Deuteride (Li-6D), and data from these experiments was needed to 
guide British weaponeers in their quest for the hydrogen bomb, which would be tested 
in the Pacific in 1957. 
  
Thus testing then briefly returned in 1956 for ‘Operation Mosaic’ to the Monte 
Bello islands, though not, as later commentators would speculate, due to 
contamination at X200.  
The first of these tests, ‘Mosaic G1’, occurred on a tower at Trimouille on 16 
May 1956. Very little of the 15 kt of yield was due to the inclusion of fusion ‘fuel’. 
The implosion devices tested in Australia featured a component known as the 
‘tamper’, a layer of dense metal intended to prolong the amount of time the core holds 
together while the fission reaction took place, thus allowing more fissions and a 
greater yield. It also served to reflect neutrons, though the component specifically 
intended for that purpose is known as a ‘reflector.’ ‘Mosaic G1’ featured a tamper 
made of lead.  
The very energetic neutrons from a fusion reaction can cause fission reactions 
in ‘natural’ or un-enriched uranium, U-238, which is fissionable. This was the 
material which formed the tamper of Mosaic G2, detonated on top of a tower on 19 
                                                 
102 Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia, pp 290-297. 
103 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I, pp. 234-235. 
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June 1956. Due to additional fission from high energy fusion neutrons in the uranium 
tamper this device was of far greater explosive power than Mosaic G1. The 
unexpectedly high yield was 60kt. 104
It is possible that the likely effect of fusion neutrons had came to the attention 
to the British, via a ‘rumour’ originating in the US, and an effort to explore this effect 
would explain why G1 had a lead, and G2 a uranium, tamper 
   
105 Despite the 
conditions of the McMahon Act it is now known that, leading to ‘Mosaic’ the British 
utilised data gained from cloud-sampling operations that the US had permitted at a 
series of hydrogen bomb tests, ‘Operation Castle’ at their  Bikini site, including the 
March 1954 test ‘Castle Bravo’106
Mosaic G2 was controversial: as Chapter Five explores, various sources also 
suggest an even higher yield of 98kt.  Milliken has alleged that Penney took measures 
to ensure that details of the Mosaic devices were kept from Australian authorities.
 As discussed in ‘Appendix II’, the effect of high 
energy neutrons and uranium tampers were significant in the American ‘Castle’ tests.  
107
September 1956 saw the first tests at what was intended to be a ‘permanent’ 
testing range. There would be two testing operations at the Maralinga site, and 
numerous minor trials. The first round of major tests was code named ‘Operation 
Buffalo.’  These tests involved experiments into refining weapons design, examining 
blast effects and the ‘indoctrination’ of military forces into the expected realities of 
atomic warfare.  
   
The first Maralinga test, Round 1 at the site named ‘One Tree’, was of a 
weaponised device, that is, an example of deliverable ordinance. This was a ‘Red 
Beard’ ‘tactical fission bomb’, newly developed for the RAF. ‘Tactical’ in this 
                                                 
104The need for the move back to Monte Bello is discussed in Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts Fields of 
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context refers to bombs suited for theatre applications and not large strategic targets.  
‘Red Beard’ was the second generation version of Britain’s first deployable bomb, 
‘Blue Danube’, incorporating similar internal design in a smaller casing.108
The next major trial, at the site ‘Marcoo’ was of a device with a core of 
enriched uranium. It aimed to explore cratering and ground shock effects. The device 
was half-buried in a shallow pit so that its midpoint was just at the surface. It yielded 
1.5kt.
 For this 
test the bomb was mounted upon a 31 meter tower and was detonated on 27 
September 1956. It yielded 15kt.  
109 As it was surface burst, a great deal of solid material would have been drawn 
into the atomic cloud as fallout. This test would later be connected with tragic events, 
as an Aboriginal family, the Milpuddies, were found camping in the contaminated 
crater. As soon as their presence was discovered, the family was rushed to a 
decontamination station and showered and scrubbed, which would have been a most 
traumatic experience. The family suffered one stillbirth, possibly as a direct 
consequence of the contamination. Their dogs, also found at the Marcoo crater, were 
shot.110 It has also been alleged that another child from this family later died from a 
brain tumour.111  This incident has been discussed in some of the books discussed in 
Chapter Five,112 and during the McClelland Royal Commission (explored in Chapter 
Six) it was referred to as the ‘Pom Pom’ incident, after the site where the Milpuddie 
family were decontaminated. Surface bursts produce considerable amounts of 
contamination,113
The next test, at Maralinga, was scheduled to be Britain’s first test of a 
weapon dropped from an aircraft, a Valiant jet bomber. The bomb was of the ‘Blue 
 which those responsible for the tests must have known.  
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Danube’ type and the site was known as ‘Kite.’ There were fears that the fusing 
system, which was designed to explode the weapon in the air, might fail, causing a 
surface detonation. If exploded on the surface, much particulate matter would be 
drawn into the atomic cloud to return as fallout. Thus, the device was tested with a 
low yield core (3kt) as opposed to the 40kt core that stockpiled ‘Blue Danube’ devices 
were fitted with.  The fusing system succeeded, resulting in the expected airburst. The 
device was dropped on 11 October 1956. 
The final test in ‘Operation Buffalo’, at the site within Maralinga code-named 
‘Breakaway’, was another physics experiment. The explosion, which took place on 22 
October 1956, was of another ‘Red Beard’ device, with the inclusion of a small 
quantity of fusion ‘fuel’ for the purpose of adding to data gathered from the Mosaic 
experiments. The yield was in the vicinity of 10-16kt. Thus, the yield from fusion was 
likely to be small, as the yield for this test was similar or perhaps less than that for the 
27 September 1956 test at ‘One Tree’. This test also took place on a tower.114
‘Operation Buffalo’ involved an ‘Indroctinee Force’, established to explore the 
potential use of atomic ordinance in an actual combat scenario.
  
115 This was concerned 
with the reactions of troops to an atomic detonation. There is in existence a popular 
belief that this programme sought to use servicemen as ‘guinea pigs’ to explore the 
effects of ionising radiation on human beings.  This and similar claims are examined 
in Chapter Six. Away from Australia on 15 May 1957 the first test of ‘Operation 
Grapple’ took place at Christmas Island in the Pacific.  Chronologically, these tests 
would overlap ‘Operation Antler’ at Maralinga and would also take place at Malden 
Island also in the Pacific. The ‘Grapple’ tests, however, involved some far larger 
explosions, as this was Britain’s testing programme of thermonuclear weapons.116
Though made possible by testing in Australia, these tests are largely outside 
the scope of this discussion as they took place elsewhere without Australian 
involvement. 
 
                                                 
114 The Nuclear Weapon Archive’, section entitled British Nuclear Testing: Operation Buffalo: 1956, 
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Maralinga Range, Commonwealth of Australia, The Report into British Nuclear Tests in Australia, p. 
275. 
 
The last round of tests in Australia, ‘Operation Antler’, began with a test at the 
site ‘Tadje’, Maralinga, on 14 September 1957. The test, mounted on a tower, was 1kt. 
This was a lightweight small diameter device code named ‘Pixie’. This test would 
later become highly controversial. As an experiment into weapons yield diagnostics, it 
included small pellets of cobalt metal. Cobalt has an atomic weight of close to 59. 
Neutrons ‘bred’ the heavier isotope cobalt 60 (Co-60), a strong emitter of gamma rays. 
The test became linked to the belief that Australia had been used to test a ‘cobalt 
bomb,’ a type of theoretical enhanced fallout bomb, thought to be a potential 
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doomsday weapon.117
 The next test, at the site ‘Biak’, took place on 25 September 1957. It yielded 
6kt. This device, code named ‘Indigo Hammer’, had two intended purposes. ‘Indigo 
Hammer’ could be employed as the ‘primary stage’ of a hydrogen bomb and it was 
also intended to be used as a warhead in itself, in the ‘Bloodhound Mark III’ Surface 
to Air Guided Weapon (SAGW). A SAWG is an air defence missile, designed to 
destroy airborne targets. The Bloodhound Mark III programme was later cancelled. 
This missile was designed to allow a small atomic warhead to explode in the air to 
destroy incoming flying targets such as aircraft or other missiles.
 This is discussed in further detail in Chapters Two and Three 
and within Appendix II. 
118 The last major 
trial in Australia, at the site Taranaki, involved a device suspended from a balloon at 
300 meters and detonated on 9 October 1957, yielding 25kt. This was also a test of an 
intended ‘primary stage’ for a thermonuclear device.119 The Taranaki site later 
received far greater contamination from ‘minor trials’ code named ‘Vixen B’ 
occurring in September and October 1960, April and May 1961 and March and April 
1963.120
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Aerial View of Taranaki after removal of contaminated soil. 
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, section entitled Maralinga Site Clean up, 
http://www.arpansa.gov.au/radiationprotection/basics/maralinga.cfm, site accessed 29/05/09. 
 
The US, UK and USSR entered into a voluntary moratorium against 
atmospheric tests in October of 1958, which would last until a Soviet atmospheric test 
on 1 September 1961.121
Also of note is what has become known as the Marston Controversy.  Here, a 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) biochemist, 
Hedley Marston, was at the centre of a controversy surrounding the causes of 
observed increases in the amounts of  radioactive iodine-131 (I-131) in the thyroid 
glands of animals.
  
122
                                                 
121 Federation of American Scientists, section entitled Comprehensive Test Ban Chronology, 
 Marston’s research into this matter first entered into the public 
domain with his 1958 paper titled: ‘The Accumulation of Radioactive Iodine in the 
Thyroids of Grazing Animals Subsequent to Atomic Weapons Tests’.  
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/chron1.htm, site accessed 30/11/09. 
122 This controversy has been reported in numerous sources, such as: Commonwealth of Australia, The 
Report of the royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia, Vol II; Arnold, A Very Special 
Relationship; Cross, Fallout. 
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Marston suggested that if livestock were exposed to I-131, then it was likely 
that widespread exposure to Sr-90 was also occurring 123
 
 This disputed claim and the 
resulting controversy will be further discussed in this thesis. 
Chapter structure and discussion of some key literature: 
 
The methodology of this thesis is such that the chapters are largely defined by 
the source material they explore.  The thesis as a whole examines how various sources 
have shaped and reflected the issues surrounding the tests, and thus each chapter can 
in some sense be seen as a review of literature and analysis of its contribution to these 
debates. As such, this section will introduce some key sources, which will be 
discussed further through the thesis as relevant. 
Frequent reference in this dissertation is made to an excellent online resource 
known as the Nuclear Weapon Archive. The principal author of the site is Carey 
Sublette, who is affiliated with the Federation of American Scientists. The 
introduction and charter of the archive states: ‘The purpose of this archive is to 
illuminate the reader regarding the effects of these destructive devices, and to warn 
against their use.’ And later: 
 
We are extremely fortunate that none of 130,000 or so nuclear weapons built since World War 
II have been used for anything more destructive than intimidation and testing.  
It seems though, on the evidence, that claims made long ago that this is a weapon that makes 
war too terrible to contemplate, and will ensure world peace, may in fact be largely true. No 
nation, and no nation's leaders, have been willing to risk nuclear attack.  
The possibility of grievous error remains though, especially since some nations have tested 
whether conventional war is still feasible even with a nuclear armed neighbor. And at the very 
least, the cost of these arms has drained staggering resources from the nations who possess 
them.  
The issues and policy questions created by these weapons change with time, but they remain 
as urgent as ever: 
• how to control them  
• how to dispose of them  
• how to prevent their spread  
• how to prevent rogue parties from acquiring them. 124
                                                 
123 Hedley Marston, ‘The Accumulation of Radioactive Iodine in the Thyroids of Grazing Animals 
Subsequent to Atomic Weapons Tests’, Australian Journal of Biological Sciences, Vol 11:3, August 
1958. 
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It is clear that Sublette and any other contributors to the archive see the value 
in creating public awareness of the realities of atomic weapons and warfare. The site’s 
disclaimer states: 
 
The opinions expressed in this archive do not necessarily express the views of the host site 
(The EnviroLink Network, The Federation of American Scientists). All material has been 
compiled from publicly available sources. This information is provided only in the interest of 
increasing public awareness of the physics and effects of nuclear weapons, and to provide a 
convenient accessible reference for understanding nuclear weapons related public policy 
issues.125
 
 
Thus, the archive aims to inform about nuclear weapons effects and issues. 
That the authors state that the archive is based on publicly available material is 
significant. The archive is not presenting dangerous material to rogue nations or 
groups as the content will not aid them in the acquisition of weapons. The archive 
acknowledges that many of the relevant details about atomic weapons remain secret. 
Due to this, the information from the archive may not always be entirely accurate. 
Much is not available to the public. An example may be seen in the issue of the yield 
of the test Mosaic G2 at Monte Bello on 19 June 1956, discussed at more length in 
Chapter Five.  
 The hosts of the Archive have changed several times; the sites mentioned in 
the archive’s disclaimer are no longer its hosts. The EnviroLink states on its website 
that it is ‘a non-profit organization which has been providing access to thousands of 
online environmental resources since 1991.’126
                                                                                                                                            
124 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Introduction and Charter of the Nuclear Weapon 
Archive, 
   Though their website does not 
directly state it, that such an organisation is presenting details pertaining to atomic 
weapons reflects the belief that understanding such issues best equips a populace to 
deal with them. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) openly promotes this 
agenda. Their website states that FAS was founded in 1945 by Manhattan project 
http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/About/Charter.html, site accessed 15/04/09. 
125 Ibid, section entitled Disclaimer, http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/About/Disclaimer.html, site 
accessed 15/04/09. 
126 The EnviroLink Network, http://www.envirolink.org/, site accessed 15/04/09. 
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scientists who believed that they and other scientists had a responsibility to warn and 
inform the public about the possibilities and dangers of new emerging technology.127
One such scientist was Nobel Prize winner and ‘Manhattan project’ scientist 
Hans Bethe, who is shown on video on the FAS site discussing how the impetus 
behind forming FAS came after viewing photos of the destruction at Hiroshima 
following the 6 August 1945 atomic strike.
 
128
The archive has an interesting history. A section entitled ‘Archive History’, 
last updated on 20 August 2003, states that the archive was started as the ‘High 
Energy Weapon Archive’ (HEWA) in November 1994 by Melbourne University 
student Gary Au. Upon graduation, Au undertook employment as a military scientist 
with the Australian Department of Defence and was thus unable to continue to 
administer the archive due to security concerns. Administration of the site was 
assumed by its principal contributor, Sublette, on 15 January 1996.   The section also 
states: 
  The Nuclear Weapon Archive, however,  
maintains an objective tone throughout its entirety; it is constructed in such a manner 
as to inform rather than persuade, supposedly based on the assumption that better 
information will lead to more humane decision making.   
 
The site's principal host and mirrors have migrated several times over the years. It moved 
from Melbourne University in August 1995 when activity on the site reached unprecedented 
levels connected with the fiftieth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Japan. This attracted 
the attention of university officials, who then closed the site down through the belated and 
selective enforcement of university regulations concerning the use of computing facilities. 
Since then it has been variously hosted by sites in Finland, Italy and the United States. Its 
most recent (discontinued) hosts include the Federation of American Scientists and Enviroweb. 
Its current host is the Membrane Domain.129
 
 
Regarding the mention of Enviroweb and not EnviroLink, these online 
resources are interrelated.130
                                                 
127 The Federation of American Scientists, section entitled About FAS, 
 It is understandable that hosting such an archive may 
generate some controversy, despite its potential for furthering knowledge on a key 
humanitarian issue.  
http://www.fas.org/about/index.html, site accessed 15/04/09.  
128 Ibid.  
129 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Nuclear Weapon Archive History, 
http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/About/Hewhist.html, site accessed 20/04/09. 
130 Enviroweb, http://www.enviroweb.org/, site accessed 12/11/09. 
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Though the details pertaining to the types, yields and testing dates of weapons 
discussed within the archive are largely consistent with other reputable sources such 
as the 1994 The RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces; their Origins, Roles and 
Development, 1946-1969 by the UK Ministry of Defence’s Humphrey Wynn,131 and  
The Nuclear Weapon Databook Volume 5: British, French and Chinese Nuclear 
Weapons, also of 1994 by Robert S. Norris and others,132
One television documentary which offers analysis of the complicated nature of 
Australian ties to its allies in the post-war era is Fortress Australia: the Secret Bid for 
the Atomic Bomb, a documentary film broadcast on ABC television in 2002. Its main 
focus is not the atomic tests but rather it is an examination of Australia’s interest in an 
atomic deterrent. This remained to be a significant issue for many years after testing 
in Australia ceased in 1957. 
  it is important to state that 
the archive can not be employed as a source of absolute reliability or on its own as a 
gauge of the accuracy of other accounts, though it is still worth comment when other 
sources present information which differs from that in the archive. 
133
In this thesis, Chapter Two examines how the tests were discussed in 
Australian parliamentary debate, a source of material for commentators in the print 
media. These exchanges involve discussions about Australian attempts to acquire 
atomic weapons and frequent instances where that those critical of the tests in the 
1950s were accused of supporting the USSR.  
 Though often not on the public record when the tests 
occurred, where relevant, items from the National Archives of Australia will be 
referred to within this thesis as they are indicative of what issues shaped debates 
involving those granted access to such information.  
 Following this Chapter Three examines Menzies-era Australian newspapers.  
The chapter explores that in the absence of information about the tests, journalists 
were all too willing to present speculation as though it were factual. This had a long-
lasting effect on how the events of the tests continue to be represented.  
Chapter Four examines how the tests were reported in the newspaper of the 
Communist Party of Australia (CPA), Sydney’s The Tribune. The Tribune was one of 
the early critics of the tests and it attempted to raise awareness of the plight of 
                                                 
131 Humphrey Wynn, The RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces; their Origins, Roles and 
Development, 1946-1969, HMSO, London, 1994, though this source has as its focus the weaponised 
devices themselves and the aircraft and missile systems intended to deploy them.  
132 Norris et al, The Nuclear Weapon Databook Volume 5; Peter Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent, 
St Martin’s Press, New York, 1984. 
133 ABC Television, Australian Story, Fortress Australia.  
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Aboriginal people they affected and their other human and environmental costs. Also 
examined is the manner in which The Tribune aimed to promote the notion that the 
USSR was always desirous of disarmament and peace; an issue which is clearly open 
to debate.  
The tests have attracted sufficient attention to warrant the publication of a 
number of books on the subject, these books and two others which also have a partial 
focus on the tests134
The first of these to emerge into the public domain was Maralinga; British A-
Bomb, Australian Legacy
 are the subject of Chapter Five.  This chapter illustrates that 
perspectives on the tests differ greatly. These can be viewed as forming a ‘spectrum’ 
from official accounts which largely defend the tests, to ‘exposés’ which seek to 
highlight their  dangers and consequences, both real and alleged.  The use of the term 
‘alleged’ here is not intended to deny there was risk; it merely indicates that the level 
of risk is heavily contested and not all allegations have been accurate. 
135 of 1982 by journalist Adrian Tame and health physics 
expert F.P.J Robotham. This book preceded the McClelland Royal Commission by 
two years and many issues explored by the book were examined by the Commission, 
and also by the author of the official Australian Commonwealth Department of 
Resources and Energy history of the tests. This book was A History of British Atomic 
Tests in Australia136 by J.L. Symonds, of 1985.  According to then Minister for 
Energy and Resources Gareth Evans, the reason this history was commissioned was 
that there had been emerging public concerns about the tests leading to a 1983 
decision to have a history compiled.137
  1985, the second year of the Royal Commission, saw the publication of two 
exposé works Clouds of Deceit: the Deadly Legacy of Britain’s Atomic Bomb Tests
 
138 
by investigative journalist Joan Smith, formerly an employee of London’s The Sunday 
Times. Also, Fields of Thunder: Testing Britain’s Bomb139
                                                 
134 William Grayden, Adam and Atoms, Frank Daniels Pty Ltd, Perth, 1957. Oliver Howard Beale, This 
Inch of Time: Memoirs of Politics and Diplomacy, University of Melbourne Press, Carlton, 1977. 
 by television producer 
Denys Blakeway and correspondent Sue Lloyd-Roberts, both of whom have been 
employed by the British Broadcasting Commission (BBC).  1986 saw the publication 
135 Tame & Robotham, Maralinga. 
136 Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia. 
137 Ibid, p. iii.  
138 Smith, Clouds of Deceit. 
139 Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts Fields of Thunder. 
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of journalist Robert Milliken’s No Conceivable Injury140 also an exposé.  Milliken has 
been employed by the Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney’s National Times, London’s 
The Guardian, Sunday Times and the New Statesman and the Los Angeles Times. In 
1987 the British official history A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapon 
Trials in Australia141 by Lorna Arnold was published by Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office.  The foreword to the text by Margaret Gowing states that Arnold had been 
assisting her research into British nuclear energy, with a focus on testing, and that: ‘in 
view of renewed public interest that led to the establishment of the Australian Royal 
Commission on the tests, I thought it desirable that Mrs Arnold’s work should expand 
into a separate book.’142 Thus, it would seem both the UK and Australian official 
histories were prompted by increased public debate in the 1980s. A second edition to 
Arnold’s text, Britain, Australia and the Bomb: the Nuclear Tests and Their 
Aftermath,143
University of Melbourne School of Education Senior Research Fellow Roger 
Cross, along with nuclear veteran Avon Hudson, also compiled accounts of negative 
aspects of the tests in Beyond Belief-the British Bomb Tests: Australia’s Veterans 
Speak Out,
 co-authored by British Programme Director for Defence and Security, 
Mark Smith, followed in 2006.  
144 of 2005. Hudson has long been known as a campaigner seeking for 
solutions to the consequences associated with the atomic tests. Nuclear engineer Alan 
Parkinson, a former member of the Australian Ministry of Industry, Science and 
Agriculture’s Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee (MARTAC). 
He was involved in clean-up operations at the former Maralinga testing range. 
Parkinson published in 2007 an exposé into the conduct of this operation, titled 
Maralinga: Australia’s Nuclear Waste Cover-Up.145
Chapter Six explores studies and reports that lead to, were used within, and 
emerged as a consequence of the McClelland Royal Commission of 1984 and 1985 
and other relevant studies. These include health studies relating to people who may 
have been affected by exposure to radiation or toxic chemicals, documentation about 
the levels of contamination of the testing areas, both immediate and lingering and 
 
                                                 
140 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury. 
141 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship 
142 Ibid, p.ix. 
143 Arnold and Smith, Britain, Australia and the Bomb. 
144 Cross and Hudson, Beyond Belief. 
145 Parkinson, Maralinga. 
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reports of clean-up attempts. This chapter establishes that many claims made by 
commentators on the tests are heavily contested. The issues explored in the reports 
have been referred to in brief in other chapters, in the context of how the reports have 
influenced or failed to influence the development of debates surrounding the tests.  
Chapter Seven examines online resources, journals, documentaries, and 
popular sources, especially those which take an anti-nuclear stance. The chapter has a 
focus on how numerous commentators have, knowingly or unknowingly, reported 
contested issues centred on the tests as though they were established, verified facts. 
Many such sources have been presented to achieve political ends. The chapter 
examines how commentators on the tests have responded to the issues raised in 
relevant earlier print reportage, parliamentary debates, books and studies. Some of 
these commentaries have prompted, called for and influenced further enquires.  
Chapter Eight explores how the tests have been represented in fictional, 
artistic and pop-cultural sources. Such means of expression are highly influential in 
shaping public understanding of social issues, though problems arise when the 
distinctions between fact and fiction are not properly ‘signposted’ and where fictional 
sources are presented as accurate commentary.  
The final chapter begins with a reflection on the nature of nuclear weapons 
development . The chapter then explores how all the different sources on the tests 
examined lend weight to the notion that representations of the tests lack parity and 
that the relevant debates, explored through the decades in this thesis, are far from 
resolved.   
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Chapter Two: The tests in Commonwealth Hansard.   
 
 This chapter will focus on Australian Commonwealth parliamentary debate 
surrounding British atomic testing in Australia between 1952 and 1957. These debates, 
though publicly available, were not popular reading, mainly reaching an audience of 
those with a special interest, as well as the various members of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives. Elements of such debates were, however, explored by the 
media in print and in radio broadcasts. The debates offer direct comment on the 
concerns of the populace and how issues connected to the tests were reflected in 
prominent media sources, such as those discussed in the next chapter. 
 The examples of parliamentary debate explored herein demonstrate that there 
were those who held that atomic weapons were the future of warfare and that 
Australia should embrace them. There were also many who held it was Australia’s 
responsibility to assist Britain, due to the perceived threat from communist countries, 
in its nuclear deterrent program. In contrast were those who wished to highlight the 
human and environmental damage of the tests and those who called for disarmament. 
This could be viewed in terms of the dichotomy between ‘realism’ and 
‘internationalism’ in the sense that the desire to continue tests regardless of their 
possible consequences is indicative of the pursuit of power. 
 This chapter aims to examine how views on the tests were expressed during 
debate. Representatives of the media, and later commentators, drew material from 
these influential exchanges. 
The controversial nature of British atomic testing is largely not reflected in the 
debates of 1952. The decision to allow ‘Operation Hurricane’ appears to have been 
made quietly and not discussed in parliament.  The test was allowed to proceed. By 
1957, which was the year which also saw the detonation of Britain’s first hydrogen 
bomb,1
                                                 
1 Wynn, The RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces, pp. 221-238. Also, The Nuclear Weapon 
Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing, 
 the debate had become contentious and the sheer number of references and the 
length of the exchanges in both the Senate and the House of Representatives had 
grown tremendously. Internationally, pressure to cease atmospheric testing became 
increasingly difficult for nuclear weapons states to resist. On 31 October 1958, the US, 
UK and the USSR began negotiations into the proposed future discontinuance of 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, 
site accessed 15/02/08. 
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nuclear weapons tests.  The US and the UK entered into a voluntary one-year 
moratorium on testing, which the USSR joined a few days later. The US extended this 
moratorium on 26 August 1959. On 28 August the USSR agreed to not conduct any 
further tests provided that the western powers continued to observe the moratorium. 
On February 13 1960, France detonated its first atomic device at a site in the Sahara 
desert. The USSR resume atmospheric testing on 1 September 1961, claiming, 
according to the Federation of American Scientists, that increased international 
tensions and the French testing programme justified this action.2
International pressure to cease atmospheric tests culminated in the signing by 
the US, UK and USSR of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in Moscow, 5 August 1963, 
going into effect on 10 October 1963.
  
3
Peter Stanley discussed the need for ‘historical imagination’ when conducting 
analysis of the fears of a given populace during a given span of years.
 
4 An example 
would be situating oneself to appreciate how tangible a threat to security from a 
foreign power must have seemed at different times in the past, even if in hindsight we 
know that such a threat did not result in actual conflict.  Such ‘historical imagination’ 
is certainly of great use when considering British atomic testing in Australia. Belief in 
the threat of nuclear annihilation at the hand of the Soviet Union was seriously 
entertained, as reflected in the parliamentary debates of 1952-57. Criticism of British 
atomic testing in Australia, as this chapter will explore, was usually opposed with the 
grim observation that Russian testing would continue regardless of the perspective of 
the Western democratic powers. There was a belief that the West must continue their 
tests to maintain the balance of strategic power.  The need for British weapons was 
seen as most dire. Anti-testing commentaries were, as we will see, widely regarded as 
anti-British commentaries. Indeed, they were often portrayed as anti-democratic 
commentaries; which tied in very well with the tendency of Menzies to capitalise on 
the anti-communist impulse for his own political ends and for the Liberal Party to win 
subsequent federal elections.5
                                                 
2 Federation of American Scientists, section entitled Comprehensive Test Ban Chronology, 
  
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/chron1.htm, site accessed 30/11/09.  
3 Due to the length of its formal title, this treaty has also become known as the ‘Partial Test Ban Treaty’ 
(PTBT), ‘Limited Test Ban Treaty’ (LTBT) and the ‘Moscow Treaty’. 
The Nuclear Threat Initiate (NTI), section entitled Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), 
http://www.nti.org/db/china/ptbtorg.htm , site accessed 12/05/08 
4 Peter Stanley, ‘A Narrow, Neo-Parochial History.’ Australian Historical Studies, v34, no. 121, April 
2003, pp. 163-164. 
5 Broinowski, Fact or Fission?, p. 30. 
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 One of the earlier concerns linked to the impending test of Britain’s first 
atomic device was the fate of rare birds in the Monte Bello islands. This issue was 
raised in the House of Representatives on 12 August 1952 by Mr. Osborne of the 
Liberal Party, (Lib)6 who was quickly reassured by the Minister for Defence, Mr. 
McBride, (Lib)7 that the issue was being considered most carefully by leading British 
ornithologists.8
 The first test, carried out on a remote island and with careful monitoring of 
weather conditions was perhaps not indicative of what would later occur; a series of 
inland tests in closer proximity to humans and livestock as well as further testing on 
the Monte Bello site which involved one test which was drastically larger than 
anticipated. The first test is much easier to come to terms with in hindsight, for it had 
the clear purpose of ascertaining whether Britain had a workable bomb. 
 Concern was not limited to rare birds but also extended to Australian 
livestock and the human population itself. Indeed, there was a popular belief that 
atomic proliferation would threaten the existence of all life, globally.  
Even H.V. Evatt, Leader for the Opposition (ALP)9 and latter a staunch 
campaigner against testing in Australia, commented on the ‘outstanding success’ of 
the first ‘all British’ test. Five days after the test, on 8 October 1952, Evatt made this 
comment in the House of Representatives, as part of a request for further information 
pertaining to the nature of the test.10
In his text Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb Reynolds commented upon the 
influence of Professor (later Sir) Mark Oliphant, on Australian interest in atomic 
matters. Reynolds suggests that due to Oliphant’s outspoken opinions on the 
suitability of atomic weapons for Australian needs, he was kept off the AWTSC as a 
concern that his presence might hinder British-American relations. This, according to 
Reynolds, is supported by the fact that in September 1951, Oliphant was denied a 
visa to enter the US for a physics conference being held in Chicago.
  Congratulations aside, this request from the 
leader of the ALP for further information foreshadowed more heated debates to come.  
11
                                                 
6 Mr Frederick Osborne, member for Evans, New South Wales (NSW), Liberal Party (Lib). 
  
7 Mr Phillip McBride Minister for Defence and member for Wakefield, South Australia, (SA), Lib.  
8 Australian Parliament. House of Representatives, Hansard, 12 August 1952, Session 1951-52, p. 161. 
The threat to native wildlife from the Monte Bello tests is discussed in Milliken, ‘No Conceivable 
Injury, pp. 33-34.  
9 Dr. Herbert Vere Evatt, Leader for the Opposition, member for Barton, NSW, Australian Labor Party 
(ALP). 
10 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 8th October, 1952,  Session 1951-52, p. 
2668. 
11 Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, p.126. 
  
 
47 
  On 29 October, 1952, Mr. Mulcahy, (ALP) 12 asked in the House of 
Representatives whether the Vice President of the Executive council could inform the 
house why the ‘very distinguished professor of physical sciences at the Australian 
National University was not invited to the Monte Bello tests and further, why an 
“eminent Australian”, who is a world authority on nuclear physics’ was refused a 
passport to enter the US.  Mr. Harrison (ALP) 13 was unable to give the house any 
information on either matter. 14
The professor referred to here was Oliphant and his absence from the British 
testing programme and the attitudes of American officials is of interest to any 
consideration of the nature of Australia’s official and unofficial stance on atomic 
weapons during this era. Though initial debates clearly reflected the belief that the 
tests were a solely British affair, merely conducted on Australian ‘real estate’, this 
chapter will explore how later responses were to call this into question. One question 
which would later be debated repeatedly was if Australia was to receive a stockpile of 
these British-developed atomic weapons for its own defence needs.  
 
 When testing moved inland, however, the close proximity of the new site to 
the existing ‘long range weapons project’ at Woomera was noted and was to draw 
considerable speculation. The possible marriage of guided ballistic missiles and 
atomic warheads was to be debated many times, as were the dangers associated with 
atomic tests being conducted within the Australian interior.  
 On 10 September 1953 a question was raised in the Senate regarding the lack 
of press access to the Woomera rocket range, in light of activity connected to atomic 
testing on the new site to the north. This question was posed by Senator Ashley, 
(ALP).15  Senator Spooner (Lib)16 replied that the Australian press would receive the 
same access as their counterparts from the United Kingdom.17 It is clear, however, 
that the obvious links between missiles and atomic warheads was as issue in which 
secrecy was paramount. However, this secrecy did not prevent media speculation, 
especially regarding the Jindivik pilot-less aircraft.18
                                                 
12 Mr Daniel Mulcahy, member for Lang, NSW, ALP   
  
13 Mr Eli J. Harrison, member for Blaxland, NSW, ALP. 
14 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, October 29, 1952, Session 1951-52, 
p.3657. 
15 Senator William Patrick Ashley, NSW, ALP. 
16 Senator William Henry Spooner, NSW, Lib, 
17 Australian Parliament, Senate, Hansard, 10 September 1953, Session 1951-53, pp. 34-35. 
18 The Age, Melbourne, 3 October, 1953, p.2 and The Sun, Melbourne, 5 October, 1953, p.9.  
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 On 7 October 1953, Senator Brown, (ALP)19 put to the Minister for Trade, 
Senator (Later Sir) Neil O’Sullivan, QLD, (Lib)20  a direct question about the possible 
use of technology developed as part of the Woomera project in the face of a foreign 
threat. O’Sullivan asserted that the relevant military experts had Australia’s defence in 
the face of atomic warfare under control. He also suggested that Senator Brown must 
surely be aware of the validity of secrecy in such matters, effectively ending this 
discussion.21
 On 10 November 1953 the Governor General, Field Marshal Sir William 
Slim
 
22 made a speech before the House of Representatives. Included was discussion 
on how during October the first mainland tests were conducted north-west of 
Woomera and that the tests were carried out in a spirit of close partnership between 
two governments. Slim notes that UK scientists had the responsibility for the 
scientific work, with the site being prepared by Australian service personnel organised 
by the Australian Department of Supply.  Also noted that to ‘provide as far as possible 
against contingencies of the future’, defence arrangements were being developed 
between the US, UK, Australia and New Zealand, while planning is also proceeding 
between the United Sates of America, Australia and New Zealand under the ANZUS 
treaty.23
This speech was an interesting one as it directly referred to Australia’s mixed 
‘loyalty’ in defence terms to both the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America. The Department of Supply was headed by Minister Beale (Lib).
  
24
                                                 
19 Senator Gordon Brown, QLD, ALP. 
 Beale was 
a key figure in parliamentary debates concerning atomic testing. He was to repeatedly 
state that the testing programme posed ‘no risk’ (an easily refuted ‘absolute’ statement) 
to the Australian populace. The promotion of this belief has its origins in similar 
official statements from Beale and other members of the Liberal party.  Beale was to 
adopt a steadfast dogma from which he refused to deviate. As a means to ridicule any 
criticism of atomic testing in Australia he would, repeatedly, attempt to link such  
criticism to the belief that the Soviet Union should be allowed to gain strategic 
superiority. This rhetorical device was intended to convey the belief that atomic 
20 Senator (Later Sir) Neil O’Sullivan, QLD, Lib. 
21 Australian Parliament, Senate, Hansard, 7 October 1952, Session 1051-53, p. 362. 
22 Governor General, Field Marshal Sir William Slim. 
23 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 10 November 1953, Session 1953, p.7. 
24 Minister for Supply, Mr. (Oliver) Howard Beale, member for Parramatta, NSW, Lib (not to be 
confused with his son Julian Howard Beale, then member for Deakin NSW.) 
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testing in Australia was a necessity in the face of the growing communist threat, a 
threat which a contemporary audience may not appreciate as having seemed likely or 
realistic.  
  During this same Speech, Slim also expressed pride in the success of 
Australian co-operation with the UK regarding the atomic tests at ‘Woomera’ and 
expressed a desire for a time in the near future when ‘this new form of power’ would 
be used not for destruction ‘but for the benefit and progress of civilisation.’25
  Regarding the atomic tests and peaceful technology, it is perhaps difficult to 
see the link. The peaceful application of atomic energy can certainly be said to be 
linked to the military application, for instance in that atomic reactors can be employed 
to produce weapons-grade fissile material. But does this link extend both ways? The 
issue is raised as to how atomic weapons testing could effect the development of 
civilisation in any other capacity but as a weapon against, or a deterrent to, a 
perceived enemy.
 
26
Questions concerning the sinister nature of the reality of atomic weapons also 
appeared in parliamentary debates. On 17 September 1953, Mr. Brown (Lib),
   
27 
questioned the Minister for Supply in the House of Representatives regarding the 
likely use of live animals in atomic tests to be conducted in Australia. Beale expressed 
an awareness of the rumour and said there was ‘no truth in it’ and that no animals 
would be employed in the tests though he also stated ‘although I can think of a couple 
who, in the view of some of us, might be used for those purposes’.28
Though the reference may have been jovial, clearly the inference is that those 
who ‘might be used for those purposes’ are those who were vocal in their criticism of 
atomic testing in Australia, notably members of the Labor party. Later we will see 
how a Liberal Party member would argue on 10 October 1956 that the use of animals 
in a later test was proof of the tests benefit to humanity. 
 
  As the next chapter explores, there were comments in the print media 
regarding concern of the possible testing of a ‘cobalt bomb’ in Australia. Commentary 
                                                 
25 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 10 November 1953, Session 1953, p.7. 
26 Perhaps this comment showed early awareness of what would be a later issue in Australia’s 
consideration of atomic matters, that of the ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosive’ (PNE). During the 1960s 
there were proposals in Australia for using atomic explosions for civil purposes, such as in mining, the 
use of craters for water storage, or in the creation of an artificial harbour. These projects did not go 
ahead. PNE’s were discussed in Broinowski Fact or Fission?, pp. 69-73. 
27 Mr Geoffrey William Brown, member for McMillan, Vic, Lib. 
28 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 17 September 1953, Session 1951-53, p. 
317. 
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by scientists such as Oliphant,29
A ‘cobalt bomb’ test did not take place, though a test with a cobalt element, as 
a diagnostic experiment, was later conducted as part of ‘Operation Antler’ in 1957. 
The fear that Australia might see the testing of a ‘cobalt bomb’ was discussed in the 
House of Representatives in 1953. Mr. Ward, (ALP)
 Hansard statements and related press coverage in 
1953 appear to be the origin of this myth. 
30  voiced his concern directly to 
the Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies (Lib)31
  
 on 17 September 1953.  Ward asked whether 
Menzies was aware that a ‘professor engaged in nuclear research at the Sydney 
University’ had stated that the prospect of a cobalt bomb in Australia was frightening, 
and that another professor ‘engaged in similar work at the Australian National 
University has declared that only a madman would use the cobalt bomb’ Ward asked 
Menzies, in light of these statements that no such bomb will be exploded at 
‘Woomera’ or ‘anywhere else in the vicinity of Australia.’ Menzies replied: 
The whole of my knowledge of the cobalt bomb was derived from the two statements to 
which the honourable member has referred. That exhausts my knowledge on the cobalt bomb. 
I have stated repeatedly the important tests that will take place from time to time at the 
Woomera range will not be associated with any danger to Australian lives. 32
 
 
This is typical of the stance of the Liberal Party on atomic testing. Menzies is 
not only suggesting that he is not aware of what a cobalt bomb is, but that if it is at all 
dangerous to the populace it will not be tested. Such was the blind nature of the 
obedience to British science of Menzies and the Minister for Supply, Beale. They 
even suggest that such an attitude be adopted by all Australians. Even given the 
presence of perceptions that there was a need for atomic testing, these kind of 
dogmatic, absolute statements, to the effect of ‘there is no risk’, indicate exceptional 
bravado and resistance to common sense. There is considerable evidence available to 
the contrary, discussed during the McClelland Royal Commission and the numerous 
subsequent texts highlighting the environmental and human costs testing, even if 
                                                 
29 A quote on the ‘cobalt bomb’ was attributed to Oliphant in The Tribune, Sydney 14 October 1953, 
p.5. 
30 Mr Edward (Eddie) John Ward, member for East Sydney, NSW, ALP. Ward was known as ‘the 
Sydney firebrand.’ 
31 Mr. Robert Gordon Menzies, Prime Minister, member For Kooyong, Vic, Lib. 
32 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 17 September 1953, Session 1951-53, p. 
317. Discussion of fears in Australia of a ‘cobalt bomb’ can be found in Titterton, Facing the Atomic 
Future, pp. 253-254. 
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some elements of these claims are contested. Total denials of any risk associated with 
the tests continued. In the House of Representatives, 8 October 1953, Mr. Peters 
(ALP)33 asked Beale for details about what equipment has been installed to detect the 
‘greatly increased amount of radioactive particles’ that will be present over Australian 
cities as a result of the forthcoming test, and whether the Government had taken steps 
to allay public concerns or ‘has it left such action to the good sense of isolated 
universities and individual scientists?’ Beale denied that there were any such fears, 
that every precaution had been taken to ensure the tests will not in any way affect the 
Australian people.34
This exchange occurred near the time of ‘Operation Totem.’ As the next 
chapter explores, The Sun News Pictorial’s correspondent into matters concerning the 
atomic tests had suggested that delays in the staging of these tests were due to 
political scaremongering in Canberra, including the aforementioned ‘cobalt bomb.’ 
Beale, like News Limited correspondent Douglas Wilkie, suggested that the scientists 
concerned with the test were wholly in control of its outcome. Yet as discussed in the 
next chapter, the yield from these tests exceeded that which had been predicted. What 
is of interest is how the leader for the opposition, Evatt, was later to draw from the 
writings of  Wilkie, whom he endorsed as an expert, in support of claims contrary to 
those of Menzies and Beale. As the next chapter explores, Wilkie’s commentaries 
showed his faith in the scientists responsible for the tests and he expressed frustrations 
at the manner in which some tests had been delayed.  
 
In regard to these debates, parliamentarians may have been constrained by 
party policy from expressing their own opinions on the tests. However, these records 
remain a significant component of the discourse of Australia’s experience with atomic 
weapons testing, strategic weapons in general and Australia’s role in the Cold War. 
On 14 October 1953 in the House of Representatives, when questioned about 
the delays of the ‘Totem’ test, Beale anticipated Wilkie’s commentary in The Sun 
News Pictorial of 15 October 1953, the day of the ‘Totem 1’ test. Mr. Freeth. (Lib)35
                                                 
33 Mr. Edward William, Peters, member for Burke, Vic, ALP. 
 
enquired whether Beale’s attention had been directed to statements suggesting the 
tests were being delayed for political reasons as the ‘Australian public are obsessed by 
the fear of radio-active clouds?’ and whether statements to this effect were factual. 
34 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 8th October 1953, Session 1951-53, p. 
1133. 
35 Mr. Gordon Freeth, member for Forest, Western Australia (WA), Lib. 
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Beale replied that these statements were ‘grossly untrue’ and that there were no 
political reasons behind the delay.  Mr. Ward asked in reply to this ‘How is the wind 
blowing at the moment?’ Beale replied that this wind was blowing: ‘very much 
against the Labor party’, that the tests were being managed by scientists of great skill 
and experience and that their timing ‘is entirely a matter for them and not anybody 
else.’ He stated that he did not believe for ‘one moment’ that the public were anxious 
about the tests, which ‘are quite safe’ and if there were not safe, they would not take 
place. He also stated the tests were ‘part of the defence of the free world, and I believe, 
as I think every honourable member believes, that all Australians are glad to play their 
part in such defence.’36
The notion that there were no risks was clearly not being totally accepted, and 
there is no mistaking the absolute nature of the denial of any risk and attempts to 
express any contrary view. On 21 October 1953, Mr. Russel, (ALP),
 
37 put to Menzies 
before the House of Representatives a question regarding the likelihood of ground 
water contamination from the tests near Woomera. Menzies replied:  ‘It has been 
stated most authoritatively that no conceivable injury to life, limb or property could 
emerge from the test that has been made at Woomera’.38
 Menzies went on to say that not conducting these tests would be ‘contracting 
out of the common defence of the free world’ and that the greatest risk likely is that 
‘we may become inferior in potential military strength to the potential enemy.’
  
39
Menzies, in this ‘realist’ statement, was in effect stating that opposing the tests 
is anti-democratic, anti-Australian and anti-British and that any criticism of atomic 
testing in Australia would play directly into the hands of the Soviet Union. Such 
inferences would later become more direct- resulting in personal attacks being made, 
in official parliamentary debate, on the character of those who would dare oppose the 
use of Australian sites for the testing of atomic weapons. Perhaps the cause for atomic 
weapons would be easier to accept if the clear and obvious risks had been admitted to 
and a willingness to accept some risk been discussed, if it allowed better empire 
defence.  
 
                                                 
36 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives Hansard, 14th October 1953, Session 1951-53, p. 
1342. 
37 Mr. Edgar Hughes Russel, member for Grey, SA, ALP 
38 This is the origin of the title of Robert Milliken’s 1986 book No Conceivable Injury. 
39 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 21 October 1953, Session 1951-53, p. 
1610. 
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 In May and June of 1956 the ‘Operation Mosaic’ tests were held. As 
previously mentioned this series saw the return of atomic testing to Monte Bello, site 
of Britain’s first atomic test. By this time the Australian connection to the 
development and testing of strategic weapons for the United Kingdom was an issue of 
public significance. This is evident in the print-media sources discussed in the next 
chapter. Throughout 1956 and 1957 parliamentary debates concerning British atomic 
testing became more frequent and more heated. 
The issue as to whether Australia would incorporate these new strategic 
weapons into its defence planning was discussed within the public domain. Thirteen 
days after the first ‘Mosaic’ test, this issue was the subject if ‘Questions on Notice’ 
and ‘Answers to Questions’ in the House of Representatives .The following question 
was raised on 29 May 1956 ‘upon notice’ by Mr. Beazley (ALP)40  to the Minister for 
Defence, Minister McBride; ‘Has the Government received any guarantee that 
Australia will receive a stockpile of nuclear and guided weapons in return for its 
contribution?’ Other points were raised not pertaining to strategic weapons and other 
questions asked. Minister McBride’s reply to this specific question, however, was that 
the joint UK-Australian range was established to test guided weapons and that the 
relevant agreements did not concern nuclear arms. He also stated that in regards to 
guided weapons the: ‘rights of the Australian Government to information on 
production techniques are safeguarded. No special guarantee is considered necessary 
to ensure the availability to Australia of guided weapons produced in the United 
Kingdom.’41
 One factor this response fails to consider is that the range at Woomera was 
established by the Chifley Labor government but since this time, under Menzies, 
atomic testing was occurring in proximity to this site. Though the range was 
‘established for the testing and development of guided weapons and similar 
equipment’ not dealing with atomic weapons, it was open to speculation whether that 
arrangement had changed. Also, the response did not offer comment on whether 
atomic weapons not connected to guided missile technology, such as free-falling 
bombs suitable for delivery by aircraft, may be stockpiled. The response was evasive. 
 
 The voice of anti-nuclear groups was becoming more prominent. For example, 
the House of Representatives Hansard of 31 May 1956, contains that Mr. Pollard 
                                                 
40 Mr. Kim Edward Beazley, member for Freemantle, WA, ALP.  
41 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 29 May 1956, Session 1956, p.2576. 
  
 
54 
(ALP)42 presented a petition from ‘1,409 members and friends of the Women’s 
Christian Temperance Union of Victoria’ who prayed that ‘as an expression of 
Christian Principle, immediate steps be taken in the United Nations towards the 
abolition of war’ and that the UK government be required to cease further atomic 
bomb development or testing in Australia. And also, Mr Makin (ALP) 43 presented a 
position from the South Australian branch of the same organisation, requesting the 
cessation of tests in Australia ‘as an expression of Christian principle’ and that 
Australia should use its influence as a member of the UN to ‘ban the use of nuclear 
weapons for war purposes, seek agreement on disarmament and support the 
elimination of war.’44
Such petitions were overly optimistic, but demonstrated sincere concern. 
Petitions may have been influential in provoking consideration of the link between 
atomic testing in Australia and the threat of increased global atomic proliferation.  
Amid this controversy, assurances to the effect of there will be ‘no conceivable 
injury’ continued to be offered by the Liberal Party. On 21 June 1956, two days after 
the second test of ‘Operation Mosaic’, ‘G2’ (which was more powerful than 
anticipated), Evatt questioned the acting Prime Minister, Mr. (Later Sir) Arthur 
Fadden, Country Party (CP)
  
45
Fadden stated that he could only give Evatt the information he had received 
earlier that morning when he was awakened at 3.20am by someone claiming to be 
associated with ‘intelligence.’ Fadden assured Evatt that the Monte Bello tests, and all 
other Australian tests, were based on the most rigid safety precautions, including very 
extensive advanced weather reporting.  Fadden stated that no explosions were allowed 
to occur without approval from ‘an Australian safety committee composed of 
 regarding the safety of the Australian populace in 
regard to this round of Monte Bello experiments. Evatt requested that Fadden give an 
immediate statement to the house, and later a more complete statement, on the effects 
of the Monte Bello test. Evatt made note that general concerns about nuclear 
experiments had been increased by ‘dogmatic statements and assurances given over 
and over again by the Minister for Supply’ and that such assurances ‘appear not to 
have been justified in the light of subsequent events’.   
                                                 
42 Mr. Reginald Thomas Pollard, member for Lalor, Vic, ALP. 
43 Mr. Norman John Oswald Makin, member for Bonython, SA, ALP. 
44 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 31 May 1956, Session 1956, p.2663. 
45 Mr. (Later Sir) Arthur William Fadden, Former Prime Minister, Acting Prime Minister, member for 
McPherson, Queensland (QLD), Country Party (CP.) 
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distinguished scientists’ who has stated that the test was carried out with no risk to life 
or property on the mainland or elsewhere. 
These comments were made about an explosion the yield of which far 
exceeded expectations and resulted in a fall-out cloud which did not drift as expected. 
As supported by the relevant entry from the diary of Minister for External Affairs, R. 
G. Casey, 46 regarding this test which occurred during the absence of Menzies, this 
test was a cause for concern for the Australian Government. Evatt took the matter 
most seriously, asking of the Acting Prime Minister by way of a supplementary 
question whether he intended to give further particulars about the Monte Bello tests. 
Evatt stated he was of the opinion that broadcasting stations and other such sources 
had not been supplied with adequate information. Evatt asked Fadden to treat the 
matter as one for which he ‘must be held personally responsible’. Fadden replied that 
he would present such details when they became available, stating ‘I am in complete 
agreement with the right honorable gentleman that the whole matter is worthy of the 
fullest reports, and I will see that I get it.’ Fadden would not speak before the House 
of Representatives on matters connected to atomic weapons for many weeks.47 Within 
a statement pertaining to the Budget on 6 September 1956, in the House of 
Representatives, Mr. Bruce, (ALP)48
 
  discussed the suitability of guided missiles and 
atomic weapons for Australian defence. Bruce stated that a great deal was being heard 
about experiments in Australia related to atomic bombs, other forms of atomic energy 
and modern weapons. He asked: 
…have we any assurance that anything is being done to provide Australia with the fruits of 
those experiments, for the purposes of our own defence? It would indeed be something to 
marvel at if we in Australia are allowing this land to be a testing ground for modern British 
and American weapons, and are left without any of the advantages that possession of such 
weapons would give us. 
 
Bruce went on to discuss how he was of the opinion that Australian defences 
and those of some other countries were ‘still in the horse and buggy stages.’ He stated 
                                                 
46Mr. Richard Gardiner Casey, Minister for External Affairs and member for La Trobe, Vic, Lib. 
Casey’s Journal entry for 21 July 1956 reads ‘Monte Bello atomic explosion yesterday (sic) with some 
flurry about the atomic cloud, which drifted over the mainland for a bit’ Casey, (Millar ed) Australian 
Foreign Minister, p.236. Millar’s notes in this text also confirm the test date was 19 July. 
47 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, June 21, 1956, Session 1956, pp. 3515-
3316.  
48 Mr. Henry Adam Bruce, member for Leichhardt, Qld, ALP. 
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that whether we like it or not, the atomic bomb which had been developed by other 
nations will be the ‘only major weapon of war in the future’ and thus Australia should 
have reserves of the relevant materials and assistance from those who are 
experimenting with weapons technology ‘so that we can play our part.’49
So much having been written on the folly of allowing atomic testing to take 
place in Australia. This is evident in numerous sources mostly dating from the 1980s 
onwards. Such commentaries were made after it became clear that British atomic 
weapons, either to be dropped from aircraft or mated to locally-tested guided missiles, 
were not to be incorporated into Australian defence planning. Yet before the 
restoration of Anglo-American co-operation on matters pertaining to atomic weapons 
in 1957, which saw the end of the need for Australian co-operation with the United 
Kingdom on such matters,
 
50
On 9 October 1956, a fascinating exchange occurred within the House of 
Representatives. Earlier, the member for Darebin, Vic, Mr. Holt (ALP) 
 the possibility of incorporating such weapons into 
Australian defence planning was being discussed. Bruce was correct in stating that 
allowing atomic testing to take place without Australia receiving a weapons stockpile 
is ‘something to marvel at.’ As it happened this was a correct interpretation of the co-
operative arrangements as Australia received no access to atomic weaponry.  
51  made a 
speech against atomic testing in Australia and on the growing strength of the anti-
nuclear testing movement as it existed globally.52 Later, during a discussion of 
Estimates 1956-57, Mr. Erwin, (Lib)53
                                                 
49Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 6 September 1956, Session 1956, p. 295. 
, made a direct case for a renewed post-war 
British Empire in which Australia would have served a key strategic role-with the aid 
of atomic weapons. He stated that Australia was fortunate to be in a geographical 
position which was suitable both for missile development and atomic tests. In 
response to this, the human and environmental costs of the atomic test were raised, as 
was the fact that although the previous Labor Government had established the rocket 
range, it had not intended for there to be atomic testing carried out in conjunction with 
them.  Erwin makes a case for the use of atomic armaments as a means to prevent the 
50 This was the subject of Wayne Reynolds, 'Re-thinking the Joint Project-Australia's Bid for Nuclear 
Weapons 1945-1960', The Historical Journal, Vol 41, No 3, 1998, pp. 853-873. 
51 Mr. Robert Wilfred Holt, member for Darebin, Vic, ALP. 
52 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 9 October 1956, Session 1956, pp. 1280-
1284, 
53 Mr. George Dudley Erwin, member for Ballarat, Vic, Lib 
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outbreak of warfare, which is akin to the Cold War notion of “Mutually Assured 
Destruction” (MAD) as a deterrent to war.  
Erwin asked those present in the House to look at the terror caused by Hitler’s 
wartime V2 missile in retrospect. It became clear, Erwin suggested that from then on 
it was clear ‘to all thinking people, strategists, economists and scientists alike- that 
this was the new weapon of warfare.’  He discussed how at the end of 1945 and 1946 
Great Britain set out to find in the Commonwealth ‘a suitable site for the testing of 
projected missiles and nuclear weapons.’ Mr. Curtin (ALP)54
Erwin then discussed that Australia was fortunate to be geographically suited 
for that purpose. He went on to state: 
 replied: ‘And they 
brought them to Australia.’ 
 
It is time that we ceased to look at nuclear warfare with some scepticism. It is real; we must 
accept it. We are in the atomic age, and for the Opposition members to say that we should try 
to resist nuclear weapons is like endeavouring to go back to the penny-farthing bicycle and to 
place our motor cars in the garage. 
 
He went to discuss that England’s choice of Woomera as a testing site for 
missiles, two ‘mighty industries’ came to Australia: the electronic and the 
aerodynamics industry. Erwin stated the establishment of these industries was 
fortunate for Australia due to the ‘inpouring of capital to this country’ putting 
Australia twenty years ahead and that ‘Australia, no doubt, is the nation of the future.’ 
He discussed that England spent ₤60,000,000 on the project at Woomera the previous 
year compared to ₤10,000,000 from Australia. Erwin stated the Woomera range ‘is 
meaning and will mean something tremendous for Australia.’ Curtin replied: ‘They 
ought to get rid of it and send it somewhere else.’ At this point Beale pointed out that 
the range had been established by a Labor Government. Mr. Clarey (ALP)55
                                                 
54 Mr. Daniel James Curtin, member for Kingsford-Smith, NSW, ALP. 
 clarified: 
‘it established a rocket range.’ Erwin went on to discuss that at Woomera, the first 
developments were into short range air-to-air, ground-to-air and air-to-ground 
missiles and now a long range deterrent missile was being developed. He stated: ‘The 
greater the degree to which we can develop long range projectiles and thermonuclear 
physics, the nearer we will come to making Australia the nation about which we so 
much dream’ and this was a contribution not just to the Commonwealth but to the free 
55 Mr Percy James Clarey, member for Bendigo, Vic, ALP. 
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world . He stated that despite the Countries large size, Australia lacked the manpower 
to develop the ‘two existing testing grounds’ alone. He commented that a few days 
earlier Menzies had spoken of re-thinking Australia’s defence expenditure and this 
was a ‘wonderful thing’ as warfare had entered a new phase, ‘the atomic phase’, in 
which the type of warfare previously known to Australia has became obsolescent to a 
large degree.  He went on to discuss Australia’s current reliance on oil and that ‘we 
are entering a phase in which we shall be completely dependent on uranium’ he 
discussed that testing grounds for ‘atomic and guided missiles’ of which he states: 
‘one is closely related to the other’ will speed development regarding Australian 
uranium fields. Erwin also stated: ‘It is only by developing the long-range guided 
missile and the thermo-nuclear bomb that we can hope to prevent war.’ Erwin 
discussed that as ‘this development is the means of preventing a third world war’ 
experimentation should not be rejected in Australia as too dangerous. He stated ‘Let 
us accept this thing. Let us get to know this thing’ as it is only proper understanding 
of atomic power and warfare that ‘we shall really do something’ and that it is through 
understanding atomic bombs that will allow knowledge about the development of 
atomic power.  
Erwin felt that in three years there would be atomic power stations all over 
England, which would be a ‘grand thing’ for that country ‘in view of the Suez 
situation and the position of England’s oil supplies.’ Erwin suggested that Australia 
could not isolate itself from England, even if popular opinion suggested that ‘we 
should be directing our thoughts towards America’. This was, according to Erwin, 
because ‘if England goes down economically, we shall go down economically’ and 
‘England’s affairs are our affairs’ Erwin suggested: 
 
The true knowledge of atomic power will help Great Britain to such an extent now and in the 
future that, once again, it will be and we shall be members of a great British Commonwealth 
of Nations that we are planning.56
 
 
Erwin’s comments on his perception of how Australia stood to expand its 
strategic and economic power base from British missile and atomic weapons 
development drew, not surprisingly, some disagreement. The issue of the impact of 
the atomic tests on the indigenous population was raised and was met with the by now 
                                                 
56 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 9 October 1956, Session 1956, pp. 1286-
1287. 
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usual denial from the Minister for Supply. He, and Menzies, continued to put forward 
the case that atomic testing would result in ‘no conceivable injury’.   
Mr Makin (ALP) at this time expressed that members of the Liberal party had 
pointed out that the initial developments at Woomera had been made by a Labor 
government but that this was a very different issue than that of atomic tests and that 
regarding this distinction ‘those honorable gentlemen should try to be more accurate.’ 
Makin suggested that his reason for taking part in this discussion was his concern for 
‘the safety of the native people’ in regards to the drift of radioactive clouds caused by 
the tests.  He stated that there had been efforts to ensure that the tests would occur 
under conditions which would ensure such clouds not drift over centres of population 
but wanted to know, what, on humanitarian grounds, had been done to ensure the 
safety of Aborigines. He said ‘there has not been the proper understanding of the 
situation, or the desire to safeguard the native population from the effects of the 
explosions that there should have been.’ Beale replied ‘That is not true’. 
Makin went on to discuss that he was aware Aboriginal people had been 
removed from the blast area but that the effects of the clouds were ‘likely to be felt by 
our native population’ whom the government had a responsibility to protect from such 
perils. Makin held that: 
 
no danger should be allowed to come to the areas that they inhabit. Their lives are just as 
valuable as those of any white person, and they should not be exposed to risk any more than 
should people in the settled areas of civilization. 
 
Makin also requested that full provisions be made to protect them, ‘although I 
cannot see how the drift of the atomic cloud over the areas they inhabit can be 
prevented.’  Beale replied ‘It does not drift over their territory.’ Makin stated that 
Beale is not able to direct the drift of such clouds, which was dependent on weather 
conditions, and asked that care be taken to ensure it was kept away from ‘native 
areas.’ Makin stated he had been informed that 2,000,000 acres had been taken out of 
native reserves to allow the tests and asked  ‘what has been to compensate the people 
for some of the best hunting country and some of the best watered areas of which they 
have been deprived?’ Makin stated the Government should acknowledge some 
responsibility to the Aboriginal people ‘although this may be a matter of no-
consequence to some honorable members who have little regard for broad 
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humanities.’ Makin stated of such ‘honorable members’ that their only concern were 
their own outlooks, but that a large number of Australians held that ‘some 
consideration should be given to these helpless aborigines’.57
All through the years of the tests, the Menzies government continued to assert 
that they were harmless to the Australian populace, including indigenous people 
living nearby. As presented above, it was also put forward that the forced relocation 
of local people, which prevented their access to their familiar and valued land 
resources, was a perfectly reasonable course of action. This suggests two things: a 
lack of knowledge about and regard for their way of life, and a sense of urgency about 
Australia’s vulnerability in the Cold War.  
 
The next day, 10 October 1956, saw another lengthy exchange on the subject 
of atomic testing within the House of Representatives, also during a discussion of 
Estimates 1956-57. As explored in the next chapter, News Limited correspondent 
Douglas Wilkie was vocally against long delays involved in the mainland atomic tests 
in 1953 (‘Operation Totem’) due to ‘political scaremongering over the “cobalt 
bomb” ’.58
 In light of this, H.V. Evatt’s would later use the writings of Wilkie in support 
of the anti-testing cause.  In the House of Representatives on 10 October 1956, Evatt 
discussed Wilkie’s claim that people were near the point where the people of the 
world will insist on an end to further nuclear tests. Wilkie, according to Evatt, was 
aware that only two years prior such a statement would be regarded as equivalent to 
heresy but now this view had been taken up by the British Labour movement and was 
the policy of the US Democratic Party.  Wilkie had also  pointed out that Russia had 
indicated a Willingness to ban further tests  by agreement between the ‘Big Three’ 
and that the UK Prime Minister and leader of the US Democratic Party Adlai 
Stevenson had expressed a similar willingness.  Wilkie’s writing had noted that 
neither the US or USSR could test a nuclear weapon without the test being detected 
by instruments in the other nation.
 
59
                                                 
57 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 9 October 1956, Session 1956,  pp. 1287-
1288 
 
58 The Sun, Melbourne, 15 October, 1953, p.3. Discussion of fears in Australia of a ‘cobalt bomb’ can 
be found in Titterton, Facing the Atomic Future, pp. 253-254, 
59 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 10 October 1956, Session 1956, p. 1320. 
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Later on the same day Mr. Hamilton, (CP)60 offered his support for atomic 
testing in Australia and indicated his opinion that criticism of such tests was not 
warranted. Hamilton expressed amazement that members of the opposition were 
critical of the tests as it had been highlighted by the Ministry of Supply that the last 
tests involved assessments on how best to protect the civilian population from nuclear 
attack. Hamilton stated that it is ‘no secret whatever’ that at a recent test there were 
‘sheep, goats and other animals and herbage for them to eat’ in the area likely to be 
affected by fallout and also ‘more herbage farther away from the centre of the blast’ 
to be fed to other animals to ascertain what degree of radioactive contamination was 
present and what would ‘render them unfit for human consumption.’61
This is of interest for several reasons. It would no doubt surprise a 
contemporary audience to hear that the irradiation of livestock was once used as an 
argument in support of atomic testing, even if it were geared to ‘how best to protect 
the civilian population’. Hamilton’s comment directly opposed that made by Beale 
three years previously on 17 September 1953, where Beale rejected the possibility 
that the tests would involve animals.
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  Evatt again quoted from Wilkie in support of his anti-nuclear agenda: ‘We’re 
near to that point at which the peoples of the world will insist on putting an end to 
further nuclear test explosions-A-Bomb and H-Bomb’. Evatt added to this ‘Let the 
Government take the initiative. It will get 100 per cent support from the Opposition 
and I believe, from those countries which are concerned with this question. Certainly, 
it will get support from suffering humanity.’
  In this debate, Beale and Evatt disagreed at 
length about the Woomera range. According to Evatt, the range was initially arranged 
by Chifley Labor Government and the Labour Government of Britain to:  ‘… gain 
answers to the V-1 and V-2 guided missiles which nearly turned the tide of war 
against us in 1944 and 1945.’ However, the range had now been appropriated to 
include atomic testing.  
63
Later, Minister Beale was able to reply to Mr. Makin about the risks of the test 
to the local indigenous population. Beale stated: ‘I should also like to answer 
something that was said by Mr. Makin, who very rightly expressed some anxiety 
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about the natives in connexion with atomic tests.’ He again expressed that the most 
stringent safety precautions had been put in place. Rather than attempt to go into 
details of this complex issue in the House, he referred to a letter of 20 September 19  
to the appropriate Minister in the Labor Government of Western Australia, Mr. Brady 
M.L.A, who had enquired into the matter. The letter was long and Beale requested 
that with ‘the concurrence of honorable members I shall incorporate it in “Hansard”.’ 
This letter been included as Appendix I to this dissertation. In essence it is yet 
another assurance that precautions have been taken to prevent any health issues from 
arising from the tests, and it closes with the statement:  
 
 I trust the foregoing information will not only inform you of the extreme care with which we 
 are planning all these operations, but will enable you to reply to any uninformed criticism that 
 these highly important and essential British Commonwealth defence operations are 
 prejudicing native life and welfare in Australia.64
 
 
 At this point in the debate, Mr. Chambers, (ALP) 65
 The essence of the debate was whether the Labour Party in Britain had 
adopted the same anti-nuclear stance as the Labor Party in Australia. He stated that 
the suggest that the very suggestion that the Labour Party of Great Britain would, like 
the ‘very foolish Labor party in this chamber’ pass a resolution in favour of ceasing 
testing ‘is an insult to the intelligence of the British Labour party.’ Beale noted that 
the resolution passed by the ALP advocating the unilateral abolition of atomic tests 
had passed by only a narrow majority and suggested that the same proposal would not  
go through a second time if put up to caucus again.  
  questioned Beale about a 
recent news story that claimed that a South Australian farmer had been forced to cull 
a quantity of cattle which had been contaminated by the tests. Beale asserted that The 
Adelaide Advertiser had printed a flat denial of the story from the gentleman who had 
initially reported it. This was the launching point for a lengthy discussion into the 
plausibility of the nations of the world bringing about the cessation of atmospheric 
atomic testing, that is, atomic tests conducted above the surface; including tests 
conducted on , on or under ships such as ‘Operation Hurricane’, those detonated on 
towers, in the air, or on the ground. 
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Mr. Holt, who made the speech of the previous day referenced earlier,66
This in turn steered the debate to discussion of the stance on atomic matters of 
the American Government. This prompted Beale to offer the following provocative 
statement: 
 asked 
if Mr. Beale opposed the stance of the churches in this matter. Beale replied that he 
did not oppose the churches, who like most thinking people wished to see an end to 
the arms race. Beale stated the Menzies Government was doing its best, alongside the 
UK and US, to create a workable and enforceable agreement on the subject. Beale 
also stated: ‘but until can get something which will protect us, we will not expose this 
country and our allies to being overwhelmed, as by an avalanche, by the forces of 
Russia, a country which is completely superior in other forms of armaments’.  
 
I now turn to the real nub of this matter, and that is the statement by the Leader of the 
Opposition. The honorable member for Darebin and some of his misguided friends are 
prepared to say “Let Australia discontinue these tests. Let Great Britain discontinue these tests. 
Let America discontinue these tests. But let Russia go on and on and on”. 
 
Whether this was what the statement offered by Holt meant was then hotly 
debated.  Beale suggested that if this was not stated implicitly within Holt’s speech, it 
was ‘the effect of the resolution that the Labor party caucus adopted the other day.’  
Not surprisingly this drew an enthusiastic reply from the member who had made the 
earlier speech, Mr. Holt: ‘I rise to order. I ask for an unqualified withdrawal of the 
statement that we are in favour of letting Russia go ahead with the development of the 
atom bomb.’ Yet Minister Beale continued with his opportunity to speak about how 
atmospheric testing was an issue of significance beyond any real influence by 
Australia.  As the Governments of the great democratic powers had been struggling to 
reach an agreement on the issue of atomic testing, he argued, the notion of Australia 
offering any kind of solution was absurd. He stated: 
 
For Australia now to mount its white charger like a paladin, come into the arena, strike an 
attitude, and say, “We shall get the great powers together to achieve this thing which Great 
Britain and America have been struggling for since 1954”, is just childish. 
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 The result of this was a lengthy discussion of the various international 
agreements pertaining to atmospheric testing and of the American proposal of an 
‘open skies’ policy for the policing of such tests. Beale was of the opinion that the 
Government of the United Kingdom would be willing to bring about the cessation of 
their testing programme in the event that the USSR would also cease testing.  He 
stated that in December 1955, Prime Minister Eden had said there could be no 
agreement to stop nuclear tests without some sort of international control. Beale then 
quoted Eden: ‘But my Government is prepared at any time and place to have 
discussions on the control and abolition of atomic bomb tests’ to which, according to 
Beale, there was no reply from the Russians. 
Beale then stated that Prime Minister Eden’s government had made an offer to 
Russia to be willing to attend a discussion, at any time, pertaining to the cessation of 
atmospheric testing. Dr. Evatt agreed that this offer was ‘a big step forward’. Minister 
Beale stated that he agreed this was a big step and that the hydrogen bomb offered 
sinister possibilities for the future ‘unless mankind does something about it’. Beale 
offered a reminder that no Hydrogen bomb tests would be conducted in Australia, and 
stated in reference to the offer to attend talks: ‘The only reply by Russia to that 
proposal was the letting of another series of hydrogen bombs in Russia.’ The notion 
that tests could be a ‘reply’ here suggests that such experiments can be viewed an 
element of communication, in effect ‘text.’ 
The discussion appears to have been heated, as the Chairman was forced to 
threaten the Member for Kingsford-Smith, Mr. Curtin, with expulsion from the 
chamber. On the matter of the Australian tests, Beale discussed how he had spoken 
warmly on the subject of the tests as he felt warmly about it, and that such tests were a 
matter of importance for everyone. He stated that efforts were being made to form an 
international agreement to diminish and ultimately end nuclear testing, including the 
‘very small atomic tests in Australia’ but asks if the ALP had been in power when the 
Australian tests had begun, would it have allowed the tests if  Britain had said: 
 
‘We offer you all of the guarantees of complete safety in this matter. Yours is the only country 
in our world that has the vacant space in which these bombs can be tested. Will you help us by 
allowing these small tests to take place?’ 
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Beale stated he thought the ALP would not have so little regard for ‘Great 
Britain, for the Empire, for themselves’ as to refuse.  Mr. Davis, (Lib.)67 replied that 
he thought ‘their leader would have done so.’ Beale acknowledged that this was 
possible but said that: ‘we will do our utmost’ towards an enforceable international 
agreement on nuclear tests but that ‘… in the meantime we intend to go ahead and, 
subject to complete safety for the Australian people, which we have achieved and will 
continue to achieve, assist Great Britain, ourselves, and our allies in the conducting of 
these tests.’68
Beale had presented the belief that the tests were ‘very small’ and the sites 
were ‘vacant space.’ The grounding of aircraft due to drifting atomic clouds was an 
issue that received some attention in parliamentary debate. As an example on 17 
October 1956, Mr. Ward questioned Minister Beale regarding whether aircraft were 
ordered not to leave the ground on 27 and 28 September of that year, following the 
first test of ‘Operation Buffalo’. Beale commented ‘There was no grounding of 
aircraft. Not a single aircraft was grounded or diverted’ and later that story about 
grounded aircraft had been circulated by ‘the communists in Australia’ and this is 
where Ward had ‘no doubt’ heard the story, and then again stated that no plane had 
been grounded or diverted.
 
69
  Earlier, on 21 June 1956, The Times of London featured a story confirming 
that 4 aircraft had been grounded in Western Australia following a test as part of 
‘Operation Mosaic’. This was confirmed by Minister Beale, who issued a statement 
that was included in the article.
 
70 This example of parliamentary debate shows an 
anti-testing argument being linked to communism, in that it suggests that the rumour 
that aircraft were grounded was being spread by communists.71
                                                 
67 Mr Francis John Davis. Member for Deakin, Vic, Lib. 
 It was a common 
argument at this time that it was the moral responsibility of those in the West to aid in 
tipping the strategic balance in their own favour, against the spread of communism.  
68 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives , Hansard, 10 October 1956, Session 1956,  pp. 
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71Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 17 October 1956, Session 1956, p1529.  
Heather Goodall writes: ‘The accusation ‘Communist’ was thrown to discredit those who raised 
concerns about the health of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians, ranging from the Presbyterian 
doctor Charles Dugoid, and anthropologist Donald Thompson, to scientists Mark Oliphant and Hedley 
Marston’  Heather Goodall, ‘Colonialism and Catastrophe: Contested Memories of Nuclear Testing and 
Measles Epidemics at Ernabella,’  in Kate Darian-Smith and Paula Hamilton (eds), Memory & History 
in Twentieth-Century Australia, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1994, p.59.  
  
 
66 
Whether Australia had any moral obligation to aid in tipping this balance was a 
frequent theme in parliamentary debate. This line of argument was a typical response 
to any expression of regret regarding the reality of atomic testing in Australia.  An 
exchange occurring in the Senate, featuring the Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, 
Senator McKenna, (ALP),72
Senator McKenna stated that in recent weeks, four tests had occurred at 
Maralinga. He said: ‘I regret very much that the explosions took place on Australian 
soil and that Australia has been exposed to whatever dangers are inherent to such 
explosions in their own country.’ Senator Kendall (ALP)
  which took place in a discussion of an Appropriation 
Bill on 24 October 1956, typified this: 
73
Senator Pearson (Lib) 
 replied: ‘That is better 
than having Russian bombs dropped on us.’ McKenna agreed this was ‘infinitely 
better’ but pointed out that there were risks of local damage from the tests. He stated 
that the fact the tests had been postponed ‘day after day for approximately a fortnight’ 
indicated that perfect weather conditions were required to ensure dangerous elements 
in the atomic clouds were carried away. He stated: ‘it is perfectly clear that there is 
danger and that, if there were an unpredictable element in the weather, grave danger 
could be caused’ and also that everybody will recall the anxiety in Australia when the 
cloud from the first test drifted ‘towards the eastern seaboard of Australia.’ 
74
 
 replied: ‘Does the honourable senator say that the 
tests should be discontinued before there is any international agreement?’ To which 
McKenna stated that if Pearson had been listening he would have known that 
McKenna felt that ‘nobody could expect any one nation unilaterally to discontinue 
them while other nations were continuing them’. The exchange continued: 
 Senator Pearson- The honourable senator said he was sorry that they took place in Australia. 
 
 Senator McKENNA-I am sorry they were held in Australia, or have been held anywhere else. 
I  can understand why they take place, but I object to them taking place in this country. 
 
 Senator Laught (Lib) 75
 
- Where does the honorable senator think they should take place? 
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73 Senator Roy Kendall, Q.L.D, ALP 
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 Senator McKENNA- Some other place could be found. An uninhabited island could be 
 found. 
 
 Senator Kendall-Does the honorable senator suggest that they could be held outside London? 
 
  McKenna dismissed this as facetious and suggested that an area should have 
been found where no damage would result and that ‘we certainly deplore the fact that 
these tests have taken place in Australia, and we say very strongly that we hope there 
will be no more of them.’76
Later that very day, a Senator who had fought as a fighter pilot during the 
Battle of Britain, was accused of being ‘anti-British’, for expressing regret over the 
tests.  The gentleman concerned, Senator O’Byrne, (ALP) 
 
77  a Labor back-bencher 
from Tasmania, had stated: ‘Why does not the Government of the United Kingdom 
carry them (the atomic tests) out in England?’  The debate was lengthy, containing a 
response from Senator Gorton, (Lib)78 that the interjection asking why the tests were 
not carried in England was silly and indicative of anti-British feeling present in some 
members of the opposition ‘but not, I think, by the leader of the Opposition’. 79
Soon after, Senator McKenna also commented on the interjection, or more 
correctly Senator Gorton’s reply to it.  McKenna stated he wanted ‘to take Senator 
Gorton to test’ for his reply to O’Byrne’s interjection. McKenna stated of the 
allegation that O’Byrne was ‘anti British’: ‘No greater untruth has been uttered in this 
Senate. Senator O’Byrne participated in the very earliest stages of the Battle for 
Britain, and was shot down during that battle’ McKenna assured Gorton that the 
question as to why the tests were not held in England was intelligent, as it showed that 
atomic tests were not without risk to human life. Gorton clarified that he had not 
wished to make an attack on O’Byrne’s character, that he did not believe O’Byrne as 
himself anti-British but that his interjection showed anti-British interest, Gorton stated: 
‘Those who argue against that sort (of tests) taking place in the Australian desert are, 
in fact, arguing against the interests of Great Britain.’ O’Byrne maintained that the 
fallout from tests in Australia would cause risk, but acknowledged his gratitude that 
Gorton had clarified his comments were not a personal attack
 
80
                                                 
76 Australian Parliament, Senate, Hansard, October 24, 1956, Session 1956, p. 882-883. 
 
77 Senator Justin Hillary O’Bryne, Tas, ALP 
78 Senator John Grey Gorton, Vic, Lib. 
79 Australian Parliament, Senate, Hansard, October 24, 1956, Session 1956, p. 887. 
80 Australian Parliament, Senate, Hansard, October 24, 1956, Session 1956, p.890. 
  
 
68 
As, the next chapter also notes, the beginning of British thermonuclear testing 
at Christmas Island  largely overshadowed news pertaining to the smaller tests in 
Australia in 1957. Despite this, the issue of testing in Australia was a common topic 
for parliamentary debate in 1957.  As in 1956, claims that criticism of testing in 
Australia played into the hands of the Soviet Union were a typical tactic of the Liberal 
Party. On 9 April 1957, during a discussion of international relations, Mr. Clyde 
Cameron (ALP)81
Cameron suggested that Menzies had spoke on Soviet tests as though the 
opposition, on opposing nuclear tests in general, were willing to allow Soviet tests 
and merely wishing that tests by the western powers would cease. Cameron wished to 
clarify the ALP believed that tests should not be carried out ‘either by Russia or by 
any other country.’ Cameron stated Menzies had accused Evatt of repeating untruths 
in the hope they will become accepted, and said:  
 referred to an earlier speech from Prime Minister Menzies 
  
The Prime Minister is himself a master of the technique of repeating untruths in the hope that 
the people will believe them. He has spent his whole parliamentary life repeating the untruth 
that the Australian Labor Party is linked in some direct or indirect way with communism, in 
the hope that people will believe this untruth.82
  
 
 Linking criticism of British testing to Soviet intentions continued. On 2 May 
1957, during question time in the House of Representatives, Minister Casey stated ‘It 
is not guesswork to say that the propaganda that is going on throughout the world now 
against the British nuclear weapons tests at Christmas Island, in the Pacific, is 
motivated by Soviet Russia.’ Soon after, during a discussion of Australian Defence in 
the House of Representatives, Beale criticised members of the ALP for speaking 
generally against ‘atomic testing’ as a whole without distinguishing what type of tests 
they were referring to, for example by linking the much larger Christmas Island tests 
to the smaller fission devices tested in Australia. This is a valid point, as the tests 
conducted for ‘Operation Grapple’, involving hydrogen bombs, were far more 
powerful than those tested at Monte Bello, Emu Field and Maralinga. A lack of 
consideration for the types of devices involved is still evident in many contemporary 
accounts of the tests.  
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An appeal for Australia to become armed with nuclear weapons was made in a 
statement made by Mr. Bostock, (Lib)83
 
 on 7 May 1957 during a discussion of 
‘Australian Defence’ in the House of Representatives: 
…we should find that our reliance on our friends would not be a deterrent. What is the 
alternative?  The alternative is to become nuclear-armed ourselves. Whenever this proposition 
is put forward, it is met immediately with two objections. The first question asked is, Could 
we be effectively armed?” and the second question is, “could we afford it?” 
 
Bostock discusses his belief that Australia could become effectively armed 
with such weapons as they are no longer as rare or as expensive as they had been only 
a few years previously.  He stated that he had seen in a ‘semi official’ paper that the 
US had a stockpile of some 35,000 bombs, and that it is well known that the UK were 
producing their own. He states that the difficulty in obtaining atomic weapons is the 
acquisition of ‘fissionable material’, and that once such material is available, weapons 
production can be ‘relatively cheap and quick.’ He states that plutonium can be 
obtained as a by-product of commercial atomic piles ‘which we shall need very soon 
if we are to develop this country’ and refers to existing suggestions to use such atomic 
piles to generate power for mining operations. He suggests that it might take five or 
six years to obtain such weapons, but that in the meantime the UK might be persuaded 
to sell them to Australia  ‘at about £5,000,000 a dozen. That does not seem to me to 
be very expensive for such a powerful weapon.’84
It should be noted that nuclear weapons require material that is fissile, and not 
merely fissionable. Bostock, a former Air Vice Marshal of the Royal Australian Air 
Force (RAAF), then went on to the details of the potential acquisition of suitable 
bomber aircraft by the RAAF, and of the potential targets in Asia which the RAAF 
would then be able to destroy, especially if making use of American bases- he asserts 
that America was a very important ally, even though he suggests that bombs might be 
first acquired through Britain. However, Australia was never to play such a direct role 
in global atomic proliferation. The course of the Cold War was such that arms 
developments were matched by the perceived ‘enemy’ – this fashion of escalation was 
what had resulted in the uneasy peace based on the notion of Mutually Assured 
Destruction.  
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Clear examples of documents, off the public record during the 1950s, which 
clearly illustrate serious consideration of the acquisition of atomic weapons for 
Australia, are now available in the National Archives of Australia. One is an excerpt 
of minutes of a 6 February 1958 meeting of the Australian Defence Committee, 
chaired by E.W. Hicks, then secretary for the Australian Department of Defence. The 
document was formerly classified ‘Top Secret and Guard’. The agenda item detailed 
by this except of minutes was titled ‘Nuclear Weapons for the Australian Forces-
Plutonium Production in Australia.’ Only 2 pages in length, the document states that 
there was no intention to acquire or produce high-yield thermonuclear weapons, but 
discusses whether it would be more affordable to produce plutonium for small fission 
weapons in Australia, or to import weapons from the UK. The committee found the 
latter option to be more viable.85
  Another record is a collection of minute papers and correspondence from 
throughout 1958 which makes it explicitly clear that the acquisition of small fission 
weapons from the UK was seriously considered. These items were formerly classified 
variously as ‘Top Secret’ and ‘Confidential.’
   
86
Later parliamentary debates repeated earlier themes- that the local tests were 
or were not ‘completely safe’, that Australia was or was not powerless to influence 
the world regarding checking the progress of atomic proliferation and, whether 
staging tests in Australia was part of a moral obligation towards the triumph of 
democracy. 
  The impact of such sources on the 
public debate is in the manner in which those with access to this discourse, which may 
have included influential parliamentarians, responded publicly to this information 
One particular exchange typified the general nature of this debate. It occurred 
in a discussion of nuclear bomb tests in the House of Representatives on 15 May 1956.  
It typifies the clash of ‘realism and internationalism’ in that it showed opposing views 
that the Western powers should push ahead with weapons development and testing, 
against the notion that the cessation of testing would further the best interests of the 
broader international community.  Evatt stated he wished to stop all atomic tests, and 
that the British Labour party was also of this opinion. In response, Beale inferred that 
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what Evatt and the ALP were asking for an end to only the British tests.  Evatt made it 
clear the ALP wished all nuclear tests would cease and that this would allow 
disarmament to become a reality: 
 
The proposal is that these tests be stopped everywhere; that they be stopped by international 
action; that they be stopped immediately and that this cessation be made everywhere. Of 
course, if that were done, it would be unthinkable that such weapons be used in time of war. 
Disarmament would really begin. That is the view of this party and of the British Labour Party, 
the New Zealand Labour Party and of every man and woman of goodwill in every country of 
the world. We are proud to hold it.87
 
 
Regardless of what his own personal views on the matter were, Evatt was here 
affirming a stance which placed the interests of the international community ahead of 
maintaining a lead in the arms race at all costs. The stance of the Menzies government 
was that atomic weapons had become the reality of modern warfare. It was believed 
that the cessation of atomic testing and the arms race as a whole, on a global level, 
was eminently desirable. However, this was largely beyond the influence of Australia. 
Regardless of whether local testing was to stop, Russia would continue its arms 
development.  In fact, due to Australia featuring such vast expanses of land, any 
suggestion that the testing of small (not thermonuclear) atomic weapons should not be 
allowed in Australia was playing directly into the hands of the USSR and other 
powers united against the powers of Western Democracy. Thus criticism of testing in 
Australia was held to be anti-democratic, as such tests would result in ‘no conceivable 
injury’.  The only occurrence, according to Beale, which should bring about an end to 
testing in Australia was if the USSR were to enter into an agreement with the 
democratic powers pertaining to the end of atmospheric tests. Such an agreement, the 
‘Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Underwater’, was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963 and brought to effect on 10 
October of that year.88
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  Yet this was well after ‘major’ tests- actual atomic explosions- 
had ceased in Australia. This was not what would bring about the end of the ‘major’ 
tests conducted in Australia. The event which brought about the end of testing in 
88 Due to the length of its formal title, this treaty has also become known as the ‘Partial Test Ban 
Treaty’ (PTBT), ‘Limited Test Ban Treaty’ (LTBT) and the ‘Moscow Treaty’. 
The Nuclear Threat Initiate (NTI), section entitled Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), 
http://www.nti.org/db/china/ptbtorg.htm , site accessed 12/05/08. 
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Australia was the restoration of Anglo-American co-operation on matters pertaining 
to atomic weapons. 
These examples of parliamentary debate illustrate that the tests were a divisive 
issue. There were those who held that the tests were totally safe and were necessary to 
aid Britain in the struggle to preserve democracy in the West. Critics of the tests were 
linked to communism. The links between the origins of the Woomera Rocket Range 
under a Labour Government and the allowance of atomic testing under Menzies was 
deliberately blurred by Liberal members, and the distinctions argued. There were even 
those who held that the tests presented an opportunity for Australia and that this 
country should have its own atomic weapons.  
There were others of the belief that the tests were dangerous and that testing 
should cease here and internationally. Also, that all atomic arsenals be destroyed. The 
next chapter will explore how the anti-testing agenda was reflected in examples of 
mainstream Australian press media from the time of the atomic tests. These accounts 
clearly drew at time from the content of parliamentary debates, reinforcing element of 
such debates in the Australian public consciousness and the discourse of the tests.
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Chapter Three: The tests in mainstream media.   
 
This chapter investigates how atomic testing in Australia was reflected in the 
print media discourse as the tests progressed.  The chapter examines five Australian 
and one British newspaper.  Four Australian newspapers were from state capital cities 
and one Australian newspaper was from a regional city. These papers are: from 
Melbourne, both the Syme family’s The Age and The Sun News Pictorial (henceforth 
referred to as The Sun). The Sun was owned by Rupert Murdoch and published by 
News Limited. Also, The Sunday Times of Perth, which had been owned by a private 
syndicate that was led by Jack Simons, until the papers acquisition in 1954 by 
Murdoch/News Limited, who also owned yet another paper discussed in this chapter, 
The Adelaide Advertiser (henceforth referred to as The Advertiser). For a local 
perspective, The Courier of Ballarat, Victoria is explored. This paper was at the time 
owned by 'The Ballarat Courier Proprietary'.  To provide a British contrast there is 
analysis of how testing was reported in the Astor Family’s The Times of London.  
Britain was responsible for the conduct of the tests and, though geographically 
removed from their immediate effects, their press material contributed to local debate.  
The examples of media coverage explored are predominantly news reports by 
unspecified authors, and opinion pieces by correspondents such as Douglas Wilkie 
and Chapman Pincher.  
 The secrecy surrounding the tests prevented reporters from having an accurate 
understanding; details of the tests revealed to reporters was subject to strict control, 
largely from officials of the UK government,1
 It must be noted that even with the passage of years it is not possible to offer 
final comment on the accuracy of this news coverage. Reporters now as then are 
unable to penetrate the veil of secrecy surroundings nuclear weapons and weapons 
testing. However, it is possible to highlight where claims were made in the press that 
have been demonstrated to be falsehoods and speculation , as later sources on the 
 and evidently a lot of commentary was 
drawn  from parliamentary debates. Misunderstandings, lack of knowledge and a 
willingness to speculate affected the media coverage, leading to the establishment of 
myths, some which have been rejected and others which have been repeated 
regardless of what has been discovered.  
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Australia, Vol III, p.9. 
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subject have emerged. This chapter explores how these newspapers informed or 
misinformed the public and thus their role in the genealogy of the debates surrounding 
the tests. 
  A great deal of the print media reporting on ‘Operation Hurricane’ 
constituted responses to the mistaken belief that the British had tested a more 
powerful or more advanced weapon than their American counterparts. This belief 
skewed the manner in which the tests were viewed by the Australian populace and 
meant that in the popular perception there was additional significance placed on the 
weapons tests as a means of consolidating Australia’s role in maintaining the global 
balance of power.  An assessment of claims of British superiority in atomic weapons 
technology is contained in this chapter, and the press coverage of these claims 
contributed to the establishment of this myth. 
References to the programme within secondary histories from the Menzies era 
are scarce; it is as though their significance to Australian foreign affairs is a matter not 
appreciated until more recent times. Recent sources generally focus upon the human 
and environmental consequences of the tests as opposed to their strategic significance.  
Menzies era media sources did contain some strategic analysis.   
Details about the nature of the testing programme continue to emerge. With 
this additional information the manner in which the older sources should be regarded 
has changed. With this in mind, the contributions of the newspaper sources to the 
public debates on the tests can be explored, and some details reported in the tests can 
be contrasted with what later sources have revealed. 
On 19 September1952, the headline of The Sun very nearly correctly stated 
‘Atom Tests Now Only A Few Days Off’.2
                                                 
2 The Sun, Melbourne, 19 September, 1952, p. 1.  
 It actually proved to be two weeks. The 
source for this information, apparently, was the observation that Ernest Titterton, 
Professor of Nuclear Physics at the Australian National University had ‘slipped 
quietly out of Canberra today’. Titterton, later of the AWTSC, was the only official 
Australian observer for this weapons test. The front page of the The Sunday Times of 
21 September’s headline of ‘Atom Lad’s Win Hint to Atom Blast?’ and 
accompanying article suggested that a horse named ‘Atom Lad’ winning the Belmont 
Cup was an omen that the test would occur soon. The article offered details of what 
ships were sailing to the Monte Bello islands for the experiment, and included that 
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HMAS Sydney had to refuel from a lighter at Darwin while en route, as there was no 
wharf big enough to allow this ship to refuel.3 The next day, 22 September, The Sun 
ran a feature piece pertaining to the key figures within the British atomic weapons 
programme, including Titterton.4  The next day, the front page stated that the time of 
the test would be dictated by weather conditions and that the director of the project, 
Dr. Penney, had arrived from England.5 The Sun of 24 September reported that Prime 
Minister Menzies stated ‘I can’t help the atomic tests, except by shutting up’.6
The Age of 4 October 1952 carried the front page headline ‘Brilliant Flash, 
Then Cloud’ with the sub heading of ‘Atom test was successful’. The operation is 
incorrectly referenced by this source as ‘Operation Havoc’ rather than ‘Hurricane’.  It 
also did not detail the fact that the explosion took place under the waterline of a ship - 
the article states: ‘The weapon was detonated over land, but the affected area included 
a large water surface’. A sub-heading suggests that ‘Flag Island likely Centre.’ This 
lack of accurate details demonstrates, not surprisingly, the close secrecy associated 
with the testing programme.  
 In his 
statement, Menzies can be seen to have distanced himself and the Australian 
Government from the tests, which were represented as a British endeavour, despite 
local assistance. A front page article in the Sunday Times of 28 September titled 
‘Atom Bomb Report Was a “Fizzdog”’ explored how rumours that the test had 
already occurred had proved unfounded. This is an example of how a poorly informed 
public resorts to rumours and speculation. 
 A peripheral article, also on the front page, had the headline ‘Scientist Says 
“More Damaging”’. The article states that Perth scientist W.J. Mangini asserted that 
although the blast was of ‘conventional size’ and was thus considerably smaller than 
some devices tested by the United States, it ‘spread its destructive power over a wider 
area than comparable US blasts’.7
                                                 
3 The Sunday Times, Perth, 21 September, 1952, p.1.  
 This claim is not supported by other sources, as I 
will explore. Many media sources from this time suggested that the ‘Hurricane’ 
device was regarded as being far more innovative than it really was and herein can be 
seen the possible origin of this myth.  The Courier of 4 October 1952  also features 
two articles by an unnamed author that reference the seemingly mysterious, unknown 
4 The Sun, Melbourne, 22 September, 1952, p. 9. 
5 The Sun, Melbourne, 23 September, 1952, p. 1. 
6 The Sun, Melbourne, 24 September, 1952, p. 3. 
7 The Age ,Melbourne, 4 October, 1952, p. 1. 
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nature of the ‘Hurricane’ device. These are titled ‘Washington in Dark of Bomb’s 
Nature’ and ‘Was it a Hydrogen Bomb?’ 8
 
 
 
The Courier, Ballarat, 4 October, 1952, p. 1. 
 
It is of interest that The Age elected to include the commentary of Mangini, as 
the physicist was acting at Monte Bello as a representative of The Sun. The front page 
headline of 4 October stated ‘A-Bomb Blast - First Picture’ and featured an image of 
the blast. As the accompanying article reinforced, the blast did not resemble the 
popular ‘mushroom cloud’ image.  The article quotes Mangini as saying ‘it could 
have been a hydrogen bomb’. It is difficult to appreciate what this insight was based 
on. A small blast could indeed involve some atomic fusion but the blast was clearly 
not a hydrogen bomb, which the US would test on 1 November 1952.  The article 
states: 
  
                                                 
8 The Courier, Ballarat, 4 October, 1952, p. 1. 
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Mr Mangini said that it was fairly obvious that while the British could doubtless have 
produced an explosion of immense magnitude - probably far exceeding any American effort - 
they probably concentrated less on producing a big bang and more on testing a more effective 
atomic weapon than the world had seen before. 9
 
  
It is quite possible that journalists had misinterpreted Mangini’s comments. 
The ‘Hurricane’ device, as previously stated, was based on a device tested by the 
Americans seven years previously. A blast exceeding the largest American tests 
would need to be a staged radiation implosion device (hydrogen bomb). A test of such 
a device was not achieved by the British until 1957, during ‘Operation Grapple’.  The 
wife of Ernest Titterton, was apparently able to perceive this.  Mrs. Titterton had 
apparently been close to the scenes of three other atomic tests. An article appearing in 
The Age of 10 October 1952 by Marjorie Joyce carried the headline ‘Bomb “Anti-
Climax”: Her Fourth’- it goes on to suggest that this atomic test was something of an 
ordinary affair so far as she was concerned.10
That there were some public fears of the possible consequences of the tests 
was evident in an article on the first page of The Sunday Times of 5 October titled 
‘Atom Dust Cloud Scare.’ The article details a practical joke played on the day of the 
test by a resident of Onslow, Western Australia, named Cliff Ross. Ross is reported to 
have rigged a pick-up to his ‘wireless’ and invited passers by inside his home for a 
quiet beer and to listen to some music. From the next room, a co-conspirator 
interrupted the radio transmission of music to make a false announcement that the 
wind had changed and that huge clouds of atomic dust were blowing towards the 
mainland and that all residents between Onslow and Roebourne were to proceed to an 
army camp at Mardie where they would be evacuated by trucks. The article reports 
that at least one present rushed to start to get his wife and children to safety, before 
the joke was revealed. An article on the same page titled ‘Big Bang Gives Britain a 
Kick’ also contains a claim that the test was ‘a dash by Britain into a leading position 
in atomic race.’
 
11
                                                 
9 The Age, Melbourne, 4 October, 1952, p. 1. 
 Here can be seen evidence both of public fears of health 
consequences, and the myth of British superiority. The health concerns are still 
evident in contemporary sources and the notion of early British superiority has been 
rejected. 
10 The Age, Melbourne, 10 October, 1952, p. 14. 
11 The Sunday Times, Perth, 5 October, 1952, p.1.  
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Such was the secrecy of the tests that the scheduled time and date of the test 
was not publicly announced. An article in The Age of 4 October 1952 was titled 
‘Pressmen’s Long Watch On Monte Bello.’ This piece details the experience of 
reporters keeping a watch on the likely test site in anticipation of the explosion.12  The 
Sun of the same date details the appearance of the blast with further commentary from 
Mangini, detailing how his assertion about the possible thermonuclear nature of the 
blast was based on the apparent speed of the expansion of smoke and gasses, which to 
him suggested great force, and also different shades of colour than other atomic 
bombs. The article, titled ‘80 miles of Atom Dust Shadows Coast’ suggests that 
although the blast was of the same approximate size as that from a fission device, it 
could possibly have been a very small hydrogen bomb. 13  Information revealed to the 
public subsequently revealed otherwise. Another article in this edition of The Sun 
explores the estimated cost of the developments leading to the test (£10,000,000) and 
the layout of the test area. A side article to this page, ‘Atom Promise,’ offers brief 
comment on the strategic significance of the test programme to Australia. It mentions 
pride in British science, but also comments upon Australia’s mineral uranium deposits 
as a factor in the country’s future role in atomic weapons development. Manhattan 
project scientist Sir Mark Oliphant, whom historian Wayne Reynolds has documented 
as a supporter of an Australian nuclear deterrent14
This piece presents commentary supportive of the notion that Australian 
uranium deposits be employed to further understanding of matters concerning atomic 
weapons within the British Commonwealth and does not make any suggestion to 
counter such views.
, is quoted as saying ‘by scientific 
excellence in the atomic field Australia may redress its meagre sources of manpower 
and its ill-distributed sources of coal and hydroelectricity’.  
15
The human experience of those connected to the test is explored within an 
article in The Sun of 6 October 1952. It refers to scientists in ‘space suits’ exploring 
the site of the test after the explosion. It speculates ‘their first job would be to move 
right to the centre of the area to bring out things such as test animals which would call 
 
                                                 
12 The Age, Melbourne, 4 October, 1952, p.2. 
13 The Sun, Melbourne, 4 October, 1952 p. 3. 
14  Reynolds, Australia’s Bid For the Atomic Bomb. 
15 The Sun, Melbourne, 4 October, 1952, p. 12. 
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for study as early as possible’. 16
This was reported on the front page of The Courier of 24 October 1952, with 
the article titled ‘Monte Bello Explosion Was Bomb Test on Harbor’.
  This was based on an erroneous belief that the test 
took place on land.   
17 This was 
supported by the front cover of The Age of the same date, with the headline ‘Ship 
Vaporised by Monte Bello Atom Bomb’.18
Despite understandable inaccuracies, The Sun included some excellent 
commentary on the influence of the tests on perceptions of relations between 
Australia’s allies.  The Sun on 7 October featured an article entitled ‘Atomic Secrets’, 
which explored the folly of the ‘atomic rivalry’ between Britain and the United States. 
Such commentary from this time period is rare. The article suggests that Britain and 
the United States, as the great democratic powers, should pool their resources. The 
article mentions the McMahon Act though not by name. It is significant that the 
newspaper showed an awareness of this act and that co-operation on matters of atomic 
weapons was widely desired. It states: 
 
 
Britain thus having thus drawn level with, if not surpassed, the United States, a sharing of 
atomic secrets by the two countries should no longer be delayed. It was the action of Congress 
in 1946 in placing restrictions upon the sharing of such secrets that compelled Britain to 
pursue her own experiments. Although the US atomic energy act was last year somewhat 
modified, press opinion on both sides of the Atlantic demands full reciprocity.19
 
  
Although the US had not been drawn equal to or surpassed, this co-operation 
would indeed eventuate in time,   Later sources detail how amendments to weapons 
control protocols following ‘Operation Grapple’ did bring about such co-operation.20
The article suggests that it was the break down of co-operation on atomic matters 
which caused Britain to embark on its own testing programme, which is significant as 
this was to bring about testing in Australia and the related debates. 
 
Not only the details of the tests, but also the scheduling of the next tests, were 
the subjects of speculative reporting in the newspapers. The Age of 6 October 1952 
                                                 
16 The Sun, Melbourne, 6 October, 1952, p. 3. 
17 The Courier, Ballarat, 24 October 1952, p. 1. 
18 The Age, Melbourne, 24 October 1952, p. 1. 
19 The Sun, Melbourne, 7 October, 1952, p. 12. 
20 Timothy J Botti, The Long Wait: the Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, Greenwood 
Press, New York, 1987, p. 232; Reynolds, 'Re-thinking the Joint Project-Australia's Bid for Nuclear 
Weapons 1945-1960'  
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suggests an imminent second test at Monte Bello.21
Surprisingly, there was little attention given to ‘Operation Hurricane’ within 
The Times of London. In fact, details of the success of the first British Atomic test 
were not deemed front page news and were reported on page 6 of the paper on 3 
October 1952.  Earlier issues of The Times had given some indication that tests were 
imminent but offered little to suggest the impending test was an especially 
newsworthy item.  The article provided details of the size of the resulting atomic 
cloud, the distance from ground zero at which the pressure wave was still able to be 
detected, as well as the safety precautions taken. The strategic connotations of the 
tests did not gain mention.
 A test would not actually occur in 
Australia until 1953, and inland, with testing returning to Monte Bello in 1956.  
22
It was reported in The Times of 9 October 1952 that an Australian born 
physicist, L.H. Martin, reported that although the device was ‘a different kind of 
explosion’ there was nothing mysterious about it.
   
23 This forms quite a stark contrast 
to the comments of Mangini who had suggested to the Australian press that the 
‘Hurricane’ test could have been thermonuclear.24 Martin was an important figure in 
Australian post-war atomic energy research, who had been involved in nuclear 
physics from 1939 following from earlier work on X-rays. He had been appointed as 
he Australian Government’s Defence Science Advisor in 194825 and from 21 July 
1955 he served as chairman of the new AWTSC.26
The 24 October edition of The Times clearly states that although the nature of 
the bomb’s construction was quite secret, the blast was akin to that of the Nagasaki 
detonation. This is consistent with what later sources have revealed about the nature 
of the device.  The writer, no doubt aware of the controversy surrounding the possible 
‘unique’ nature of the test, stated:  
 
 
                                                 
21 The Age, Melbourne, 6 October, 1952, p. 1. 
22 The Times, London, 3 October, 1952, p.6. 
23 The Times, London, 9 October, 1952, p.5. 
24 The role of Australian scientists, Ernest Titterton, Alan Butement and Leslie Martin within the 
testing programme was explored by Tim Sherratt in his article ‘Australian Scientists at the British 
Atomic Tests’ of 1985Tim Sherratt, ‘Discontents’, section entitled Australian Scientists at the British 
Atomic Tests, http://www.discontents.com.au/words/science_show.php, site accessed 16/02/08.  
25 Cross, Fallout, pp. 35-47. 
26 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I, pp. 234-235. 
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Mr. Churchill’s statement on the British atomic weapon test revealed that it had at least one 
claim to originality- it probably has several that could not be disclosed for security reasons. 
American atom bombs have been exploded over land and sea, but the Monte Bello experiment 
was initiated in a Warship, which provided yet another set of conditions for an atomic 
explosion. 
 
The article continues with details pertaining to the temperature and pressure of 
such an atomic explosion.27 Page 9 of the same edition offers some analysis of the 
strategic significance of Britain’s new status as an atomic power and suggests that the 
director of the weapons programme, Dr. Penney, is fully deserving of his 
knighthood.28  It should be noted that the ‘Hurricane’ device was deliberately placed 
under the waterline of a ship. The American test ‘Baker’, as part of ‘Operation 
Crossroads’ of 24 July1946, was similar as it had involved a test of an atomic device 
suspended under a fleet.29
 Details of ‘Operation Hurricane’ as reported in the print media discourse of 
1952 featured many understandable inaccuracies that are in hindsight clearly apparent. 
The secrets surrounding the development of atomic weapons were closely guarded. It 
is difficult to ascertain how these inaccuracies were received at the time, or even if 
they were noted by contemporary readers.  According to the Nuclear Weapon Archive 
print media sources indicate that ‘Operation Hurricane’ was a poorly documented 
endeavour.
 
30
  As the first inland test, Totem 1, approached, The Advertiser of 5 October 
published a page five article titled ‘Where are we in atomic weapon development?’ 
drawn from analysis from  Ernest Titterton. Titterton, in brief, compares the 
development of atomic weapons in the western world with similar technological 
achievements in the USSR. Significantly, he also states that the 1946 US McMahon 
 Considering the operation’s purported significance to international 
relations and the global balance of power in this period of history, the lack of 
documentation is indicative of the very tight control of information resulting from 
security concerns. 
                                                 
27 The Times, London, 24 October, 1952, p.4. 
28 Ibid, p.9. 
29 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Operation Crossroads: 1946, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/Crossrd.html, site accessed 15/02/08. Levels of 
contamination at Monte Bello were noted to be similar to that found on land areas in proximity to the 
‘Baker’ site, as detailed in  Atomic Weapons Research Establishment; Scientific Data Obtained at 
Operation Hurricane- Top Secret Section of Director’s Report’ A6456 R018/001, 1954-1985. 
30Ibid, section entitled British Nuclear Testing, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, 
site accessed 15/02/08. 
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act ensured that Britain was forced to pursue its own independent nuclear deterrent 31 
Leading up to the test, The Advertiser published some pieces exploring the UK’s 
strategic defence capacity. On 13 October 1953, a piece by Douglas Wilkie on the 
second page titled ‘Woomera-edge of beyond’ described the rapid technological 
development occurring at the Woomera range. Prime Minister Menzies is quoted as 
saying the range was the most important piece of defence work in the free world’32
On page 2 of the 14 October edition, a piece titled ‘Britain’s ability to hit 
back’, by Walter Farr of London’s Daily Mail, based on material quoted from British 
general Sir Kenneth Crawford. Crawford, then the United Kingdom’s controller of 
munitions and former deputy chief of Britain’s imperial general staff is quoted 
regarding how the UK can hit back against any aggressor. He cites six significant 
defence assets  here: 1) Atomic bombs 2) tanks 3) ideas (science)  4) poison gases 
including nerve gases 5) air born troops 6) Air transport, or in his terms ‘flying 
lorries’. 
  
33
The second British atomic test and the first of nine atomic detonations on the 
Australian mainland, was reported on the front page of The Age of 16 October 1953 
with the headline ‘Bomb Blast Heard Over 200 Miles’ and with the subheading of 
‘Secrecy preserved on Atomic Weapon exploded at Woomera’.
  Such weapons development not only contributed to strategic power, but to 
economic power through the development of Britain’s armaments industry. 
34 The site was Emu 
Field, actually 300 miles from Woomera.35
          It is confusing that the article reported the device was ‘Exploded at Woomera’ 
but also details that residents of Woomera saw no evidence of an explosion and 
learned of the detonation much later, via radio broadcast. However, it states that 
residents in an area 150 to 200 miles south and south-south west of Alice Springs 
reported hearing the blast. Also contained in the report is that five Mustang fighters 
and a tank less than half a mile from ground zero appeared undamaged, as did a steel 
tower a mile away. It was also reported that a Canberra jet bomber of the RAF flew 
over the site 20 minutes after the test to collect air samples.
 
36
  There was speculation in the print media at the time about the proximity of 
the inland atomic tests to the Woomera rocket range.  An article that commented upon 
  
                                                 
31 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 5 October, 1953, p. 5. 
32 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 13 October, 1953, p. 2. 
33 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 14 October, 1953, p.2. 
34 The Age, Melbourne, 16 October, 1953, p.1. 
35 Cross and Hudson, Beyond Belief, p. 22. 
36 The Age, Melbourne, 16 October, 1953, p.1. 
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the nature of the Woomera Rocket Range was featured in The Age of 3 October 1953. 
It was titled ‘Woomera-Atomic age Township’.37 It mentioned the pilot-less airplane, 
Jindivik, which would be the subject of later speculation. An article entitled 
‘Plutonium and Jindivik’ appeared in The Sun of 5 October 1953. This was written by 
Douglas Wilkie, who represented The Sun at the second atomic test and whose 
material was also at times featured in The Advertiser; they were both News Limited 
publications.  This article speculated on the likely marriage of atomic weapons with 
missile technology tested at Woomera. Specifically he mentioned Jindivik, which 
takes its name from the local indigenous word for ‘broken pieces’.38
Wilkie also wrote a piece for The Sun of 12 October 1953, entitled ‘The 
Curtain Rises at Woomera’ in which he again referred to the possible use of guided 
missiles for the delivery of atomic ordinance.  In this article he described the Jindivik 
as a target aircraft for the testing of surface to air missiles.
 
39 This is consistent with 
other sources.40
 Wilkie’s report of the next day, 13 October 1953, speculated on whether 
delays in the second test may in fact be attributed to political reasons as opposed to 
concerns about weather conditions. He asks: 
 These articles are evidence that the possible mating of atomic 
warheads to missiles was an issue of public significance, which would grow through 
the decades as the perceived threat of the global arms race increased. 
 
Has the great atomic test been delayed for so many days because of extreme concern at 
Canberra and Westminster for a jittery Australian public obsessed by the menace of 
radioactive clouds?41
 
 
 The weapon was tested on 14 October. In ignorance of this, Wilkie had 
submitted a piece which was published in The Sun of 15 October 1953 titled 
‘Canberra Caution Holds Up A-Tests’. He suggests that weather concerns are no 
longer a valid excuse for delays. He wrote: 
 
                                                 
37 The Age, Melbourne, 3 October, 1953, p.2. 
38 The Sun, Melbourne, 5 October, 1953, p.9. 
39 The Sun, Melbourne, 12 October, 1953, p.2. 
40 Monash University Centre for Telecommunications and Engineering, section entitled The ‘Aerial 
Target’ and ‘Aerial Torpedo’ in Australia, http://www.ctie.monash.edu.au/hargrave/rpav_jindivik.html, 
site accessed 20/02/08. 
41 The Sun, Melbourne, 13 October, 1953, p.2. 
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Summer weather is now so firmly established- ahead of time- that it seems impossible that the 
atomic bomb can be exploded this year… unless the scientists rely more on their expert 
knowledge of the behaviour of radioactive discharges and are less severely restricted by 
‘safety’ precautions laid down in Canberra lobbies.  
 
 This is extremely ironic due to the fact that, as discussed, this device had a 
greater than expected yield. Within the article, Wilkie also suggested that: 
 
Canberra’s safety limit far surpasses anything laid down by the scientists and is, in some 
measures due to the ‘cobalt bomb’ scare mongering produced by politicians.42
 
 
Here, Wilkie attributes the scare of the ‘cobalt bomb’ to politicians. The 
possible links of such a device to the Australian tests was still being discussed in the 
1980s in relation to cobalt metal pellets discovered at Maralinga, suggesting that this 
myth did not end with the 1950s43 though later accounts such as the 2005 book 
Beyond Belief by Cross and Hudson did not attribute the presence of cobalt pellets at 
Maralinga to a ‘cobalt bomb.’44
  The Sun’s front page of October 16, 1953 states ‘Britain Sets Lead on A-
Bomb’ and the corresponding article, ‘Pocket A Bomb’ also by Douglas Wilkie, 
suggests that the fact that the bomb had a smaller yield than the ‘Hurricane’ test at 
Monte Bello is indicative that the British had surpassed the US in the field of ‘pocket’ 
atomic bombs. 
 The notion of such a device is further explained in 
Appendix II, and this article shows that the issues associated with such devices were 
being presented to the public. The source for this material was likely to have been the 
statements made my scientists and examples of parliamentary debate discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
45
 Similar content was expressed in an article ‘Woomera Atomic Explosion 
“Great Success”’ on page 1 of The Advertiser also of 16 October.
  
46
                                                 
42 The Sun, Melbourne, 15 October , 1953,  p.3 
 Also on this page 
was an article cited as being contributed by a special correspondent from London, 
titled ‘Britain “Ahead of World” With Atomic Weapon’ reinforces the falsehood that 
43 Tame & Robotham, Maralinga, p.111, p.236. 
44 Cross & Hudson, Beyond Belief, pp. 99-109. 
45 The Sun, Melbourne, 16 October, 1953 pp. 1-3. 
46 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 16 October, 1953, p. 1.  
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the United Kingdom was ahead of the other world powers on matters of atomic  
weapons technology and added further currency to this myth.47
 The Sun of 16 October 1953 featured an article entitled ‘Blackened Circle 
Where Bomb Tower Had Stood’. This was sourced from the London Daily Mail 
correspondent Lachie McDonald, who was also present at the tests. He correctly 
asserted that the test was a ground burst on a tower. He also noted that the spread of 
potential devastation was smaller than that at Nagasaki- a site he had visited a few 
weeks after the Japanese surrender.
 
48
 McDonald commented that it was possible this weapons test was related to the 
development of small tactical warheads designed for missiles developed at 
Woomera.
  
49 This was not the case- there were two other types of device being 
considered as missile warheads at this time.50 An article in the same edition of The 
Sun, 16 October 1953,  entitled ‘First A-Bomb definitely a winner’ from Chapman 
Pincher, a science writer for The London Daily Express, suggests that this test was the 
first of an operational bomb, that is, a ‘weaponised’ device. This was, again, not the 
case. Pincher also asserted that the device yielded between 10-15kt, the actual figure 
was closer to 10. Pincher states for comparative purposes that the bomb exploded at 
Hiroshima yielded 20 Kt, but the actual figure in that case was ~12.5Kt.51
 On the same page is an article from Douglas Brass, titled ‘Blast May Even 
Shatter Anglo-US secrecy.’ This article suggested that the ‘advanced’ nature of the 
weapon test may even bring about the desired sharing of atomic secrets between the 
USA and Britain.
 
52
                                                 
47 Ibid.  
  Chapman Pincher also contributed an article to The Advertiser 
published on page 8 of the 16 October edition as ‘Noted Science Writer Describes 
Explosion.’ The article is accompanied by illustrations of the tower on which the 
device was mounted, and an interpretation of the internal design of the device. This 
clearly shows a hollow plutonium ‘pit’ surrounded by explosives, though these are 
48 The Sun, Melbourne, 16 October, 1953 pp. 1-3.It is also significant that the Nagasaki device was 
slightly more than twice as powerful as those tested as part of ‘Operation Totem’.  
49 Ibid. 
50 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html site accessed  19/02/08 
51  The Sun, Melbourne, 16 October, 1953, p, 3. In relation to possible fallout, Melbourne readers were 
assured by the front cover headline of The Sun of October 19, 1953 ‘Radioactive Dust Gives Us a 
Miss’ and corresponding data to demonstrate that Melbourne had been spared any drifting irradiated 
particles. 
52 The Sun, Melbourne, 16  October, 1953, p. 3 
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shown as cylinders and not shaped lenses. Pincher suggests that Britain may be 
capable of producing ten or more atomic devices a month. 53
 The time period around this 14 October 1953 test saw media attention to the 
issue of atomic weapons proliferation. The Courier of 16 October 1953 ran a front 
page article titled ‘P.M. Calls for Control.’ This detailed Menzies outspoken 
perspective on the need for a strict system control of atomic weapons technology. He 
also believed it should be shared among the western allies.
 
54 The Sun of 20 October 
1953 featured a front page article titled ‘P.M. seeks Atomic Knowledge “Swap”’. It 
reports that Prime Minister Menzies intended to press US President Eisenhower that 
there should be a free exchange of information pertaining to atomic weapons 
development between allied nations.55
 A few days earlier, The Times of 15 October 1953, featured an article titled 
‘Atomic Weapon Control’ with the subheading ‘Mr. Menzies Suggests an Early 
Conference’. The article states that Prime Minister Menzies had spoken to the House 
of Representatives on 15 October on ‘a private member’s motion urging the United 
Nations to devise immediately a world-wide system for the control of atomic 
armaments’.
  
56
 Juxtaposed by images of the ‘Totem 1’ test, The Age of 16 October 1953 also 
explored the atomic weapons control debate with an article titled ‘Support for Atomic 
Weapons control- M.P.’s Warn of Danger of A-Bomb Race’. The article stated that: 
‘The importance of, and support by Australia for, international control of Atomic 
Weapons was stressed by speakers from both sides of the House in a lengthy 
parliament debate today’.
  
57
 
 This report suggests that the need to have strict control 
over the proliferation and use of atomic weapons was an agreed-upon concept.  
Trevor Smith, writing in an article titled ‘Atom Bomb With a Message’ on page 2 of 
The Advertiser, 19 October 1953 commented on the use of atomic tests in Australia as 
a form of communication. He wrote: 
Psychological warfare has a very important place in the latest series of atomic explosions in 
Australia. This is as carefully calculated as the scientific aspects. And it is directed to the 
following addresses: To Moscow to keep the Kremlin aware of Britain’s advances; to 
                                                 
53 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 16 October, 1953, p. 8.  
54 The Courier, Ballarat, 16 October, 1953, p.1. 
55 The Sun, Melbourne, 20 October, 1953, p.1. 
56 The Times, London, 15 October, 1953, p.7. 
57  The Age, Melbourne, 16 October, 1953, p.5. 
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Washington to strengthen America’s reconsideration of the need for exchanging atomic 
information (this deadlock is wasting millions of pounds and dollars) ; to the Western capitals, 
every man and women in them, to keep driving home the terrible reality and finality of atomic 
warfare. 58
 
 
On the issue of the sharing of atomic technology, though in this case civil 
technology, page 3 of the 19 October 1953 edition of The Advertiser featured an 
article titled ‘Anglo-U.S.  Atomic Discussions’ which explored how an exchange 
between these two nations would not be ‘one sided.’ It reports that the UK had 
proposed the construction of a ‘breeder’ reactor at Ayrshire, Scotland.59 A ‘breeder’ 
reactor, however, can also produce fissile material60
 Britain’s wartime vulnerability to unguided V2 missiles, and the possibility of 
mating atomic warheads to more sophisticated guided missiles, was explored by 
Chester Wilmot, writing for The Advertiser on page 2, 21 October 1953 in an article 
titled ‘New technique for Delivering A-Bombs.’ Within the article, Wilmot states that 
the United States had already produced very small atomic warheads for artillery shells, 
which could also be very easily carried by missiles.
 which may be suitable for 
military applications.  
61
The Sun of 24 October 1953 reported that the era of guided missiles has begun, 
with the use of a radio-controlled Second World War era Hellcat fighter plane packed 
with high explosive being directed into a target in Korea. This was reported in an 
article titled ‘What Brains Has A Bomb?’ by Ian Jones. The title has a multi-layered 
meaning. It suggests ‘a bomb’ as in any given ‘bomb’ and also hints at ‘A-bomb’- a 
common abbreviation for an atomic device. This multi-layered meaning is apparent as 
the article explored the link between the beginning of the age of guided missiles and 
the possible marriage of the missiles developed at Woomera with atomic devices.
 
62
 The first of the ‘Totem’ tests of 1953 occurred on 15 October but the second 
‘Totem’ test which occurred on 26 October yielding a slightly smaller eight kilotons
  
63
                                                 
58 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 19 October, 1953, p.2  
 
did not seem to receive reportage. This is surprising, as The Age of  11 September 
59 Ibid, p.2.  
60 Hyperphysics, Georgia State University, section entitled Fast Breeder Reactors, 
http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/nucene/fasbre.html, site accessed 11/08/10 
61 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 21 October 1953, p.  2. 
62  The Sun, Melbourne, 24 October, 1953, p.7. 
63 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing :‘Operation Totem: 1953, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html site accessed  19/02/08 
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1953 featured a page one headline, with corresponding article, entitled ‘Two Big 
Blasts In Atomic test-Less Powerful Than Explosion at Monte Bello’ which correctly 
states that two tests, each less than 20Kt, were scheduled to be completed at Emu 
Field.64
 Three years later, the front page headline of The Sun of 17 May 1956 which 
read ‘A-Bomb No.3 Melts Desert.’
  
65  This should have read ‘No. 4.’ This article 
pertains to the ‘Mosaic’ series- the third round of tests (but not in actuality the third 
test)66 which were again conducted at Monte Bello and not in the desert. The article 
asserts that the test may have been of the primary stage or, in effect, the ‘trigger’ of a 
thermonuclear device. Though thermonuclear weapons ‘primary’ stage tests would be 
an element of the later tests staged in Australia this was not quite the case for 
‘Operation Mosaic’. In actuality, these tests were an exploration of fission explosions 
‘boosted’ with a fusion reaction within a quantity of fusion ‘fuel’: Li-6D.67
 The Times of 8 May 1956 featured an article titled ‘Monte Bello Experiments- 
Different Type of Test’. It contained the following:  
  
 
Authorities in Melbourne say that the explosion during the coming atomic tests at the Monte 
Bello islands, off the north coast of Western Australia, may not be as spectacular as the 
explosion in October 1952, during the United Kingdom’s first test at Monte Bello, or the 
explosion in emu flat, near Woomera in central Australia, in October 195368
  
 
As will be shown, this was to be correct of the first of these tests, and incorrect 
of the second. ‘Mosaic G 1’,  the first of the second round of tests at Monte Bello, 
                                                 
64 The Age, Melbourne, 11 September, 1953, p.1. 
65 The Sun, Melbourne, 17 May, 1956, p.1. 
66 It seems this mistaken belief lingered. An article from page 8 of The Times, London,  03  September, 
1956 titled “ ‘No Risk In Atomic Tests’ states that ‘Two tests have been held in the Monte Bello 
islands and one at Emu Field’ It was actually three at Monte Bello and two at Emu Field by this stage.  
67 Though a fusion reaction occurs in a ‘boosted’ device, the term ‘fusion bomb’ is generally reserved 
for multi-stage devices where the ‘fusion’ reaction takes place as a result of the implosion of a  
secondary stage as a consequence of the heat, pressure and release of  wave radiation from  the primary 
stage.  The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Elements of Thermonuclear Weapon Design, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-4.html#Nfaq4.4, site accessed 20/02/08. 
68 The Times, London, 8 May 1956, p. 11. It must be noted that there were in fact two tests at this site, 
which was known as Emu Field and not Emu Flat. Ibid, section entitled British Nuclear Testing: 
Operation Totem: 1953, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 15/02/08. 
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wrongly reported in The Sun as ‘atomic bomb no. 3’,69 was a physics experiment 
rather that the test of a weaponised device.70
Leading up to the ‘Mosaic’ test series, The Age featured a two-part question 
and answer series with Professor Titterton. The first of these was entitled ‘Answers to 
Questions on Atomic Tests’. It appeared in The Age of 15 May 1956.  In answering a 
series of questions, Titterton asserted that the weapons tests were a means to gauge 
the effects of theories developed in laboratories, resulting in less costly weapons of a 
more efficient design.  He stated that there was no co-operation on atomic matters 
between the United States of America and Britain and thus, independent British 
testing was required. He also admitted that weapons tests could only enhance 
understanding of peaceful uses of atomic energy in an indirect fashion.
  
71
 Some tougher questions were asked in the second article. Appearing in The 
Age of 16 May 1956, which was the date of the first test of the ‘Mosaic’ series, it was 
titled ‘Why Australia Is Atomic Testing Ground’. Titterton was asked why testing 
was not conducted in the UK, replying that the population density is too great. He was 
then asked if ‘there is no danger to Australia by using Maralinga as a testing ground, 
why are the Monte Bellos used?’ His answer was that tests of the likely effect of an 
atomic strike on a port must be conducted, hence the island tests. This is a valid 
explanation of the ‘Hurricane’ test, which was conducted under the waterline of a ship, 
but not the ‘Mosaic’ tests. As stated, these were experiments into the likely outcome 
of fusion boosting.  
   
 In light of the earlier debate surrounding possible use of a ‘cobalt bomb’, and 
the fact a later test as part of ‘Operation Antler’ would notoriously feature cobalt 
pellets, it is of interest to see that Titterton was asked here ‘What of the Cobalt Bombs 
with long-lasting effects?’ His reply was: 
 
It has been stated definitely, by both the U.K and Australian governments, that no cobalt 
bomb will ever be fired in Australia. Actually, it is dubious whether a cobalt bomb would be a 
worthwhile weapon of war anyway.72
 
  
                                                 
69 The Sun, Melbourne, 17 May , 1956, p.1 
70 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing: Operation Mosaic: 1956, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 15/02/08. 
71  The Age, Melbourne, 15 May, 1956, p.2.   
72 The Age, Melbourne, 16 May, 1956, p.2.  
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Titterton expressed similar sentiment in his 1956 book Facing the Atomic 
future.73 Cobalt bombs’ as discussed further in Appendix II, were widely considered 
to be a sort of ‘doomsday device.’  The authors of Maralinga, Tame and Robotham,74 
would much later attempt to discredit the story that the cobalt was used as a 
diagnostic experiment.  The much later 1987 film source Ground Zero would also 
feature sinister commentary about a lost film hiding details connected to the tests, 
which when discovered was found to be irradiated due to contact with Co- 60.75
Although at 15kt, the second Mosaic device yielded less energy than that of 
‘Operation Hurricane’, page 10 of The Times of 17 May 1956 still stated ‘Atomic Test 
Explosion-Newest British Device-Violence Startles Observers.’
 
76
The Sunday Times of 20 May 1956 featured a page 2 article titled ‘Doolittle 
Hints on Atom Tests’ which examined claims by United States Air Force (USAF) 
Lieutenant General Jimmy Doolittle made while visiting Australia that the Monte 
Bello experiments were likely to have been linked to missile developments at 
Woomera, specifically nuclear-armed surface to air guided weapons intended to 
destroy incoming aircraft which may be carrying hydrogen bombs.
 
77
An article by The Sunday Times writer John Allen on page 14, 20 May titled  
‘HIROSHIMA has led to weapon of peace’ explored how Allen, who had seen the 
destruction after the atomic strike against Hiroshima, now was better equipped to 
understand the sheer power of atomic weapons after having now witnessed the first 
Mosaic test.  He also comments that others present, who had seen other atomic 
explosions, witnessed unusual colours in the sky after this test, leading to speculation 
that new technology must have been tested, and that perhaps it was linked to the 
hydrogen bomb. Allen suggests that the strides Britain was making in atomic weapons 
technology may be what ‘could keep Britain – and Australia – at peace.’
 Though 
Doolittle’s comments here may have been relevant to later experiments such as those 
involving the ‘Indigo Hammer’ device, the link between SAGW technology and the 
‘Mosaic’ tests is not supported by other available evidence. 
78
                                                 
73 Titterton, Facing the Atomic Future, pp. 253-254. 
 Pictures of 
74 Tame & Robotham, Maralinga, p.111, p236. 
75 Avenue Pictures, Ground Zero. 
76 The Times, London, 17 May, 1956, p.10. 
77 The Sunday Times, Perth, 20 May 1956, p.2. The same page contains a piece titled ‘Crash Delays 
U.S. Bomb’ which details how the crash of a American B-57 bomber had delayed a hydrogen bomb 
test.  
78 Ibid, p.14. 
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the test, with commentary that atomic weapons technology was now ‘on our doorstep’ 
was present on page 15.79
A high but unspecified yield was correctly reported the day after the second 
‘Mosaic’ test, in The Sun of 20 June 1956 with the headline ‘A Blast Monte Bello’s 
Biggest’.  Actually, it was not only Monte Bello’s biggest but far larger than those 
that had been tested at Emu Field as well. A subsection of the article ‘Atom Pact with 
U.S. Soon,’ like previous articles, called for co-operation on matters pertaining to 
weapons development.
 
80
 The second ‘Mosaic’ test, G2, caused a significant amount of drama owing to 
the size and drifting pattern of a resulting atomic cloud. The Times of 21 June 1956 
featured an article entitled ‘Atomic Cloud Near Australian Coast’ reporting that four 
civil aircraft had been grounded in the area as a precaution.
  
81  Similarly, an article 
appeared on page 1 of The Age of 21 June 1956, titled ‘Atomic Cloud Drift Inland 
Hinted by Plane Grounding’. The Minister Beale, issued a statement to the effect that 
rumours of the cloud drifting ‘as far inland as Marble Bar’ were inaccurate.82 The 
diaries of then Minister for External Affairs, R.G. Casey, of 21 July 1956 state ‘Monte 
Bello atomic explosion yesterday [sic] with some flurry about the atomic cloud, 
which drifted over the mainland for a bit’. The actual test date was 19 July.83
Further speculation into the possible relationship between atomic bombs and 
the missiles developed at Woomera occurred.  In an article titled ‘Second A-Test at 
Monte Bello in Next Few Weeks’ which appeared on the front page of The Age of  18 
May 1956, the following was stated:  
 
 
It seems likely, however, that the present British effort is in the direction of producing small 
enough bombs to be used as warheads in tactical weapons such as guided missiles and 
projectiles. If this is so, it is probable that yesterday’s bomb was such a type, and the test 
scheduled for Maralinga in October will be a guided missile, possibly launched from 
Woomera, fitted with a nuclear warhead to explode at Maralinga.84
  
 
                                                 
79 Ibid, p.15.  
80 The Sun, Melbourne, 20 June, 1956, p.2. 
81 The Times, London, 21 June, 1956, p.8. 
82 The Age, Melbourne, 21 June, 1956, p.1. 
83 R.G. Casey, (T.B. Millar Ed) Australian Foreign Minister: the Diaries of R.G. Casey, William 
Collins Sons & Co, Glasgow, 1972. p236. Millar’s notes in this text also confirm the also confirm the 
test date was July 19. 
84 The Age, Melbourne, 18 May, 1956, p.1. 
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Neither of these speculative claims about the second ‘Mosaic’ test or the first 
‘Buffalo’ test were correct, but the line of enquiry is an interesting one, as 
‘weaponised’ devices would indeed be tested for ‘Operation Buffalo’,  though not 
involving missiles.85
Testing was soon to move again inland, to the new Maralinga site.  On 7 
September 1956 an article on page 3 of The Advertiser titled  ‘Maralinga Atom Test 
After Dawn on Tuesday’ reports that a test would be held soon, and that radioactive 
foodstuff would be given to livestock to gauge the likely effect of such contamination 
on the human population in the event of actual atomic attack.
 The controversy over the yield of the Mosaic G2 tests would not, 
apparently, emerge until 1985. 
86  The test was delayed 
by unsuitable weather conditions.87 Two articles in The Sun, ‘Race With Time in S.A 
Atomic Project’ 20 June 1956 88 and ‘And Still No Bomb,’ 24 September 1956,89  
reported further anticipation surrounding the first use of this site.  Part of this 
anticipation can be explained as this series of tests aimed, partially at least, to explore 
actual ‘weaponised’ devices- those in a form that could be dropped as ordinance in a 
real conflict. On  27 September 1956, a short page one article by Chapman Pincher 
titled  ‘Range Escapes’ detailed that 50 minutes before a the first scheduled test at 
Maralinga, winds blew back from the proposed testing site towards the Maralinga 
airstrip and village, causing the postponement of the test,90 which took place instead 
later that day. Another short article titled ‘Beale Denials Rumours’ documented the 
Minister for Supply’s rebuttal of claims that Maralinga was a poorly chosen and 
unsuitable site.91
                                                 
85 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing :Operation Buffalo: 1956, 
 On the day after the first Maralinga test, the front page of The Sun of 
28 September 1956 reports ‘After 16 Days of Waiting That Bomb Went Off at 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.htmlsite accessed 19/02/08 
86 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 7 September, 1956, p. 3. The issue of feeding radioactive feed to stock was 
discussed by Mr. Leonard William Hamilton, member for Canning, WA, CP, Australian Parliament, 
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90 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 27 September, 1956, p. 1. 
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Dusk’.92 A bomb it was, though not air dropped; the device in question was a ‘Red 
Beard’ tactical atomic weapon.93
The Advertiser of 28 September 1956 included a page 2 article by Chapman 
Pincher which showed that ‘target response items’ were present at this test. This was 
titled ‘Flight Over a Battlefield in the Dessert’ and in it Pincher describes flying over 
military equipment destroyed by the atomic blast.
  
94 A front page article on 29 
September 1956 with the headline ‘ ‘No Risk’ From Atom Blast, Minister’s 
Assurance’ explored a statement from Minister Beale to the Australian public that 
there would be no risk from the test. The article states that Beale had sought advice on 
this issue from Professor Martin of the AWTSC.95
Another actual weapon, this time a ‘Blue Danube’ type- featuring a low-yield core,
 
96  
was tested on 4 October 1956. It was described on the front page of The Sun of 5 
October 1956 as a ‘Spider Web A-Bomb.’ Witnesses stated that the smoke trails of 
rockets fired before the detonation resembled a spider web. Commentary in The 
Advertiser showed an awareness that this device was tested at ground level, with 
photos showing the explosion and the criss-cross smoke trails from the rockets97
Contrary to earlier commentary by Douglas Wilkie, The Advertiser of 5 
October 1956 included a page 2 article by Chapman Pincher titled ‘Little is Going On 
At Woomera’ in which Pincher promoted that despite the expenditure, little in the 
way of useable weapons technology had emerged from Woomera. He stated that from 
the £10m a year spent on the facility, only £1m worth of usable weapons had been 
developed.  Pincher attributes this to underestimation of the costs that emerge due to 
the remote location of the range, such as the £500,000 he cites as being spent to lay 
450 miles of telephone cable, and other technical issues such as ensuring that air-
launched missiles are developed with aircraft suitable to the task.
  
98
                                                 
92 The Sun, Melbourne, 28 September, 1956, p.1. Three excellent photos of the test were included with 
the a headline of  ‘Three Stages in Penney’s Maralinga A-Bomb Test in  The Advertiser, Adelaide, 28 
September, 1956, p. 1. 
 
93 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing: Operation Buffalo: 1956, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 22/02/08. Also, Norris et al, The 
Nuclear Weapon Databook Volume 5, p.28-30. 
94 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 28 September, 1956, p. 2.  
95 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 29 September, 1956, p. 1. 
96The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing: Operation Buffalo: 1956, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 22/02/08. 
97 ‘Second A-Bomb Exploded’, The Advertiser, 5 October 1956, p.1. 
98 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 5 October, 1956, p. 2. 
  
 
94 
A debate in the House of Representatives discussed in the previous chapter 
was the subject of an article on page 7 of The Advertiser, 11 October 1956. This was 
titled ‘Labor Censure Motion over Atomic Trials Fails.’ The article explores a speech 
by Evatt’s in the House of Representatives on how Australia should take the lead in 
the cessation of atomic testing. The article paraphrases Minister Beale: ‘it would be 
childish to say that Australia could solve the problem that the US and Britain had 
been trying to overcome for years’99
An article titled ‘Third Atomic Bomb Exploded’ with a subheading of 
‘Dropped From Valiant’ was on the front page of The Advertiser of 12 October 1956 
with photos of the mushroom cloud.
 
100 The device was indeed dropped from a 
Valiant.101 Similar photos to those in The Advertiser featured in The Sun of the same 
day.102A photo of the final test of 1956 appeared on page 7 of The Advertiser of 
October 23,103
Few other details of Maralinga tests in print media sources were presented. 
Security was tight and attention had shifted to ‘Operation Grapple’- the British 
hydrogen bomb tests conducted at Christmas Island which were very significant 
world events. 
 the day after this test. The similarities of the reportage of The Sun and 
The Adviser reflect their common ownership. 
The Advertiser of 12 September 1957 had a front page headline of ‘A-Test 
May Be Held Today’ with an article exploring how the first of a new round of tests 
may be about to occur. The same page features an article titled ‘A Missile On Target’ 
which explores the testing of the English Electric ‘Thunderbird’ SAGW being tested 
at Woomera.104
An article appeared in The Sun of 16 September 1957 which stated ‘Troops 
Move Into A-Blast Era’.
   
105
                                                 
99 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 11 October, 1956, p. 7. Beale’s comments ref Australian Parliament, 
House of Representatives, Hansard, 10 October 1956, Session 1956, pp. 1332-1337. 
 If it had been widely known that this test involved using 
cobalt metal then more attention would doubtlessly have resulted, due to popular fears 
of a ‘cobalt bomb’.  
100 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 12 October, 1956, p. 1. 
101 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing: Operation Buffalo: 1956, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 22/02/08. 
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104 The Advertiser, Adelaide, 12 September, 1957, p. 1. 
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 The Courier of 20 September 1957 on its front page featured an article titled 
‘Conventional Arms for Australia’s Defence’.  The day was a Friday, and the article 
stated: 
 
Canberra, Thurs (AUP).-The prime Minister, Mr Menzies, said today that Australia would 
not set out to become a nuclear military power but the government would act upon the basis 
that Australia’s immediate plans for defence should be in the conventional field. That was 
apart from co-operative experimental work at Woomera and Maralinga.106
 
 
Menzies’ use of the term ‘immediate’ is very convenient here; the 
commentaries of those such as Reynolds and former diplomat Richard Broinowski 
show that long-term plans involving the cited ‘experimental work’ were definitely 
under careful consideration.107
  A test which escaped interest was staged on 25 September 1957. This was a 
test of the lightweight plutonium device ‘Indigo Hammer’.
 
108
 The last test of an actual atomic device (as opposed to the components tested 
in later ‘minor trials’) occurred on 9 October 1957.
   This test was 
overshadowed by the larger explosions resulting from British testing at Christmas 
Island. 
109 It  made the front page of The 
Sun of 10 October 1957, with the headline ‘The Balloon Bomb’s Off.’110
The Advertiser of 10 October1957 had a page one headline of ‘Balloon A-Test 
Best of Series’ and an article pertaining to the test of the previous day. The article 
states this was the first ‘airburst’ of a nuclear weapon in Australia,
 The device 
had indeed been detonated while suspended by balloon.   
111 which is not the 
case; a previous test at Maralinga had been dropped by an RAF valiant and fused to 
be an ‘airburst.’112
                                                 
106 The Courier, Ballarat, 20 September, 1957, p.1. 
 Am image of the mushroom cloud is situated next to another 
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South Australia had seen the Russian satellite. These articles and images show that 
fears associated with the Cold War were newsworthy items in this time period. 113
A front page article appearing in The Courier’s, 10 October, was headlined 
‘Biggest Atomic Bomb Yet Exploded’. It went on to state: ‘Its heat and blast were far 
more powerful than any of the previous 11 fired on the Australian continent or the 
Monte Bello islands’.
 
News of Sputnik largely overshadowed coverage of this test in other newspapers. 
114 In fact, of the 11, ‘Hurricane’ was of similar yield (25kt) 
‘Mosaic G2’ was some two to three times greater. 115
An article in The Times of 30 October 1957 explored the preliminary plans for 
the pooling of atomic secrets between Britain and the U.S.  It reported that US 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was ‘not sure, even now’ that Congress would 
allow proposed changes to the McMahon Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to take place.
 
116  
The phrase ‘even now’ is of interest, as ‘Operation Grapple,’ the testing programme 
centred on Britain’s hydrogen bombs, was ongoing at this time. The British Hydrogen 
bomb would soon see Anglo-American co-operation, and security concerns 
surrounding Australia and Canada would ensure that Britain’s former colonies were 
not granted access to this discourse.117
The representations of the atomic tests within newspaper sources make 
interesting reading. The efforts of the British were largely celebrated by the 
Australian press, but the successful detonation of the first British device, as discussed, 
was only deemed page 6 news for London’s The Times.
   
118
Print media sources indicated that in the absence of freely available data 
pertaining to the tests there was a willingness to engage in speculation- and this is 
what influenced public opinion during this time period.  
 Thus there was somewhat 
different reportage between The Times and the Australian newspapers. Also, although 
the tests were of keen interest to Australian readers, security was tight and reportage 
was often inaccurate and unverified, but nonetheless ran as front page or feature 
articles. 
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Commentators in the print media, in instances explored in this chapter, 
showed considerable faith in the superiority of British technology compared to that of 
the US. This is evident from claims at the time of the 1952 Hurricane test that Britain 
had somehow surpassed the US, even the possibility that it had been a test of a 
Hydrogen bomb.   
That this device was more sophisticated than those developed by the US at this 
stage is not evidenced. In fact there is considerable evidence to the contrary. It is 
certainly the case that details pertaining to atomic weapons are under very strict 
control and that publically available sources cannot in any way give a researcher a 
complete understanding. However, that the ‘Hurricane’ device was based on the 
American plutonium weapon developed during the wartime ‘Manhattan Project’ is 
well established.  This is the subject of what has been termed the ‘Penney Report’, or 
‘The UK Public Record Office File AVIA 65/1163, "Implosion" (covering the years 
1947-1953).’ Though this file has been withdrawn from access by UK Public Record 
Office in 2002, no attempts were made by the British government to contact those 
who may already have held copies of this report119 and a copy is present on Carey 
Sublette’s Nuclear Weapon Archive.120 According to the archive and as discussed in 
Chapter One the ‘Hurricane’ device differed only in that it featured a ‘levitated’ 
core.’121
Later claims were made that Britain had surpassed the US in the area of cheap, 
smaller ‘pocket’ atomic bombs which would now be referred to as ‘tactical’ nuclear 
weapons. As this chapter explores, these claims began to emerge at the time of the 
first inland tests, ‘Operation Totem’ of October 1953. Although the ‘Totem’ devices 
had demonstrated that cheaper plutonium being produced in Britain may be suitable 
for weapons use, 
 
122
 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, for example, notes that following the 
restoration of co-operation between the US and UK on matters of atomic weapons in 
  that these devices were more sophisticated is not evidenced. 
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120 Ibid, section entitled UK Public Record Office File AVIA 65, "Implosion". Report written by William 
G. Penney on 1 July 1947, 
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1958 ‘All subsequent UK nuclear weapons are based on US designs, which were 
made available to Britain.’123
  The claims of British superiority in terms of weapons design is an example of 
how speculation and personal belief was presented as an accurate record of history. It 
is also possible that these claims were published in the print media purely to generate 
reader interest. In any case, the belief that Britain’s nuclear weapons technology was 
more advanced than that of the US was a myth that emerged during the course of the 
tests. With the emergence of later evidence, this particular falsehood did not become 
firmly established in the Australian public consciousness beyond the era of the tests 
  
The print media of this time period also included comments on the impending 
marriage of atomic weapons and guided missiles, including the emergence of SAGW 
technology.  With the growing arms race, this issue would continue to be significant 
to debates surrounding nuclear weapons down through the decades. 
 The possibility of Anglo-American co-operation on nuclear weapons also 
received media coverage during the tests, including a demonstrated awareness of the 
McMahon act and its implications. The press gave voice to Menzies concerns over 
global nuclear proliferation, which was apparently concerned with the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons by states he perceived as hostile, as he simultaneously advocated the 
sharing of weapons technology among the Allied western powers. Menzies also stated 
that Australia had no immediate plans to acquire nuclear weapons for Australia, 
although clearly there was more to this issue than the information to which the public 
was granted access. 
Via the press, parliamentary debates surrounding the cessation of testing 
entered into the public consciousness, with some of the exchanges discussed in 
Chapter Two being directly referred to in the print media.  
It is clear that during the tests, although the scientists behind the programme 
were held in very high regard, there was also concern about drifting atomic clouds 
and irradiated dust. It was not publicly known that many of the tests produced 
unexpected yields, a fact which makes the arguments of those like Wilkie who 
asserted that the scientists of the testing programme should have been free of the 
interference of politicians, seem ill-considered in hindsight. The press reportage 
explored in this chapter exhibited the tensions caused by delays in the tests due to 
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weather, and that public safety concerns existed. An example is the drift of fallout 
from the Mosaic G2 test. Concerns about fallout from these tests continue to this day, 
with controversy emerging in 1985 regarding the yield of this test. 
 Also, there was very real concern surrounding ‘salted’ enhanced radiation 
weapons-the cobalt bomb. As the previous chapter explored, the issue of the ‘cobalt 
bomb’ was raised in Australian parliamentary debate, prompted by statements by 
physicists. This was likely the source of press commentary, and ambiguities about the 
use of cobalt in the Australian tests were still being referenced in the 1980s.124
The overwhelming impression gained from a reading of mainstream media 
accounts of the tests from 1952 to 1957 is that the UK and Australian Governments 
maintained a strict control of information, and in absence of such information, 
journalists were all too willing to present speculation as fact. The effect of this is still 
apparent in later sources, although much information pertaining to these tests remains 
unknown. The next chapter will explore the reportage of the atomic tests in the news 
paper of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), The Tribune. 
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Chapter Four: The tests in the reportage of The Tribune. 
 
 
The Tribune, Sydney, October 7, 1953, p. 3. 
 
The Tribune, of Sydney, was the official newspaper of the Communist Party of 
Australia (CPA). This chapter examines how issues connected with British atomic 
testing were explored and documented within this newspaper. The CPA of the 1950s 
was vocally against atomic testing in Australia, and supported global atomic 
disarmament.  It should be noted that the CPA and thus The Tribune can not be 
considered wholly representative of communism in Australia and certainly not 
representative of all those Australians towards the left of the political spectrum. The 
Tribune was supportive of Soviet interests. The mainstream impact of The Tribune on 
the debates surrounding the tests was no doubt restricted by popular anti-communist 
feelings but it is regardless of value to examine the contribution of the paper on the 
tests.  
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The Liberal Party of Prime Minister Menzies openly supported the notion that 
Britain and the United States required atomic weapons to preserve democracy. The 
Liberal Party of Prime Minister Menzies was also vocally anti-communist in the 
scenario of the Cold War.1
Menzies came to power in the 10 December 1949 federal elections on a 
platform of anti-communism.  In the lead up to the election, Menzies and the leader of 
the Country Party, Arthur McFadden had announced that if they won the following 
election, the Liberal coalition would take action to dissolve the CPA.
 
2  Menzies 
regarded the impending Bill to dissolve the party to be ‘a law relating to the safety 
and defence of Australia.’3
 The Communist Party Dissolution Bill was introduced by the Menzies 
Government to parliament on 27 April 1950. It became law on 20 October of that year, 
following lengthy debate in the Senate. An appeal against the Bill was made in the 
High Court by the CPA and representatives from ten unions.
 
4 On 9 March 1951, six 
of the seven High Court Judges ruled the bill to be unconstitutional and it was 
overturned.5  Evatt, a former High Court Judge, had a key role. He appeared before 
the court on behalf of the Waterside Worker’s Federation and he was able to make a 
case that the legislation was unconstitutional.6 The decision by the High Court went to 
a Referendum on 22 September 1951, which was defeated by the small majority of 52, 
082 votes.7
In 1952, the Liberal Government that had attempted to make the CPA an 
illegal organisation allowed the first British atomic test to occur. As Chapter Two 
explored, within Australia critics of British atomic testing were often accused of 
having political beliefs leaning towards communism. In addition to its anti-testing 
stance, The Tribune also promoted the belief that the Soviet Union desired a cessation 
      
                                                 
1 W.J. Brown, The Communist Movement and Australia: A Historical Outline: 1890s to 1980s, 
Australian Labor Movement History Publications, Haymarket, Australia, 2000. 
2Alistair Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia: A Short History, Hoover Institution Press, 
Stanford, California, 1969, p.111. 
3 John Murphy, Imagining the Fifties; Private Sentiment and Political Culture in Menzies’ Australia,, p. 
98. See also Judith Brett, Robert Menzies’ Forgotten People, Macmillan, Sydney, 1992, p.77. 
4 Brown, The Communist Movement and Australia, pp. 189-197. 
5 Ibid, p.199.  
6 Stuart MacIntyre, A Concise History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 
p.209. 
7 Brown, The Communist Movement and Australia, p. 201. Stuart Macintyre states of Evatt’s role in 
opposing the legislation: ‘This was Evatt’s finest hour. He was in no sense a communist sympathiser 
but alarmed by the sweeping powers the government proposed to employ. MacIntyre, A Concise 
History of Australia, p. 210. 
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of all atomic testing, and had only developed their bomb in response to American 
aggression. Also of interest is that The Tribune promoted the belief that renewed post-
war Japanese militarism was of greater threat to Australia than aggression from 
communist countries.  
 The post-war period era saw considerable discussion in Australia about Soviet 
espionage. There was widespread fear of Soviet spies. Earlier, under Chifley’s ALP 
Government, the American intelligence operation code named ‘Venona’ had 
discovered that 20 Australians had been passing on defence-related information to the 
Soviet Embassy in Canberra.8 Among the implications of this operation was that the 
US refused to grant access to defence oriented scientific date to Britain if such 
information were to be shared with Australia9
1953 saw considerable attention in The Tribune leading up to and after the 19 
June execution of US ‘atomic spies’ Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.
 
10 The Tribune 
portrayed the Rosenbergs as martyrs for peace. Numerous articles suggest that the 
leaking of American atomic secrets to the Soviet Union was intended to end the 
American monopoly on atomic weapons. The unfortunate reality is that such leaks 
contributed to the speed of development of a Soviet atomic device,11  and thus an 
increased perceived need in America for more powerful weapons in the form of the 
Hydrogen bomb. This was technology that Soviet politicians and scientists chose to 
match.12
Following the defection of Soviet diplomat and apparent ‘spy’ Vladimir 
Petrov to ASIO, the Royal Commission on Espionage was established, it was 
informally known as the Petrov Commission. It began on 17 May 1954. One of the 
figures examined by the Commission was Tribune contributor and Editor Rex Chiplin, 
who was believed by some to be a Soviet Agent.
  
13
                                                 
8 ABC Television, Australian Story, Fortress Australia. 
 The Petrov Commission aided in 
raising fears of communism among the Australian people. It is of no coincidence that 
9 Cain, ‘Venona in Australia and its long-term Ramifications, ’p.234;  Terrorism & Intelligence in 
Australia,  p.74. 
10 Brown, The Communist Movement and Australia, p.169. 
11 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 220. 
12 Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, Simon and Schuster, New York, 
1995.  
13 Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia, pp. 112-113. 
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the Commission began in May 1954, the month of a federal election, which would be 
won by Menzies.14
The Petrov Defection and Royal Commission on Espionage were met with 
scepticism by communist writers in the 1950s. The 1956 book The Petrov Conspiracy 
Unmasked compiled and edited by W.J. Brown includes in its forward: 
  
 
The desertion of Vladimir Petrov and his wife from the Soviet Embassy in Australia in April 
1951 allowed the Menzies Government and the Australian daily newspapers to unleash a spate 
of “spy scare” hysteria such as the country has never seen before. But, as the Leader of the 
Federal Labor Party Opposition Dr. H.V. Evatt and many others have since charged, the truth 
of the Petrov Affair is that it was no more than a crude political conspiracy organised over a 
long period with the knowledge of the Prime Minister, Robert Gordon Menzies.15
 
 
It should be noted that this book is not neutral in its tone in that the author was 
himself a communist and it may be regarded with scepticism, yet it is indicative of the 
level of mistrust of Menzies’ government. 
Frank Cain writes that the Petrov affair drew together ‘…the deep fears stirred 
by RG Menzies since the 1930s over the threats of communism, the effects of the US 
led Australian Venona operation of the late 1940s and the continuation of political 
surveillance now conducted by the new and secret ASIO’16 Cain also documents how 
Petrov, who made claims to ASIO that he was a colonel of the Soviet Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD), was actually a cipher clerk with poor English skills, a severe 
drinking problem and involved in the illegal on sale of scotch whiskey obtained from 
the Soviet embassy, and unlikely to be in possession of information of real 
significance.17 Cain suggests that ‘In spite of the intellectual and linguistic 
disadvantages affecting Petrov, he enjoyed the extensive tolerance of his embassy 
superiors as if he had been sent on a mission to Australia to entrap or be entrapped for 
intelligence purposes.’18 The report of the Royal Commission into Espionage’s report 
in September 1955 would not recommend a single prosecution for espionage.19
                                                 
14 Murphy, Imagining the Fifties, chapter entitled ‘The Petrov Election,’ pp. 121-135.  Frank Cain 
writes ‘the highly publicised allegations of Soviet spying were effective in having sufficient 
uncommitted voters swing back to the support the Liberal Party-led government and have it returned to 
power.’ Cain, Terrorism & Intelligence in Australia, p. 130. 
 
15 W.J. Brown (ed) The Petrov Conspiracy Unmasked, Current Books Distributors, Sydney, 1956, p. 6. 
16 Cain, Terrorism & Intelligence in Australia, p. 131. 
17 Ibid, pp.130-158.,  
18 Ibid, p. 138.  
19 Ibid, p. 156. 
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 In this environment the contributions of The Tribune were not likely to have 
popular appeal or impact, even if the paper raised some valid points on the issues 
around the tests. The Tribune, as this chapter details, gave considerable attention to 
peace rallies.  Some examples of such rallies supported by or that have been 
associated with the CPA were a petition in early 1950s calling for a ban of the atomic 
bomb and the National Peace Conference in Sydney in 1953.20
Other newspapers from this period showed a tendency to portray the atomic 
tests as spectacular or even exciting events, complete with enthusiastic headlines and 
photos of towering mushroom clouds. The Tribune highlighted the atomic tests as 
destructive and horrible. The headlines are chosen to show the potential human and 
environmental damage of the detonations. Also, unlike other papers, The Tribune 
offered little comment or speculation on the technical aspects of the testing 
programme.  
 
 Like most contemporary Menzies-era sources and indeed later ones, The 
Tribune contains numerous errors concerning the events of the tests and the realities 
of atomic weapons. This is understandable in light of the poverty of information 
pertaining to the tests within the public domain, and in consideration of the paper’s 
obvious bias. Unlike the other media sources explored within this dissertation, The 
Tribune offered little in the way of strategic assessment or technical details about the 
tests. Overall, it detailed the risks of the tests and their negative consequences, citing 
examples of world opinion being against them. The Tribune of this period also went 
to great lengths to promote the plight of the Aboriginal people, a group whose 
interests were not adequately considered by those responsible for the tests. The 
newspaper also explored which groups were involved in anti-testing activism. It listed 
scientists, world leaders, church groups and offered much detail about the strong 
involvement of various Australian workers unions in anti-testing protests and petitions.  
 The Tribune was a weekly Sydney paper released on Wednesdays. On one 
such Wednesday, 16 April 1952, was published a page 8 article titled ‘Stop Deadly 
Atomic Blast in Australia.’ The article suggests that Australian servicemen and 
civilians may need to receive a series of injections to be protected from the effects of 
ionising radiation, and possibly the use of a protective skin paste. There is no apparent 
                                                 
20 Len Fox, Broad Left, Narrow Left, Published by the Author, distributed through APCOL, 
Chippendale, 1982, pp. 118-119. Fox does not state who instituted the petition but reports that 
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evidence to support this. The article suggests: ‘...every civilian and soldier will be 
under dire threat of death or disease when the dread mushroom cloud arises over 
Australia-if the scientists allow it to rise.’ And later: ‘Aborigines anywhere near the 
explosion centre would of course be doomed to a horrible death’. The newspaper 
urged its readers to write to Prime Minister Menzies in protest about the upcoming 
tests.21 Soon after, following the ‘Hurricane’ test, The Tribune published disturbing 
photos taken of victims of the American atomic strikes against Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, as a means to highlight the unpleasant realities of atomic warfare. The 
photos were situated under the headline ‘Here is the truth behind Monte Bello’.22
 The ‘Hurricane’ experiment, aside from demonstrating that Britain had a 
workable bomb, aimed to explore the effects of a shipborne atomic device being 
detonated in a harbour. It was feared that atomic bombs might be employed against 
the western powers in such a fashion. Under a headline of ‘Don’t be fooled by atom-
bomb lies’, The Tribune explored this fear on 29 October 1952. It contained this 
statement: 
 
 
A hundred and twelve million Soviet citizens signed the Stockholm petition declaring they 
would regard the first use of an atomic bomb in any future war as a war crime. THAT’S the 
best answer to hate-mongers who assert that Russia could or would sneak an A-Bomb-laden 
ship into a foreign harbour to blow up thousands of women and children.23
  
 
 The tests in Australia were to receive further attention from The Tribune when 
they moved to Emu Field in 1953.  On 23 September 1953, an article was published 
detailing ‘The Great Australian Convention on Peace and War’, chaired according to 
the Tribune by Reverend J. Eric Owen. The article states that the convention would 
come to its climax at a public rally at Leichhardt stadium, Sydney, that evening. The 
article states that: ‘convention deliberations receive added significance from the A-
bomb experiments taking place at Woomera.’ This is yet another example of how the 
missile tests at Woomera and the Atomic tests at other locations were often confused 
in publicly available sources. The article states that a representative of the Aboriginal 
Rights Council of Victoria, Mr. Shadrack James, spoke at the convention as part of on 
                                                 
21 The Tribune, Sydney, 16 April 1952, p. 8. 
22 The Tribune, Sydney, 22 October 1952, p. 7. 
23 The Tribune, Sydney, 29 October 1952, p. 2. 
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‘appeal for measures to better the conditions of Australian aborigines’. 24
A problem exists in that the convention commenced not on 23 September but 
on 10.00am on 26 September 1953 at Sydney Town Hall, with Owen not as chairman 
but as the first keynote speaker.
 It is not 
stated whether the atomic tests were specifically mentioned by James, though the 
impact of the tests was discussed at other times during the convention.  
25 Though the reportage of The Tribune would suggest 
the conference was affiliated with the CPA, the reality was that it was intended for all 
those desiring peace.26
The Tribune article, which clearly states that the convention was ‘still meeting 
in Sydney’ is positioned next to a piece titled ‘Points About the Atom Bomb’ which 
discusses the bomb as a device intended for use against civilian centres. The main 
article contains little that suggests that the atomic tests received much attention from 
those who spoke at the convention. 
  
27
 A front-page article on 7 October 1953 was directly concerned with the risks 
of the tests to the Aboriginal populace. It was titled ‘Aborigines in Danger- A Bomb 
on Reserve.’ The author clearly feared the worst, stating ‘Many Australian Aborigines 
will almost certainly be killed on the atomic bomb tests on the Woomera Rocket 
Range. The bombs will be exploded in the vicinity of the Great Central Aborigine 
Reserve.’ Again, these tests were not actually carried out on the Woomera site. In fact 
people were not killed in these tests, certainly not directly, and The Tribune can thus 
be seen as contributing to this element of mythology.  Long term consequences are 
not so easily understood.  However, people were relocated and their traditional lands 
contaminated. The article also stated ‘This utter disregard for human life emphasises 
the danger to all Australians of the failure to ban the atomic bomb.’ The article 
explored the unfortunate ‘rounding up’ of nomadic people in the testing area. It stated:  
  It is clear that had the convention been a 
wholly CPA organised event, The Tribune would have been in a position to print the 
correct dates. 
 
                                                 
24 The Tribune, Sydney, 23 September 1953, p. 12. It is not stated if James is any relation to Indian 
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criticism doe to the belief that it was controlled by the CPA. The article uses the convention as a focal 
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Even if the atomic blast does not kill and mutilate a number of Aborigines, it will devastate 
their hunting grounds, destroy their waterholes and devastate tribal territory that is sacred to 
them and to which they believe their spirits will return after death. The inevitable result will 
be disastrous to the tribes.  
 
It is through this kind of moderate language and reasonable claims that the real 
consequences of the tests are best understood. Also explored was the notion that the 
atomic bomb is not really a viable military tool, due to the indiscriminate nature of its 
destruction. The article suggests that such bombs are only suitable against civilian 
populations as a weapon of terror. Also contained is a reference to the perceived 
continued threat from Japan in the post-war environment: 
 
The atomic secret is no longer a secret. There is nothing to prevent Japan, now getting aircraft 
carriers and jet planes as well as a big army, from getting the atomic bomb. And despite the 
pious hopes of ‘Pig Iron Bob’, the Japanese are more likely to march southward than attack 
China and the Soviet. 28
 
 
It is worth noting that Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan was a formal 
renunciation of war.29 ‘Pig Iron Bob’ is a reference to Menzies, who famously, or 
perhaps infamously, allowed the sale of materials, notably iron, to Japan prior to the 
Second World War. The page also featured a photo of the crowd at the peace rally at 
Leichhardt stadium, the caption states ‘Photo shows part of the huge crowd 
disappearing into the bleachers during the final rally of the convention on Peace and 
War in Sydney’s Leichhard Stadium’30 This rally had been reported on 23 September 
as occurring ‘that evening’ as the climax to the convention31 which did not begin for 
another three days.32
                                                 
28 The Tribune, Sydney, 7 October 1953, p. 1. 
  Page 3 of the 7 October edition featured a political cartoon. The 
picture is in the desert, and two Europeans are being addressed by an Aboriginal man, 
29 National Diet Library, Birth of The Constitution of Japan, section entitled Text of the Constitution 
and other Important Documents, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s2, site accessed 
21/04/09. 
30 The Tribune, Sydney, 7 October 1953, p. 1. 
31 The Tribune, Sydney, 23 September 1953, p. 12. 
32 Deery, ‘War on Peace; Menzies, the Cold War and the 1953 Convention on Peace and War’ p. 254. 
See also Reason In Revolt, section entitled Australian Convention on Peace and War, 
http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/biogs/E000493b.htm, site accessed 30/09/09. 
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carrying spears and in traditional dress. In the background drifts a mushroom cloud. 
The caption: ‘Hello professor-How’s civilisation?’33
Page 5 of The Tribune of 14 October 1953 featured an article in the form of a 
creative piece by regular contributor and known communist public speaker Paul 
Mortier. The piece was titled ‘Atomaniacs- The High Priests of Destruction.’ The 
article notes that some time that week, Menzies, ‘safely ensconced some thousands of 
miles away’ is satisfied at his role in a ritual in honour of a new god; ‘atomic death’, a 
ritual about which details have been hidden from the British and Australian public, 
and shared only between the top British, Australian and American ‘brass hats’. The 
article suggests the people will not join in the ‘worship’ as they remember the first 
appearance of this ‘new god’ and here the article goes on to offer an account of the 
wartime atomic strike against Hiroshima.  Later, it discussed how the ‘high priests’ 
considered Hiroshima only a ‘feeble beginning’ and thus devise the Hydrogen bomb, 
where ‘the Hiroshima bomb is merely the fuse.’ The article then details a warning 
from Albert Einstein about the destructive potential of such bombs, and then states:  
 
 
But the high-priests accepted it not as a warning, but as a promise. “Let us build a cobalt 
bomb” they cried, “a bomb which would send clouds of poisonous dust to circle the world and 
obliterate life.” Australian Physicist, Professor Oliphant, said that ‘only a madman would 
explode such a bomb.” Rumours that such a bomb was to be exploded at Woomera were 
officially denied. But the people were given no details. The representatives of a foreign power 
could be told-but not the Australian people. 
 
 As already outlined, there were no plans to test such a bomb, which was not 
really a viable device in any case. It is of interest that The Tribune attributes 
commentary on the ‘cobalt bomb’ to Oliphant. The article highlights Australia’s 
vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction and plays on the fears of the populace: 
‘And we in Australia-what does that mushroom over Woomera portend for us? Nearly 
half of our population lives in two of our coastal cities. Just two atom bombs could 
destroy them.’ This is indicative of a belief that Australian involvement in atomic 
proliferation would make the country a more likely target for such weapons.  This is 
reinforced by the manner in which the article discusses in its conclusion the need to 
stop atomic testing in Australia before the ‘the time will come when Sydney, 
                                                 
33 The Tribune, Sydney, 7 October 1953, p. 3. 
  
 
109 
Melbourne, Adelaide and our other cities are targets for atomic bombs.’ The article 
states that the Council of Peace and War, which ‘defied Menzies efforts to destroy it’ 
is evidence of the growing movement against Menzies and in favour of 
disarmament.34
The notion that proliferation merely creates further ‘nuclear targets’ is a total 
rejection of the belief, which was then coming to prominence that atomic weapons 
could bring about some measure of stability by making total warfare on a global scale 
impossible. As Chapter Two explored, Opposition leader H.V. Evatt would also 
express a desire for complete global disarmament. Such anti-nuclear commentaries 
would frequently be linked to communist agendas.  
 
 One belief was that atomic and other weapons of mass destruction could, 
supposedly, prevent total war. The bombs would be used as tools of intimidation.  
This notion was discussed in an article in The Tribune of 21 October 1953, titled 
‘Answers to A-Bomb Fears. ’ It made the claim: ‘Although Chinese, Russians and 
other intended “enemies” were supposed to be frightened by the Woomera A-bomb 
on Thursday, Australian politicians and newspapers soon showed who was really 
scared.’ This claim suggests that the experiments were being used, in part, as a form 
of communication with ‘enemies.’ The article then went on to explore the notion that 
those who were frightened were the Australian populace. Like Mortier’s article of 14 
October, it compared the atomic tests with some kind of pagan ritual, stating: 
 
At Woomera itself the proceedings, as described and broadcast, resembled the rites attending 
the worship of some horrible and fearful heathen god, down to the mystic intonation (“four, 
three, two, one”) before the bang.35
 
 
 There would be a pause in these ‘heathen rites’ in Australia until testing 
resumed, first in the Monte Bello islands and then at Maralinga, in 1956. On 11  
January  of that year, four months before the next test is Australia, The Tribune 
published an article titled ‘Bulganin, Pope offer…Chance to lift A-clouds from Aust.’. 
N.A. Bulganin was the then Soviet Premier, whose comments were drawn from his 
                                                 
34 The Tribune, Sydney 14 October 1953, p.5. The writer attributes the suggestion that only a madman 
would detonate a cobalt bomb to Oliphant. This statement was referred to in the House of 
Representatives on 17 September 1953 by Mr. Ward, member for East Sydney of the ALP, yet he had 
stated the scientist was from the ‘Sydney University’ and not the ANU. Australian Parliament, House 
of Representatives, Hansard, 17 September 1953, Session 1951-53, p. 317. 
35 The Tribune, Sydney, 21 October 1953, p. 10. 
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exchange with American TV correspondent Charles Shutt on New Year’s Day. The 
article begins: 
 
Imperialists want to hurry on World War III and fight it with globe-busting H-bombs. They 
show great partiality for Australia and the South Pacific when testing-time comes round. 
Australia’s role is that of ‘expendable’ guinea pigs, whose weather, health, crops, and even 
lives can be jeopardised without too much worry in Washington or London. 
 
 The 1950s era claim that Australians (and others) were ‘guinea pigs’ is worthy 
of note, later commentaries are often similar in tone. The article also states, in relation 
to the upcoming ‘Operation Mosaic’: ‘“Experimental” H-bomb explosions- maybe 
not with an H-bomb itself- are scheduled for the Monte Bello Island in April.’ These 
two tests would begin in May. They were indeed experiments employed to gain data 
about fusion reactions; though they were not “hydrogen bombs” per se.  Bulganin is 
quoted as stating: 
  
…the Soviet Union sees the way out of this so-called atomic deadlock not in the continuation 
of the arms drive, but in fresh efforts to reach agreements on the banning of atomic weapons 
and on the stopping of the armaments race. 
 
 Further: 
 
Marshal Bulganin was asked to comment on assertions that the possession of H-bombs by 
both east and west had led to a disarmament deadlock, but also “automatically excluded the 
possibility of hydrogen war.” “Assertions of this kind can, in fact, lull the vigilance of peoples 
who support the elimination of the threat of an atomic war.” He agreed that the fact that 
“atomic and hydrogen weapons cannot be used with impunity” had a deterrent effect on those 
circles which would like to unleash a mass-annihilation war. 
 
It is clear that Bulganin, as well as The Tribune, were or wished to appear 
sceptical regarding the concept that the threat of ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ 
could ensure peace. The article then ties Bulganin’s statements, and an earlier 
statement from the Pope, to The Tribune’s anti-testing commentary: 
 
Marshal Bulganin’s statements should be read alongside the Pope’s Christmas call for the 
renunciation of atomic tests and the banning of the use and manufacture of atomic weapons. 
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Both statements point the way forward for Australia. The Australian Labor Movement has 
demanded the ending of tests on Australian soil. Even sections of the capitalist press, 
including the Sydney Daily Mirror and the Century, have joined the demand. This week’s 
Century headline reads: Keep H-Bomb out of Australia.36
 
 
Even though ‘Operation Mosaic’ was some months away, The Tribune 
showed an awareness of the likelihood of controversy surrounding the drifts of atomic 
clouds across the mainland.  This is expressed in an article from 22 February 1956, 
titled ‘Stop the Monte Bello Menace to Australia” which featured the sub-heading 
“Where Will Deadly A-Dust Go?”  It details how a meteorological expert, Mr. 
Frederick Rose, wrote to The Tribune expressing concern regarding the uncertain path 
of clouds resulting from atomic detonations. Rose is reported as having served during 
the war in aviation forecasting.  He is quoted as stating: ‘The Minister for Supply, Mr. 
Beale, is trying to lull the Australian people into believing that the atom bomb will not 
be exploded on the Monte Bello islands unless the meteorological experts say it is 
safe.’ He then comments on the impossibility of making this assurance. As it 
happened, the clouds from the ‘Mosaic’ experiments did indeed drift in an unexpected 
fashion. Rose is also quoted as stating: “There is no way to make atom bomb tests 
safe except by not holding them.”37 As the next round of tests neared, protests 
continued. The Tribune of  21 March 1956 featured an article titled ‘Meeting on atom 
ship hits tests’ detailing how a protest was staged alongside the ship M.V. Comara, 
which was about to sail to the Monte Bello islands with equipment for the tests. The 
article details that the meeting was attended by 200 waterside workers and seamen 
and was addressed by Mr. P.R.  Lawrence, MLA, as well as representatives of the 
Seaman’s Union, Lumpers’ Union and the West Australian Peace Council.38
The Tribune of 16 April 1956 featured an article headlined ‘All voted against 
the A-bomb tests.’ It discussed further protests by unions, stating: 
 
 
All nine members of the Management Committee of the NSW Gas Employees’ Union have 
answered Yes, Yes, Yes, to three questions on the Peace Council’s Public Opinion Poll. They 
[sic] questions ask for a Yes or No to: Cancelling the present series of A-bomb tests in 
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37 The Tribune, Sydney, 22 February 1956, p.2. 
38 The Tribune, Sydney, 21 March 1956, p.2. 
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Australia; action through the UNO for a general ban on atomic weapons: suspension of all 
bomb tests pending such a ban.39
 
 
More articles detailing protests would follow, including ‘Protests flood in as 
H-hour nears’ in The Tribune of 25 April 1956. It began thus: 
 
Political, industrial and church protests are mounting on a world scale as the date draws near 
for the dreaded explosions of horror weapons in Monte Bello (Australia) and the Marshall 
Islands. 
 
 The article details how Adlai Stevenson, who was an American Democratic 
Party candidate in the 1952 elections and who would later became US Ambassador to 
the United Nations, was among those calling for a halt to atomic testing, as well as Dr. 
H.V. Evatt. 40
 Also featured on this page is an article under the heading ‘Rex Chiplin Says...’ 
along with an accompanying caricature of Chiplin, The Tribune’s editor: 
 
 
Commonwealth Serum and Laboratories office scientist Dr. J.J. Graydon was seriously 
injured in the Woomera explosion. Dr. Graydon is a world authority on blood. 
• What was he doing at Woomera, which is supposed to be a weapons testing range? 
• Was he supervising the assembly of bacterial weapons? 
• Was he studying the effect of radioactivity on blood cells? 
It is in everybody’s interest to demand an explanation of his presence at Woomera.41
 
 
 This was speculative and would not be the last time that The Tribune would 
attribute the injury or death of a scientist at Woomera (which was not an atomic test 
site) to atomic testing.  On 2 May 1956 was featured an article titled ‘This A-test 
death must be the last! Tragedies contract the glib assurances.’  It states:  
  
Grief over the death of a top British scientist at Woomera and regret over the severe injuries to 
others will be mingled for Australians with alarm. Is this the last-or only the first- fatal 
accident to be associated with the nuclear weapons tests in and near Australia this year? 
James Lister, the scientist killed at Woomera, can be rated as one of the casualties of the world 
war III which must never be allowed to happen.  
                                                 
39 The Tribune, Sydney, 16 April 1956, p.2. 
40 The Tribune, Sydney, 25 April 1956, p.3. 
41 Ibid. 
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 As will be explored, Lister did not die as a consequence of atomic testing. The 
article goes on to comment on Minister Beale’s assurances the tests would do no harm. 
The article challenges Beale’s assurances, stating ‘Mr Beale may be entitled to his 
opinion. But so are the following scientists who, knowing something about the subject, 
have warned humanity to stop nuclear weapons if it wants to go on living.’  Listed are 
members of the Federation of American Scientists, Dr Robert Oppenheimer, Professor 
Ernest Pollard and Professor Stanley Livingstone.  The article also suggests that 
‘Japanese, Danish, British, Australian and countless other doctors have supported 
these American Authorities’.42
The missile accident which caused the fatality was covered by the 
international news service, Reuters. The story was published in The New York Times 
of 20 April 1956 with the headline ‘Secret-Missile Accident at Woomera Kills One’.  
The article shows nothing to suggest this fatality had any connection with atomic 
testing, and it did not. The fatality and five injuries were caused when a test missile 
exploded at the Woomera rocket range. The article also details that an RAAF aircraft 
flew an iron lung to Woomera Hospital to treat one of the casualties.
 
43
The Tribune article pertaining to the accident, and other material featured in 
The Tribune of this time period, also offers comment on the contamination of 
Japanese fishermen, including the death of Aikichi Kuboyama, as a consequence of an 
American hydrogen bomb test going wrong.
 
44  This was the test ‘Castle Bravo’ of 1 
March 1954 on a reef off Bikini Atoll,45
  The Tribune continued to feature material related to anti-testing protests. Also 
on 2 May 1956, was an article titled ‘W.A. Seamen Force Safeguard on A-Test’ 
which states that: ‘The Seamen’s union in WA has won a guarantee that no State-
owned ships will be allowed within 500 miles radius of the British atom explosion on 
the Monte Bello islands.’
 further discussed in Appendix II.   
46
The Seamen’s Union contained a notable communist element. One issue about 
which the union was vocal was Australian involvement in the Korean War, a conflict 
 
                                                 
42 The Tribune, Sydney, 2 May 1956, p. 6. 
43 The New York Times, New York, 20 April, 1956, p. 5. 
44 The Tribune, Sydney, Sydney, 2 May 1956, p.6. 
45 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Operation Castle, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/Castle.html, site accessed 04/03/09. 
46 The Tribune, Sydney, 2 May 1956, p.12. 
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which was regarded as a fight against the spread of communism, W.J. Brown in his 
2000 book The Communist Movement in Australia commented: 
  
In Australia at the outset of the war many unions, with the seamen to the forefront, 
condemned the Korean War and the Menzies Government for supporting it. Criticism by the 
Federal Executive of the Seamen’s Union of Australia of the Korean war was immediately 
attacked by the media throughout Australia.47
 
 
Later, Brown comments on the stance of The Tribune on this conflict: 
 
In a direct move to try to intimidate the Communist Party, W. Burns, the publisher of The 
Tribune, was charged with sedition and sentenced to nine months gaol, later reduced to six 
months. Burns’ crime was the appearance of a Tribune article headed “Not a man, not a ship 
for Korea.’48
 
 
On 9 May 1956  an article appeared in The Tribune  titled ‘WA Govt to 
discuss demand for A-test ban’ which stated: ‘After a protest march of seamen 
through the streets of Perth, the WA Deputy Premier, Mr. Tonkin, promised that the 
Cabinet would discuss seamen’s demands for an end to nuclear weapons tests’49  On 
16 May 1956, the day of the test ‘Mosaic G1’, The Tribune published an article titled 
‘Storm of protests against A-tests’ which contained: ‘Nearly 3000 Sydney waterside 
workers have voted almost unanimously, in a public opinion poll, against the holding 
of nuclear weapons tests in or near Australia’.50
 The controversial ‘Mosaic G2’ test of 19 June 1956 would lead to allegations 
being published in The Tribune that radioactive rain fell both in Cloncurry, 
Queensland and in Melbourne, Victoria. 27 June 1956 saw a headline of ‘Radioactive 
rain falls over Queensland- All Queensland demands- Ban the bomb tests’.
 Similar examples abound. 
51   The 
‘official’ history of J.L. Symonds comments on the rain, stating ‘The radioactive 
content of the rainwater was estimated to be much below maximum permissible 
levels.’52
                                                 
47 Brown, The Communist Movement and Australia, p. 188. 
  The debate about whether there is ‘a safe dose’ of radiation is again raised 
48 Ibid, p 188-189. Not cited in the book is that this article appeared in The Tribune, 1 July 1950, p. 1. 
49 The Tribune, Sydney, 9 May 1956, p.3. 
50 The Tribune, Sydney, 16 May 1956, p.8. 
51 The Tribune, Sydney, 27 June 1956, p.12. This rain is also discussed within this documentary: Film 
Australia, Silent Storm, directed by Peter Butt, 2003. 
52 Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia. 
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by this. Due to the varied agenda of those that have offered comment on this 
radioactive rain it is difficult to understand if it were potentially dangerous with any 
degree of certainty.  
 
 
The Tribune, Sydney, 4 July 1956, p.4. 
 
The Tribune of 4 July 1956 featured a cartoon, depicting a woman carrying her 
shopping, while a butcher examines a steak with what appears to be a stylised Geiger 
counter. The caption is ‘A beautiful cut, madam, and only a 100 count.’ The cartoon 
was situated over a headline of ‘Atomic Meat a Threat to Australia’ in an article 
which contained the comment: ‘Discovery of radio-active rain near Cloncurry 
(Queensland) last week justified Queensland meatworkers’ demands for the Geiger-
testing of cattle from the west.’53
The Tribune of 18 July 1956 featured a headline of ‘Is Fed. Govt. Hiding Facts 
on H-tests?’ and an article which stated: ‘An authoritative report from Victoria this 
   
                                                 
53 The Tribune, Sydney, 4 July 1956, p.4. 
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week stated that after the recent Monte Bello H-bomb tests highly radioactive rain fell 
in Melbourne- it registered a Geiger count of 2,000 compared with the normal count 
of 70.’ 
This was not an ‘H-bomb’ test, but the test of a fission bomb that included a 
quantity of fusion ‘fuel’ as an experiment, further evidence of confusion surrounding 
this test in the public domain. The article detailed how the Melbourne newspaper The 
Guardian, also a CPA publication,54
 
 sought answers from a scientist assigned to the 
Australian Atomic Safety Committee, Mr. Stephens, who commented ‘I’m not 
competent to interpret the facts’, suggesting that curious parties should contact, 
Professor Martin of the AWTSC. The article contains the following from, and in 
reference to, Martin: 
“We have tested rain from all over Australia and can tell you that the radioactivity was never 
at any time more than one per cent of the normal background” Asked how this squared with 
the report of prospectors in Cloncurry and other places of counts up to 3,000 compared with 
the normal background of 20, Professor Martin said those who took the counts probably did 
not know what they meant.55
 
 
 On 1 August 1956 The Tribune printed an article titled ‘New Health Director 
Warns on Atomic Explosions’ with a sub-heading of ‘Future Generations May be 
Threatened.’ The tone of the piece is consistent with that of later anti-test 
commentaries which warn of the notion of ‘no safe dose’ and of the unknown nature 
of genetic damage and risks to the unborn.  The article details how Dr. Wallace, the 
then new Director for the NSW Department of Health, had spoken about the lack of 
facilities in that state for detecting excessive radiation.  He is quoted as stating: ‘It is 
possible to determine that a given amount of radiation is not having any effect on the 
individual; but no-one can yet lay down the law on the possible effects on future 
generations’ and later: ‘I would say that as little as possible exposure to radiation is 
the best thing.’56
In September 1956 testing began at the now-infamous Maralinga site. The  
 These observations compare favourably with later analysis of the 
possible effects of ionising radiation. 
                                                 
54 Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia , p.81 
55 The Tribune, Sydney, 18 July 1956, p.1. 
56 The Tribune, Sydney, 1 August 1956, p.10.  
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weekend beginning on 8 September of that year also saw the Australian Assembly for 
Peace open in Sydney. The Tribune of 5 September offered an article headlined ‘Test 
peril looms as Assembly gathers.’  It was well-known that testing was about to 
resume in South Australia. The article states that: ‘World disarmament will be one of 
the three main topics discussed at the Assembly.’ Two detonations later, on 10 
October 1956, The Tribune would again publish claims pertaining to the radioactive 
contamination of meat, with the headline ‘Atomic cloud pollutes our meat country.’ 
The corresponding article drew information from the 8 October 1956 Sydney Sun to 
suggest that cattle in Alice Springs ‘…showed a count of 3000 compared with the 
background 30.’ The Tribune also reports that: ‘Sydney and Newcastle pigeon-
fanciers report the non-return of homing pigeons flying in the bomb-affected area.’ 
And ‘In an interview with Tribune, Mr. Matt Lydon, secretary of Newcastle’s pigeon 
club, pointed out that there was an atomic cloud in the area and even if the pigeons 
had not passed through it, they would certainly have had to pass through a 
contaminated area’.57
 The Tribune of 31 October 1956, stated in headline ‘New ALP Call to End A-
Bomb Tests.’ It featured quotations from ALP Senators McKenna and O’Byrne,
   
58 
discussed in Chapter Two, from the record of parliamentary debate Hansard, from the 
Senate, 24 October, 1956. 59
 
 This was an example of an exchange, also covered in 
examples of mainstream press discussed in Chapter Three, in which anti-testing 
commentary was equated by Liberal Party Senators with being ‘Anti-British.’ Evatt 
and other members of the ALP had clearly expressed the belief that all tests should 
cease, not just those being held in Australia. The article comments on how atomic 
weapons technology was, at the time, confined to only three countries and states:  
A “gentlemen’s agreement” to ban tests could easily be policed, because nobody could today 
explode a nuclear bomb without scientific instruments recording the fact for the rest of the 
world.60
 
 
In 1957 British nuclear testing was conducted both at Maralinga as well as 
Christmas and Malden Islands. The latter, ‘Operation Grapple’, was intended to 
                                                 
57 The Tribune, Sydney, 10 October 1956, p.1 
58  The Tribune, Sydney, 31 October, 1956, p.1. 
59 Australian Parliament, Senate, Hansard, October 24, 1956, Session 1956, pp. 882-883. 
60 The Tribune, Sydney, 31 October, 1956, p.1. 
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demonstrate Britain’s mastery of the technique of ‘radiation implosion’- the 
technology of the hydrogen bomb. Throughout 1957 The Tribune, like most 
Australian newspapers, devoted considerable attention to the hydrogen bomb issue.  
The detonation of the British hydrogen bomb resulted in renewed Anglo-American 
co-operation on matters of atomic weapons; it was hardly necessary for the US to 
withhold weapons-oriented data from its ally once they had tested their own megaton-
range devices. 
 Yet even before such a British test, on 30 January 1957, The Tribune 
published a piece titled ‘Australia in Pawn for U.S. A-tests’ It suggested that:  
 
Without the consent of the Australian people, the American army may soon take over the 
Woomera rocket range and the Maralinga atom bomb testing range under an Anglo-American 
deal. The result could be an immediate and automatic involvement for Australia in any war 
started by the U.S or its allies. Australia would be tied to a policy decided on in Washington.61
 
 
Despite these fears, a handover of testing facilities never eventuated. The 
Nuclear Weapon Archive states that following the decision by the US to adopt Britain 
as a strategic partner in ‘deterring the Soviet Union’, Britain’s nuclear weapons were 
based on American designs. To this end, joint US-UK testing took place at the 
American testing range in Nevada, while the UK lent America the use of its Malden 
island site for a 1962 round of thermonuclear tests.62
Local testing had largely been overshadowed in the media by global events in 
the form of the larger hydrogen bomb experiments. The coverage in The Tribune of 
1957 pertaining to weapons was mostly concerned with tests throughout the world 
and not just those tests on Australian soil. On 20 February 1957 The Tribune featured 
an article titled ‘Vic. Unions Seek World Industrial Action Against Nuclear 
Weapons.’ It stated that ‘Melbourne Trades Hall Council last week proposed that the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions should seek world industrial action to ban the use 
of nuclear weapons and experiments with them.
 
63
                                                 
61 The Tribune, Sydney, 30 January 1957, p. 2. 
 In its anti-testing commentary, The 
Tribune would continue to place the blame for atmospheric tests on the capitalist 
powers, claiming it was always the intention of the USSR for a global ban on such 
62 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Joint US-UK testing, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 04/03/09. 
63 The Tribune, Sydney, 20 February 1956, p.16. 
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tests to be enforced. An article that carried this message was titled ‘Stop the Bomb 
Tests.’ It was published by The Tribune of 19 March 1957, and it suggested that if any 
young children develop symptoms of blood disorders or bone cancers it is due to 
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan’s rejection of worldwide 
demands for the suspension of nuclear testing. The article states that such disorders 
are linked to Sr-90 contamination from nuclear tests, which the article suggests the 
USSR wishes to ban. As the ‘hazardous levels’ of such fission products are not 
understood, the article suggests the only safeguard is to cease all testing.64
There is no doubt that the cessation of atmospheric testing was a positive step 
for humanity and the environment, for such testing without doubt causes some level 
of contamination.  Also, Sr-90 is indeed a dangerous fission product. Yet this article 
seems to promote the notion that any blood disorder or bone cancer would certainly 
be the result of test related fallout. The article blames such fallout on the West, 
however, the Soviet Union itself conducted no fewer than 221 atmospheric tests.
 
65
On 10 July 1957 The Tribune carried an article with the headline of ‘May 
Have to Ban Milk!’ This may have been linked in some way to the work of Hedley 
Marston. The article details that a member of the Federal Civil Defence Authority, 
Colonel Lillywhite, made a statement to a school of dairying technology at the 
Hawkesbury Agricultural College, Richmond. The statement was to the effect that the 
ban on milk might be foreseeable, in the event of continued nuclear testing, due to 
cows eating quantities of radioactive grass. Thus: ‘Radiation (strontium) would attack 
the bones and milk of cows.’ Such a ban on milk did not occur and atmospheric 
testing in Australia in any case ceased that year. The article states that the need for a 
ban on testing was: 
 
 
...further strengthened by Dr. E.P. George, an advisor to the NSW Civil Defence Organisation, 
who last week said that nuclear tests held already would eventually “kill a few thousand 
people.” 
 
Dr. George is also quoted as stating that airbursts of large hydrogen devices 
would contribute a high level of contamination as they threw ‘radioactive material 
                                                 
64 The Tribune, Sydney, 19 March 1956, p.2. 
65 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Soviet Atmospheric Tests, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/Sovatmtest.html , site accessed 04/03/09. 
  
 
120 
high in the upper-atmosphere.’66
The Tribune continued to report on anti-testing demonstrations. An article of 
17 July 1957 was titled ‘Deputation to ask Beale to stop A-tests.’ It detailed a public 
meeting held at Paddington Town Hall. The meeting elected a ‘Stop the tests’ 
deputation to see Minister Beale. It consisted of approximately 12 men and women, 
including Mr. E.J. Ward MP, and Ald. W.M. Rigby.
 This interpretation can be challenged. If most of the 
yield of the test was gained from the fusion reaction, and not fission reactions in the 
primary stage or in a uranium tamper, then such devices would not produce much 
fallout if detonated in the air. If detonated on or close to land or water, however, such 
material would be drawn up with the atomic cloud, irradiated, and would drift. 
67 Ward was quoted as stating 
“As long as the Menzies Government is in power, this country is in real danger.’68
On 31 July 1957 The Tribune  covered the story of a slogan, stretching 40 feet 
and in letters 4 feet high, being painted in protest on the retaining wall around 
Government House, Adelaide. The slogan was ‘Ban all A-H bomb tests.’ In reference 
to the writer: 
 
 
A young moulder and outstanding Adelaide swimmer, Lance Bestt, did the job. He was 
afterwards arrested, his house searched and personal belongings removed. A magistrate fined 
him £20 and ordered him to remove the sign within 12 days. There was considerable public 
support for Mr. Bestt and admiration for his courage and skill with the brush. 
 
 The article explains that local unions called on Bestt to offer congratulations 
and donations were sent to cover the fine. The Moulders Union requested that charges 
be dropped. Bestt is reported as agreeing to remove the sign during Saturday 3 August 
1957, but in the interim the sign was seen by thousands.69
A large article of 14 August 1957 titled ‘Hiroshima to Maralinga- a Long 
Stride into Peril’ reflected on the legacies of atomic weapons. In particular it offers 
The Tribune’s perspective of the stance of communists on such weapons. The  article 
discusses that the World Council of Churches, the Pope, The Australian Council of 
Churches and most of its affiliates, notable scientists (Einstein, Oppenheimer, Rotblat, 
 
                                                 
66 The Tribune, Sydney, 10 July 1957, p.1. 
67 Mr. William Mathew Rigby, NSW, ALP. 
68 The Tribune, Sydney, 17 July 1957, p.12. 
69 The Tribune, Sydney, 31 July 1957, p.1. 
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Oliphant and others) many governments  and political parties of socialist and other 
countries worldwide opposed nuclear arms, and goes on to state that: 
 
Prior to say, 1954, the more militant sections of humanity who comprised the movement 
against atomic weapons often had to bear the stinging attacks of people who are to-day 
themselves part of the movement. This was the lot of Communists in particular. Yet, far from 
carrying grudges, we welcome every one of these new voices to the movement. How could it 
be otherwise? Communists are serious about their struggles for peace. Atom bombs, like 
modern wars in general, arise from capitalism; and they bring endless suffering to the people. 
Hence Communists fight against them, and have done so rather longer than most other 
people.70
 
 
It is certainly the case that communists in Australia were vocal anti-test 
commentators. However, as the examples of parliamentary debate in Chapter Two 
show, it was very common for other groups with an anti-testing agenda to have their 
interests dismissed as merely playing into the hands of the communist world powers. 
These powers were, for the most part in the West, considered ‘the enemy’. The article 
discusses the location of Maralinga, and how the scientists monitoring weather 
conditions would have the public believe that their understanding of the drift of 
fallout clouds is foolproof. The article challenges this by citing that Americans, who 
are ‘experienced at this sort of thing- they’ve been at it for 12 years’ have experienced 
illnesses such as leukaemia, hair loss and other disorders in locations downwind of 
areas in Utah and Nevada. The article also discusses how every atomic detonation 
adds to the levels of radioactive particles in the atmosphere, and how these will 
eventually fall to earth. 
It goes on specifically to discuss the threat from Sr-90 being absorbed in bone 
tissue. Comments on war and atomic weapons as consequences of capitalism aside, 
the article makes a good case against atmospheric atomic testing, which did 
eventually cease in the 1960s. It did not make bold, unsubstantiated claims. For 
example, the article does acknowledge that the ailments reported in Nevada and Utah 
‘may’ be a consequence of atomic testing. That the likely effect from atomic tests on 
future generations is poorly understood is also a valid point. The article closes by 
stating: 
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The Menzies Government has never opposed atomic weapons and tests, but it has 
“contributed” places like Maralinga. The true cold-bloodedness of its policies stands revealed. 
Twelve years after Hiroshima, we know enough to say:  “No more. This is too dangerous, 
Stop all tests, at Maralinga, and everywhere else!” Let Maralinga return to its normal, desert 
quiet, until the Australian people are ready to turn the desert to good use.71
 
 
 One is left to wonder what use the author imagined for this desert. Its pre-
testing use as the traditional land of the local Aboriginal people seems quite 
appropriate.  
The final three Australian ‘major tests, ‘Operation Antler’, drew closer. The 
more environmentally damaging but less newsworthy ‘minor trials’ would continue 
for some years after this. The Tribune reported the upcoming round of tests with the 
headline ‘Bomb Tests in Four Weeks’ with a subheading of ‘Labor council to start 
peace petition’ on 14 August 1957. The article begins:  
 
It has been announced that the Maralinga (South Australian) A-bomb tests are scheduled to 
start within four weeks. By way of reply, the Melbourne Trades Hall Council announced the 
launching of a petition for a world ban on A and H bomb tests. The petition will state that “in 
the words of Sir. W. Churchill, “there is no defence against the hydrogen bomb’.”72
 
 
There is a certain irony to the inclusion of this Churchill quotation, as it was 
the lack of viable defences against hydrogen bombs which led Churchill to the 1954 
decision that Britain should possess such a bomb.  Also reported in the article are 
details of the 6 August opening of the third World Conference against atomic and 
hydrogen bombs in Tokyo. This was the twelfth Anniversary of the atomic strike 
against Hiroshima.  The conference was attended by 70 delegates from 22 countries, 
though the Japanese government, according to The Tribune, had banned some 
delegations.  
The article also details a 300,000 strong rally through the streets of Moscow, 
also on 6 August, as a protest against nuclear war. The article concludes by reporting: 
 
Latest position, in brief: The Soviet Union is ready to sign a pact to-morrow to ban all nuclear 
tests, making no prior conditions at all. The ban would be self-policing because the bombs 
can’t be exploded without detection in all countries. But the Soviet Union would agree to the 
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admission of all countries of inspectors to observe whether the bombs are going off or not. 
Other methods of disarmament could then be considered, the Soviet Union said.73
 
 
After this date, the USSR would conduct a further 181 atmospheric nuclear 
tests, the last being on 25 December 1962.74 On 30 October 1961 the Soviet Union 
tested a device which was the most powerful the world had ever seen by a large 
margin.75
On 21 August 1957, The Tribune featured the headline of ‘Miners Call for 
Action against Atomic Tests.’ The article reports that the Central Council of the 
Miners’ Federation called for ‘industrial days of protest.’ It was proposed that this 
would involve a special day of protest on the coal fields. Also: 
 
 
In another resolution, the Council also asked the Australian Council to contact the World 
Federation of Trade Unions and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions seeking 
a declaration by the two bodies calling for an end to the tests.76
 
  
 The article also states that a large public meeting was held in the Lower 
Melbourne Town Hall the previous week, in which it was unanimously demanded that 
the Menzies Government immediately cease the Maralinga tests. The meeting was 
called by the Communist Party, with the party’s general secretary making statements 
to the effect that: ‘the Soviet Union had, ever since its birth stood unswervingly for 
peace and disarmament of the nations.77
 The Tribune of 21 August 1957 features an article titled ‘Adam and Atoms,’ 
which explores a book of the same title.
 
78 This book was written by William Grayden, 
a West Australian MP.79
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
  The article discusses how Grayden authored a WA 
Parliamentary Select Committee report on conditions in the Warburton-Laverton area, 
which was ignored in the daily press until, the article suggests, The Tribune published 
extracts from it, and that even following this, the report was largely ‘merely used it as 
a seven-day sensation.’ Also discussed is how the Federal Government requested the 
74 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Soviet Atmospheric Tests, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/Sovatmtest.html , site accessed 11/03/09. 
75Ibid, section entitled Tsar Bomba, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/TsarBomba.html, site 
accessed 11/13/09. 
76 The Tribune, Sydney, 21 August 1957, p1. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Grayden, Adam and Atoms. 
79 Mr. William Leonard Grayden, MLA, West Swan, Lib, Ind. Lib. 
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WA Government cede 285,000 acres of Aboriginal reserve in the Warburton-
Laverton area for a weather station and nuclear weapons testing range.  The article 
states: ‘and that’s where Grayden’s story begins. The natives were driven out.  The 
Menzies government didn’t put it like that, but that is what happened.’ The article 
discusses the huge area, comprising parts of the Northern Territory, West and South 
Australia, expected to be patrolled by one patrol officer. The article also states: 
 
The WA Government further ceded prospecting rights of over four million acres of the 
Reserve to South Western Mining Ltd, an off-shoot of US International Nickel Company. 
Grayden makes the point that a factor influencing the position of the weather station was its 
proximity to water. He makes another point- that given assistance the natives could establish a 
pastoral industry on one well-watered and grassed strip of the reserve. But this section is 
included in South West’s Mining lease! The natives are left with a barren, waterless and 
foodless waste. 
  
Also, Grayden discusses that the plight of the aboriginal people has been 
worsened by the arrival of atomic testing and that the Commonwealth should grant 
financial aid for affected persons. The article states that Australians go out of their 
way  ‘... to protect a rare bird, so why not go out of our way to preserve 
natives…particularly as they have something to offer humanity later on.’80
Adam and Atoms will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Five. The 
Tribune would soon cover a different kind of damage from the tests. Not human, not 
environmental, but of valuable material objects. A story of 28 August 1957 was 
headlined ‘Tragic Waste in Maralinga Tests Exposed.’ It states: 
 
  
Earmarked for destruction in the forth-coming Maralinga atomic tests are: 
• Brand new motor cars- Holdens and other makes 
• Brand new refrigerators. 
• Brand new stainless steel sinks. 
• Household equipment of all kinds- all brand new. 
This claim was made at Melbourne Trades Hall Council last Thursday night by Liquor Trades 
Union delegate, Mr. Jim Coull. 
                                                 
80 The Tribune, Sydney, 21 August 1957, p.7. There had been an earlier public debate about the plight 
of Aboriginal people displaced by defence research. In this case it was missile research at Woomera, 
which had resulted in public speeches by activist (later Sir) Douglas Nicholls, and others, beginning in 
1946.  See Mavis Thorpe Clark, Pastor Doug; The Story of Sir Douglas Nicholls, Aboriginal Leader, 
Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1956, pp. 143-159. 
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 The article reports that Coull understood such items were to the value of more 
than £1, 000,000 and were being sent to Maralinga as ‘guinea pigs’ for the tests. The 
article also states: ‘Mr. Coull said if capitalists thought they could solve their 
problems of over-production this way, they were mistaken.’ It is doubtful that such 
weapons effects tests were also intended to dispose of excess material objects. The 
article also mentions anti-test protests and petitions: ‘Trades Hall Council Secretary, 
Mr. J.V. Stout, who is also president of the Victorian Branch of the Labor Party, told 
the Council: ‘“We have 100,000 petition forms coming from the printers next week 
which will give Victorians a chance to sign against the Maralinga and all other atomic 
tests. Trade unionists must use this petition”.’ The article also reports protests in 
Adelaide by the Boilermakers Society, as well as opposition to the tests from the 
Australian Railways Union, and those at a well-attended meeting by the Meatworkers 
union. It also reports that at the ALP state convention in South Australia, ALP 
politicians were called upon to campaign against the tests. On the subject of 
leukaemia morbidity and mortality, the article stated: 
 
Tribune interviewed a prominent medical man, associated with the Medical School of the 
Adelaide University, on the incidence of leukaemia in South Australia. He said that in 1933, 
2.5 people per 100,000 contracted leukaemia annually, whereas by 1956, the figure had risen 
to 5 people per 100,000. The dreaded disease, leukaemia, which is inevitably fatal, has now 
reached the proportion when nearly 50 people contract the disease annually in South Australia, 
and prominent scientists have pointed out that the increasing incidence of leukaemia is 
associated with radio-active fall-out from atomic tests.81
 
 
As Chapter Six explores, the link between testing in Australia to cancer 
(including leukaemia) incidence and mortality is largely unsupported by studies. 
Again, though such a link is not proven it has also not been disproved. There are 
likely to be numerous other reasons for increases in leukaemia instances in the early 
half of the twentieth  century, for example exposure to various chemicals.  
The Tribune of 4 September 1957 carried an article headlined ‘Calling 
National Conference Next Month on Atomic Tests.’ The article announced that: 
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 A national conference “to consider the atomic tests now scheduled to commence at 
 Maralinga, their possible effects on the Australian people, and  their relationship to the 
 international problem of nuclear control” will be held at Adelaide on October 11-13. 
 
 What was, hopefully, the last ever atomic explosion in Australia took place on 
9 October 1957.82
 
 ‘Minor Trials’ continued, beyond the awareness of the general 
Australian populace. The conference, according to The Tribune, was organised by the 
South Australian Peace Committee, who distributed leaflets quoting known scientists 
about the dangers of the tests. The leaflet stated: ‘All scientists admit there is no safe 
minimum dose of high-energy radio-activity. Any amount of it has some bad effects.” 
The use of the word ‘all’ suggests that this notion of ‘no minimum safe dose’ is not 
disputed within the scientific community when in fact this has been the topic of 
considerable debate. The article discusses the growing importance of Australia’s 
positive interaction with Asia, and suggests that this is threatened by atomic testing.  
A separate section of the article, titled ‘notable supporters’ includes a state-by-state 
list of significant Australians who opposed the tests. Within the body of the article, it 
is stated that the leaflet contained the following quotation: 
  The World Council of Churches, His Holiness the Pope, scientists such as Professor 
 Oliphant, pacifists, the Australian Labor Party, the Australian  council of Trade Unions, and 
 other leading people and organisations have  expressed firm opinions.83
 
 
 It is indeed interesting to see that The Tribune on several occasions cites 
Oliphant as an anti-testing commentator, when Wayne Reynolds’ Australia’s Bid for 
the Atomic Bomb84
 Throughout the years of the major tests, The Tribune continually demonstrated 
a strong anti-testing agenda, and detailed that other world leaders, scientists, churches 
and unions were involved in relevant activism. The Tribune’s stance that the USSR 
always championed atomic disarmament and peace may also be called into question, 
though this was a view that the USSR wished to promote. In an article titled ‘War on 
Peace;  Menzies, the Cold War and the 1953 Convention on Peace and War,’ Phillip 
 would suggest he was, in fact, later a key figure in an independent 
Australian bid for an atomic deterrent.   
                                                 
82 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing: Operation Antler: 1957, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 11/03/09. 
83 The Tribune, Sydney, 4 September 1957, p.3. 
84 Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb.  
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Deery wrote ‘in the early 1950’s the imminence and inevitability of a third world war 
was widely accepted. America had lost its atomic monopoly, Russia promoted itself 
as the defender of world peace against the war-mongering West and Korea had turned 
the Cold War hot.’85  Whether the USSR actually intended for disarmament is a 
matter of contention.86
It is clear that The Tribune attempted to bring attention to the plight of the 
Aboriginal people. It also did much to show that the human and environmental 
damage from the tests, despite official assurances, was poorly understood, although 
many of the claims made about these issues were speculative in nature. The impact of 
the legitimate issues raised by The Tribune was no doubt lessened due to anti-
communist climate of the time.  Factors influencing this climate included  Menzies’ 
electoral campaigns, his attempt to ban the party, limited wars in Asia against 
communist insurgency and also the Royal Commission into Espionage. 
 
 The CPA, it can be said, were not wholly representative of the Australian left 
in any case.  Analysis of strategic issues, and pleas for renewed co-operation on 
matters of nuclear weapons among the allies, were not a point of focus for The 
Tribune, which despite its prominent bias explored some very genuine human and 
environmental issues associated with the tests, albeit with frequent exaggeration.  
The next chapter will examine how the issues and events connected with 
atomic testing in Australia have been explored in examples of books devoted to this 
subject.
                                                 
85 Deery, ‘War on Peace; Menzies, the Cold War and the 1953 Convention on Peace and War’, p. 248. 
86 The Tribune’s stance that the USSR desired disarmament and peace is evidenced by the following 
examples of the paper’s reportage: The Tribune, Sydney, 29 October 1952, p. 2; 11 January 1956, p.2; 
19 March 1956, p.2; 14 August 1957, p. 3; 21 August 1957, p. 1. 
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Chapter Five: The tests in selected books. 
 
This chapter will focus on the contribution to the debates surrounding the tests 
by the more prominent examples of the discourse of Australia’s atomic tests; books 
which span the years 1957 to 2007 with a focus on British atomic testing, some such 
books are wholly devoted to this subject.  
When compared, the secondary texts which reference British atomic testing in 
Australia often include differing accounts of the same events. Such discrepancies can 
be explained in part by the differing intentions of their authors. Also, much of the 
information pertaining to atomic weapons and their testing is not available in the 
public domain, or was not available at the time these accounts were written. Many 
published sources, especially print media sources from the time of the testing 
programme, were based on speculation. This has affected the factual integrity of latter 
texts which draw from such sources.  
A problem exists in that several examples of these works were published at the 
time of the the McClelland Royal Commission of 1984 and 1985, prompted by the 
same increase in public debate.  One consequence of this timing, which would have 
been most useful in selling books, is that numerous factual discrepancies may have 
been accepted by their readerships.  It must be noted that the findings of the 
McClelland Royal Commission would not have been held as totally factual or 
definitive by all authors in any case. Despite this, the findings of the McClelland 
Royal Commission would still have served to inform these authors or create new 
avenues for their research. No one is situated to be able to definitely redress the 
inaccuracies of these books as too much remains unknown. However, it is possible to 
examine how these books have contributed to the debates surrounding the tests, and 
how accounts of the same events differ.  
Much of the material that has been published about the tests has been written 
to highlight the human and environmental consequences. Indeed it is the books 
written in response to the emerging Royal Commission which did much to promote 
the belief that the tests resulted in wide scale harm.1
                                                 
1 This belief has influences much of the source material discussed in Chapter Seven and the fictional, 
artistic and pop culture responses discussed in Chapter Eight. 
  Other sources seek to explain the 
significance of the tests to Australia’s position, in security terms, during the Cold War. 
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The histories which focus on the events of the atomic tests could be arranged 
in a spectrum. At one edge would be those that seek to expose their alleged 
devastating impact, drawing heavily on anecdotal evidence. First hand accounts from 
Commonwealth armed forces servicemen, civilian contractors associated with the 
tests, and the indigenous occupants of the testing areas are cited. As I will explore, in 
many of these works, every opportunity is taken to demonstrate that the tests were ill-
considered, reckless and callous.  Two clear examples of such works are Joan Smith’s 
Clouds of Deceit2 and Roger Cross and Avon Hudson’s Beyond Belief. 3 Cross, as 
previously mentioned is a  Senior Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne 
and Hudson holds a long term interest in promoting the issues associated with the 
atomic tests and is a ‘nuclear veteran’ himself. 4 Many of these texts refer to the so-
called ‘Pom Pom’ incident, which will be further explored in Chapter Six. This was 
the contamination of an Aboriginal family, the Milpuddies, who were found camping 
in the crater left by the ‘Marcoo’ test.5 Another prominent issue concerned Army 
Warrant officer William Jones’s driving a centurion tank exposed to an atomic blast,6
At the other edge of this spectrum would be the ‘official histories’.  These 
include J.L. Symonds’ A History of British Atomic Testing in Australia,
 
also to be discussed in Chapter Six. 
7 written for 
the Australian Commonwealth Department of Resources and Energy, and Lorna 
Arnold’s A Very Special Relationship 8
 
 the latter published by HMSO (UK). Both 
these texts make use of copious amounts of data sourced from official records. They 
also seek to reject openly some of the claims made by the popular ‘exposé’ books on 
British atomic testing; for example, they call into question the accuracy of popular 
accounts of the ‘Black Mist’, the cloud of toxic particles which allegedly drifted over 
Aboriginal settlements following the test Totem 1 which occurred on 15 October 1953 
at Emu Field. This will be discussed in further detail. 
                                                 
2 Smith. Clouds of Deceit. 
3 Cross & Hudson Beyond Belief. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts Fields of Thunder, pp-118-12; Smith. Clouds of Deceit, pp. 125-127; 
Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, pp. 111-117. Also referenced without detail in Tame & Robotham, 
Maralinga, pp. 142-143. 
6 Tame & Robotham, Maralinga, pp. 155-156; Smith. Clouds of Deceit, pp. 105-106; Milliken, No 
Conceivable Injury, p. 309; Cross & Hudson Beyond Belief, pp. 39-40. 
7 Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia. 
8 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship. 
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Key books pertaining to the tests: 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, a book emerged in 1957 which explored, in 
part, the consequences of the tests. This was titled Adam and Atoms, and is a potent 
book. It provides a great deal of evidence showing the poverty stricken conditions on 
central Aboriginal reserves. It is divided into two books.  Book one explores the 
report of the Select Committee to the West Australian Parliament. It comprised: W. 
Grayden (chairman) E.P. Oldfield, S.E. Papham, J.J. Rhatigan, and Stewart Bovell. 
Though Aboriginal people were clearly affected by the tests, in that contamination 
may have occurred and certainly that people were required to move, Grayden’s book 
in no way attempts to claim that the poverty among Aboriginal people originated due 
to the tests. Instead, it uses the fact that the tests took place on traditional land as a 
means to emphasise just how poorly Aboriginal people have been treated. 9
Grayden reports that two military servicemen had gotten lost in the Maralinga 
area very easily and that they were hard to find. He uses this as evidence to clearly 
demonstrate that ‘patrolling for Aborigines’ in the testing area would be all but 
impossible. Further, he explores reports that Aboriginals had kept wandering into the 
testing areas, due to the fact that the notion that a bomb would be detonated with the 
approval of the government was, to them, so hard to comprehend. Grayden suggests 
that the prominent Aboriginal belief was that bombs would be dropped by another 
hostile country, as the idea that they would be detonated as experiments made no 
sense to them. 
 
10
Also explored in Grayden’s book is the notion that the treatment of Aboriginal 
people on the reserves was contrary to several Articles of the Declaration of Human 
Rights.
 
11 It explores this by commenting on the nature of the local terrain, the lack of 
available food and water as well as the standard of education. 12
 
 This was worsened 
by the displacement of Aboriginals for the tests. Grayden writes: 
                                                 
9 Grayden, Adam and Atoms.  
10 Ibid, p.3-5. 
11 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
12 Ibid, pp.15-28. 
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The necessity for keeping the Maralinga Testing Ground free from natives has interfered with 
the normal way of life of the natives who frequented the area east and south of the Warburton 
Mission, inasmuch as a large area of their tribal ground is now denied them.13
 
 
It appears that surviving on this land was already difficult enough, without 
having access to certain areas restricted. Grayden reported on how, due to the lack of 
food within the confines of the reserve, it was not unknown for infanticide to occur, in 
the case where a woman is still nursing a child when a second is born. He stated that 
in the harsh conditions of the area, infants may be nursed three or more years, thus 
such an instance would create a situation where the food supply of both children 
would be affected.14  Grayden states that the Committee found conditions for 
Aboriginal people in the Warburton-Laverton to be deplorable. Basic life necessities 
were lacking and that ‘Malnutrition and blindness and disease, abortion and 
infanticide and burns and other injuries are commonplace.’ Food and water was very 
sparse, and adequate medical attention beyond the capacity of the Warburton mission. 
Employment and educational opportunities were also insufficient leaving the young 
‘more poorly fitted for fending for themselves when thrown back on their own 
resources at the completion of that education.’ Grayden recommended medical and 
food aid for these people as a matter of great urgency.15
An article in The Tribune of 21 August 1957, mentioned within Chapter Four, 
explored how the select committee report did not receive mainstream attention in the 
press.
 
16 Adam and Atoms details how the committee report was initially hotly 
denounced as exaggerated and a ‘scare report’ by News Limited publisher Rupert 
Murdoch. Murdoch, according to Grayden, had denied that Aboriginal people in the 
area were sick or starving.17
                                                 
13 Ibid, p. 34. 
 The entirety of the book is full of evidence to the 
contrary, including photographs.  Though the poverty of Aboriginals on remote 
central reserves did not originate with the tests, Grayden’s book highlights the 
experiments as an example of the gross disregard that Europeans have largely 
exhibited to the indigenous populace. It is also valid that the removal of people from 
testing areas was of no help at all to this situation.  
14 Ibid, pp. 36-37. 
15 Ibid, p. 41.  
16 The Tribune, Sydney, 21 August 1957, p.7. 
17 Grayden, Adam and Atoms, pp. 68-86. 
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From an alternative perspective, and  also not solely devoted to the issue of the 
tests, the memoir of former Minister for Supply, Howard Beale, titled This Inch of 
Time18  is relevant to this discussion, particularly a chapter devoted to the tests titled 
‘The Mushroom Cloud.’ Beale opens the chapter by describing how later French 
nuclear testing in the Pacific caused many Australians to become aware of their own 
history in regards to such weapons tests. Beale states of the tests in Australia ‘I think 
the story ought to be told. It is not one of which any Australian need be ashamed.’19 
Soon after, Beale incorrectly states that nine devices were tested in Australia. Though 
there were nine devices tested inland, Beale also mentions the three Monte Bello tests. 
He incorrectly states there were four tests at Maralinga when there were seven. 
Further, Beale here states there were two tests at Emu20 and yet a few pages later 
writes ‘there were four tests at Emu and much was learned from them21
Beale later states: ‘I nearly ran into serious trouble during the second 
Montebello test in July [sic] 1956.’
 
22 The month of this test was June. Beale details 
how he was at Woomera with a group of newspapermen, and during a meeting 
someone entered and whispered something to a newspaper editor which caused quite 
a commotion. The whispered information was quickly passed around. Apparently, 
Beale’s memoirs detail, a cloud of dangerous fallout from the test had drifted towards 
the mainland. Beale suggested that the rumour had originated from a miner at Marble 
Bar who had detected radiation on his Geiger counter after ‘partaking of refreshments 
at the pub.’ Beale writes that this miner witnessed  a Geiger reading of 500 counts per 
minute which ‘may have seemed high to him, but in fact it was less than the reading 
to be obtained from the luminous dial of a wrist-watch’, which he attributed to the 
bomb and passed this information to a Perth newspaper who telephones their editor at 
Woomera.23
Beale comments on how damage-controlling statements needed to be made by 
the acting Prime Minister McFadden, the Safety Committee and himself.
 
24
                                                 
18  Beale, This Inch of Time. 
 He offers 
comment on what he considered the low risks of the tests and how they were 
monitored. He reports there were some 70 to 80 observation and reporting stations 
19 Ibid, p.76. 
20 Ibid, p. 77. 
21 Ibid, p.80. 
22 Ibid, p. 82. 
23 Ibid, p.83. 
24 Ibid, pp. 83-84. 
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and ‘As to the Aborigines, there were none living there, nor, as far as we knew, were 
there any going walkabout within or near the test area, but, by way of greater 
precaution, frequent patrols moved through the area right up to the time of firing.’ 
Beale reports that no Aboriginal people were found in the testing areas and goes on to 
comment on anti-testing responses. He stated that the communists ‘screamed their 
heads off’ as did ‘some earnest people’, some newspapers (those taking an opposing 
line to that of their rivals) and a section of the Labor party opposed the tests 
 
Beale also wrote: 
  
Everything was trotted out - the horrors of Hiroshima, the Bikini fishermen, miscarriages, 
hideous mutations affecting unborn children, and of course droughts and floods. (I got myself 
into trouble with some clergymen by lightly suggesting in answer to a question in the House 
that the bomb had about the same effect on the weather as praying for rain.) From the 
comments of some critics, one would have thought that we were going to explode an 
enormous hydrogen bomb in the suburbs of Adelaide, instead of small atomic devices 350 
miles away where the prevailing winds would carry the fall-out harmlessly westward into the 
Great Victoria Desert of central and western Australia.25
 
 
As we have seen, there were inaccuracies being presented from all sides of the 
atomic testing issue and shaped how public understanding of these debates developed. 
Though the risks of the tests were certainly exaggerated by some commentators, the 
tests could hardly be said to be ‘harmless’ and these areas of desert were not totally 
free of people. Beale thought an ideal way to bring members of the Australian public 
around to his way of thinking would be to invite Dr. Penney, director of the British 
atomic weapons programme, to a press conference at Beale’s own rooms at the 
Commonwealth Bank in Sydney.  Beale states that Penney ‘bore the stamp of absolute 
integrity’ and that ‘he also did the unusual thing of disclosing his own personal 
problem of conscience when he had been asked to direct the making of the bomb, and 
why he had finally agreed to do it.’26
Despite presenting some inaccuracies about the number and times of these 
tests, Beale’s account presents his attitudes quite clearly and he managed to conclude 
this section of his memoir with a precise summation of his perspective of the Cold 
War situation and why Australia was involved. His account of the situation is ‘realist’ 
  
                                                 
25 Ibid, pp. 84-85. 
26 Ibid, p.85.  
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as it has its focus on maintaining mutual security alliances with the US and UK, and 
of assisting the UK in furthering their strategic power. Beale’s writing suggests he has 
no personal regrets over Australia’s role in the tests. He speaks of an ‘intimate 
partnership’ between Britain and Australia, from which Australia ‘gained much 
knowledge and experience in the field of nuclear defence science.’ On the morality of 
the tests, he suggests that opinions formed on the subject must consider the political 
situation at the time of the tests and not ‘twenty years later.’ Beale writes: 
 
In the 1950s the cold war was raging: Russia had swallowed up many of the ancient 
independent states in Europe, and was thrusting down into Greece towards the Mediterranean, 
the Berlin air-lift crisis had brought the world close to World War III (I was in Berlin in 1948 
during the airlift and can vouch for the tension and danger of the time); and the United States 
had lost her nuclear monopoly. Situated on the edge of Europe, with the English Channel no 
longer any defence, Britain was especially vulnerable to nuclear blackmail, and there was no 
certainty in British minds that, if she were under intolerable threat, the United States would 
risk the destruction of her own cities in order to protect British ones. 
 
Beale goes on to state that Britain had no other option than to develop its own 
‘retaliatory nuclear power’ to supplement the American deterrent against the 
communist powers. For Australia to refuse assistance, Beale writes, would have been 
‘brutally ungenerous’, so long as Australia was satisfied there would be no danger. 
Beale suggests that: ‘There are times when a nation must stand up and be counted; for 
Australia this was such a time.’27
It is interesting to note that Beale believed that Australia stood to gain 
knowledge from the tests and did not merely provide a testing site. It is difficult to see 
whether he thought such knowledge meant being able to operate in military theatres 
involving atomic weapons, or to eventually be able to make use of such weapons for 
Australian defence needs.  
 
 Despite being an intelligent comment on the global power struggle of the 
Cold War, there are problems with Beale’s commentary. It can be seen as an example 
of strategic assessment which fails to integrate an accurate analysis of the real 
experiences of those concerned with the tests. There were dangers and damages 
resulting from permitting the tests, evident in the fears and possible contamination of 
servicemen and Aboriginal people, the need for the removal of people from the testing 
                                                 
27 Ibid p.87. 
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areas and the contamination of the desert. Beale’s position here also does not justify 
experiments such as the ‘Vixen B’ trials, discussed in this chapter, which blasted 
molten plutonium across vast tracts of previously uncontaminated land. One can see, 
however, if a person somehow formed the view, based on official reassurances, that 
the tests were truly harmless, Beale’s commentary would appear quite logical. It 
would seem in any case that Beale regarded the testing sites as expendable areas. 
Journalist Adrian Tame and health physics expert F.P.J. Robotham’s 
Maralinga28 of 1982 was the first popular text which sought to portray the testing 
programme in a negative fashion. Yet some of its claims appear to be heavily based 
on speculation.  It was released before the McClelland Royal Commission and thus 
the authors would have not have been influenced by its findings in authoring the book. 
The book makes the claim that Co- 60 found at Maralinga was likely present due to 
British experiments into the ‘cobalt bomb,’ an issue which will be discussed further in 
this chapter.29
 Another example of its speculative content is the manner in which the authors 
describe a ‘hurried departure’ from the “village” set up to be inhabited by those 
involved with ‘Operation Totem’- X200. A rapid departure from X200 is also hinted 
at in Ground Zero
 
30 in the secret film discovered by the male protagonist. Tame and 
Robotham’s text contains a very mysterious story that relates to the second test of 
‘Operation Totem’. This story can be seen as the origin of a key myth. According to 
the authors, the man that was to later head the Australian Nuclear Veterans 
Association (ANVA) Rick [sic] Johnstone, and another RAAF servicemen whose 
name has been lost, were asked shortly after the second ‘Totem’ test to locate a 
missing bushman, Len Beadell, author of Blast the Bush.31
The account states that they discovered around 25 buildings with cutlery left in 
drawers, food supplies intact, vehicles left with the keys in the ignition and with other 
signs that would suggest the area was left in great haste. They were later advised to 
forget what they had seen and found that all references to the settlement had been 
deleted from official records. According to the authors, at the time of the ‘Totem 2’ 
test, wind conditions had suddenly shifted. This, allegedly, caused the atomic cloud to 
 Their journey took them to 
the alleged ‘ghost town’ which was X200. 
                                                 
28 Tame & Robotham, Maralinga. 
29 Ibid, p.111. See also p.236. 
30 Avenue Pictures, Ground Zero. 
31 Len Beadell, Blast the Bush, Lansdowne Publishing, The Rocks, NSW, 1967. 
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drift towards the settlement-bringing about the need for rapid departure. The authors 
state the device was ‘dropped from a tower’. This was not the case; it was detonated 
atop the tower. Tame and Robotham admit here to basing their conclusions upon, in 
their own words, ‘educated guesswork.’ They write: 
 
If such educated guesswork is in fact correct, it gives a ready explanation for the evidence of 
 hurried departure found by Johnstone. It also makes clear why Government reports have been 
 so reluctant to acknowledge the existence of the buildings at Emu. Taking the educated 
 guesswork a stage further, one is entitled to wonder why the tests were transferred to the 
 Monte Bello Islands after Totem II. The order of sites for the tests was Monte Bello, Emu, 
 Monte Bello again and Maralinga. Why the move back to Monte Bello after only two tests at 
 Emu? Surely a more logical progression would have been to complete the second Monte 
 Bello test at Emu, before moving equipment and manpower the comparatively short distance 
 to Maralinga. But this, obviously, would have been impossible had Emu been badly 
 contaminated.32
 
  
As noted previously, the reason for the move back to Monte Bello was the 
urgent need for data into fusion reactions, leading up to the upcoming ‘Grapple’ tests 
in the pacific,33 Emu Field has been deemed too remote and that the ‘permanent’ site 
at Maralinga was not yet ready.34 Also, the potential size of the ‘Mosaic’ experiments 
rendered the inland test sites unsuitable.35
 The existence of X200 is widely documented, for example, the majority of 
Len Beadle’s Blast the Bush,
 
36
 
 which mostly consists of amusing anecdotes, is set 
there. Yet the authors of Maralinga document in their book an awareness of Blast the 
Bush. They write of this book: 
…a frighteningly naïve account of the events leading up the tests. Published in 1967, the book 
deals in an inappropriately cheerful humorous way with Beadell’s preparations and assistance 
in the choice of bomb sites.37
 
 
                                                 
32 Tame & Robotham, Maralinga, p.163-165. 
33 Blakeway and Lloyd Roberts, Fields of Thunder, p. 95 see also Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, pp 
206-207.  
34 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, pp. 159-166. 
35 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing: Operation Mosaic:  1956, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 20/03/09. 
36 Beadell, Blast The Bush. 
37  Tame & Robotham, Maralinga, p. 156. 
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The context of this quote is in reference to Beadell’s brief mention of the issue 
of the Centurion tank driven by Warrant Officer Jones, which will be further 
discussed in Chapter Six. Tame and Robotham report that Beadell’s account makes no 
reference to the potential risks faced by Jones in his retrieval of the tank.38   Beadle’s 
writing reveals much of life at X200.39
This was addressed by J.L. Symonds’ 1985 official history, A History of 
British Atomic Testing in Australia
  Returning to the issue of the alleged ‘hurried 
departure’ of X200, Tame and Robotham’s ‘educated guesswork’ is something of a 
reach. 
40, released by the Australian Department of 
Resources and Energy. Symonds writes that there was no evidence from radiation 
sampling flights or later surveys that the village received contamination and that the: 
‘guesswork’ of Tame and Robotham is ‘... not supported by the technical, 
administrative  and Peace Officer operations at the time.’ Symonds goes on to write 
that in 1955 and 1956 the Emu Village was used as a base for those moving 
equipment and even some buildings to the intended permanent site at Maralinga.’41
Within the introduction to Symonds’ work, Gareth Evans, then Minister for 
Resources and Energy, stated that the text had been prompted by renewed public 
interest in the tests and would be of general use to historians and other interested 
parties. He also stated it would also serve as a useful document throughout the course 
of the ongoing McClelland Royal Commission. This is a point of possible confusion; 
the book was published in April, with the McClelland Report not being presented 
until November, of 1985.
 
42 As a point of interest, a copy of the text can be clearly 
seen in one of the closing scenes of Ground Zero.43
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
 The book is shown on the desk of 
the actor playing Jim McClelland, who presided over the commission.  Like the work 
of Lorna Arnold’s, which will be discussed in this chapter, Symonds’ book challenges 
many of the claims of those books which sought to highlight the alleged hazards of 
the testing programme.  
39 Beadell, Blast The Bush.  Also, though initially ‘Restricted’, a pamphlet intended for British 
scientists by Beadle and others titled Welcome to the Claypan details that the area was staffed by 165 
officers and men before the arrival of scientists. This pamphlet is discussed in Beadle, Blast the Bush, 
pp. 78-79, which also contains some of the same illustrations.  
40 Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia. 
41 Ibid, p.220. 
42Ibid, p. iii.;Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear 
Tests in Australia. Vol I, pp. ii-iii. 
43 Avenue Pictures, Ground Zero. 
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Among the most scathing of accounts of British atomic testing is journalist 
Joan Smith’s 1985 book Clouds of Deceit.44
 
 Smith is an investigative journalist who 
has taken a personal interest in atomic matters connected with the United Kingdom.  
Formerly an employee of London’s The Sunday Times, Smith expresses in her 
introduction a frustration that this paper did not allow for an in-depth exploration of 
atomic issues, due in part to the ownership and editorial tone of the publication. She 
states: 
…the new editor, Andrew Neil, felt I had ‘got into a rut’ on nuclear stories. It was a curious 
reversal of the old practice at the paper, under which reporters were encouraged to gain 
expertise in particular fields which interested them. The message was clear; stories that might 
damage the nuclear industry were no longer welcome at the Sunday Times.45
 
  
 Clouds of Deceit is a full-blown ‘exposé’ into the alleged dangers which were 
associated with British atomic testing. Smith’s stance is distinctly anti-nuclear. The 
text is intended as a means to educate its readership on the plight of those who were 
affected by the tests. There is a primary focus on ‘nuclear veterans’- the military 
personnel who assisted with the testing program- with attention also given to the 
civilians, including Australia’s indigenous population. Thus, the British and 
Australian governments’ official perspectives at the time of the tests are heavily 
criticised. The work utterly damns the tests.  
Unlike the other texts on which this chapter offers comment, the scope of 
Clouds of Deceit is not confined to the tests in Australia. In fact, the text begins with 
an exploration of the damage associated with the early stages of the hydrogen bomb 
tests staged in the vicinity of Christmas Island. Also, comment is made regarding tests 
which occurred after the restoration of Anglo-American co-operation on atomic 
matters- the era of joint atomic testing between these powers- on American soil. This 
is because it is an exploration of the damage allegedly caused by British bomb tests as 
a whole.    
Clouds of Deceit is a text which was published in 1985, coinciding with the 
end of the McClelland Royal Commission; it is a product of its time. It is difficult to 
ascertain as to whether the text, published by Faber & Faber, known to print a great 
deal of ‘popular’ material, was timed as such so as to create maximum public 
                                                 
44 Smith, Clouds of Deceit. 
45 Ibid, p.9. 
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awareness, or maximum public sensation, or had been merely prompted by renewed 
public debate.  It is readily apparent that it is an account with a prominent bias. Lorna 
Arnold’s A Very Special Relationship46
Though documents connected to the McClelland Royal Commission (and 
various other official reports) were drawn upon, the primary sources of information 
for Smith’s book were eye witness accounts from servicemen connected to the tests. It 
is an attempt to air their voices and improve their likelihood of receiving 
compensation. In achieving this end, however, various scientists and technicians 
connected to the programme have been portrayed in, perhaps, an excessively sinister 
light. The notion that such individuals may have been pursuing their technical goals 
out of genuine concern due to the perceived threat of the Cold War is not a concept 
the text explores.
 it could be said, served as a counter point to 
texts such as this. 
47
A text which is positioned within the middle of this spectrum is Fields of 
Thunder by Denys Blakeway & Sue Lloyd-Roberts, also published in 1985, 
  
48
The text advocates a close examination of the effects of ionising radiation on 
Commonwealth servicemen. The more severe critical accounts of the tests such as 
Beyond Belief 
  and 
thus also coincided with the end of the McClelland Royal Commission. Although 
some of the events represented in this book (i.e. the ‘Black Mist’ and the yield of 
Mosaic G2) are contested, Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts, for the most part, invite 
readers to form their own conclusions.  
49
                                                 
46 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship, 
  include stories of how servicemen may have been exposed to 
radiation, and then comment on their later health complaints. Fields of Thunder 
suggests that a more scientific way to explore this link is to compare numbers of 
health complaints among ‘nuclear veterans’ to those of test groups who received only 
the usual background radiation doses to which their contemporise were not present at 
the tests were exposed Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts wire that the only way to show 
that test veterans were exposed to damaging radiation is to demonstrate that they more 
cases of cancer than a control group not present at the tests. They write that this is the 
purpose of a study of ex-servicemen then being carried out by the UK National 
Radiological Protection Board.  They state that the control group was comprised of 
47 Smith, Clouds of Deceit.  
48 Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts Fields of Thunder. 
49 Cross and Hudson, Beyond Belief. 
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servicemen with the same age background as test participants. They also state that a 
similar survey of Aborigines was being conducted in Australia. 50
The study on British servicemen was explained in the paper ‘A Summary of 
Mortality and Incidence of Cancer in Men from the United Kingdom who Participated 
in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes.’ It states in its conclusion that test participation did not have a 
detectable effect on life expectancy or total risk of developing cancer: 
 
  
...apart from a possible effect on the risks of developing multiple myeloma and leukaemia 
(other than chronic lymphatic leukaemia) The evidence relating to multiple myeloma and 
leukaemia  was confusing, and on balance we conclude that there may have been small 
hazards of both diseases associated with participation in the programme but this has not been 
proved. 
 
They write that the only carcinogenic agent known to increase both these 
ailments is ionising radiation, but were unable to evidence than those participants 
affected to these ailments suffered any unusual exposure51
This study and two follow-up studies are discussed further in Chapter Six. 
Despite the impartial language Blakeway and Lloyd Roberts have adopted when 
describing the events of the tests, the publishers of the edition I have viewed, Unwin 
Paperbacks 1985, adopted a different tone for their back cover synopsis. The back 
cover states: 
 
 
The effects of the devastating nuclear bombs exploded by the British in Australia and on the 
Pacific Islands are only now coming to light. The tests were carried out hastily and in the 
wrong conditions; servicemen and civilians were exposed to radiation: and large parts of 
Australia were polluted - some for thousands of years - by the fallout.  
 
Yet the text itself states that clear proof of exposure to high levels of high 
levels of radiation in test participants was then unestablished, though new research 
methods may be able to detect chromosomal damage but only if doses of around ten 
                                                 
50 Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts Fields of Thunder p.17.  
51 S.C. Darby, G.M. Kendall, T.P. Fell, J.A. O’Hagan, C.R Muirhead, J. Ennis, A.M. Ball, J.A. Ball, 
J.A. Dennis, R. Doll, ‘A Summary of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer in Men from the United 
Kingdom Who Participated in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and 
Experimental Programmes,’ British Medical Journal, Volume 296, 30 January 1988, pp.332-338. 
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times the official safety levels permitted at the tests occurred. They write that such a 
high level of dosage has not been confirmed in a test participant, however:   
 
...this does not establish beyond doubt, however, that the tests veterans are not suffering as a 
result of exposure to radiation. The arguments about safety still remain to which servicemen 
may have been negligently exposed in ways not appreciated by the authorities at the time.  52
 
 
It should also be noted that the means of detecting chromosomal damage have 
become more sophisticated, though this has not been yet linked in studies to exposure 
resulting from tests in Australia.  
Throughout the text there are anecdotes are presented which suggest that 
various servicemen may have been exposed to risk, and this is linked to discussion of 
their various health ailments. Yet the language employed suggests that in all these 
instances there is at least some doubt. The evidence is contested. Blakeway and Lloyd 
Roberts also suggest that servicemen may later have thought they had been exposed to 
risk, even if their conditions were actually quite safe, due to lack of understanding of 
technical matters pertaining to ionising radiation. 
Fields of Thunder refers to anecdotal reports that some Aboriginal people 
were killed outright in some instances by the tests. The book states that these accounts 
have never been verified officially. The accounts come from Patrick Connolly and 
John Burke, who claim that ASIO agents warned them to not continue to tell this 
story.53  These accounts were later rejected by the McClelland Royal Commission 
after Connolly was served a subpoena to appear before the Commission in Perth on 1 
May 1985.54  Connolly’s had also earlier claimed was that he assisted in the secret 
burial of radioactive waste. Reportage of this claim was contained in a page 3 article 
in Perth’s Daily News, 27 Dec 1976, titled ‘I Buried Atomic Waste.’55
                                                 
52 Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts Fields of Thunder, pp.16-17. Yet another study exists which comments 
upon incidences of cancer and mortality in Australian servicemen connected with the test. As it has not 
been referred to in these popular secondary histories it is outside the scope of this chapter, and will be 
addressed subsequently. This is Richard Gun, Jacqueline Parsons, Phillip Ryan, Phillip Crouch and 
Janet Hiller, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia, Discipline of Public Health, 
School of Population Health and Clinical Practice, University of Adelaide. Department of Veterans 
Affairs, Canberra, 2006. 
 Among his 
53 Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts Fields of Thunder, pp. 120-121. 
54 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report into the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol II, pp. 430-432. 
55 Daily News, Perth, 27 December,1976, p.3. This clipping is also contained in a collection of 
documents in National Archives of Australia: Department of Aboriginal Affairs; ‘Atomic Weapons 
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other claims, as stated in an interview contained in the 1981 documentary Backs to the 
Blast: An Australian Nuclear Story, was that he witnessed Aboriginal people without 
protective clothing within areas contaminated by the tests.56
Another book which seeks to expose the alleged risks of the tests is by 
journalist Robert Milliken, No Conceivable Injury of 1986.
  This claim is far easier 
to establish. Connolly’s statements can be seen as the origins of how belief that 
Aboriginal people were killed and their bodies hidden were presented to the 
Australian public. When these commentaries are evaluated it is important to consider 
the findings of the Royal Commission on the matter. 
57 As previously noted, the 
title comes from a statement made by Prime Minister Menzies in the House of 
Representatives on 21 October 1953. The statement was:  ‘It has been stated most 
authoritatively that no conceivable injury to life, limb or property could emerge from 
the test that has been made at Woomera’.58
  Milliken asserts that much of the impetus for a post-war British bomb came 
from the scientific advisor to former Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Frederick 
Cherwell. Milliken writes:  
 
 
Cherwell’s atomic nationalism was based not just on the Bomb; he also saw great British 
industrial potential in atomic energy. The country’s prosperity in the Victorian era, he pointed 
out, was due largely to the men who had the imagination to put and keep England ahead 60 to 
80 years in the use of steam power for industrial purposes.59
 
 
   
 The focus on the clear link between civil and military technology is significant.  
Later in the text, Milliken comments on the intentions of Dr. Penney, head scientist 
for the British atomic bomb project, stating: 
 
…(Penney) believed Britain should build its atomic bombs as soon as possible, partly from 
national prestige and an unwillingness to concede monopoly over the bomb to the United 
                                                                                                                                            
Tests Health Effects- Collection of Press Cuttings, Radio Transcripts and Media Releases Related to 
Nuclear Testing in Australia’, A6456 R008/001, 1953-1985. 
56 Composite Films, Backs to the Blast: An Australian Nuclear Story, directed by Harry Bardwell, 1981. 
57 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury. 
58 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 21 October 1953, Session 1951-53, p. 
1610. 
59 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, p.18.  
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States, but also because the military chiefs of Staff were strenuously pushing for a stockpile of 
weapons to be produced over the next five years.60
 
 
Following Britain’s decision to produce an atomic deterrent, Milliken asserts, 
it had been considered that the American site at Nevada would be a suitable place to 
test their bomb. Yet Anglo-American co-operation had broken down. Australia was 
chosen for the site instead. Milliken suggests:  
 
and in spite of the way the testing was dressed up, particularly by the Australian government 
at the time, to be a significant venture in Commonwealth atomic co-operation, Australia was, 
in the final analysis, merely the place to test the British Bombs.61
 
 
This passage is indicative of Milliken’s overall perspective: that Australia 
played host to the tests and held no real interest in acquiring its own atomic deterrent. 
We have seen that this was not entirely the case. Chapter Two contained analysis of 
examples of parliamentary debate which suggest that the acquisition of atomic 
weapons by Australia, through Britain, was seriously considered, and there are 
documents for audiences outside the general population to support this. 
Milliken’s text comments on some of the inaccuracies concerning the tests in 
print media sources, notably confusion surrounding how the test for ‘Operation 
Hurricane’ was carried out under the waterline of a ship, not on land on a tower.62 
One of the phenomena that Dr. Penney wished to explore for this test was, according 
to Milliken, ‘Base Surge.’63 Milliken does not allude to the fact that this term is not 
always used in the context of how it related to atomic weapons, and actually has its 
origins in geology and vulcanology- referring to explosions of steam from eruptions. 
In the context of ‘Operation Hurricane’, however, such a ‘base surge’ would be the 
resulting cloud of mist from seawater, which would contain irradiated particles.64
 Further on the subject of Britain’s strategic situation leading up to the tests, 
Milliken comments upon the massive blow to Anglo-American relations surrounding 
  
                                                 
60 Milliken, pp.27-28. 
61 Ibid, p. 22. 
62 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, p.32.  
63 Ibid, p.41.  
64 ‘Base Surge’ and atomic weapons tested on or in water is explored in the following page which is 
concerned with one of the American atomic tests at Bikini Atoll in 1946 as part of ‘Operation 
Crossroads’ Richard V.  Fisher,  University of California, Santa Barbara, section entitled Operation 
Crossroads,  http://volcanology.geol.ucsb.edu/bikini.htm  
site accessed 10/06/08.  
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‘atomic spy’ Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs was a German refugee and scientist, granted British 
citizenship in 1942 and was a key contributor to the wartime ‘Manhattan Project’ 
working under fellow scientist Hans Bethe. His work centred on implosion assembly, 
the type of device which constituted the first tested by the Americans, the Soviet 
Union and the British. It was for the Soviet Union that Fuchs was later found to be 
spying. 65
Milliken’s description of the lack of co-operation on atomic matters between 
the US and the UK in the post-war period adequately frames the reader to grasp the 
significance of Menzies’ decision to accept the British tests ‘without bargain’.
 
66 
Further analysis into Britain’s strategic situation, post, ‘Operation Hurricane’ is later 
offered. Milliken explores how, although ‘Hurricane’ had demonstrated to the 
Americans that Britain was capable of producing its own atomic deterrent, the British 
government still had hopes of entering into a mutual arrangement on atomic weapons 
with the US. 67
 This concern can be linked directly to the decision to undertake the 
construction of a British thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb. Milliken discusses that 
although Australia was correctly assured that no such device would be tested here, 
that the local tests were linkable, in some instances, to hydrogen bomb research. He 
offers some comment upon the testing of a small fission device as part of ‘Operation 
Antler’ in 1957 which was intended as a test of the ‘primary’ stage of a thermonuclear 
weapon.
 
68
Lorna Arnold’s 1987 book A Very Special Relationship,
    
69
 
  is like the work of 
Symonds an official history. It is not, then, like so many other books which reference 
Australia’s experience with atomic tests, an ‘exposé’.  The introduction to the text 
states: 
This book is neither an apologia for nuclear weapons or weapon tests, nor an argument against 
them. Defence policy, nuclear strategy, weapons research and development, and the ethics of 
nuclear weaponry are not its business. It is concerned to show why Britain adopted certain 
post war defence policies that entailed nuclear weapons tests: why more than half of them-and 
                                                 
65 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, p..37-39. See also; The Crime Library, Section Entitled Klaus 
Fuchs, Atomic Bomb Spy, http://www.crimelibrary.com/terrorists_spies/spies/fuchs/1.html, site 
accessed 10/06/08.  
66 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, p.42.  
67 Ibid, p.139.  
68 Ibid, p.148, p.227. 
69 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship. 
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all the earlier ones- were in Australia; where and how they took place, how the two nations 
cooperated; and what was achieved, and at what cost. It looks at the radiation safety standards 
of the time and of the present day, and it considers how the safety aspects of the trials 
appeared and how they appear now. 70
 
 
Although Arnold aimed to explore, in part, why defence policies that involved 
the testing of atomic weapons were implemented by Britain, she did not aim to 
explore how the weapons were intended to be deployed or used. Arnold makes the 
claim that her book is an objective account of historical facts connected to the tests- 
she claims to offer historical accuracy, and invites the reader to draw his or her own 
conclusion from the book’s factual content. However, the general tone of the work, 
which downplays any notion of danger associated with the testing programme, has 
been called into question.  Roger Cross wrote in Fallout: Hedley Marston and the 
British Bomb Tests in Australia, a book exploring the Marston controversy that A 
Very Special Relationship was: ‘A published British whitewash of these events exists. 
Its author, Lorna Arnold, appears to have had official backing-having received ‘every 
possible help from the British Ministry of Defence.’71
 Within Arnold’s book on several occasions, it is stated that there is in 
existence a popular belief that the dangers allegedly associated with testing were 
subjected to some form of ‘cover up.’ Arnold rejects such a conspiracy, stating: 
 
 
Far from trying to cover up anything that went wrong, the scientists discussed it ad nauseam; 
they had every incentive to study each trial exhaustively, to learn as much as possible from it, 
to identify and understand errors and shortcomings, and to improve and refine their methods 
for future trials. This is clear from reading the stream of scientific reports and notes that 
appeared for months or years after each of the trials. 72
 
 
It is open to debate whether scientists would have had the opportunity to 
discuss such matters ad nauseam. In a later section which aims to address ‘Health and 
safety allegations’, Arnold lists some of the popular criticisms that have been 
published in response to the testing programme, and states of them: 
 
                                                 
70 Ibid, p. xv. 
71  Cross, Fallout, p. 164. 
72 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship, p. xvi. 
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If all these accusations were true, the scientists must have been guilty of ignorance, 
incompetence, or a cynical disregard for safety, or all three, and there must have been a 
gigantic secret conspiracy among many scores of them. I have tried to consider without 
prejudice as much of the evidence as I could and before coming to any conclusion, to weigh 
up its credibility bearing in mind the state of knowledge at that time. 73
 
 
The rejection of such a ‘conspiracy’ is understandable. That said, the prejudice 
that Arnold here claims to have avoided, or sought to avoid, is inevitable. The book 
would later be released as a new edition titled Britain, Australia and the Bomb: the 
Nuclear Tests and Their Aftermath also with the involvement of British Programme 
Director for Defence and Security, Mark Smith, as co-author.74 The principal 
differences are discussions of more recent clean-up efforts and the British National 
Radiological Protection Board Studies.75
 
  
The ‘Black Mist’: 
 
The story of the ‘Black Mist’ is an often reported example of beliefs in 
negative consequences of atomic testing in Australia, initially passed through 
Aboriginal oral history. J.L. Symonds wrote of the phenomena: 
 
The report of the ‘black mist’ sightings was raised in 1980 when the Pitjantjatjara Council 
advised the Australian Minister for Aboriginal affairs that some of their people may have been 
affected by radiation from the nuclear weapons tests in the period 1953 to 1957. 
 
Symonds notes that this story was reinforced in media coverage.76  It would 
seem that following this media coverage, Tame and Robotham’s 1982 Maralinga was 
the first book to promote the notion that the ‘Black Mist’ caused the blindness of 
Lester.77 The story has been referenced in many secondary texts from the 1980s that 
served to further establish awareness of this issue.78
                                                 
73 Ibid, pp. 232-233.  
 Two separate issues exist, 
whether the mist occurred and whether it resulted in physical ailment.  Arnold offers 
74 Arnold and Smith, Britain, Australia and the Bomb.  
75 Ibid, pp. 235-268. 
76 Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia, p. 177. 
77 Adrian Tame & F.P.J. Robotham, Maralinga, p. 144. 
78 Cross & Hudson Beyond Belief, pp. 22-40;  Smith. Clouds of Deceit pp. 123-124; Milliken, No 
Conceivable Injury, pp. 121-124, 129-130, 309, 321, 323; Blakeway & Lloyd-Roberts, Fields of 
Thunder, pp.4, 107-11.  
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direct comment about the ‘Black Mist’ phenomena. The text states that it is probable 
that some sort of ‘mist’ had occurred around the time of Totem 1, due to the large 
number of recorded sightings. Arnold comments upon these eye-witness accounts: 
 
The Aldermaston chemists were puzzled by the description of the mist or cloud as black and 
oily, with a strong smell- by some accounts of diesel fuel, by others of liquid propane gas, or 
dead kangaroos. An explanation that has been suggested is that it came from spinifex bushes 
ignited by the heat of the explosion. 
 
Spinifex bushes, it would seem, are known when ignited to produce an odour 
not unlike that of turpentine. Arnold states that there were only two or three ‘trivial’ 
bushfires in that area around the time of Totem 1. The text also states that radiation 
sampling at the time of T1 would suggest that  ‘even immediately under the centre of 
the plume and at a distance of only 10 miles from ground zero, the radiation dose 
would have been too small to cause acute illness’. Arnold claims that some people in 
the area may have received a dose of radiation, but ‘the long-term carcinogenic risk 
was insignificant, about 1 in 10, 000 but probably lower’.79 Arnold states that this 
finding was drawn from a joint study by the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment 
and the Meteorological Office for which the book offers no formal reference. Arnold 
states that this finding was similar to the conclusions presented in Australian Ionising 
Radiation Advisory Council (AIRAC) reports of 1983, reviewed in 1985, though 
‘reached in an entirely different method.’80 It should be noted that the Emu Field test 
site and the Wallatinna settlement, where Lester stated the contamination occurred, 
were separated by a distance of 173km.81
Arnold suggests that due to the lack of accurate dating within the culture of the 
local indigenous population, the disturbances caused by an atomic test may have 
stood out, and later became confused with another significant event- an outbreak of 
illness. This does not seem to fit with popular accounts of the mist causing almost 
immediate symptoms of ailment. Arnold concludes the section with the remark ‘But 
 Though, Arnold’s position as an ‘official 
historian’ may have impacted on the objectivity of her analysis.  
                                                 
79 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship, pp.73-75. 
80 Ibid. The report, Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council, British Nuclear Tests in Australia; 
a Review of Operational Safety Measures and of Possible After Effects, Australian Government 
Printing Services, Canberra, 1983, is discussed in Chapter Six. 
81 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I,  p.186. 
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the black mist remains something of a mystery, though not, it seems, a harmful one.’82
Arnold also comments on Hedley Marston’s research and allegations 
concerning fallout, which may have drawn the afore mentioned commentary from 
Roger Cross. Arnold suggesting that the controversial aspect of Marston’s research 
was Marston’s ‘erroneous’ inference that contamination from I-131 was linked to 
contamination from Sr- 90, which is absorbed in a similar way to calcium in bone 
tissue. Arnold writes: 
 
Whether or not this mysterious ‘mist’ was actually harmful, it certainly produced real 
fear, which in itself can be linked to illness. The response of the Royal Commission 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
…Marston, who was not involved in the strontium-90 work, used his iodine 131 research 
results to make calculations about strontium-90 and included these vague, but somewhat 
alarmist, conclusions in his report on the iodine-131 survey. They were however not only 
unsupported by any experimental data but were based on faulty assumptions about the 
behaviour of strontium-90.83
 
 
Arnold had earlier stated: 
  
The figures in Marston’s 26 tables of thyroid measurements showed that the iodine-131 levels 
in inhabited and stock-rearing areas were all well below the safety limits; the highest figure he 
recorded was about one-hundredth of the so-called ‘Scott Russell’ safety limit, which was 
based on the maximum iodine concentration in milk for infants, the critical group. Yet 
Marston’s paper did not say this, or compare his measurements with this or any safety 
standard.84
 
 
  Due to its status as an ‘official’ British history, it is unlikely that Arnold’s 
book would foreground any risks associated with the tests. The Report of the Royal 
Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia, informally known as the 
McClelland Report does support Marston’s findings that there were detectable levels 
of fallout found in the city of Adelaide as a result of the 1956 tests.85
                                                 
82 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship, p.75 
 
83Ibid, p. 197. 
84 Ibid, p.96. 
85 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia, 
Vol II, pp. 434-438. 
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 On the issue, Roger Cross acknowledged that whether the health consequences 
of fallout exposure in Australia were significant is open to discussion, and that the 
debates over the possible effects of exposure to low level ionising radiation have been 
raging for 50 years.  Cross notes that Marston’s contemporaries found his I-131 
measurements to be valid. Cross also discusses that an assessment of the likely effects 
of low levels of radiation on a sample population requires detailed knowledge of 
factors such as diet, however he writes:  
 
What can be said from this distance of time is that evidence shows that some radioactive 
contamination occurred, and that no advice was given to the population on ways of 
minimising exposure, not even to families with young children or the traditional inhabitants 
and owners of the land. 86
 
 
Arnold’s text concludes with a section titled ‘three thoughts on fallout’ which 
states that although Australia played host to 12 atomic tests, levels of fallout across 
the nation were, across this time period, less than that experienced by Britain due to 
their proximity to far larger atmospheric tests.87
Another book which has its focus on the alleged human and environmental 
impact of the tests is Roger Cross and Avon Hudson’s Beyond Belief
 Again, even if one were to accept that 
Australia received little contamination, the fear of contamination is significant. 
88
  
 This book 
begins with an explanation of the strategic and political situation leading up to the 
‘Hurricane’ test and the decision to continue atomic weapons development following 
this. Beyond Belief examined how the popular notion of the 1950s that possession of 
atomic weapons would be a sign that a given nation was significant on the world stage: 
Always mindful of her sense of self importance on the world stage, Britain was certainly not 
going to miss out on membership of the exclusive ‘nuclear bomb club’. Ernest Bevin, Foreign 
Secretary in the British Labour government of 1945-51, is reported to have said as early as 
1946: “We have got to have this thing over here, whatever it costs. We have got to have a 
bloody Union Jack on top of it.’89
 
 
                                                 
86 Cross, Fallout, pp. 179-180. 
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This shows the view of the atomic bomb as a symbol of power and not just a 
tool of potential use to the military. The authors establish a distinctly anti-nuclear tone, 
as one would expect from the title. The rest of the text is a series of damning 
anecdotes from military servicemen, i.e. ‘nuclear veterans’, civilian contractors 
associated with the testing programme, Aboriginal people and the family and loved 
ones of all such parties.  
 The aim is to demonstrate to the reader how the alleged poor management of 
the testing programme was, in fact, ‘beyond belief’, as the title might indicate. Every 
attempt has been made to show the tests in the poorest possible light. For example, 
one anecdote states that three English Electric Canberra bombers were sold off 
following a ‘sniffer’ cloud sampling operation. The story then suggests that at least 
one of the aircraft served in that capacity. One of the three aircraft was later used in 
the conspiracy-oriented motion picture Ground Zero.90 The anecdote states that the 
starring male actor of this film, Colin Friels, later developed cancer.91
 Engineer Alan Parkinson’s 2007 text Maralinga-Australia’s Nuclear Waste 
Cover-up 
 It seems that 
the inference here is that ionising radiation from the aircraft might have been 
responsible. This particular anecdote is also really pushing the boundaries of plausible 
belief, yet the book shows numerous examples of genuine concern over the conduct of 
the tests, and accounts that suggest that instances of individual contamination may 
have been linked to later illness.   
92
 As previously noted that this dissertation has its focus on the ‘major’ atomic 
trials in Australia; those that yielded an atomic explosion. This is due to their 
significance to the Australian public consciousness as they were publicised events. 
The ‘minor’ trials were far more secret endeavours and actually resulted in greater 
lingering contamination. Parkinson’s account, unlike for example those of Smith or 
Hudson and Cross, does not have its focus on the consequences of the tests on 
‘nuclear veterans’. Rather, the issue the book explores lingering contamination from 
  has become a significant element of the atomic testing discourse. It 
differs from other works which seek to inform of the human and environmental costs 
of the testing programme as its primary focus is on the clean up of the Maralinga site. 
                                                 
90 Avenue Picture, Ground Zero. 
91 Cross & Hudson, Beyond Belief, p.121. 
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beryllium (which is not radioactive but is toxic) uranium, plutonium and other 
radioactive substances  
 One element of the ‘minor trials’ was the exploration of the possible 
consequences of nuclear ordinance being involved in an accident, or misfiring. To this 
end, the ‘Vixen B’ minor trials were staged at the Taranaki site (which was also the 
site of the last ‘major’ atomic test as part of ‘Operation Antler’ in 1957, though no 
atomic explosion occurred during the Vixen B trials). 
 As previously discussed, the implosion devices tested in Australia by Britain 
involved the precisely timed detonation of explosive lenses to compress the ‘pit’ into 
a supercritical state. For an efficient reaction to take place, the implosion must be 
symmetrical and without the ‘Munroe effect’ of uneven ‘jets’ of energy. But what if 
the detonators were to misfire, and the ‘pit’ was not compressed evenly? What if, 
indeed, instead of being evenly ‘imploded’, the plutonium, uranium and other 
materials (the reflector et cetera) were partially vaporised, scattered or ignited? In the 
Vixen B ‘minor trials’, thus was done intentionally, to gauge the effect of an accident 
involving atomic ordinance. 
  These experiments were typically conducted on steel structures known as 
‘featherbeds’ which were situated on concrete. Parkinson writes: 
 
For the bomb to work, the explosive charges have to be detonated simultaneously- this will 
compress the plutonium and produce the nuclear explosion with its characteristic mushroom 
cloud. However, in those trials, the purpose was not to produce a nuclear explosion; one 
explosive charge was fired ahead of others, thus avoiding the nuclear reaction. Even so, the 
heat of the chemical explosion melted the plutonium and uranium core and hurled the molten 
mix almost a kilometre into the air, where it was caught by the wind and spread over a huge 
area - shaped like a giant radioactive handprint. The palm of the hand was central Taranaki, 
the thumb pointed west, the inordinately long forefinger pointed northwest, the middle finger 
pointed north, and two fingers were bound together to point northeast. We referred to these 
‘fingers’ as plumes. The three main plumes stretched for several kilometres, well beyond what 
was to become the clean-up boundary. 93
 
 
Plutonium is a silvery white metal, which in non-critical quantities can be 
handled with gloves.  It emits alpha particles which are known to ionise tissue - these 
will be stopped by a few centimetres of air or by a layer of skin. Yet if so much as a 
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single milligram of plutonium lodges in the lungs, continually bombarding the tissue 
with ionising alpha particles - the eventual effect is fatal.94
 The clean-up of the Maralinga and Emu site would eventually be detailed in a 
report by the Australian Commonwealth Government’s Department of Education, 
Science and Training (DEST) in 2003, titled Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test 
Sites at Emu and Maralinga (Australia) 2003
 Thus, the scattered 
fragments of plutonium throughout the soil of the Taranaki site could be considered a 
serious problem, hence the major clean-up operation.  
95
 It is interesting to note that in the introduction to the text, Parkinson does not 
fall into the common trap of blaming the ills of the tests solely on the British; he 
asserts that there was a genuine interest within elements of the former Liberal 
government of Menzies in the acquisition of atomic weapons for Australia. He cites 
Wayne Reynolds as a source in support of this. In addition to this, he infers that the 
proposed reactor for the Jervis Bay site may well have been intended to produce 
weapons-grade plutonium. Yet he offers no definitive comment on this, leaving the 
issue rather open. Parkinson’s point here is that Australia may not have been as 
officially neutral on matters pertaining to atomic weapons as is commonly thought.
 and informally known as the 
MARTAC (Maralinga Technical Advisory Committee) Report. Parkinson’s text 
suggests that the report is a deeply flawed document. 
96
 Parkinson was employed on the clean-up project due to his expertise as a 
highly experienced mechanical and nuclear engineer. However, due to conflicts with 
other parties involved with MARTAC, he was eventually removed from the project. 
This may explain his possible motives for ‘blowing the whistle’ on what he suggests 
are the project’s faults, though the conflict may have begun with other parties 
involved in the project not sharing his particular judgement of these perceived issues.  
  
 During the Vixen trials, radioactive debris from the experiments were buried 
in pits, which were later capped with concrete during the earlier British clean-up 
‘Operation Brumby’ of 1967.97
                                                 
94 Ibid, pp.xvii-xix. 
 Parkinson observed, however, that the precise location, 
contents, and degree to which these pits were sealed was poorly documented and or 
95 Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test 
Sites at Emu and Maralinga (Australia) 2003, Department of Education, Science and Training, 
Canberra, 2003. 
96 Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
97 Ibid, p. 8.  
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falsified by the British. Thus, there were problems even finding the areas that needed 
to be properly dealt with. 
Once identified, the contents of the pits were to be sealed via a process known 
as ‘in situ vitrification’ (ISV). This involves the pits being temporarily covered with a 
large ‘hood’, allowing four graphite electrodes to penetrate the earth. These electrodes 
would conduct tremendous voltage, causing the soil to liquefy and then harden in a 
glass-like state. This material, though still radioactive, could not be scattered or 
inhaled.98
 
 Parkinson explores how the process, though highly suited, was cancelled 
midway through due to one unexplained explosion of material being vitrified and the 
high costs of the procedure, perhaps because early cost estimates had been based on 
earlier, inaccurate British data. The alternative approach of exhuming the contents of 
other pits for reburial was not, according to Parkinson, suitable. Other procedures 
implemented at Taranaki, such as the scraping of contaminated soil into a large trench, 
were also considered unsatisfactory by Parkinson. 
MosaicG2 and the Tadje Cobalt Pellets: 
 
Many sources offer comment on confusion surrounding the yield of the second 
test as part of ‘Operation Mosaic’, G2, which took place on 19 June 1956 at the 
Monte Bello islands.99
Joan Smith’s Clouds of Deceit states on the matter: 
  The figures here are not widely agreed upon in many sources. 
 
… in 1984, the British Government admitted that the second of these tests had been a 60 
kiloton blast, three times bigger than previously stated. Secret documents released to the 
Public Records Office in 1985 suggest it was even bigger than the 1984 description- 98 
kilotons.100
 
 
 And also: 
 
It is now clear that the British did everything they could to deceive the Australians. The true 
size of the biggest bomb, the ninety-eight kiloton Mosaic II blast - nearly eight times as large 
                                                 
98 Ibid, pp. 94-98. 
99 Milliken reports the yield at 60kt, Ibid, p. ix. 
100 Smith, Clouds of Deceit, p. 27. 
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as the Hiroshima bomb - was concealed from the Australian Government for twenty nine 
years.101
 
 
  
Mosaic G2, The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/G2.jpg, site accessed 29/05/09. 
 
Another book reports the size of the Mosaic G2 yield at 98kt. This is Denys 
Blakeway & Sue Lloyd-Roberts’ Fields of Thunder of 1985 which contains the 
following: 
 
...but in 1985, in response to repeated requests from the Australian Royal Commission, the 
British revealed documents showing that the blast yield from Mosaic G2 had been 98 kilotons, 
four times bigger than any of the Australian blasts and very nearly in the megaton range.102
 
 
 As will be discussed in Chapter Six, the Royal Commission did not record in 
their report a yield of 98kt for this test.103
                                                 
101 Ibid, p.122. 
 It must be noted here that 98kt can not be 
102 Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts Fields of Thunder, p. 98. 
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considered to be ‘very nearly’ in the megaton range’. 100kt is still only one-tenth of a 
megaton (mt.) The figures of 60 and 98 kt are both cited in numerous sources. The 
Nuclear Weapon Archive as at 8 November 2010 still cited a 98kt yield (and 
elsewhere on the same page a 60kt yield in a summary of British tests) and stated of 
G2: 
 
This was the highest yield test ever conducted in Australia. Since the test yield broke an 
assurance made personally by PM Anthony Eden of the UK to PM Robert Menzies of 
Australia that the yield would not exceed 2.5 times that of Hurricane (thus about 62 kt), the 
true yield was concealed until 1984.104
 
 
 I had noted that one group whose interest would have been best served by 
promoting the belief that the British tests were risky and ill-considered, the Australian 
Nuclear Veterans Association, still reported a yield of close to 60kt. Their website 
states: 
  
Mosaic G2 exploded at 10.14 on 19 June 1956. The approximate yield was 56 kt. The cloud 
rose to 47 000 feet, well above the predicted 37 000 feet. This was the largest atomic device 
detonated by the British Government in Australia. The northern half of the mainland was 
subject to radioactive fallout.105
 
 
 Yet another source which, despite serving to highlight any risk associated with 
the tests, reports the smaller 60kt yield. This is Roger Cross and Avon Hudson’s 
Beyond Belief.106
 
 Curious as to this lack of parity, I made an enquiry to Mr Sublette 
via email.  His reply: 
I have been considering amending my comment about this test on my website. 
My source for the yield claim is: 
Nuclear Weapons Databook V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear 
Weapons; by Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse; 1994 - pg. 33. 
And their cited source is a 1984 New Scientist article - which I haven't 
                                                                                                                                            
103 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission  into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol  I, pp. 245-246, 
104 The Nuclear Weapon Archive , section entitled British Nuclear Testing, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed  08/11/10 
105 ‘The Australian Nuclear Veterans Association’, section entitled Operation Mosaic, 
http://users.bigpond.net.au/anva/mosaic.htm, site accessed 17/02/08. (now hosted at 
http://www.sandersonsite.com/anva/mosaic.htm, under construction, site accessed 02/12/09 ) 
106 Cross & Hudson Beyond Belief, p.41, p.190. 
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actually seen (if you can't find the Norris et al book I can look the New 
Scientist reference up in my copy for you). 
I don't know how reliable the New Scientist article is - the magazine is 
overall pretty good, but they do go out a limb sometimes. 
A few years ago I corresponded by email with Lorna Arnold through her 
assistant (since she is now blind) and she said that she had never 
encountered documents supporting this story. This has led me to question its 
veracity (given that Ms. Arnold is one of the best equipped people there is 
to be able to weigh in on this). 
I should add this background to my website to give people a warning that 
this claim is in question. 
If you should be able to lay hands on the NS article, I should like to get a 
scan of it. Finding a library that has a 25 year old archive of this British 
popular science magazine is not that easy in the States. I'm sure I could do 
it if I made it a priority, but I haven't done so yet. 
 
Carey107
 
 
 Lorna Arnold is, as previously discussed, the author of the official British 
history of the tests, A Very Special Relationship.108 I obtained Norris et al’s Databook. 
As Sublette suggested, on page 33 it reported the yield of Mosaic G2 at 98 kt. As 
Sublette was also aware, the relevant footnote for this pertained to an article from 
New Scientist, 24 May 1984.109 This article cited the smaller yield of 60kt, thus it was 
incorrectly reported by Norris et al.110 Further correspondence with Mr Sublette 
(which included sending a copy of the New Scientist article) suggests he will amend 
his archive accordingly. The Nuclear Weapon Databook111 which contained this error 
was published in 1994. It may be that it drew upon the 1985 book Clouds of Deceit, or 
other sources influenced by it. This book hints at ‘secret documents’, showing that 
this test was 98 Kt, without formally providing any sources about them.112
                                                 
107 Electronic Mail Correspondence, 08/09/08. 
  On the 
matter of G2’s yield, Fields of Thunder, also of 1985, offers no formal source. It 
seems as though the notion of the yield of this test being 98kt is a falsehood which has 
entered the public consciousness in 1985, the final year of the Royal Commission into 
108 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship. 
109 Steve Conner, ‘The Nuclear Blast that Britain Kept Secret’, New Scientist, London, 24 May 1984, 
p.4. 
110 Norris et al, The Nuclear Weapon Databook Volume 5, p.33. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Smith, Clouds of Deceit, p.27.  
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the tests, though because these works do not present the sources of their reports, it is 
difficult to ascertain its true origin. This indicates a willingness to accept this line of 
argument regardless of its evidencing base.   
Due to its use of fusion ‘fuel’ and uranium tamper, the yield of Mosaic G2, 
though not a multi-stage device was far larger than other tests conducted in Australia 
and its cloud would have included significant amounts of radioactive and toxic 
particles. This is a factor in the controversy surrounding the drift of this cloud as 
discussed in previous chapters. The significance of the use of a uranium tamper is 
explained within Appendix II. 
Another controversial issue related to weapons design, also explored in 
Appendix II, has drawn numerous commentaries. This is the use of cobalt pellets in 
the ‘Tadje’ test of ‘Operation Antler’ on 17 September 1957 at Maralinga. As we 
have seen, there was earlier controversy surrounding the possible testing of a ‘cobalt 
bomb’ in Australia. The fear of a ‘cobalt bomb’ had been discussed in the House of 
Representatives and newspapers as early as 1953.113 In his 1956 book Facing The 
Atomic Future, AWTSC member and ANU physics professor Ernest Titterton 
referred to fears in Australia of the ‘cobalt bomb’, and suggested that such a device 
was not really a useful weapon.114
 
 Tame and Robotham’s Maralinga makes the claim 
that the Co-60 present at Maralinga was likely do to experiments into the ‘cobalt 
bomb’: 
… (cobalt) had been included for ‘diagnostic purposes.’ What the cobalt-60 could diagnose 
that the abundant fallout could not, is hard to discern. It is much more likely the cobalt was 
included as part of a study of a potential cobalt bomb, considered at one time to be the 
possible ultimate weapon’115
 
 
 The Nuclear Weapon Archive states that the cobalt was intended to yield data 
about the nature of the blast due to the degree of neutron activation of the target pellet, 
and that these pellets were discovered to be being ‘mildly radioactive’.116
                                                 
113 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 17 September 1953, Session 1951-53, p. 
317, The Sun, October 15, 1953,  p.3 
An account 
which suggests otherwise is that of Milliken, which cites the experiences of a member 
114 Titterton, Facing the Atomic Future, pp. 253-254, 
115 Ibid, p.111. See also p.236.  
116 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 10/10/08. 
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of the Australian health physics team at Maralinga, Doug Rickard. Milliken’s account 
suggests that the AWTSC had not informed Menzies about the presence of Co- 60 in 
the Tadje device, and that this one only discovered when Doug Rickard, a member of 
the health physics team at Maralinga, was conducting a routine survey of the bob sites.  
He encountered radiation levels ‘so high his instruments could not measure them.’ 
The account details that Rickard dug about the dirt with his feet and discovered 
several metallic-looking particles, which he put in a tobacco tin and drove the 98 
kilometres back to the health physics laboratories at Maralinga. Milliken writes that 
Rickard’s arrival caused ‘great consternation and intrigue because the pellets were 
more powerful than anything his team had ever detected. In fact, his staff were 
waiting for him outside because, as he approached, the instruments in the laboratory 
had gone haywire.’117
Yet why would a device intended to be an experiment into enhanced fallout 
feature metal pellets, which would be scattered, as opposed to a jacket of metal which 
would be reduced to airborne particles? The explanation that the test was an 
experiment in diagnosing yield, due to the degree of activation of the pellets, as 
suggested by The Nuclear Weapon Archive appears much more likely. However, it 
must be noted that The Nuclear Weapon Archive does not indicate when these pellets 
were discovered to be ‘mildly radioactive’. Given that Co-60 has a half-life of ~5.27 
years, there is some allowance for the possibility that both sources are correct.
 
118 The 
experiences of Doug Rickard’s with Co- 60 is also included in the 2005 Beyond Belief 
of Cross and Hudson119
 
without reference to the cobalt bomb.  It would seem the 
notion that Australia was intended to be a testing site for a ‘cobalt bomb’ is a myth of 
the 1950s which was perpetuated over three decades into the 1980s.  
Further remarks: 
 
Books commenting on atomic testing in Australia vary in scope. They range 
from those that set out to demonstrate the full extent of their negative impact such as 
                                                 
117 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, p. 229.  
118 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Cobalt Bombs and Other Salted Bombs, 
http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq1.html#nfaq1.6, site accessed 10/10/08. 
119 Cross & Hudson Beyond Belief, pp. 99-110. Also included here is the account of another individual, 
Ian McKiggan. 
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those of Tame and Robotham,120 Smith,121  Milliken122 and to a lesser extent 
Blakeway and Lloyd- Roberts123 to the ‘official’ histories of Symonds124 and 
Arnold125 and the Memoirs of Beale.126   It is apparent that the only means to come to 
an appreciation of the events connected with British atomic testing is through a wide 
critical reading of relevant source material and an appraisal of the available scientific 
evidence on their conduct and consequences.  I have endeavoured to gain an 
appreciation of the political situation which made the tests justifiable. The view that 
the tests were harmless can be rejected, though as evident in the variance in accounts 
on the subject, the extent of this ‘harm’ is heavily contested. Of key importance in 
developing an understanding of the events of the tests are reports and studies leading 
up to, involved in and response to the McClelland Royal Commission, to be examined 
in the next chapter. Of particular influence is the McClelland Report127
                                                 
120 Tame and Robotham, Maralinga. 
 itself. Far 
from being a definitive document, it sought to support its findings with firm evidence 
and clearly state where firm conclusions could not be reached
121 Smith, Clouds of Deceit. 
122 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury. 
123 Blakeway & Lloyd-Roberts, Fields of Thunder. 
124 Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia. 
125 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship. 
126 Beale, This Inch of Time. 
127 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia. 
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Chapter Six: The tests in studies and reports.   
 
This chapter explores publicly available reports related and in response to the 
Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia of 1984 and 1985, and 
other related studies. Such reports are in themselves a contribution to the debates 
surrounding the tests, and commentary elsewhere in this thesis, such as Chapter Seven, 
examines how this contribution has been used, misused or neglected by other 
commentators. In many cases, certain beliefs about the tests have been repeated 
despite lack of evidence from related studies and reports. 
The reports include studies into the levels of contamination in the testing areas, 
epidemiological health studies, reports into clean-up attempts at the test sites and 
explorations of alleged misconduct by those responsible for carrying out the tests.  
An analysis of the relevant documentation highlights several key issues. One 
issue is that epidemiological health studies into the effects of the tests have largely 
been inconclusive. It must be stated that although it is difficult to demonstrate that the 
tests caused ill-health, this does not necessarily prove they did not. Also, broad studies 
such as those considered here do not reflect on the likelihood of exposure to ionising 
radiation in individual cases. Accidents and miscalculations may have happened. 
However, when claims about the risks, or lack of risks to human beings as a result of 
the tests it should be noted that opinions are varied and the whole truth can never be 
fully understood. 
Another consideration is that many of the risks of the testing programme are 
not unique to the nuclear weapons issue. This is the case even when considering the 
issue of cancer incidence and cancer mortality, 1950s military servicemen, and civil 
contractors, whether at the tests or not, came into contact with carcinogens such as 
asbestos and also possibly benzene. The high incidence of cigarette smoking also 
presented its own hazard.  
That sources making use of scientific methodologies have not been able to 
confirm some of the claims about hazards associated with the tests, despite 
considerable anecdotal evidence to the contrary, is perhaps an example of the divide 
between the objectivist and subjectivist paradigms. This perhaps can be likened to the 
difficulty in integrating strategic assessment and assessment of the human experience; 
the broader scientific (or strategic) picture is difficult to reconcile with the 
experiences of individuals.  
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The McClelland Royal Commission hearings, commissioned by the ALP 
Government of Prime Minister Bob Hawke, occurred between 22 August 1984 and 26 
September 1985 at Sydney, Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, London (UK), Marla 
Bore, Wallatinna, Perth and Karratha.1  The three volume McClelland Report was 
presented to the Governor General, Sir Ninian Stephen by Commission President J.R. 
McClelland and Commissioners J. Fitch and W.J.A Jonas on 20 November 1985 and 
was published by the Australian Government Publishing Services that year.2
The McClelland Royal Commission drew negative conclusions of the tests, 
documented verifiable harms from the tests and made recommendations. The Royal 
Commission was very influential in influential in shaping public debates on the test; 
yet it also rejected many of the ‘conspiracies’ that remain and are continually 
reinforced in the public consciousness. An examination of the McClelland Report, 
and related reports, shows much of how the public mythology of the tests has been 
informed or misinformed.  
  
 One area of interest which is very widely agreed-upon is that the Maralinga 
range required a ‘clean up’. The ‘minor trials’ which took place there were not 
discussed publicly at the time they were conducted. However, with time, the 
contamination they caused became more widely known. The large, hand-shaped patch 
of contaminated soil of the ‘Taranaki’ site was a verifiable reality which was observed 
and documented.  It contained plutonium in the form of tiny particles,3
It may have been the prevailing thought in the Menzies era that the remote 
sites selected as testing areas were of little consequence. However, the contemporary 
populace seems to generally have a higher regard for Australian natural resources and 
heritage.  Though it may have been denied at the time, the sites of the mainland tests 
were the traditional lands of the local indigenous people. The long-term goal is that a 
level of decontamination be achieved that would allow these sites to be safe. Though 
such sites were never used for permanent habitation, the inland testing sites were part 
of the area used by semi nomadic people and it was only out of disregard for these 
people that tests were held there. 
 potentially 
fatal if lodged in the tissue of the lung. 
                                                 
1 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia. Vol II, p. IX-I. 
2 Ibid, Vol I, pp. ii-iii.  
3 N. Pearce, Final Report on Residual Radioactive Contamination of the Maralinga Range and the Emu 
Site, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, 1968. 
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The McClelland Report serves as the focal point for this chapter. As a whole, 
the report avoids sensationalist claims but manages to highlight the perceived risks of 
the testing programme. The report has come to represent the ‘official’ Australian 
voice on the tests,4 though prior to its release, Symonds’ far less critical text served in 
this role. One of the stated goals of that text was to inform the McClelland Royal 
Commission, so it is interesting to consider that it does not take an anti-testing stance 
or focus on alleged misconduct, as the McClelland Report certainly does.5
   The first volume of the McClelland Report introduces the topic, discusses 
Australian involvement in the weapons project, and offers a chapter discussing 
nuclear weapons, radiation and aspects of health physics before going through each of 
the five operations of the testing programme in Australia; ‘Hurricane, Totem, Mosaic, 
Buffalo’ and ‘Antler.’ 
  
These chapters detail the purpose, location, yield, fallout pattern, safety of 
servicemen, safety of Aboriginal people  and various other details of each test as well 
as addressing other issues that arose which were  of particular concern. Thus the 
specific allegations of eyewitnesses are evaluated and discussed, some of which have 
been previously discussed in this thesis.  These include  the ‘Black Mist’ which  
occurred after the test ‘Totem 1’on 15 October 1953 at Emu Field, also the alleged 
‘hurried departure’ of X200, and the use of cobalt metal pellets in the test ‘Tadje’ of 
14 September 1957 at Maralinga.   
 The second volume of the report details the ‘minor trials’, defining the 
location, dates and nature of the trials code named ‘kittens’, ‘tims’, ‘rats’ and ‘vixens’. 
This leads directly to discussion of any radioactive or toxic materials left at the range, 
including plutonium and beryllium. Also included is a chapter discussing the politics 
of the ‘minor trials.’  There is a specific chapter titled ‘sundry topics’ which offers 
comments on specific allegations and conspiracies. These include discussion on the 
decontamination procedures for aircraft used to sample particulate matter in the 
atomic plumes. Also, the report a rejection of claims that whole atomic bombs were 
secretly disposed of at Woomera by fire and that the tests were known to result in the 
deaths of Aboriginal people, whose bodies were secretly disposed of. The allegations 
regarding the deaths of Aboriginal people come from servicemen Patrick Connolly 
                                                 
4  Dieter Michel, ‘Villains, Victims and Heroes: Contested Memory and the British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia’, Journal of Australian Studies, No 80, 2004. pp. 221-228. 
5  Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia. 
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and John Burke, who also claim to have been warned by ASIO not to recount this 
story. Connolly also made a claim that a special hospital had been established, in 
secret, to treat Aboriginal people affected by radiation. Due to inconsistencies in their 
accounts regarding the names of officers associated with the alleged cover-up and the 
dates of the alleged events, the McClelland Royal Commission did not accept their 
claims. Connolly was served a subpoena to appear before the Commission on 1 May 
1985 in Perth, where his testimony was rejected 6
 The second volume of the McClelland Report then details the issue of secrecy 
and freedom of information throughout the testing programme; this is related to both 
the major and minor trials.  Clean up operations were discussed and the likely options 
for future management of the site. A chapter of the volume details the various studies 
on the alleged health effects of the tests. The volume concludes with some 
recommendations.   
 
 A third volume consists of conclusions drawn by the McClelland Royal 
Commission and a list of further recommendations. Though the report is freely 
available to interested parties, it is clear that it is not a ‘popular’ source for a wide 
audience. Many examples of the conduct of the tests are criticised by the report, but 
appropriately so, and with an evidencing base.    
Due to the large number of accounts which report it, one particular story has 
become a hugely influential element of the discourse of the testing program. This is 
the story of the ‘Black Mist’. On this topic, the McClelland Royal Commission heard 
evidence from Yankykunytjatjara Anungu (Aboriginal people) elder Yami Lester, 
who was the subject of an article appearing in Adelaide’s The Advertiser of 3 May 
1980. Lester claimed that following exposure to the mist he went temporarily blind in 
his left eye and permanently blind in the right. Lester said that the mist: 
  
…was coming from the south, black-like smoke. I was thinking it might be a dust storm, but 
it was quiet, just moving, as it looks like, through the trees and above that again, you know. It 
was just rolling and moving quietly.7
 
 
The Royal Commission sought to establish: 
                                                 
6 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol II, pp. 430-432. This conspiracy was at the heart of Avenue Pictures, Ground Zero, 
7 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I, pp. 174-175. 
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a) Did the physical phenomenon known as the Black Mist occur? 
b) Was it a result of Totem 1? 
c) Did it cause illness and death? 
d) Did it cause Yami Lester’s blindness?8
 
    
 
Within the conclusion section to the entry on the ‘Black Mist’, the report states: 
 
There is no reason to disbelieve Aboriginal accounts that the Black Mist occurred and that it 
made some people sick. Both radiation exposure and fear can lead to vomiting. At Wallatinna 
the vomiting by Aborigines may have resulted from radiation, it may have been a psychogenic 
reaction to a frightening experience, or it may have resulted from both of these.  
 
And also: 
 
The Royal Commission believes that Aboriginal people experienced radioactive fallout from 
Totem 1 in the form of a Black Mist or cloud at and near Wallatinna. This may have made 
some people temporarily ill. The Royal Commission does not have sufficient evidence to say 
whether or not it caused illnesses or injuries.9
 
 
As previously noted, difficulty in proving that an event resulted in harm does 
not imply that it did not. The 173km distance between the Emu Field test site and 
Wallatinna is significant in any consideration of the ambiguities surrounding this 
issue.10
Another controversial element of ‘Operation Totem’ was the recovery of a 
Centurion tank used as a target response item.  The experiences of Warrant Officer 
Jones in recovering this tank have been referenced in numerous history texts. The 
experience may have led to his early death.
 
11 His widow was interviewed about this in 
the 1981 film Backs to the Blast.12
The McClelland Report made no specific mention of Warrant Officer Jones 
and instead focused on the officer in command of the party, Captain J.G. Monaghan. 
 
                                                 
8 Ibid, Vol I. 
9 Ibid, Vol I, p. 194. 
10 Ibid, Vol I, p, 186 
11 Tame & Robotham, Maralinga, pp 155-156; Smith. Clouds of Deceit, pp 105-106; Milliken, No 
Conceivable Injury, p 309; Cross & Hudson Beyond Belief, pp. 39-40. 
12 Composite Films, Backs to the Blast. 
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This suggests that the McClelland Royal Commission was selective and not infallible 
in its judgement. The report states that the tank was placed 350 yards (or 
approximately 320 meters) from the Totem 1 tower (unoccupied). Thus it would have 
been exposed to ‘prompt’ radiation and fallout.  The report also details that the tank 
was driven under its own power three days after the test on 18 October, and that it was 
later driven 650km to Woomera, setting off on 19 October. The tank was examined 
for radioactivity on 4 November 1953 and 26 July 1954. The McClelland Report 
documents that it was ‘slightly radioactive’ when first driven after the test and later 
‘not seriously contaminated.’   
In reference to this lack of precise information, contained in the report is the 
following: 
 
Those crew members who travelled with the Centurion tank on its journey from Emu to 
Puckapunyal were subject to radiation exposure. No crew members wore film badges for any 
part of the journey, and the Royal Commission is therefore unable to determine the level of 
exposure for any members of the crew. 
 
And also, in the conclusion to the chapter on ‘Operation Totem’: 
 
Those people exposed to radiation as a result of their participation in the Totem tests have an 
increased risk of cancers as a result of that exposure, although the Royal Commission has 
been unable to quantify the probable increase.13
 
 
The language used within the report suggests that the risks were likely to have 
been small but also clearly states that the precise levels of contamination and the 
health risks from this cannot be known.  In any case, that servicemen were subjected 
to any such risk and allowing them to fear for the worst are actions resulting in 
verifiable negative consequences. However, the McClelland Report makes no note 
that Warrant Officer Jones stayed with the tank in the interim between the 15 October 
test and driving it away from the test site on 18 October, or that he would later die of 
cancer, or actually any mention of Jones at all.14
                                                 
13 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I, pp. 226-229. 
  The ‘official histories’ of Symonds 
14 Tame and Robotham report that Jones stayed with the tank three days, Maralinga, p 156.  Smith 
reports Jones time with the tank at two days, Clouds of Deceit, pp. 105-106.  Milliken states Jones 
stayed with the tank ‘several days’, No Conceivable Injury, p 309. These accounts all place Jones death 
  
 
166 
and Arnold both suggest that following the  test, the tank was only ‘slightly 
radioactive’ but that if it had been crewed during the test itself, the ‘prompt’ radiation 
would have proved lethal. These accounts differ in that Arnold places the tank at 250 
yards (approximately 228 meters) from the tower, and Symonds at 350 yards 
(approximately 320 meters).15  It should be noted that the tank was used in the service 
of the Australian military for 23 years after ‘Operation Totem’, including 15 months 
of operational deployment in Vietnam.16
The absence of reference to Jones in the McClelland Report is puzzling and it 
indicated the McClelland Royal Commission was not comprehensive and was subject 
to limitations. It is yet another example of the problems associated with coming to an 
understanding of the events of the tests. The epidemiological studies discussed within 
this chapter do not account for instances of individual contamination such as the 
experiences of those involved in driving the centurion tank. 
 
In any case, that Jones later died from cancer is a tragic event. Whether this 
was caused by his role with the centurion tank cannot be known with certainty. Yet 
the fact remains that he was placed into a situation of unknown danger. His family 
would later, quite reasonably, form the belief that his death was due to radiation 
exposure and this indeed may have been the case. Even if the cause of Jones’ cancer 
is unknown, this incident exists as a clear example of a negative consequence of the 
tests and one apparently overlooked by the McClelland Royal Commission. 
The previous chapter explored the lack of parity in sources which reference 
the test ‘Mosaic G2’. Joan Smith’s Clouds Of Deceit, for example, reported that in 
1985 ‘secret documents’ emerged that indicated the yield was much higher than 
otherwise documented, 98 kt as opposed to 60kt.17 This claim is in no way supported 
by or even discussed within the McClelland Report.  In fact, the report clearly states 
that the test was slightly below the maximum expected yield.18
                                                                                                                                            
as occurring in 1966. That Jones stayed with the tank ‘two days’ and later died is reported in 
Composite Films, Backs to the Blast. 
 However, the 
15  Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia, pp. 185-186.  Arnold, A Very Special 
Relationship, pp. 66-67. 
16 Raeme know-how (Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers), section entitled, Atomic 
Tank: The Unique History of Centurion169041, http://www.raeme.info/ops.php?op=armd&item=3, site 
accessed 20/09/10. This account also makes no mention of Jones and indicates that contamination was 
minimal, though those who recovered the tank subsequent to the test had later expressed some concern 
over lack of briefing on the issue of possible contamination, and lack of protective equipment.  
17 Smith, Clouds of Deceit, p. 27. 
18 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission  into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol  I, pp. 245-246, 
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conclusion to this section states of the two Mosaic tests: ‘The Mosaic tests were 
conducted in a hurry under marginal weather conditions.’19 I have explored the 
controversy surrounding the drift of the atomic cloud from ‘Mosaic G2’ over the 
mainland. This has clearly added to the controversial nature of this test, allowing for 
the alleged or incorrect recording of the 98 kt yield to be readily accepted. The report 
also states: ‘The theoretical predictions were incorrect for the Mosaic tests and parts 
of the clouds passed over the mainland of Australia.’20 The third volume of the report, 
Conclusions and Recommendations, suggests that weather conditions in the Monte 
Bello islands made the location unsuitable for the Mosaic tests, that predictions of 
fallout patterns for both tests were incorrect and that parts of the atomic cloud passed 
over the mainland. Also that the vulnerability of Aboriginal people on the mainland 
was not considered by the AWRE (UK) or the AWTSC. However, the McClelland 
Royal Commission did find that precautions taken for servicemen concerned with 
‘Operation Mosaic’ were generally adequate. 21
Another verified consequence of the tests concerned the fears faced by the 
Milpuddie family following their contamination at the crater formed by the Marcoo 
test. This later became known as the ‘Pom Pom’ incident after the location of a 
decontamination station.  As documented by the McClelland Report, Prime Minister 
Menzies had received assurances from the AWTSC that the testing range was secure 
and the Aboriginal populace safe. This was clearly not the case. As the McClelland 
Report recounted, on 14 May 1957, Captain R. Marqueur of the Royal Australian 
Engineers was informed that there was a group of Aborigines in a ‘dirty’ area. There 
were fears that news of this contamination could put a halt to testing.
 
22
 After being found camping near the crater, the Milpuddies, a couple and two 
children, were rushed to a decontamination station. The McClelland Report shows the 
Peace Officer, T. Murray, gave testimony to suggest that the car ride was terrifying 
for the family, who ‘vomited everywhere.’ The account also suggests that the 
decontamination shower was also a frightful experience, with Murray being required 
to aid washing Edie Milpuddie,
  
23
                                                 
19 Ibid, Vol I, p. 248. 
 who was pregnant at the time.  Patrol Officer 
MacDougal was quoted as stating in a report of 19 June 1957: 
20 Ibid, Vol I, p. 258. 
21 Ibid, Vol  III, pp.18-19. 
22 Ibid, Vol I, p. 319. 
23 Ibid, Vol I, p. 320. 
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The man is not very concerned in regard to his experiences but his wife is worried about the 
possibility of punishment for trespassing on what was obviously a male area and therefore 
probably a ceremonial ground taboo to females. 
 
The McClelland Report goes on to state: 
 
Edie Milpuddie was pregnant at the time. The baby was born dead. Edie and other Maralinga 
women believe that this happened because there was ‘poison’ on the ground where they had 
been. 
 
The report also documents that the dogs belonging to the Milpuddies were 
shot. 24 The McClelland Report also examines how Range Commander Colonel 
Durance saw the incident as a ‘political embarrassment’ and efforts were made to 
ensure it would not become known to the public. Patrol Officer McDougal also went 
to the extent of suggesting to the Milpuddies that ‘as they had accidentally seen 
something of a whiteman’s ceremony they should not declare anything to other white 
men.’25
 
 The report comments on this cover up, stating: 
Hushing up the affair was one thing. Doing nothing about it was quite another. There were 
only two patrol officers checking in the movements of Aborigines in an area of 30 000 square 
miles. A third patrol officer was eventually appointed. He was never told of the Marcoo 
incident even though the information would have been vital when he was co-ordinating aerial 
and ground searches for the Antler trials.26
 
 
The conclusion to this section of the McClelland Report included: 
 
Overall, the attempts to ensure Aboriginal safety during the Buffalo series demonstrate 
ignorance, incompetence and cynicism on the part of those responsible for that safety. The 
inescapable conclusion is that if Aboriginals were not injured or killed as a result of the 
explosion, this was a matter of luck rather than adequate organisation, management and 
resources allocated to ensuring safety. 
 
And: 
                                                 
24 Ibid, Vol I, p.321. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, Vol I, p. 322. 
  
 
169 
 
The Pom Pom incident demonstrated that flaws existed in the security system at Maralinga. 
Those responsible for security seemed at least concerned about the exposure of such flaws as 
the welfare of the Milpuddie family.27
 
 
Range security was clearly flawed to some degree and as a consequence, the 
Milpuddie family suffered a terrible experience. Whatever the cause of the loss of the 
child, this incident is a tragic example of a negative consequence of the testing 
program. That people were removed from their traditional lands is injurious itself. 
That the Milpuddies were subjected to this event and its resulting fear is tragic.  
On the matter of the presence of Co-60 pellets at Maralinga at the site ‘Tadje’, 
the first volume of the McClelland report discusses that Titterton was aware of the 
presence of this material but did not inform other members of AWTSC until after the 
detonation. The relevant health physics bodies associated with this test were also not 
informed of the presence of Co-60, which was later found with detection equipment, 
presenting an unnecessary example of ‘individual contamination.’ The Royal 
Commission was concerned by Titterton’s non-disclosure, and Titterton had 
apparently hinted that leaving the material for health physics personal to find would 
provide them with a little ‘test’  However, the notion of a ‘cobalt bomb’ is not 
discussed, and the presence of the material is firmly attributed to its use as a 
radiological ‘tracer.’ 28
In the second volume is discussion surrounding the ‘Marston Controversy,’ a 
brief overview of the nature of Marston’s work is offered. The report explores how 
the AWTSC contested Marston’s inference that the presence of I-131 in animal 
thyroids could be indicative of the likely distribution of Sr-90 and its daughter 
products. The report also states: ‘There have been claims from time to time that 
Marston’s results were suppressed for their disturbing findings; but this would appear 
not to be so.’ The report documents that Marston’s results were published, except for 
two figures highlighting ‘gamma spectra’ of fallout. The AWRE had insisted this 
 
                                                 
27 Ibid, Vol I, p. 323. 
28 Ibid, Vol, I, pp. 388-393. The notion of Titterton not disclosing the presence of Co-60 as a ‘test’ for 
the health physics personnel is also discussed in Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, pp. 231-232. It is 
suggested that as contamination from the ‘Tadje’ explosion decayed, radiation from the Co-60 pellets 
would begin to stand out, due to its longer half-life.  
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information be removed on the grounds it ‘could be used to derive bomb design 
information.’ According to the report, Marston readily agreed to this censorship. 29
The third volume of the report also offers comment on other issues this thesis 
has explored. Numerous books discussed in the previous chapter report Prime 
Minister Menzies’ acceptance of the British request to allow testing in Australia 
without conferring with even his own cabinet. The McClelland Report states: 
  
 
The Royal Commission received no evidence to disturb the overwhelming impression that the 
original decision to lend Australia to the United Kingdom for the purpose of the latter’s 
nuclear test program was taken by the Australian Prime Minister Menzies without reference to 
his cabinet. 30
 
 
This lack of conferring with others is an often-cited example of Menzies’ 
anglophilia. As the previous chapters have shown, however, there is evidence to 
suggest that it had been hoped that the tests would provide the Australian military, at 
the very least, with operational knowledge of the use and effects of nuclear weapons 
in the theatre. As discussed in examples of parliamentary debate in Chapter Two, 
there were also those who had hoped the tests would aid in the possible acquisition of 
nuclear weapons for Australia. 
On the subject of the confusing and inaccurate press reporting following 
‘Operation Hurricane’, the report states, as conclusion number seven:   
 
There was virtually complete government control of the Australian media reporting the 
Hurricane test and the lead up to it, thus ensuring that the Australian news media reported only 
what the UK Government wished.31
 
 
Further on the issue of the tests as represented by the Australian media, this 
time pertaining to ‘Operation Mosaic’, the McClelland Royal Commission found: 
 
Information on Mosaic provided to the Australian news media and to the public was largely 
limited to generalised assurances on safety. Only when things appeared to be going wrong was 
more information provided.32
                                                 
29 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia, 
Vol II, pp. 434-438. 
 
30 Ibid, Vol III, p.7. 
31 Ibid, Vol III. 
32 Ibid, Vol III, p.9.  
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These extracts from the report are wholly consistent with the examples of 
mainstream print media from the time of the testing programme discussed within 
Chapter Three. Also included is a section on ‘Radiation Protection Standards’ which 
concludes with the following statement: 
 
The Royal Commission has been unable to quantify the probable increase in the risk of cancer 
among the participants in the trial program or among the Australian population in general.33
 
 
Yet it is very common for contemporary sources to state that the tests caused 
cancer and cancer mortality as if this is a self-evident truth. The recommendations 
section of the report suggest that that nuclear veterans should be compensated, with 
the onus of proof shifted from the claimant to the Commonwealth and that this should 
also apply to civilians affected, including Aborigines. There is a specific mention of 
compensation to those who may have been exposed to the ‘Black Mist.’ It was also 
recommended that a formal register of those who may have been affected be compiled.  
The Royal Commission also recommended a clean-up to ensure the affected inland 
sites were suitable for unrestricted habitation by traditional Aboriginal owners, and 
that the Monte Bello site also be cleaned. It was recommended that all costs for such a 
clean up be borne by the UK government.34
The recommendations reflect how the interests of the population indigenous to 
the test sites were not properly appreciated during the Menzies era. It was formally 
considered acceptable practice for Aboriginal people to be removed. For this very 
reason air patrols were staged so they could be found.  
 
It can be firmly stated that the McClelland Royal Commission accepted that 
the testing programme held negative consequences for the Australian landscape and 
populace. These consequences, the report asserts, can be definitively attributed to the 
actions of the Government of the United Kingdom, and by Menzies and his advisors 
for failure to accept the implications of allowing the British programme to take place. 
That the report rejects some of the more extreme claims, for instance that there was a 
need for a rapid departure from the X200 Village, or that there was a conspiracy to 
hide the bodies of Aborigines killed directly by the tests, reflects that despite its 
                                                 
33 Ibid, Vol III, p.15. 
34Ibid, Vol II, pp. 614-615. 
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limitations the McClelland Royal Commission showed need for adequate proof to 
support any claims and allegations. However, it cannot be regarded as the definitive, 
all-encompassing document on British atomic testing in Australia. It did not examine 
the wider political ramifications of the tests,  for example that there was a real belief 
that Australia stood to receive technical advancement from the testing programme, as 
referenced in examples of parliamentary debate within Chapter Two. The McClelland 
Report also did not offer details on all allegations, for example it did not detail the 
experiences of Warrant Officer Jones. 
As the previous chapter explored, there are numerous accounts which suggest 
that the tests resulted directly in cancer incidence and cancer mortality. This is likely 
to have caused an impact on how the public has regarded the tests. In discussing this, 
specifically in regard to the book Fields of Thunder,35
Three studies were conducted by the UK’s National Radiological Protection 
Board (NRPB).  The first study showed no evidence of increased mortality among 
nuclear veterans against a control group, who were also servicemen from this time 
period. It stated there was some indication of a possible risk of increased leukaemia 
(other than chronic lymphatic leukaemia or CLL). There was also indication of a 
possible increase in multiple myeloma among veterans.
 the previous chapter assessed 
formal studies involving test veterans and control groups as a means to ascertain the 
actual risks of the tests. These studies form an important element of the discourse of 
Australia’s atomic test experience. As a whole, studies show how popular claims 
about the tests are widely disputed and indicate that reports of confirmed widespread 
illness arising from the tests are not supported. 
36 This necessitated a follow-
up study which suggested that these possible increases may have been a chance 
finding. 37
A third study published in 2003 also found that levels of cancer mortality and 
incidence among veterans were also similar to that of control groups and that the 
 
                                                 
35 Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts Fields of Thunder, pp. 10-28. 
36  Darby et al, ‘A Summary of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer in Men from the United Kingdom 
Who Participated in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes.’ 
37 S.C. Darby, G.M Kendall, T.P. Fell, R. Doll, A.A. Goodill, A.J. Conquest, D.A. Jackson, R.G. 
Haylock, ‘Further Follow up of Mortality and  Incidence of Cancer in Men from the United Kingdom 
who Participated in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes.’ British Medical Journal, Volume 307, 11 December 1993, pp. 1530-1535.  
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increase of multiple myeloma suggested by the first study was, again, likely to be a 
chance finding. It stated: 
 
Overall levels of mortality and cancer incidence in UK nuclear weapons test participants have 
continued to be similar to those in a matched control group, and overall mortality has 
remained lower than expected from national rates. There was no evidence of an increased 
raised risk of multiple myeloma among test participants in recent years, and the suggestion in 
the first analysis of this study of a raised myeloma risk is likely to have been a chance finding. 
There was some evidence of a raised risk of leukaemia other than CLL among test participants 
relative to controls, particularly in the early years after the tests, although a small risk may 
have persisted more recently. This could be a chance finding, in view of low rates among the 
controls and then generally small radiation doses recorded in former participants. However, 
the possibility that test participation caused a small absolute risk of leukaemia other than CLL 
cannot be ruled out. 38
 
 
 No single study is definitive, of course, but problems have arisen in that few 
sources appear to acknowledge the issue is contested. That is to say, many popular 
accounts assert that the tests positively caused cancer and fatalities. 
A study undertaken in Australia provided some different findings, again 
suggesting that no single study can be definitive. This was Australian participants in 
British Nuclear Tests in Australia undertaken for the Department of Veterans Affairs, 
by the Discipline of Public Health, School of Population Health and Clinical Practice 
of the University of Adelaide. 39
                                                 
38 C.R. Muirhead,  D. Bingham, R.G.E. Haylock, J.A. O’Hagan, A.A. Goodill, G.L.C Berridge, M.A. 
English. N. Hunter, G.M. Kendall, ‘Follow up of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer 1952-98 in men 
from the UK Who Participated in the UK’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes’ Occupational Environmental Medicine, Volume 60, 2003, pp. 165-172. 
  The study was in two volumes, the first being 
entitled Dosimetry 2006, and the second Mortality and Cancer Incidence. The first 
volume explores changes in the units of measurements for radiation and radiation 
exposure from the Menzies era to its time of publication. It also explores the doses 
likely to have experienced by nuclear veterans. The second volume pertains directly 
to health effects.  The main findings suggest the mortality rate in test participants to 
be similar to the general population, with 4233 deaths in participants, compared to 
4250 from the General population The most common cause of death in test 
participants was cancer, and death from cancer was 18% greater in test participants 
39 Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia. 
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than would be expected in the general population The study found a 23% higher than 
normal incidence of cancer but the findings clearly state: 
 
 
The increases in cancer rates do not appear to have been caused by exposure to radiation. No 
relationship could be found between overall cancer incidence or mortality and exposure to 
radiation. None of the above cancers occurring in excess showed any association with 
radiation exposure in this study. In particular, there was no link between radiation exposure 
and leukaemia, excluding chronic lymphatic leukaemia (non-CLL Leukaemia), which is 
commonly found to be increased in groups exposed to radiation. These findings are consistent 
with the low levels of radiation exposure found in the study. Only 4% of the study population 
had an estimated radiation exposure greater than 20 millisieverts (mSv) from test participation, 
and 79% had an estimated exposure of less than 1 mSv. The estimated mean radiation 
exposure of the study population due to participation in the tests was 2.8 mSv, only slightly 
greater than the background exposure received by Australian every year. 
 
In the absence of a correlation with radiation exposure, the excess of non-CLL leukaemia is 
unexplained. Other than radiation, the best established cause of leukaemia is exposure to 
benzene, but there is no information available about benzene exposure in test participants. 
 
 
The findings also suggest that instances of Mesothelioma in test participants 
be most likely attributable to exposure to asbestos, used in naval vessels (of the 26 
instances of mesothelioma in test participants, 16 occurred in Royal Australian Navy 
personnel) and construction, and that this exposure may not have occurred at the time 
of the tests. Lung, Oesophageal, lip, oral cavity and pharynx were suggested to 
perhaps be related to increased incidence of cigarette smoking, with asbestos also 
being linked to the incidents of lung cancer. 40
It must be noted here that mortality was similar in test participants to the 
control. Though there was a 23% increase in the likelihood of cancer among 
participants and a 18% increase in rates of cancer mortality, this was not attributed by 
the study to exposure to ionising radiation. Indeed, the likelihood of increased rates of 
smoking, exposure to asbestos and possibly benzene are suggested to be the causes of 
this increase. It seems that service in the RAN and in the civil construction industry 
was likely to result in increased exposure to asbestos during this time in history. Of 
. 
                                                 
40 Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia, Vol II,: ‘Mortality and 
Cancer Incidence Study’, pp. v-vi.  
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particular interest is the fact that the study reports radiation exposure of participants 
similar to background levels. A methodological concern may be the focus on ‘mean’ 
exposure. This, again, says little about the experiences of those in the test group who 
received the higher doses.  
 The British studies, including follow-up studies into multiple myeloma and 
non-CLL leukaemia, did not report an increased cancer risk. It must be noted that the 
control group for this study was also comprised of servicemen of the same age group 
as participants. This may suggest a similar exposure to cigarette smoke and asbestos 
among the control group and participants in the British study; it appears that such 
exposure was part of 1950s military life.   
 Whatever the cause, the Australian study did reveal a 23% increase in cancer 
incidence and a 18% increase in cancer mortality among test participants. It would, 
indeed, be interesting to see how such figures would compare if the control group was 
also selected from those with similar life experiences to participants (i.e. armed 
services and those involved in the civil construction industry) as the study control 
group was from the general Australian population.41 Following this study, and in 
accord with the recommendations of the McClelland Report, the Department of 
Veterans Affairs took steps to compensate nuclear veterans. DVA’s website 
documents that defence force and public service personnel who participated in the 
tests are covered by the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, 1988 which 
provides health treatment and compensation for injuries and diseases incurred during 
peacetime service. Also, following the Royal Commission, in 1986 an administrative 
scheme was established to compensate civilian contractors, pastoralists and 
indigenous Australians who were in the testing areas. In response to the mortality and 
cancer incidence study, all military and civilian personnel will be able to access 
treatment for all cancers, regardless of cause, paid for by DVA.42
The recommendations of the McClelland Royal Commission predate the 2006 
study by 21 years. The study found no reportable incidence of mortality or cancer 
from exposure to ionising radiation. Yet this did not affect the decision to grant 
compensation for cancer treatment, for whatever the cause, there had been an 
observed increase in cancer incidence and cancer mortality among test participants.  
 
                                                 
41 Ibid, Vol II, p.16. 
42 Department of Veterans Affairs, section entitled Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, 
http://www.dva.gov.au/health/spec_programs/nuctest/faq.htm, site accessed 30/09/08. 
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An earlier paper on the issue of compensation for (in this case British) Nuclear 
Veterans was by anti-nuclear activist Sue Rabbitt Roff of the Centre for Medical 
Education, Dundee Medical School. The paper states: 
 
This article documents the deliberate and repeated decisions not to provide adequate radiation 
protection to most of the 40,000 men who participated in the British programme in the 1950s 
in Australia and Christmas Island, precisely to avoid future liability claims. 43
 
 
The notion that ‘adequate radiation protection’ was not provided so as to avoid 
future claims to compensation is confusing. Roff also claims:  
 
By July 1958 the British tests had to be moved again (to Christmas Island in the Pacific) 
because the Australians had finally realized they were being irradiated in their own desert 
backyard.44
 
 
By this time there was indeed pressure to suspend testing in Australia, yet it is 
also quite clear that the move to Christmas Island was concerned not with this issue 
but due to Australia’s total lack of suitability for the thermonuclear (i.e. hydrogen 
bomb) tests conducted at Christmas Island.  Australia had been frequently assured that 
no such test would take place here- for the simple reason that the British intended the 
tests in the Pacific to involve explosions at least 10 times larger than those in 
Australia. 
 
 The paper states further still: 
 
The British weaponeers were under tremendous pressure to successfully detonate a fission 
bomb before the expected moratorium on atmospheric testing came into effect, not least to 
gain the respect of the Americans who had shut them out from their nuclear development 
programme because of security leaks.45
 
 
 The device to which Roff is here referring is actually a fusion device (i.e. 
thermonuclear) not a fission device. The British had been testing the latter since 1952.  
Roff’s paper states that the British study infuriated nuclear veterans, who funded their 
                                                 
43 Roff, ‘Blood Money: The Duty of Care to Veterans of UK Nuclear Weapons Tests’, Medicine, 
Conflict and Survival, Volume 18 Issue 3, 2002,  p. 311. 
44 Ibid, p.313. 
45 Ibid. 
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own study.46 Roff also asserts that: ‘Epidemiological studies are usually inconclusive 
- and always highly ‘artificial,’ relying on statistical models - which is perhaps why 
Governments reach for them first.’47  Epidemiology in this context is the study of 
incidence of disease or ailment among large populations. It is of little surprise that 
Roff would later publish another paper titled ‘Under-ascertainment of multiple 
myeloma among participants in UK atmospheric atomic and nuclear weapons tests.’ 
This study suggested that the increased incidence of multiple myeloma found by the 
British study was not a chance finding.48
 Roff adopts a distinct stance; her research started with known health 
complaints and sought to prove its link to atomic testing. This, compared to other 
studies, is working ‘backwards’; they sought to find if there was a link, not prove 
there was one.   
 
  One of the recommendations of the McClelland Report, the compensation of 
nuclear veterans, was eventually addressed, at least in part, by the Department of 
Veterans Affairs. Another such recommendation was that the sites of the tests be 
restored as soon as possible to a condition where they may again be suitable for 
permanent inhabitancy by their traditional owners. As a result of the ‘minor trials’, in 
particular the Vixen A and Vixen B trials, the heaviest levels of contamination were at 
the site of the ‘permanent’ test range at Maralinga.  
 Two very significant documents in the discourse of Australia’s atomic 
experience are the official reports into contamination of the Maralinga site. The first 
of these originated from the United Kingdom in 1968 and is known after its principal 
author as the Pearce Report, more formally Final Report on Residual Radioactive 
Contamination of the Maralinga Range and the Emu Site. The report was conducted 
by the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) and published for the 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). 49
                                                 
46 Ibid, p.320.  
 The copy I have seen, made 
freely available through Canberra’s Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, is marked 
‘restricted’, indicating that it has only entered the public domain in more recent times. 
47 Ibid.  
48  Roff, ‘Under-ascertainment of Multiple Myeloma Among Participants in UK Atmospheric Atomic 
and Nuclear Weapons Tests’ Occupational and Environmental Medicine. Vol 60, December 2003. 
Online paper, http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1740439, site accessed 
10/10/08. The use of the phrase ‘atomic and nuclear’ is confusing; perhaps what is meant is ‘atomic 
and thermonuclear’ or perhaps ‘nuclear and thermonuclear.’ 
49 Pearce, Final Report on Residual Radioactive Contamination of the Maralinga Range and the Emu 
Site. 
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As the precursor to the later MARTAC Report, discussed in Alan Parkinson’s 
Maralinga,50 it remains a significant. The report was compiled following the 
conclusion of the clean-up code named ‘Operation Brumby’ of 1967.51  It details the 
sites of the ‘major’ and ‘minor’ inland tests. Included is a diagram of the ‘major’ test 
sites at Maralinga. This shows the hand-shaped plume of plutonium debris which 
resulted from the ‘Vixen B’ minor trials held at the Taranaki site,52 which the reader 
may recall was also the site of a ‘major’ trial. This hand-shaped plume, caused by the 
distribution of plutonium by explosives, was the major source of lingering 
contamination at Maralinga. Other diagrams show it in more detail. 53
The report details what steps were taken to clean up the relevant areas, such as 
the scraping of contaminated soil and the capping the burial sites of debris in concrete. 
The report also details what radioactive contaminants were disposed of and the 
quantity in Millicuries (mCi). The report outlines what contamination exists and what 
steps were taken, without offering any further subjective comments, recommendations 
or conclusions. The ‘Operation Brumby’ clean up was later found to be highly 
unsatisfactory, on 19 October 1978 the Chairman of AIRAC, R.J. Walsh, wrote the 
Minister of Housing, Community and Development, R.J. Groom, detailing lingering 
plutonium contamination at the ‘airfield cemetery’ at  Maralinga and that surveys 
were still in progress.
 
54
The MARTAC report was briefly mentioned in the previous chapter but only 
due to the fact that its claims were heavily disputed in a popular text, written by 
former MARTAC advisor, engineer Alan Parkinson. The report itself warrants further 
analysis.  Despite the claims of Parkinson, the MARTAC Report asserts that: ‘The 
rehabilitation program has been achieved within budget and on schedule.’
  The letter was also formerly classified ‘Restricted.’ It would 
later be deemed that there was need for a subsequent clean up which involved the 
formation of the committee MARTAC.  
55
                                                 
50 Parkinson, Maralinga 
 
51 Pearce, Final Report on Residual Radioactive Contamination of the Maralinga Range and the Emu 
Site, p. 4.  
52 Ibid, p.27. 
53 Ibid pp. 28-30. 
54 National Archives of Australia: Cabinet Paper No 77; Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory 
Council (AIRAC)-‘Letter re Plutonium at Maralinga’ - Minister responsible: [Not recorded] (AIRAC) - 
presented at Cabinet Meeting 1 November 1978 - File No LC2230, A12933 776, 1978-1978.  
 It should be noted that the letter is signed by R.J. Walsh of AIRAC and addressed to R.J. Groom, (Lib), 
Minister for Environment, housing and Community Development.  
55 Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test 
Sites at Emu and Maralinga (Australia) 2003 p. li.  
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The report contains a brief account of the lead-up to the McClelland Royal 
Commission: 
  
 In June 1984, the Minister for Resources and Energy announced that, following his 
 examinations of the Kerr Report (Kerr et al. 1984) and discussions with Dr. John Symonds 
 who had been commissioned in early 1984 to write an official history of the British Nuclear 
 tests in Australia (Symonds 1985), he would be recommending to the Australian Cabinet that 
 some form of public inquiry be held. The Minister noted that this inquiry would cover the 
 conduct of the tests and their effects on servicemen and Aboriginal people of the affected 
 areas. New surveys of the site by the ARL, which had detected plutonium fragments from the 
 Vixen B trials, were cited as a further consideration in support of a public inquiry. 
 
 The Government announced in July 1984 that it would be establishing a Royal Commission 
 into British Nuclear Tests in Australia (Royal Commission). The terms of reference of the 
 Royal Commission emphasised the conduct of the tests, health effects among Australian 
 participants and Aborigines, and future management and use of the test sites. The final item 
 assumed greater significance with test site contamination forming a major element in Royal 
 Commission recommendations and becoming the focus of the Government’s response.  
 
 This section of the MARTAC Report then goes on to discuss the 
recommendations of the McClelland Royal Commission, where relevant56
An element of the MARTAC Report which clearly shows how elements of the 
‘Vixen B’ trials of 1961, 1962 and 1963 went wrong is its exploration of the sites of 
‘featherbeds’. These were the heavy structures upon which the explosive distribution 
of plutonium and other radioactive and/or toxic materials occurred. The report states: 
‘while initially intended for re-use, each ‘featherbed’ was heavily damaged by the 
detonation.’
 It is stated 
that the McClelland Royal Commission recommended that the traditional inhabitants 
of the test areas be compensated for loss of use of their land by the British 
Government.  
57
                                                 
56 These are recommendations 3, 4, 6 and 7, Ibid, pp. 37-38.  
 The phrase ‘heavily damaged’ seems inappropriate: the accompanying 
images show the ‘featherbeds’ blown into twisted wreckage. 
57 Ibid, p.124. 
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 Wreckage of ‘Featherbed’, Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, Rehabilitation of 
Former Nuclear Test Sites at Emu and Maralinga (Australia) 2003, p. 125. 
 
 This confirms that the experiments did not, initially in any case, progress 
according to plan. If likely damage to the structures was not estimated accurately, 
how could the pattern of distribution of radioactive or toxic materials have been 
estimated accurately? Quite simply, it was not.  
  Yet the fact that certain aspects of the tests did not proceed as planned does 
not support some of the more unusual claims by their detractors. There are in 
existence many popular sources which report the use of servicemen as ‘human guinea 
pigs’ into the effects of atomic weapons. Such claims are especially common in 
connection with the ‘Indoctrinee Force’, known by the abbreviation ‘I-Force’ 
included within ‘Operation Buffalo’ throughout October 1956 at Maralinga. The 
McClelland Report states: 
 
The Indoctrinee force was eventually made up of 283 men, 178 from the U.K (172 Officers, 6 
Civilians), 100 from Australia, (74 Officers, WO and CPO, 1 civilian and 25 other ranks) and 
five officers from New Zealand.58
 
 
 The purpose of the use of indoctrinees was to gain operational experience of 
the effects of atomic weapons. This has led to a popular belief, not supported by 
                                                 
58 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I, p. 336.  
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evidence, that the operation was used to test the effects of radiation on the 
indoctrinees. The programme was arranged so that the force received lectures on 
issues connected with atomic weapons. Next would be a tour of the test site before the 
detonation, so as to acquaint the force with the location of ‘target response items.’ The 
force would then be exposed to the flash, heat and blast effects the test at a distance of 
around 7.2km. Finally, the force would be lead on a tour of the site to view the effects 
of the blast on the ground and target response items before being decontaminated by 
the army and monitored by AWRE health control.59 The distance of the force from 
the test site at detonation would exceed the range of the effects of ‘initial’ or ‘prompt’ 
radiation. Thus, any dangers would be concerned with fallout or with induced 
radiation at the test site. The McClelland Report cites examples of allegations about 
lack of safety measures being employed.60
 
 These accounts, like many connected with 
the tests in general, are conflicting.  The report quotes Symonds by stating: 
All Australians received doses less than those prescribed in the Maralinga Safety Regulations. 
One Australian record indicates that about 45 of the Australian members of I-force received 
less than the minimum measurable exposure on the film badges used in the one tree test.61
 
 
According to Symonds  the I-force were not used employed as ‘guinea pigs’ to 
test the effects of  atomic weapons on people so much as an experiment into how 
troops might deal with the realities of atomic warfare. As would later be explored by 
Parkinson,62
                                                 
59 Ibid, Vol I. 
 there is a very real possibility that the I-force experiment was 
misunderstood due to lack of knowledge in the public domain on health physics. For 
example, indoctrinees were required to stand with their backs to the blast. If one were 
unaware of the range at which ‘initial’ ionising radiation is a risk, then this would 
appear to be very dangerous. This may explain why claims about deliberate radiation 
exposure are continually repeated, without acknowledgement that they are in dispute 
and generally not supported by studies. Some of the wilder claims about the lack of 
humanity among the British scientists may have caused the members and loved ones 
of the I-Force some considerable worry.  
60 Ibid, Vol I, p.338, 341. 
61 Ibid, Vol I, p.341.  
62 Parkinson, Maralinga. 
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 We have seen how the public has been very willing to accept accounts which 
present the tests in a negative fashion. The McClelland Royal Commission examined 
and rejected a claim that as part of ‘Operation Buffalo’ tests were conducted on the 
mentally handicapped. The McClelland Report indicates that an article from The 
Times of London in 1984 suggested this, and that numerous witnesses had attested to 
hearing a strange babble of human speech from the testing area. The report writes that 
the Commission totally rejected the allegations that these sounds were from ‘mentally 
defective’ people being experimented upon. The report documents that voices 
intermingle and carry long distances in the desert air, that ‘tape recordings played 
backwards or forwards at fast speeds simulate gibbering’ and that machinery could 
also perhaps cause the unexplained sounds. The report suggests that a more probable 
cause for the rumour was provided by a witness, who in reference to the Indoctrinee 
force stated: 
 
 
They appeared to be drawn from all the services. We didn’t speak to them. I had seen the 
same group about one month previously in a trench on the Watson side of the Village. We 
referred to them as the “secret army”. It is generally believed amongst the men that this group 
must have been made up of people who were mentally retarded or defective in some way 
because they were always seen wearing full-dress uniform despite the terrific heat, whilst all 
of us were simply in shorts et cetera.63
  
 
 That the origin of the rumour that ‘Operation Buffalo’ featured experiments on 
the mentally handicapped may have arisen from flippant remarks about the attire of 
the I-force is an example of the desire of the public to accept negative accounts of the 
actions of the British and Australian governments. Perhaps a consequence of the lack 
of accurate information being released, this willingness among members of the public 
to accept extremely negative claims of the tests which are not grounded in fact is 
typical. This has added confusion to the very serious issue of nuclear proliferation in 
modernity. This issue is complex enough without having mistruths entering the public 
consciousness, especially from highly regarded sources such as The Times.   
                                                 
63 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I, p. 346.  
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The McClelland Report comments on a study conducted into potential health 
effects of the tests on Aboriginal people, as discussed within Fields of Thunder64 and 
within the previous chapter. The report was titled A Survey of Diseases That May Be 
Related to Radiation Among Pitjantjatjara on Remote Reserves and was published in 
1981 by the South Australian Health Commission.65 The authors of the study 
encountered four major problems. The population at risk could not be defined 
precisely, there was no comparable population for a control group, relevant health 
records were missing, inaccurate or incomplete and statistics such as birth records 
were of doubtful accuracy. The conclusions of this study indicate that despite the poor 
quality of data there was no clear indication of disease trends in remote Aboriginal 
populations which could be linked with evidence with exposure to radiation. The 
study stated that there were five cancer deaths at Yalata between 1979-80 though this 
may have happened due to chance, though continued monitoring was recommended. 
The study specifically noted that:  ‘The quality of demographic data and of 
information on the health status of Aboriginal populations is inadequate for 
epidemiological research of good quality’66
The McClelland Report also commented on radiation assessment studies. 
Firstly, it explored the AIRAC report. This committee explored issues such as the 
‘Black Mist’. The findings were eventually published in a report titled British Nuclear 
Tests in Australia, a Review of Operational Safety Measures and of Possible After 
Effects, known as AIRAC 9.
 Findings into the effects of ionising 
radiation on the Aboriginal populace have largely been inconclusive. As Chapter 
Seven will explore, many contemporary sources take it as self-evident that the British 
atomic tests caused cancer among Aboriginal people, the belief is persistent and, due 
to the methodological problems associated with the relevant studies, the persistence of 
such beliefs is understandable. That said, the lack of supporting scientific evidence 
should be noted.   
67  The report stated ‘The black mist question appears to 
be a myth in the making’.68
                                                 
64 Blakeway & Lloyd-Roberts, Fields of Thunder 
 On the matter of the ‘Black Mist’, as has been discussed 
65 Aboriginal Health Unit, A Survey of Diseases That May be Related to Radiation Among 
Pitjantjatjara on Remote Reserves, South Australian Health Commission, Adelaide 1981, p.607.  
66 Ibid, p.16. 
67 Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council, British Nuclear Tests in Australia; a Review of 
Operational Safety Measures and of Possible After Effects.  
68Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol II, p.596.  
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earlier, the McClelland Royal Commission accepted the claims of a ‘Black Mist’ 
which made people unwell, in particular stating the accounts of the mist were mostly 
consistent.69 Yet the AIRAC report states ‘there are a number of uncertainties and 
inconsistencies of the stories’.70 As per Arnold71 and Symonds,72
 
 the AIRAC 9 report 
does not accept that the fallout from Totem 1 could have been harmful, stating: 
The mean risk to an individual member of the community of contracting cancer as a result of 
 exposure to fallout cannot be more than 1 chance in 10 000, and may be zero. Any possible 
 effect of the fallout will clearly be undetectable [sic].73
 
  
As a whole, the McClelland Report was critical of AIRAC 9, stating that 
relevant persons or those who had made allegations about the tests were not 
interviewed, and that AIRAC had relied on existing written material. 74
Those writing the ‘official’ accounts such as Symonds
 
75
The McClelland Report also suggests that the AIRAC 9 report was not an 
adequate scientific account of the testing programme and that adequate inquiries were 
not made before conclusions were offered. The McClelland report suggests that: 
‘...this failure may have been due to an agreement with the relevant Minister to limit 
its inquiries’ and that if this were the case the report should have indicated this rather 
than giving the impression that a thorough investigation had occurred.
 have a tendency to 
avoid anecdotal evidence, showing a marked preference for referring back to other 
reports. As report material is often ‘official’ in nature also, this further feeds suspicion 
of governmental non-disclosure of information. Yet there will always exist an 
epistemological divide between sources that aim to evaluate the observable scientific 
phenomena associated with an event  (such as a blind trial) and those which explore 
the human element without this ‘distance’ from the research. 
76
                                                 
69 Ibid, Vol 1, p.174, p.194. 
 
70 Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council, British Nuclear Tests in Australia; a Review of 
Operational Safety Measures and of Possible After Effects, p. 45.  
71  Arnold, A Very Special Relationship. 
72 Symonds, A history of British Atomic Tests in Australia. 
73 Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council, British Nuclear Tests in Australia; a Review of 
Operational Safety Measures and of Possible After Effects, p. 50. 
74Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol II, p. 597.  
75 Symonds, a History of British Atomic Tests in Australia. 
76 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol II Vol 11, p. 602. 
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It is clear that the McClelland Royal Commission rejected the validity of the 
AIRAC 9 report. In response to this report the ‘Kerr Committee’ was formed on 15 
May 1984, to report on 31 May 1984.77 The McClelland Report criticised this 16 day 
timeframe as inadequate, and offered some criticism of the language employed by the 
Committee in their report. However, the McClelland Report did acknowledge the 
Kerr Committee as acting as a catalyst for the implementation of a Royal 
Commission.78
One obvious shortcoming of the AIRAC 9 report is the following statement 
from a section titled ‘Relevant Features of Nuclear Weapons’: 
  
 
The explosive yields of the tests in Australia were all in the ‘low’ or kiloton’ ranges: this 
means that in no case was the yield much more than 20 kilotons nominally associated with the 
nuclear weapons used in Japan, and in some cases it was much less. 79
 
 
Indeed, in many cases the yields of the Australian tests were much less than 20 
kilotons. Yet as the previous chapter explored, the yield of the test Mosaic G2 of 19 
June 1956 was approximately three times this amount. Confusion exists here in that 
this test has been previously reported, apparently erroneously, to have had an even 
greater yield of 98 kilotons.  
The Report of the Expert Committee on the Review of Data on Atmospheric 
Fallout Arising From British Nuclear Tests in Australia  (Kerr Report, 1984) offers 
direct comment on these issues. Within its ‘discussion and conclusions’ section it is 
stated that little in AIRAC 9 could be said to be factually incorrect in comparison with 
official documents as ‘the use of language is too subtle.’ An example cited in that 
AIRAC 9 stated that ‘no case was the yield much more than the 20 kilotons nominally 
associated with the nuclear weapons used on Japan and in some cases it was much 
less’ which is technically correct as both a 20kt and a 60kt device fall into the same 
category of being a ‘kiloton, or low intermediate’ yield device. Yet the Kerr report 
notes that such a statement is not scientifically objective or adequately informative to 
a public who may: ‘...believe that a 60 Kt yield weapon has three times the fallout 
                                                 
77 B. Kerr, K. Bentley, D.W. Keem, F.P.J, Robotham, Report of the Expert Committee on the Review of 
Data on Atmospheric Fallout Arising From British Nuclear Tests in Australia, Department of 
Resources and Energy, Canberra, 1984.  
78Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol II, p. 603. 
79Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council, British Nuclear Tests in Australia; a Review of 
Operational Safety Measures and of Possible After Effects, p.15.  
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effects of one with a 20 Kt yield (which is not so due to other physical constraints on 
fallout).’ 80
It is indeed the case that the fallout contamination from an atomic blast is not 
directly proportional to its yield. As for the broad category of ‘kiloton, or low 
intermediate range’ of yield, such terms are used as the yield of a nuclear weapon can 
vary so dramatically. The Nuclear Weapon Archive states: ‘The smallest nuclear 
weapons actually deployed have had yields around 10 tons (like the W54), and have 
been intended for short range tactical or nuclear demolition use (e.g. blowing up roads 
and bridges).’
 
81
That the Kerr Report was a catalyst for the formation of the McClelland Royal 
Commission is reflected in its recommendation that a public inquiry be held to 
explore the consequences of the tests, including the possible health effects on those 
who served at the testing sites, those who assisted at these facilities and also, mainly, 
on Aboriginal people who lived in the regions of the tests. 
 This ranged to the other extreme of tens of megatons for the largest 
fission-fusion-fission devices tested by the U.S, Britain and the U.S.S.R. To put this 
in perspective, the explosive yield of a nuclear weapon can range from 10 tons, to tens 
of millions of tons (of TNT equivalent.) 
82
 
 The McClelland Royal 
Commission would be exactly that. ‘The Kerr Committee’ was comprised of the following 
persons: 
The members of the Committee are: Professor Charles B. Kerr (chairman), Professor of 
Preventive and Social Medicine, University of Sydney; Dr  Keith Bentley, Senior Research 
Scientist, Commonwealth Institute of Health and visiting Fellow, Australian National 
University; Mr Donald W. Keam, Head of the Standards and Compliance Section, Australian 
Radiation Laboratory; and Mr Rob Robotham, Radiation Protection Officer, Melbourne 
University.83
 
 
The last name, Mr Robotham, is the co-author of the ‘exposé’ text 
Maralinga.84
                                                 
80 Kerr et al, Report of the Expert Committee on the Review of Data on Atmospheric Fallout Arising 
From British Nuclear Tests in Australia, pp.  34-35.  
  Another health study discussed throughout the course of the 
McClelland Royal Commission was the 1983 Survey of Health of Former Atomic Test 
81The Nuclear Weapon Archive, Section entitled fission weapon designs 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-2.html#Nfaq4.2.3, site accessed 17/10/08. 
82  Kerr et al, Report of the Expert Committee on the Review of Data on Atmospheric Fallout Arising 
From British Nuclear Tests in Australia, p.42.  
83 Ibid, p.1.  
84 Tame and Robotham, Maralinga. 
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Personnel,85 which has become informally known as the Donovan Report after the 
principal author. This was the head of the survey, Department of Health scientist J.W. 
Donovan.  The study was in two parts, the former titled Survey of Former Atomic Test 
Personnel Report and the latter Causes of Death of Former Atomic Test Personnel 
Report. The McClelland Report discussed the structure of the survey; the first part 
being a questionnaire sent to all identified participants and the second part was an 
analysis of causes of death reported on death certificates.86
Like many other health effects surveys pertaining to the tests, the findings 
were not conclusive. The Donovan Report states: 
 
 
There was no association between the existence of a record demonstrating exposure to any 
 amount of radiation and the occurrence of any diseases. Despite this, respondents who 
 believed they had been exposed to radiation reported higher prevalence of malignant 
 melanoma, other skin cancers, all other cancers and infertility.87
 
  
It may be that the belief in an exposure to radiation could have stemmed from 
the occurrence of the illness.  It is evident that the secrecy of the tests has means that 
people involved have been fearful of the effects of possible exposure to contamination. 
The Donovan Report noted that those reporting their health had worsened, those more 
restricted by ill health and those more concerned with their health were also more 
likely to have been engaged in duties which could have led to radiation exposure or 
required the use of protective equipment, though evidence of such contamination was 
not ‘borne out by records.’88
 It is difficult indeed to draw any conclusions from findings of the Donovan 
Report. However, people involved with the tests were genuinely afraid and fear itself 
can lead to illness.  In reference to the survey, the McClelland Report commented that 
a significant association between reported illness and reported radiation indicators 
does not prove an excess of radiation induced illness. The McClelland report noted 
that the questions of the Donovan survey were very subjective and it was likely those 
 
                                                 
85 J.W Donovan, Survey of Health of Former Atomic Test Personnel, Commonwealth Department of 
Health, Canberra, 1983. 
86 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol II, p. 603.  
87 Donovan, Survey of Health of Former Atomic Test Personnel, p. IX.  
88 Ibid, p.X. 
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respondents with poor health or concern about their health would be more likely to 
state that had taken part in duties which may be relation to radiation exposure and that: 
 
...without proper objective evaluations of illnesses and radiation exposure, it is not possible to 
say whether the associations between the radiation indicators and the illnesses were ‘cause and 
effect’ or produced by some other interaction89
 
 
 The McClelland Report returns to the issue of lack of a clear demonstration of 
cause and effect, suggesting that although health surveys are valid and useful in 
investigating claims of dramatic increases in ailments such as cancer and infertility, it 
is not possible to draw definite conclusions from them. 90
 Yet again, despite the strong association between test participation and illness 
suggested by anecdotal evidence, formal studies have, for the most part, not provided 
definitive answers. It seems that the ‘facts’ of Australia’s involvement in British 
atomic testing are only very loosely agreed upon. The official reports that led to, were 
involved in, and responded to the McClelland Royal Commission have tended to vary 
greatly in tone from the popular histories discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
 The issue genetic damage as a consequence of the tests is also compounded by 
a lack of information. More material pertaining to this is likely to emerge as research 
continues. One example is a study conducted by Associate Professor Al Rowland at 
New Zealand’s Massey University. The Massey University website states:  
 
Dr Al Rowland’s research team is currently conducting a major study of New Zealand nuclear 
test veterans. The study endeavours to determine whether or not this group of naval personnel 
incurred any genetic damage as a consequence of their duties associated with witnessing the 
British atomic bomb tests at Christmas Island in 1957-58.91
 
 
The study examined the Christmas and Maldon Island hydrogen bomb tests, 
thus it was not a response to the McClelland Royal Commission or testing in Australia. 
However, as Chapter Seven will explore, this study has still impacted on debates 
surrounding tests in Australia and Australian veterans. The study was published in the 
                                                 
89 Ibid, Vol II, p. 604. 
90 Ibid, Vol II, p .605. This section notes the problems of drawing conclusions from surveys involving 
self-reported illnesses and self reported participation in activities.  
91 Massey University, section entitled Associate Professor Al Rowland 
Senior Lecturer in Genetics and Plant Biology, http://imbs.massey.ac.nz/Staff/rowland.html, site 
accessed 10//01/09.  
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journal Cytogenetic and Genome Research in a paper titled ‘Elevated chromosome 
translocation frequencies in New Zealand nuclear test veterans’ in June 2008 .92
The conclusion to the study stated: 
 The 
study revealed new findings due to its use of a recently-developed cytomolecular 
technique known as mFISH (multicolour fluorescent in situ hybridisation.) The 
technique, used to examine lymphocytes (a type of white blood cell), was intended to 
investigate a potential link between chromosome abnormalities and possible past 
radiation exposure in New Zealand nuclear test veterans who participated in 
Operation Grapple of 1957-58. The aim was to compare data from 50 nuclear veterans 
with 50 matched controls (selected due to being in the same age group with military 
or police training in their youth). Data from only 49 veterans was used as one 
veteran’s ‘lymphocytes failed to grow.’ During their service the veterans were on 
naval vessels between 20 and 150 nautical miles from ground zero (these were large 
scale tests, of far greater magnitude than those in Australia). 
 
In summary, a sample group of New Zealand naval personnel who participated in Operation 
Grapple shows three times the frequency of total chromosome translocations than a group of 
closely matched controls. Our analysis of potential confounding factors is most likely 
attributable to radiation exposure. Further clarification might be obtained by a similar study on 
British and Fijian participants in Operation Grapple.93
 
 
Such chromosomal translocations indicate genetic damage. It is clear that 
much remains to be discovered about this and the effects of low-dose ionising 
radiation in general.  More recently, Rebekah Jourdain, a Doctoral Candidate in the 
field of clinical psychology, also at Massey University, began undertaking a study 
into the psychological effects of ‘Operation Grapple’ on Royal Navy servicemen.94
Though new findings are emerging, in particular those pertaining to genetic 
damage, health studies have largely not established that exposure to radiation from the 
tests caused any wide-scale harm. Such studies, however, do not address the issue of 
individual incidents from which exposure may have occurred. Such instances include 
  
                                                 
92 This study would be published as M.A. Wahab, E.M. Nickless, R. Najar-M'Kacher, C. Parmentier, 
J.V. Pod, R.E. Rowland, ‘Elevated Chromosome Translocation Frequencies in New Zealand Nuclear 
Test Veterans,’ Cytogenetic and Genome Research, Vol 121, No. 2, 2008. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Massey University, section entitled ‘Psychological fallout of nuclear fallout assessed’, 
http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/news/article.cfm?mnarticle=psychological-fallout-of-
nuclear-testing-assessed-13-05-2010, site accessed 20/11/10.  
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the Centurion tank controversy.  The risks from the tests may not have been unique to 
them, being common with much else of 1950s military life, or the lives of those 
involved in engineering and civil construction. It is clear that certain episodes of the 
tests resulted in great fear and harm, an example being the ‘Pom Pom’ incident. 
As a whole, the McClelland Report rejects the more extreme allegations of 
misconduct associated with the tests.  However, the overall tone is that the testing 
programme was not a positive aspect of Australia’s history and that monetary 
compensation from the United Kingdom should be offered. This eventually occurred, 
yet the issues concerned with Australia’s atomic test experience remain poorly 
understood within the public domain.  
The material discussed in this chapter shows that although a complete 
understanding of the consequences of the tests can not be known, verifiable harm did 
occur. However, as the next chapter shows, contemporary sources which highlight 
issues associated with atomic testing in Australia continue to draw excessively from 
inaccurate data and speculation. The contribution of report material to the debates on 
the tests has influenced other commentators, who are not always aware of data that 
has been available in report format, and on occasion this data has been misused or 
ignored.
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Chapter Seven: Other contributors to the debates on contamination and health 
effects. 
 
This chapter examines online resources, journals, documentaries, and popular 
sources, especially those which take an anti-nuclear stance.  The purpose of the 
chapter is to consider how commentators on the tests have responded to the issues 
raised in relevant earlier print reportage, parliamentary debates, books and studies. 
Some of these commentaries have prompted, called for, and influenced further 
enquires.  This chapter shows examples of how the issues surrounding the tests have 
come to be regarded and how certain untruths regarding to the tests are persistent, 
despite what has been discovered and put on public record. The next chapter explores 
how these issues are presented in fictional, artistic and pop-cultural sources.  
In many sources explored in this chapter, simple errors have resulted in 
otherwise legitimate arguments losing their potential impact.  Central to this 
discussion is the notion that there is no real need for exaggeration or speculation as, in 
many cases, the truth is bad enough.  
 Examples of unfortunate truths about the tests include that, regardless of one’s 
individual position on the matter, there is no way that atomic testing could possibly be 
good for people or the environment. It is also well-documented that some tests did not 
proceed as planned. The ‘Totem 1’ and ‘Totem 2’ tests at Emu Field and the ‘Mosaic 
G2’ test at Monte Bello,1 resulted in higher than expected yields. The ‘feather beds’ 
for ‘single point trials’ during the Vixen B minor trials, intended for multiple re-use, 
were blasted into wreckage as plumes of molten plutonium arced across the desert.2
 When examining the sources discussed in this chapter, it worthy to consider is 
the contrast between alleged callous acts by those responsible for atomic testing as 
opposed to the notion that their actions were believed to be reasonable according to 
the prevalent attitudes of the time. Changes have occurred in the way that the risks of 
exposure to radioactive and toxic materials are considered, as have prominent 
attitudes towards the welfare of the indigenous population. The 2006 Australian 
  
That such contamination occurred and that it was deplorable is not contested.  
                                                 
1 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing. 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 12/12/08 
2 Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test 
Sites at Emu and Maralinga, pp. 39-40. 
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health study undertaken for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs3
Yet another issue to consider is that writers who reflect poorly on the tests do 
not always have an ‘anti nuclear weapons’ agenda. The British Nuclear Tests 
Veterans Association (BNTVA), who have published material which suggests they 
hold that a nuclear deterrent in the hands of the West was instrumental in preserving 
global stability, have also called the conduct of Britain’s testing programme into 
question.
 explored the risks of 
exposure to asbestos and cigarette smoke among test participants to cancer incidence 
and mortality; this is also an area in which popular attitudes have changed. It would 
also not be deemed acceptable in the current climate to leave an area of desert 
extensively contaminated; likewise it is not acceptable for persons to smoke cigarettes 
in enclosed public areas. 
4
Whether prominent ‘anti nuclear weapons’ and ‘anti-testing’ commentators 
acknowledge or appreciate the concerns of the Cold War requires investigation. Fear 
of a Third World War and of a communist triumph over democracy appeared tangible 
to many people in the 1950s. This is certainly evident in the parliamentary debates 
explored in Chapter Two and in print media sources from that time period as 
discussed in Chapter Three.  With the benefit of hindsight it is all too easy to ridicule 
these fears, as such a conflict never occurred. Yet when considering historical sources, 
one must consider the concerns of past generations. Also, if one were to accept the 
notion that Britain ‘needed’ the atomic bomb, then the blame for their testing 
programme could be directed towards the United States. It was in response the US 
McMahon Act of 1946 that an independent British programme was implemented.
 Their position suggests that those who assisted in the testing of atomic 
bombs were warriors of the Cold War and that such warriors deserve better treatment. 
5
An important element of the discourse of Australia’s atomic test experience 
which explores the McClelland Royal Commission was a paper published in the 
Journal of Australian Studies by Dieter Michel. It was titled ‘Villains, Victims and 
Heroes: Contested Memory and the British Nuclear Tests in Australia.’ 
 
6
                                                 
3 Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia. 
 
4 British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, section entitled Press Release: Nuclear Veterans Day, 
http://www.bntva.com/press/pages/1500902.htm, site accessed 10/12/08. 
5 Reynolds, 'Re-thinking the Joint Project.’ 
6 Michel, ‘Villains, Victims and Heroes.’ 
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 This paper was centred on the British official history of the tests compiled by 
Lorna Arnold7  as contrasted with the McClelland Report. The paper, suggests that 
accounts of the tests are heavily contested. The latter, of course draws from ‘popular’ 
histories. Michel suggests that the McClelland Report, critical of the tests, represents 
the Australian viewpoint. This does not take into consideration Australian 
commentaries and studies which are not critical of the tests, such as Symonds8 and 
AIRAC 9.9
 
 Michel reports that Arnold’s account shows the Australian government as 
a heavily involved collaborator within the testing programme whereas other accounts 
show the Australian role as minimal. The paper explores the distinction between 
‘popular’ and ‘official’ memory and also comments on the prevalence of material that 
intended to expose risks associated with the tests that were published around the time 
of the McClelland Royal Commission.  Michel states: 
Popular or collective memory can be described as ‘the matrix of socially positioned individual 
memories,’ which cannot exist outside individuals, yet remains inherently communal in nature. 
This inevitably produces a dominant mainstream discourse, from which conflicting alternative 
versions, or ‘counter memories’, are marginalised. Popular memory is then distinct from, yet 
not always in opposition to, official memory, which Paula Hamilton describes as Authorised 
Accounts-authorised by governments, institutions, companies, etc.’10
 
 
It is interesting to note that Michel refers to what he describes as the 
‘precursor’ to the McClelland Report, the Australian ‘official history’ of J.L. 
Symonds.11 Michel suggests that this book offered comment on Australia’s lack of 
official involvement in the tests, which is in conflict with the overall tone of Arnold’s 
A Very Special Relationship.12
Symonds’ book largely rejects allegations of misconduct connected with the 
testing programme. As previously explored, Symonds largely shows the testing 
programme in a positive light. Michel explains Symonds tone thus: ‘this can be 
 The paper singles out the McClelland Report and 
Arnold as the respective ‘official’ Australian and British voices.  
                                                 
7 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship. 
8 Symonds, A history of British Atomic Tests in Australia. 
9Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council, British Nuclear Tests in Australia; a Review of 
Operational Safety Measures and of Possible After Effects. 
10 Michel, ‘Villains, Victims and Heroes’, p. 221.  
11 Symonds, A history of British Atomic Tests in Australia. Michel cites this book as being published 
by the ‘Department of Energy and Mines’. The actual publisher was the ‘Department of Resources and 
Energy’. 
12 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship. 
  
 
194 
explained by the fact that Symonds had relied almost entirely upon British and 
Australian sources’13
This bears with it the implication that, according to Michel, Symonds’ work 
may have been far more critical of the tests had it made use of anecdotal evidence. 
However, such anecdotal evidence can be expected to adopt a confrontational or 
adverse position on the tests, those satisfied with the fashion in which the testing 
programme was conducted are unlikely to want to speak out.  Michel also suggests 
that the similarities between British and Australian accounts were also a product of 
‘manipulation by both governments of their coverage in the media.’
 and later in the paper that that Symonds history differs from the 
tenor of the McClelland Commission findings, due in part to their differing 
methodologies, with the Royal Commission exerting pressure on British authorities to 
release classified documents and also making use of oral testimonies of those who 
may have been affected by the tests. 
14
 Michel offers comment on the controversy surrounding the alleged ‘Black 
Mist’. He states that Symonds rejected this allegation due to not having access to 
documents released by the British that were explored during the McClelland Royal 
Commission.
 The print media 
sources explored in Chapter Three largely support this claim.  
15 The relevant section of the McClelland Report offers little to suggest 
that such documents emerged as a consequence of the McClelland Royal 
Commission.16
As its title, A Very Special Relationship
  
17
                                                 
13 Michel, ‘Villains, Victims and Heroes’, p.226.  
 suggests, Arnold’s work did indeed 
speak at great length on the topic of a reciprocal relationship between Australia and 
the UK at the time of the tests. Michel very correctly highlights how this concept is in 
dispute. Michel writes that ‘this contest between official memories was not merely 
symbolic but carried with it specific political and financial implications for each 
nation’ as due to the Royal Commission, Australia received $45 million from Britain 
in the 1990s for rehabilitation of the testing areas. The conclusions of the Commission 
also strengthened the compensation claims of servicemen from both countries. The 
McClelland Report and associated media coverage provided material for popular 
histories, Michel notes that: ‘One important aspect of these works, written 
14 Ibid, p. 222. 
15 Ibid, p. 223. 
16 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I, pp. 174-194. 
17 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship. 
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predominantly by journalists for public consumption, was the overtly dramatic mode 
in which most were cast, complete with villains, victims and heroes.’ 18
The McClelland Report, popular histories and the ‘official’ histories of Arnold 
and Symonds barely scratch the surface of how hotly contested are the memories of 
Australia’s atomic test experience. Michel’s paper also explores how at the time of the 
tests, their critics were frequently accused of aiding the communist cause.  This is 
consistent with the content reflected within Menzies era parliamentary debate, as 
explored in Chapter Two. As a whole, Michel’s paper rejects that there a ‘very special 
relationship’ as depicted by Arnold existed.  
 
A significant Australian anti-nuclear and nuclear-testing commentary is the 
1981 documentary Backs to the Blast.19
 
 ‘Australian Screen’ curator Damien Parer 
says of the documentary: 
There was considerable political impact after the film’s initial broadcast on the Seven network 
in 1981. The documentary prompted a House of Lords enquiry in Britain and a Royal 
Commission in Australia chaired by Justice James McClelland. The Australian Government 
sent the British Government a bill for $250 million to clean up the affected area. Eventually 
the traditional owners were able to return to their lands. The film was released by Channel 4 in 
the UK and the documentary has been screened in six other countries.20
 
 
The McClelland Report suggests the catalyst was the report of the ‘Kerr 
Committee’.21  Parer’s view is likely to be erroneous on other counts; I have seen no 
evidence of the suggested formal British enquiry, and a reply to an electronic mail 
correspondence question directed to the House of Lords also indicated that no such 
enquiry took place, although the atomic testing issue itself, as would be expected, was 
discussed in British parliamentary debate from time to time.22
 Despite the title, only a small proportion of Backs to the Blast
 
23
                                                 
18 Michel, ‘Villains, Victims and Heroes’, p. 222. 
 is devoted to 
atomic weapons and their testing. The documentary is primarily concerned with the 
19 Composite Films, Backs to the Blast. 
20 Australian Screen, section entitled Backs to the Blast, an Australian Nuclear Story, (1981), 
http://australianscreen.com.au/titles/backs-blast/, site accessed 29/05/09. 
21 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol II, p. 603, in reference to 21 Kerr  et al, Report of the Expert Committee on the Review of 
Data on Atmospheric Fallout Arising From British Nuclear Tests in Australia. This report recommends 
that the Australian government hold a public inquiry, which would occur in the form of the Royal 
Commission, on p. 42. 
22 Electronic Mail Correspondence to the House of Lords, 16/06/09. 
23 Composite Films, Backs to the Blast. 
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mining and export of first radium and then uranium in Australia. Throughout the 
documentary there is commentary about the dangers of exposure to radiation offered 
by F.P.J. Robotham, who with Adrian Tame co-authored Maralinga.24
 The documentary links uranium mining to atomic testing, the narrator states: 
‘Only minimal safeguards were placed on the sale of yellowcake exported from the 
previous Port Pirie plant. Some was enriched in Britain and became nuclear fuel 
which, ironically, returned to South Australia.’  The footage here cuts to the atomic 
cloud of a bomb test.
 
25
 Throughout the segment of the documentary concerned with the tests, the 
‘official voice’ is contrasted with eye witness accounts. This official voice is 
represented by Titterton, the former head of the Department of Nuclear Physics of the 
Australian National University in the years 1950-1970 and a member of the AWTSC. 
 
  For example, Titterton is shown commenting that Australia was a suitable 
testing site due to large areas ‘totally devoid of buildings, totally devoid of people.’ 
This is then juxtaposed with footage of local Aboriginal people who are interviewed, 
discussing how they were relocated from their traditional lands.26
 Some of the eyewitness accounts come from those who have contributed to the 
books discussed in Chapter Five. These include crane driver Avon Cross, co-author of 
Beyond Belief.
 
27 Also mentioned was RAAF driver Ric Johnstone, who would later 
become the head of the Australian Nuclear Veterans Association.  Johnstone’s 
experiences and claims are also discussed in Tame and Robotham’s Maralinga.28  
Johnstone explains his role with the Number 1 Radiation Protection Unit, which he 
describes as a Canadian unit. Johnstone reports that following his time at Maralinga 
he was diagnosed with palpable lymph nodes, liver trouble, a type of anaemia and a 
nervous condition he describes as an ‘anxiety state with agoraphobic syndrome.’29
 Titterton is also shown commenting on the ability of the Atomic Weapons 
Safety Committee to veto the firing of any tests, and of the role of 32 monitoring 
stations. This is juxtaposed by discussion of a ‘Black Mist’ like phenomena though it 
is not stated which test this was allegedly connected with. Titterton comments on the 
thorough and scientific nature of the monitoring with any exposure to radiation. This 
 
                                                 
24 Tame and Robotham, Maralinga. 
25 Composite Films, Backs to the Blast. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Cross & Hudson Beyond Belief. 
28 Tame and Robotham, Maralinga. 
29 Composite Films, Backs to the Blast. 
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differs from the accounts presented by Johnstone, who states that at times it was too 
hot to wear protective equipment or to keep it properly sealed. 
 RAAF wireless operator Eric Geddes is also shown discussing his role in a 
cloud-sampling aircraft. He states that no acknowledgement was given of any risk, 
and that aircrew members even ate cut lunches of sandwiches whilst on board aircraft 
on cloud sampling missions. He also states that scientists retrieving the samples from 
wingtip mounted canisters also approached the aircrew with Geiger counters, which 
clicked, showing the presence of ionising radiation.  
 Peggy Jones, widow of Warrant Officer William Jones, is also interviewed, 
discussing how her late husband was required to retrieve a Centurion tank, as 
explored in Chapters Five and Six. Though it is not stated in the documentary, this 
tank was a ‘target response item’ from a test at Emu Field.  Jones discusses how the 
tank broke down and how her late husband stayed with it for two days. Jones then 
goes on to discuss that her husband showed signs of illness within days. Jones then 
details how her late husband was diagnosed with cancer, discharged as medically 
unfit-with no pension, and later died a ‘terrible death’.30
  Another eye-witness account comes from Bill Hammond, a civilian contractor 
employed to bury rubbish. His account suggests his group were supposed to bury 
rubbish by hand, but instead used a tractor which they had found which had scorched 
paint. Hammond states that due to the long hours they worked, washing was sent 
home to be laundered. He suggests this exposure was the possible causation of the 
death of his 23 year old wife, 12 months later, from cancer.  Hammond also states that 
he himself later experienced bladder cancer.  
 
 Titterton’s claims that there were no Aboriginals in testing areas is contrasted 
with an account from Patrick Connolly of the RAF.  His eye-witness account states 
that he encountered scarcely clad, barefooted Aboriginal people in a testing area, 
while he was wearing Wellington boots, overalls and gloves.31
                                                 
30 More details of this story, such as Jones’ first name and rank which was not in the documentary, are 
included in Smith. Clouds of Deceit, pp. 105-106. The incident is discussed, without mention of Jones, 
in Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I, pp. 226-229. 
 As discussed in 
Chapter Six, the McClelland Royal Commission would later reject another of 
Connolly’s claims that Aboriginal people were killed outright by the tests and their 
bodies hidden, and that a secret hospital had been established to treat Aboriginal 
31 Composite Films, Backs to the Blast. 
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people affected by radiation. 32
The segment of Backs to the Blast concerned with the tests does not attempt to 
state that radiation from the tests caused illnesses and deaths from ailments such as 
cancer. Rather, it shows how eye-witness accounts differ from the official assurances 
of Titterton. Also, these accounts show where contamination may have occurred, and 
may have caused illness and death.
 Contemporary viewers of the documentary may be 
unaware of this. 
33  The large scale studies discussed in Chapter Six 
do not allow for such instances of individual contamination.34
In more recent years, the Sustainable Energy and Anti-Uranium Service has 
published a website titled Maralinga-Our Own Shame.
  
35
The page contains the statement ‘During the mainland tests many army 
personnel were deliberately exposed to the blasts just to see what effect radiation had 
on troops.’ This strongly worded reference may have been made regarding the ‘I-
Force’ of ‘Operation Buffalo’.
 Though informative, the 
page also refers to tests which occurred at sites other than Maralinga- the Monte 
Bellos, Emu Field as well as the tests at Christmas and Malden Islands.  The sites are 
discussed within the article but the headline is misleading. The word ‘Maralinga’ has 
become synonymous with all atomic testing in Australia to the extent to which it is 
common for it to be used in reference to tests which took place at the other two sites 
(Emu Field and Monte Bello).  
36
                                                 
32 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report into British Nuclear Tests in Australia, Vol II, pp. 430-432. 
  That the troops were deliberately exposed to 
radiation was not, as the previous chapter explored, a claim supported by the 
McClelland Royal Commission nor has it been indicated by health effects studies. 
The claim of deliberate exposure here is apparently presented, despite what exists on 
33 Composite Films, Backs to the Blast. 
34 Darby et al, ‘A Summary of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer in Men from the United Kingdom 
Who Participated in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes’, Darby et al, ‘Further Follow Up of Mortality and  Incidence of Cancer in Men from the 
United Kingdom Who Participated in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and 
Experimental Programmes; Aboriginal Health Unit, A Survey of Diseases That May be Related to 
Radiation Among Pitjantjatjara on Remote Reserves, Donovan, Survey of Health of Former Atomic 
Test Personnel;  Muirhead  et al, ‘Follow up of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer 1952-98 in Men 
from the UK Who Participated in the UK’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes’; Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia. It should be 
noted that the Aboriginal health unit study in particular experiences problems with its study population. 
Also the Gun study did find an increase in cancer incidence and mortality but attributed this to 
exposure to asbestos, cigarette smoke and possible benzene and not due to exposure to radiation.   
35 The Sustainable Energy and Anti-Uranium Service, http://www.sea-
us.org.au/thunder/britsbombingus.html, site accessed 17/11/08. 
36 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I, p. 336. 
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the public record to dispute it, so as to portray the conduct of the tests in critical light. 
Other claims such as the following are more easily supported: 
 
Security at the test sites was lax. The testing range boundaries were not properly monitored, 
allowing people to walk in and out. Any signs were in English, which the local Aboriginal   
population could not read. Fallout from the ground blasts led to massive contamination of the 
Australian interior. The fallout from Maralinga even reached Adelaide and Melbourne. Some 
places are still heavily radioactive due principally to the presence of 20 kg of plutonium, the 
most toxic element known to humans.37
 
 
The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons posted on 3 October 
2008 an article reporting the anniversary of the ‘Operation Hurricane’ test of that date 
in 1952. It states that personnel were exposed to fallout and that 30 barrels of 
radioactive waste material (material that experienced ‘induced radioactivity’) was 
dumped into the sea.38 They cite as their source The Atomic Forum.39
The nuclear testing issue has also been raised in an online edition of Green 
Left-Australia’s Radical Weekly Newsletter. This edition featured an article titled 
Maralinga- Nuclear Testing in Australia on 2 August 1995. Again, even though the 
title specifies ‘Maralinga’ the article related to all three of the Australian test areas. 
The article offers some exaggerated or possibly poorly informed commentary 
pertaining to the ‘minor trials’: 
  There appears 
to be little reason to doubt this claim. 
 
These “minor tests” consisted of about 500 experiments, including crashing aeroplanes with 
nuclear bombs on board, setting fire to atom bombs and placing them in conventional 
explosions. These tests actually left far more radiation than the major tests and resulted in 
large amounts of plutonium being spread over a wide area.40
 
 
This is not accurate. It is true that the ‘minor trials’ resulted in more 
radioactive contamination than the ‘major tests’ yet the author is mistaken about the 
nature of these trials. The reference to planes carrying atomic ordinance being 
                                                 
37The Sustainable Energy and Anti-Uranium Service, http://www.sea-
us.org.au/thunder/britsbombingus.html, site accessed 17/11/08.  
38 The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, section entitled Anniversary of First 
British Test, http://www.icanw.org/news/hurricane-british-nuclear-test, Site Accessed 17/11/08.  
39The Atomic Forum, section entitled Operation Hurricane. 
http://www.atomicforum.org/uk/hurricane.html#hurricane, site accessed 17/11/08.  
40 Green Left, 2/08/95, http://www.greenleft.org.au/1995/196/11520, site accessed 17/11/08.  
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deliberately crashed is probably a reference to the Vixen B trials of 1961-63.41 Yet 
planes were not crashed; the cores of atomic weapons were subjected to uneven 
detonations to gauge the effect if a plane carrying atomic ordinance were to crash. 
The distinction is important. This example highlights how falsehoods may be 
perpetuated in the discourse of the tests.  Also, the McClelland Royal Commission 
found no evidence to support claims that whole atomic bombs were burned.42
However, as part of the ‘Vixen A’ minor trials beginning in September 1957, 
rods of plutonium were burned in a petrol fire.
  
43   The article goes on to state that: 
‘Australian servicemen and the traditional Aboriginal owners of the land were 
suffering blindness, sores and illnesses like cancer. They started to piece things 
together, linking their afflictions with their exposure to nuclear testing’. 44
The links between such afflictions and exposure to the tests remains to be 
demonstrated via scientific study, though as has been already stated; that the link has 
not been positively demonstrated does not imply that it is disproved.  
 
An article that takes a stance against the tests appeared in Melbourne’s The 
Age on 11 May 2003 and was published online. It was titled ‘Maralinga’s Afterlife’45
However, it also states that: ‘The dead were subject to experimentation as well. 
After a cloud of strontium-90 drifted towards Adelaide following a detonation in 1958, 
the bodies of deceased Australians, especially of young children and still-born babies, 
were secretly harvested.’ The article further documents that ashed bones were 
analysed, in the aid of public safety, without consent, in laboratories in Adelaide, 
  
It was written by John Keane, Professor of Politics at the Centre for the Study of 
Democracy at the University of Westminster in London. It too begins with the claim 
that the ‘British Government treated Aborigines, Australian servicemen and even its 
own troops as scientific guinea pigs’. The article makes claims similar to many of the 
secondary histories emerging at the time of the McClelland Royal Commission; that 
servicemen were expected to decontaminate radioactive aircraft and visit radioactive 
testing sites with inadequate protective equipment.  
                                                 
41  Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test 
Sites at Emu and Maralinga, pp. 39-40. 
42 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report into British Nuclear Tests in Australia, Vol II, pp. 433-434. 
The report suggests that the person who reported the burning of bombs, Mr. Earner, was mistaken 
about what these objects actually were. 
43 Parkinson, Maralinga, p. 6. 
44 Green Left, 2/08/95, http://www.greenleft.org.au/1995/196/11520, site accessed 17/11/08.  
45 The Age, 11/05/03, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/05/11/1052280486255.html, site 
accessed 18/11/08.  
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Melbourne and, in Britain, Aberdeen, Liverpool and London, in violation of the code 
of ethics for research drawn up at Nuremberg following the Second World War. The 
article writes that according to Roff, there were two programmes of this sort;  ‘Project 
Sunshine’ of the US Atomic Energy Commission, co-ordinated by the UN, ‘before 
being handed over to the Commonwealth X-Ray and Radium Laboratory and the 
Australian Atomic Energy Commission.’ The larger, Australian directed project lasted 
from 1957 to around 1980. It, the article documents, required the use of many 
thousands of hearts and thyroid glands and the families were the deceased were never 
informed.46
The issue of experiments involving deceased tissue will be further explored 
but firstly, there was no ‘major trial’ in 1958, they had ceased in 1957. It is unlikely 
that Keane’s description of fallout extending to Adelaide in 1958 is in reference to a 
‘minor trial’ as the article later states: 
  
 
The huge nuclear plume that sheared off unexpectedly from the third Maralinga bomb was an 
example. Code-named Kite, it was a three-kiloton drop on the afternoon of October 11, 1958. 
Part of its strontium-90 cloud drifted out of control, southwards, over the sleeping city of 
Adelaide, whose population was 518,000 at the time.47
 
 
However, the Kite test of ‘Operation Buffalo’ occurred on 11 October 1956. 
The error is almost certainly merely typographical in nature. What is of concern is 
that the article, in particular this statement ‘the bodies of deceased Australians, 
especially of young children and still-born babies, were secretly harvested’ alludes to 
this test resulting directly in deaths. This is not established or evidenced in report 
material pertaining to the tests. The article also alludes to high mortality rates among 
test veterans, which the previous chapter also showed to be inaccurate. The article 
states: ‘Five decades after entering service, the thousands of British and Australian 
men who have survived Maralinga (more than a quarter of them are now dead) feel 
hurt and humiliated.’48
The article comments on compensation for Australian nuclear veterans, 
referring to the Report of the Review of Veterans' Entitlements released by the 
  
                                                 
46 The Age, 11/05/03, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/05/11/1052280486255.html, site 
accessed 18/11/08. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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Department of Veterans Affairs in 200349 in stating that all Australian test veterans 
who are ill will cancer should be entitled to a disability pension and treatment ‘for the 
remainder of their shortening lives’, meanwhile in Britain the Blair Government 
continues official denials. Then UK Minister for Veterans, Dr Lewis Mooney, is 
quoted as stating: ‘There is no — I repeat, no — evidence that servicemen were 
exposed to radiation’ and "we've looked very carefully at their complaints. We don't 
think they're justified. If disagreeing with them is callous, then so be it’50
This neglects that the study used by the Australian Department of Veterans 
Affairs to inform its decision to compensate also found no proof of increased cancer 
incidence and mortality being linked to radiation exposure. The article makes accurate 
comments on the reckless nature of the ‘minor trials’ but also asserts ‘The technique 
of developing "low-yield", "tactical" or "battlefield" nuclear weapons — in effect, 
their miniaturisation — was first dreamt up at Maralinga in what were known as the 
"Minor Trials"’.  Evidence to supports this claim is not provided. Also mentioned are 
the notorious cobalt pellets from the Tadje test. The article states: ‘Aboriginal people 
did wander through radiated lands. They camped in fresh craters, to keep warm and to 
trap rabbits blinded by cobalt pellets.’  Despite its various inaccuracies, the article 
makes a strong point about the adverse consequences of atomic testing, especially the 
contamination of Aboriginal land. 
 
Keane refers to anti-nuclear activist Sue Rabbitt Roff. Roff’s work was 
discussed briefly in the previous chapter. It is of relevance to discuss her work in 
more detail. On the subject of experiments into the effects of absorption of Sr-90 by 
human tissue, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency 
(ARPANSA) compiled a brief report titled Australian Strontium 90 Testing 
Programme 1957-1978. The report mentions that: 
 
...there is some indication that Australian laboratories sent bone samples to the US as part of 
Project Sunshine the majority of activity undertaken in Australia related to a national program 
for the measurement of strontium 90 in human bone in the period 1957-1978. 51
                                                 
49 Department of Veterans Affairs, Section titled Report of the Review of Veterans' Entitlements, 
 
http://www.dva.gov.au/pensions/review/index.htm, site accessed 18/11/08. 
50 The Age, 11/05/03, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/05/11/1052280486255.html, site 
accessed 18/11/08.  
51 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency,  section titled Australian Strontium 90 
Testing Programme 1957-1978, http://www.arpansa.gov.au/pubs/reports/sr90pubrep.pdf,  Site 
Accessed  26/08/10. This report states that human bone tissue was tested.  Of interest is a 3 June, 1957, 
letter from the Acting Secretary of the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 
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Roff reported unethical experiments on deceased tissue in an article entitled 
‘Project Sunshine and the Slippery Slop: The Ethics of Tissue Sampling for 
Strontium-90’. 52  Though the use of human tissue of deceased persons for 
experimentation without the consent from their family is deplorable, there is no 
evidence to suggest that atomic testing was the cause of mortality. Calling this claim 
into question is not suggesting that the American ‘Project Sunshine’ or similar 
operations are ethical. The link between the Australian tests and ‘Project Sunshine’ is 
not firm, and the operation is largely outside the sphere of this discussion. However, it 
is worthy of mention as Roff, one of the more prominent critics of the Australian tests, 
has written about it.53 This bone sampling program and its links to Sr- 90 
contamination from atmospheric nuclear tests was the subject of the 2003 Film 
Australia documentary Silent Storm. The film  documents how CSIRO biochemist 
Hedley Marston disputed the notion of a ‘safe dose’ of radiation and resented that 
physicists  saw themselves fit to comment on the physiological effects of radiation, 
which he deemed to be the area of expertise of physicians and biochemists. Silent 
Storm explores how Marston and his team conducted their analysis of animal thyroid 
glands as a means to track the path of I-131, as an indicator of radioactive fallout, 
across Australia following various atomic trials,54 which would be published in 
1958.55
 It also documents how Marston became aware of fallout contamination in 
Adelaide via an air-sampling experiment and the incident in which radioactive rain 
was discovered by a prospector in Cloncurry, Queensland.  The documentary takes an 
objective tone and makes it clear that Marston never overtly stated that the fallout was 
cause for panic, but instead took displeasure at the official government statements to 
the effect that there was no such contamination and that the tests were utterly 
harmless. One of those interviewed for the film was author and health physics expert 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Raymond Applegate, to The Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations. The letter 
highlighted a need for the ash of animal bones, as well as ‘artificial human bone preparation’ National 
Archives of Australia: Prime Minister’s Department; ‘United Nations Strontium 90 Programme, 
Australian Participation’, A1209 1957/606, 1957-1959. 
52 Roff, ‘Project Sunshine and the Slippery Slope: The Ethics of Tissue Sampling for Strontium-90’, 
Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 18:3, 2002, pp. 299-310.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Film Australia, Silent Storm, directed by Peter Butt, 2003. 
55 Marston, ‘The Accumulation of Radioactive Iodine in the Thyroids of Grazing Animals Subsequent 
to Atomic Weapons Tests.’ 
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F.P.J. Robotham, who discusses the difficulty in conducting epidemiological studies 
which conclusively link harm to radiation exposure, due to other variables such as 
exposure to carcinogenic and other harmful chemicals. These concerns have been 
echoed by others who have commented on the various epidemiological studies 
discussed in Chapter Six. 
The documentary explores the 2001 discovery of ashed human bones in a 
Melbourne laboratory. Such bones were taken from bodies undergoing autopsy, 
without consent from family members, during a long-lasting government radiation 
sampling programme which began in Australia in 1957. Marston, according to the 
film, reported to the effect that the evidence of I -131 contamination may be found in 
the thyroids of animals, but ‘the effects of strontium 90 contamination will be found 
in the bones of children’.  There is a strong focus within the film on the possible 
contamination of the Australian dairy industry and it was indeed government policy at 
this time that Australian school children receive one half pint of milk to drink each 
day.  It is of interest to note that Silent Storm reports that the ashed bone samples do 
show Sr-90 contamination, but that levels of contamination doubled in 1959, although 
the major trials in Australia having ceased in 1957. The film suggests that fallout 
contamination from far larger Russian, British and American hydrogen bomb tests is 
likely to be to blame. Sr-90 is a fission product, released in such hydrogen bomb tests 
in the fission ‘primary’ and perhaps through additional fission in a uranium tamper.  
Silent Storm thus takes a stance against all atmospheric testing, not just those tests 
which occurred in Australia. The film acknowledges that the full health effects of the 
tests in Australia are not fully understood and that relevant issues are heavily 
contested.56
Sue Rabbitt Roff has made various statements alluding to secret documents, 
especially those that allegedly suggest that test participants were knowingly exposed 
to radiation. The details about this document or documents are vague.  Roff appeared 
on the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) programme ‘Lateline’ on 11 May 
2005 to speak about such documents. Roff stated that the document does not actually 
discuss what people were required to do but that some were expected to walk and 
even crawl through ground zero within hours of a detonation and to visit 
contaminated areas within days. Roff notes that this would cause exposure to 
 
                                                 
56 Film Australia, Silent Storm, directed by Peter Butt, 2003. 
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radionuclides, particularly in their clothing.57 This appears to be a reference to the ‘I 
Force’ as discussed in Chapter Six and in the McClelland Report.58
 
 Roff goes on to 
state of the document: 
It's a document from the Australian military forces central command and it's headed 'Dose 
Rates: Buffalo Trials'. It's a series of -- a list of names of men who were known to have been 
exposed to radiation during the Buffalo period of trials and immediately afterwards in 1956. 
 
In discussing how the document surfaced, Roff suggests that hat sometimes 
things ‘slip through people’s fingers.’ Roff speculates that it may have been meant to 
be censored as there were three copies of the document in the archives, two with 
names and details erased and one intact.  Roff also questions: ‘why do you expose 
40,000 people to the observation of nuclear weapons tests if they're not all technically 
necessary?’ and suggests a two part answer to that question: To prepare men for how 
to act in the event of a nuclear war situation and to also gauge the likely health effects 
of there exposure in later years. 59
Here Roff is suggesting that the tests might have involved some very large 
scale experiments into the effects of radiation on servicemen, far beyond the scope of 
the small ‘I-force’. This and similar statements show the emergence of the belief that 
people were used as ‘guinea pigs.’ Further, Roff also states that other documents 
indicate the British Government stopped taking blood samples from those present at 
the tests as they could provide evidence for liability investigations and possible 
compensation, and suggests that: 
 
 
There are several documents that are available to us now which state that quite clearly so the 
men feel that the average general Clark [sic] or Cook or other low level service person who 
was required to observe and participate in the tests was being used as part of a mass 
experiment program together with these more specific men who had to do very specific tasks 
under the guidance of the scientists and the doctors.60
 
 
                                                 
57 ABC, Evidence Uncovered about Maralinga Experiment, 
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/stories/s295331.htm, broadcast 11 May 2001, site accessed 25/11/08. 
58 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol 1, p. 336. 
59 ABC, Evidence Uncovered about Maralinga Experiment, 
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/stories/s295331.htm, broadcast 11 May 2001, site accessed 25/11/08. 
60Ibid 
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That servicemen may have feared contamination is significant. As for 
evidence of this contamination, such claims appear largely unsupported. According to 
the McClelland Report as discussed in Chapter Six, even members of the I-Force were 
outside the range of  ‘prompt’ or ‘initial’ radiation, thus leaving possible exposure to 
fallout or contaminated areas to be the risk.61  Roff may have been referring to a 26 
page report held in the  National Archives of Australia,  from the Department of 
Defence:  ‘Dosage Record - Australian and New Zealand Personnel attending Buffalo 
trials - Maralinga 1956’which has as the title of its 21st page ‘Dosage Rates: Buffalo 
Trials’.62 The report was available to the Royal Commission and is consistent with the 
discussion of ‘Operation Buffalo’ contained in the McClelland Report.63
 Roff’s research has been widely called into question. A statement from Dr 
Ivor Surveyor, consultant physician in the field of nuclear medicine to the University 
of Bristol, was published online on the ‘Radsafe’ mailing list on 14 May 2001. The 
statement was a transcript of electronic mail correspondence to the presenter of the 
‘Lateline’ programme, Mr Tony Jones. Radsafe has been described as: ‘a consortium 
of organisations that have come together to offer mutual assistance in the event of a 
transport accident involving radioactive materials belonging to a Radsafe member’.
 As for cooks 
et cetera being part of a large experiment program, this appears totally groundless.  
64
  
 
The statement suggested that Roff’s documents differed in no way from studies by the 
McClelland Royal Commission, and Surveyor also wrote: 
 it is not my purpose to argue the case for or against the testing of 
 atomic bombs, nor do I intend to enter into the ethical 
 considerations concerning atomic bomb testing and the involvement of 
service personnel in that business. However, I do question very strongly the motives of Dr. 
Rabbitt Roff in presenting as "new" material, matters that are already on the 
 public record. I also consider it is very wrong and alarmist to pretend that men  
 were exposed to excessive and dangerous doses of radiation. The  
 reality is that the exposures at Maralinga are of the same order of  
 magnitude and in some cases less then routine diagnostic  
 radiology or nuclear medicine tests performed in considerable  
                                                 
61 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol 1, pp. 335-342.   
62 National  Archives of Australia: Department of Defence;  ‘Dosage Record - Australian and New 
Zealand Personnel attending Buffalo trials - Maralinga 1956’, A6456, R047/031, 1958-1965. 
63 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol 1, pp. 273-299. 
64 Radsafe, http://www.radsafe.org.uk/, site accessed 25/11/08. 
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 numbers every day in hospitals and clinics around the world.   
 It should also be noted that many human populations are living in  
 high background areas in the world.  Therefore they are exposed  
 year after year to radiation of this magnitude or greater.   In fact  
 there is no known way of escaping from levels of background  
 radiation.  I am surprised that the ABC did not make any attempt to check  
 the facts of the story with a known radiation expert before giving  
 "air time" to an account that can only be described as activist  
 propaganda. 65
 
  
 Surveyor’s comments are here consistent with the various epidemiological 
studies examined in this dissertation,66 and also the McClelland Report67 to which he 
has referred. The counterpoint to Surveyor’s comments, as Roff would later explore, 
is the notion that there may be ‘no safe dose’. These mysterious documents cited by 
Roff have been mentioned in other articles. One such article was published online by 
Green Left on 23 May 2001 by Jim Green. This was titled ‘Maralinga- An Act of 
Indefensible Callousness’. The article cites Roff’s ‘documents’ to support the claim 
that the Maralinga tests involved radiation experiments on test participants. As per the 
criticism from Surveyor, the details of the article appear to be concerned with data 
readily available from the McClelland Report. The article mentions the upcoming 
South Australian Health Study as though expecting this study would validate its 
claims.68 It did not.69
Another of Roff’s essays, titled ‘The Glass Bead Game: Nuclear Tourism at 
the Australian Weapon Test Sites’
  
70
                                                 
65 Radsafe mailing list, 
  of 1998 aims to explore the notion that 
Australia’s former test sites may become tourist destinations. It predates the latest 
http://radlab.nl/radsafe/archives/0105/msg00234.html, site accessed 05/11/08.  
66 Darby et al, ‘A Summary of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer in Men from the United Kingdom 
Who Participated in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes’; Darby et al, ‘Further Follow up of Mortality and  Incidence of Cancer in Men from the 
United Kingdom Who Participated in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and 
Experimental Programmes; Aboriginal Health Unit, A Survey of Diseases That May be Related to 
Radiation Among Pitjantjatjara on Remote Reserves, Donovan, Survey of Health of Former Atomic 
Test Personnel;  Muirhead  et al, ‘Follow up of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer 1952-98 in Men 
from the UK Who Participated in the UK’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes’; Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia.   
67 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia. 
68 Green Left, section entitled Maralinga: An Act of Indefensible Callousness, 
http://www.greenleft.org.au/2001/449/26050 , site accessed 05/11/08.  
69 Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia. 
70 Roff, ‘The Glass Bead Game.’ 
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clean-up operations ending in 200371 and states ‘Maralinga is probably the most 
contaminated nuclear weapons test site outside the former Soviet Union.’72  
 
In-Situ Vitrification ‘hoods’ over burial pits. Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, 
Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test Sites at Emu and Maralinga, 2003, p. 242. 
 
On the subject of this contamination, within the introductory paragraph, Roff 
states: ‘This paper surveys the attempts to clean up the site of UK nuclear weapons 
test in the 1950s, not least by attempting to vitrify vast tracts of desert’. This indicates 
an awareness of the use of in-situ vitrification (ISV) technology, which was not 
employed by MARTAC to ‘vitrify vast tracts of desert.’ ISV technology was used, 
until it was abandoned, to solidify the contents of ‘burial pits’; sites of concentrated, 
buried contaminated material, so that such contents would not spread or become 
inhaled. There were no attempts to vitrify large areas.73
The article goes on to offer a confused account of the ‘Black Mist.’ Roff states: 
 This is another example of a 
misunderstanding about the tests and their consequences being presented, and how the 
public mythology of the tests may be influenced by such misunderstandings.  
‘One Aboriginal family, the Milpuddies, were caught by the ‘black mist’ rainout of a 
1957 test and suffered one stillbirth and one child dying of a brain tumour.’74
                                                 
71 Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test 
Sites at Emu and Maralinga (Australia) 2003. 
 The 
72 Roff, ‘The Glass Bead Game.’, p.290. 
73 Parkinson, Maralinga, pp. 75-87. 
74 Roff ‘The Glass Bead Game’, p. 291. 
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Milpuddies were contaminated as a result of the tests. However, this family was not 
exposed to any ‘Black Mist’ (the controversy surrounding the ‘Black Mist’ occurred 
in 1953, not 1957). The Milpuddies were found camping in the crater formed after the 
Marcoo detonation of Operation Buffalo,75 which occurred on 4 October 1956, again 
not 1957.  The same passage of Roff’s text also states: ‘it is not impossible that the 
“measles epidemic” at Ernabella Mission to the north of the test sites in 1957 was 
actually radiation sickness.’76 The use of the phrase ‘it is not impossible’ 
acknowledges that such a claim is open to debate. However Ernabella is close to the 
Northern Territory border, hundreds of kilometres from any nuclear testing site.77
 Despite these errors, Roff’s paper goes on to offer detailed evidence on the 
issue of Co-60 contamination following the Tadje test of  14 September 1957,
 
78 in 
particular the experiences of health physics scientist Doug Rickard, whose 
experiences were also discussed in Chapter Five. Roff’s account is indicative that 
Rickard was exposed to dangerous levels of contamination. Within the article Rickard 
is quoted as stating ‘However when the film badge was developed it had been so 
saturated with radiation that it was totally black and it was impossible using the 
available equipment to determine just how much gamma radiation I received.’79 This 
is an example of the problems with the broad-scale epidemiological studies- they 
cannot account for individual experience such as those of Rickard. However, it is not 
legitimate to offer this as evidence that such instances were wide spread. Roff also 
cites Rickard’s experiences in such a manner as to suggest that tourists to the testing 
areas would be likely to suffer a similar exposure. This is most unlikely as the easily-
detected Co-60 pellets were removed long ago.80
Another relevant paper by Sue Rabbitt Roff is ‘Establishing the Possible 
Radiogenicity of Morbidity and Mortality from Participation in UK Nuclear Weapons 
  
                                                 
75 Cross and Hudson, Beyond Belief, pp. 74-75 
76  Roff ‘The Glass Bead Game’ p.291 
77 Ibid.  Confusion between memories of possible contamination at Wallatinna from ‘Totem 1’ and 
Measles outbreaks at Ernabella is the subject of Heather Goodall, ‘Colonialism and Catastrophe: 
Contested Memories of Nuclear Testing and Measles Epidemics at Ernabella,’  in  Darian-Smith and 
Hamilton (eds), Memory & History in Twentieth-Century Australia, pp. 55-76. The chapter explores 
how an Aboriginal man, Kunmanara, was convinced that the effects of a measles outbreak he witnessed 
in 1948 was a consequence of atomic testing in Australia. Testing commenced in 1952, with the first 
test in South Australia occurring in 1953.  
78 The Nuclear Weapon Archive , section entitled British Nuclear Testing, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 12/12/08 
79 Roff, ‘The  Glass Bead Game’, p.299. 
80 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, p. 229. 
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Development’.81 This paper pertains to compensation claims made by and on the 
behalf of British Nuclear Veterans.  The paper does not resort to overly speculative 
claims. The focus is on ‘Hills Principle of causation’ and how claims for 
compensation have to satisfy this principal. The central argument of the paper is that 
‘The past decade has seen a sea change in the understanding-and consensus, in the 
health physics profession: there is no safe dose of radiation exposure, no threshold 
below which exposure may be assumed to be safe’.  82
 The implication of this is that if even though it has not been proven that 
groups of servicemen were exposed to levels of radiation held to be ‘dangerous’, 
negative health effects may have occurred. The paper also explores how it is a 
common but mistaken belief that any ill effects of radiation exposure would have 
manifested early. Roff suggests the period of latency may be longer than earlier 
thought and that nuclear veterans may be likely to experience health consequences, 
due to the tests, in their 60s and 70s.
 
83
 Roff then attempts to examine the likelihood of radiation exposure to nuclear 
veterans, exploring first the types of contamination that results from an atomic blast. 
This is followed by commentary on the likelihood of such contamination affecting 
people at tests at the Monte Bellos, Emu Field, Maralinga and Christmas Island.  
 As a basis for comparison, Roff uses the 
example of radiation exposures experienced by the survivors of the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki nuclear strikes. Roff makes it clear that the doses experienced by atomic 
bomb survivors are likely to be significantly higher than those experienced by test 
participants.  
 The paper concludes with Roff’s assertion of her belief that the three UK 
Government commissioned epidemiological studies suffered from a small study 
population. This, Roff contends, has the implication that the study lacked statistical 
power ‘particularly in relation to low dose exposures.’ Roff goes on to suggest: 
  
The findings of the official studies therefore are not robust enough on which to base 
judgements of consistency. There are similar faults and biases in other epidemiological studies 
of US, French and New Zealand nuclear test veterans.84
 
 
                                                 
81  Roff, ‘Establishing the Possible Radiogenicity of Morbidity and Mortality from Participation in UK 
Nuclear Weapons Development.’ Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 20:3, 2004, pp. 218-241. 
82 Ibid, p.219. 
83 Ibid, p.225. 
84 Ibid, p.237. 
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The only firm conclusion which can be taken from the paper, however, is that 
aside from individual incidents like that affecting Rickard’s radiation doses that may 
have been received by test participants may cause health complaints, including cancer 
incidence and cancer mortality. In concluding, Roff states: 
 
The application of the tests of Hill’s Principles indicates, then, there is positive evidence of 
exposure to ionising radiation that may have ranged from acute high doses to chronic low dose 
exposures.85
  
 
 Despite the logical line of enquiry presented by the majority of the paper, the 
strength of this ‘positive evidence’ is still open to debate. The sentiments of this paper 
are also outlined in another article by Sue Roff, published on the website of the 
BNTVA. It is titled Statement to the Press and was published on 30 September 2002.  
Of particular relevance is its observation that the NRPB studies commissioned by the 
UK Ministry of Defence are routinely ruled to be irrelevant to individual men’s 
applications for compensation. They take into account the chances of contracting 
cancer for the whole sample group, and not the cause of an individual’s illness86
As already noted, broad epidemiological studies do not account for individual 
instances of possible exposure.  The BNTVA hold that Britain’s acquisition of an 
atomic deterrent may have aided in the preservation of world peace. An article titled 
Nuclear Veterans Day, 3 October 2002 wrote that in 1992 UK Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher had stated Britain’s nuclear deterrent had ‘kept the peace for forty 
years.’ And that it had now been 50 years that Britain had enjoyed that peace. 
However, those that had made it possible, test participants, ‘do not have peace’ as 
they were suffering or had died from ‘illnesses that we firmly believe were caused by 
their involvement in the nuclear arms race and thus radiation!’ 
 
87
 In addition to the belief in adverse health effects from participation in the tests 
among veterans, the BNTVA expressed concern regarding possible health effects in 
their children: 
 
 
                                                 
85 Ibid.  
86British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, section entitled Statement to the Press 
http://www.bntva.com/press/pages/3000902.htm, site accessed 10/12/08. 
87British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, section entitled Press Release: Nuclear Veterans Day, 
http://www.bntva.com/press/pages/1500902.htm, site accessed 10/12/08. 
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The UK Government refuses to look into the ill health of the veteran's children, many of whom 
were born with genetic damage and like their fathers, many have died. We are told that we 
must prove that damage was done to the father before our children can be examined!  
  
The issue of genetic damage from British nuclear tests is the subject of the 
2008 Massey University study.88
 
  The impact of this study, which pertains to large 
scale thermonuclear tests in the Pacific not involving Australians, is yet to be fully 
realised. The BNTVA also challenges the British government to undertake studies 
into the possible effects of the exposure to radiation among veterans themselves: 
The UK Government has refused to fund a study to help discover whether or not the men were 
harmed through their involvement with radiation. We are willing to take the chance that we 
could be wrong but the Government will not take the same risk - WHY - do they know 
something they are not telling us?89
 
 
However in issuing this challenge the association does not appear to have 
taken into account that thus far the British Government has funded three studies, all 
largely inconclusive. In Australia, such conclusive proof was not required by the 
DVA, who will now pay for cancer treatment for those present at Australian tests, 
despite the relevant Australian study not linking cancer morbidity and mortality to 
radiation. 90
The following, from the BNTVA’s cited list of ‘aims’ is of interest: 
 
 
The NRPB Study was supposed to be a Health Study but instead became a Cancer Morbidity 
Study only. The PM, Mrs Thatcher herself, has told us it was not advisable to carry out a 
Health Study. No man, his family or doctor, was approached for information. The Study 
included over 5,600 men who were sent out to prepare the Test Sites and then returned to base 
before any explosion took place. Men over a certain age were excluded - 'they would have 
died in any case'. Men who had emigrated were not taken into account. Even so the Study 
showed a marked increase in leukaemia and multiple myeloma amongst the veterans. We are 
demanding a proper Health Study be conducted where each veteran and his doctor, is 
approached for a full medical history. We have even suggested to Lord Trefarne a simple 
                                                 
88The results of this study would be published as M.A. Wahab et al, Elevated Chromosome 
Translocation Frequencies in New Zealand Nuclear Test Veterans.’ 
89 British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, section entitled Press Release: Nuclear Veterans Day, 
http://www.bntva.com/press/pages/1500902.htm, site accessed 10/12/08. 
90Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia. Department of Veterans 
Affairs, section entitled Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, 
http://www.dva.gov.au/health/spec_programs/nuctest/faq.htm, site accessed 30/09/08. 
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method in which this could be carried out and we were supported by Jack Ashley MP, 
Winston Churchill MP and Frank Cook MP but nothing has happened as yet.91
 
 
 It should be noted that the British health studies, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, suggested the possible increase in multiple myeloma and leukaemia was 
likely to be a chance finding.92 The BNTVA 2002 article closes with a challenge 
posed to the British government. That if a war occurs against Saddam Hussein and if  
he does  and use have nuclear weapons, will the servicemen affected who will have 
illnesses, be treated  by fallout be met with the same callousness of veterans of the 
nuclear tests and told that their exposure to radiation has nothing to do with the 
service of their country? The BNTVA write that contemporary servicemen should be 
informed of the risks and that in the1950s they trusted their government to guard their 
safety and they now believe this trust to have been misplaced, and they express a hope 
that contemporary servicemen will not be so trusting. They write that they served their 
country without hesitation and: ‘When we were asked to serve our country, without 
question, to a man, we did so. Now that we need the help of our country why does it 
ignore us? Where is the honour in this? Don't let our country forget its nuclear 
veterans because - ALL WE SEEK IS JUSTICE!’93
Though the fear of nuclear weapons use in the Iraq war was, thankfully, never 
realised, it is of interest to consider how this question and the tone of the article 
frames test participants as ‘Cold Warriors’.  The BNTVA do not take an ‘anti nuclear’ 
stance per se, in fact it appears they hold that such weapons may have prevented 
conflict in modernity. They do hold that those who they believe contributed to the 
stability of the world should be compensated like any other veteran. It is reasonable to 
expect that those servicemen who subjected themselves to potential risk for the 
perceived benefit of their country should be well-treated.  The BNTVA admit that 
little is known about the possible effects of radiation. They ask in the ‘Aims’ section 
of their website for a recognition that in the 1950s, knowledge about the long term 
consequences of nuclear testing was in its infancy and thus no one could state that no 
one was affected.  Scientists of today, they state, are still learning about radiation and 
 
                                                 
91 British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, section entitled Aims, 
http://www.bntva.com/aboutbntva/aims.htm, site accessed 10/12/08. 
92 Muirhead et al, ‘Follow up of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer 1952-1958 in Men from the UK 
Who Participated in the UK’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Tests and Experimental Programmes.’  
93 British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, section entitled Aims, 
http://www.bntva.com/aboutbntva/aims.htm, site accessed 10/12/08. 
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its effects which can take years to manifest. They write that at the time of the 1952 
tests, there had not been a sufficient amount of time since earlier US tests to gauge the 
possible long term effects  (six years since the 1946 tests at bikini) and that no 
information had been made available from the wartime atomic strikes against Japan,94
The BTNVA’s acknowledgement that much is not known about the effects of 
the tests and that no speculative claims are made in this section of their website lends 
weight to the position; here they are not easily refuted.  It is also the case that even if 
harmful radiation exposure did not occur, belief in the possibility of such exposure 
has been a major stressor for veterans. The pursuit of compensation for UK test 
participants is an ongoing issue.  
  
In Australia, a significant and vocal group that has taken an anti nuclear stance 
in relation to the tests is the Australian Nuclear Veterans Association (ANVA), 
presided over by Ric Johnstone. One of his experiences were detailed in the text 
Maralinga by Tame and Robotham95 discussed in Chapter Five. The primary source 
of data used by the website is the McClelland Report and thus the claims made are 
reasonable based on the evidence available to the McClelland Royal Commission and 
available in the public domain. Under a section entitled ‘birth defects’ the page refers 
to the work of Roff.96
Roff is far from alone in criticising the conduct of the tests.  A source relevant 
to this discussion is John Pilger’s A Secret Country,
   
97 which was also made into a film 
report of the same title in 1985.98
 
 Part of this film commented on British atomic 
testing in Australia. On this subject, Pilger offered the following: 
Australia has the distinction of being the only country in the world to have supplied uranium 
 for nuclear bombs which its leaders allowed to be dropped by a foreign power on their own 
 territory and their own people without warning.  
 
 This is blatantly sensationalist. To claim that bombs were dropped without 
warning, not only on Australian land but on Australian people as though Australia 
                                                 
94 Ibid, note the 1945 ‘Trinity’ test is not discussed.  
95 Tame & Robotham, Maralinga, pp.163-165. 
96 Australian Nuclear Veterans Association, Section Entitled Birth Defects, 
http://users.bigpond.net.au/anva/defects.htm, site accessed 19/12/08, (now hosted at 
http://www.sandersonsite.com/anva/defects.htm, under construction, site accessed 02/12/09 ) 
97 John Pilger, A Secret Country, Cape, London, 1989. 
98 Ronin Films, A Secret Country, the First Australians Fight Back, Central Independent Television, 
Great Britain, 1985.  
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was being subjected to nuclear attack is utterly groundless. Pilger is here alluding to 
Australian uranium being used to manufacture ordinance used against Australia. Here 
is a case where the simple truth of the matter- that the British conduced 
environmentally damaging atomic tests with largely unknown effects on human health, 
would have made a much more effective point. Pilger also commented that nuclear 
veterans suffered an elevated rate of cancer due to exposure to radiation, a claim 
which has yet to be established by studies. He does correctly state, however, that 
indigenous people were ‘shooed off like rabbits’, from the testing areas.   
Pilger’s report featured an interview with Yami Lester regarding the ‘Black 
Mist’. Pilger comments that print-media commentators from the time of the test, in 
particular Chapman Pincher, then scientific correspondent with London’s The Daily 
Express, often equated anti-testing responses with being anti-democracy and anti-
Britain. This is consistent with the findings outlined from the analysis of 
parliamentary debate and mainstream media s as presented in Chapters Two and 
Three. 
A balanced and well evidenced report which takes a stance against the tests 
can be found in A Toxic Legacy- British Nuclear Testing in Australia published online 
by the Australian Institute of Criminology. 99 This online report is also published as 
the one relevant chapter from the 1989 book Wayward Governance, Illegality and its 
Control in the Public Sector by P.N. Groboski.100
 
 
Cancer has many causes, and to demonstrate conclusively that a particular case was caused by 
Maralinga exposure and not by smoking, diet, exposure to X-rays, or some inherited 
predisposition is extremely difficult. The Royal Commission's recommendation that the onus 
of proof be borne by the government was not accepted. For this reason, most claims have thus 
far been unsuccessful.101
 
 
Typical of material on the tests is a brief article about Maralinga published by 
a group of volunteers known as ‘GreenNet’, date unlisted.  The article correctly points 
out that Aboriginal people were removed from the range. The article goes on to state: 
                                                 
99Australian Institute of Criminology, section entitled A Toxic Legacy: British Nuclear Testing In 
Australia, http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/lcj/wayward/ch16.html, site accessed 24/11/08.  
100 P.N Groboski, Wayward Governance, Illegality and its Control in the Public Sector, Australian 
Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 1989. 
101 Australian Institute of Criminology, section entitled A Toxic Legacy: British Nuclear Testing In 
Australia, http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/lcj/wayward/ch16.html, site accessed 24/11/08. 
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That ‘Maralinga was direct act of genocide.’ The article states that nuclear weapons 
can contaminate land and water systems for ‘up to 250,000 years.’ It also suggests 
that far-travelling radioactive clouds caused ‘much sickness and death’ and that 
Aboriginal people speak of l the Black Mist that caused blindness and cancer.’ The 
article mentions British and Australian servicemen affected by the tests and also that: 
‘…the (testing)area remains unsafe for habitation for 250 000 years is just another 
case of nuclearisation perpetrating directly and indirectly acts of genocide upon 
indigenous and non-indigenous people. The British continue to dispute their 
responsibility to rehabilitate the land.’102
The tests cannot reasonably be described as ‘a direct act of genocide’.  
Genocide, as defined by Article II of the ‘United Nations Convention of the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,’ singed on 9 November 1948 at 
New York, going into effect on 12 January 1951:   
 
 
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group, as such: 
a) Killing members of this group; 
b) Causing serious bodily harm to members of this group 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within this group; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.103
 
 
Though the tests had real consequences for Aboriginal people, that this was 
their intended purpose is not supported. Thus reporting the tests as ‘a direct act of 
genocide’ is not a reasonable claim. The article’s claim indicates the lack for 
awareness that an act must be committed with intent to be genocide. Even the claim of 
‘much sickness and death’ has not been established, even after the McClelland Royal 
Commission. Traditional owners have indeed spoken of the ‘Black Mist’ yet this issue 
                                                 
102 GreenNet, section titled Nuclear Issues; Maralinga, 
http://www.green.net.au/humpsnotdumps/maraling.htm, site accessed 04/12/08.  
The article mentions  Pitjantjatjara and Kokatha  people, however, it also mentions the ‘Maralinga’ 
people, perhaps what is meant here are the Tjarutja people, who are known as the ‘Maralinga Tjatjura’ 
103 The United Nations, section entitled United Nations Convention of the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.htm, site accessed 29/09/09. The use 
and misuse of the term ‘genocide’ in reference to Aboriginal people in Australia is discussed in Larissa 
Behrendt, Chris Cunneen & Terri Libesman, Indigenous Legal Relations in Australia, Oxford 
University Press, South Melbourne, 2009, pp.39-42. 
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is also contested, as is the claim that servicemen were exposed to radiation.104
 Another contributor to the debate on the effects of the tests is Jim Green, an 
Australian anti-nuclear activist whose PhD dissertation was concerned with issues 
connected to the research reactor at Lucas Heights.  He is the Australian co-ordinator 
for the ‘Beyond Nuclear Initiative’, which is a project of the Arid Lands Environment 
Centre and is firmly opposed to the nuclear industry 
 Though 
this kind of language it employed to achieve potential ends, explaining why it has 
been presented despite what exists on the public record, it is all-too easily refuted due 
to the absolute nature of its claims. Their position would be strengthened by focusing 
on the issue that the consequences of atomic testing are poorly understood.  
105
 Green administers a large online archive of material about nuclear issues. The 
archive features a significant section pertaining to British atomic testing in Australia. 
It details commemorative events which occurred at the time of the 50th anniversary of 
the first test at Maralinga, 27 September 2006.  The section also features some essays 
and links concerned with the tests, problems with clean-up efforts and the handover of 
former test sites to their traditional owners.  Many of the essays to which Green has 
provided links feature claims not consistent with evidence. Other links to material 
outlining problems with the clean-up appear to suffer from no such shortcomings and 
the claims made are supported. The following, from an article by Green titled 
‘Maralinga: a host of indiscretions, short-cuts and cover-ups’ of 4 May 2000 is a clear 
example: 
 
 
Many Aborigines were severely affected by the British weapons tests, whether or not they 
were exposed to radiation. Forced relocation was particularly traumatic.106
 
  
Green also comments on ISV technology. As previously mentioned, during the 
final clean-up of the Maralinga range, this technology had been abandoned in favour 
of contaminated material being buried in trenches.  As stated by Parkinson, one 
reason ISV was abandoned was due to an explosion during the vitrification of one of 
                                                 
104 GreenNet, section titled Nuclear Issues; Maralinga, 
http://www.green.net.au/humpsnotdumps/maraling.htm, site accessed 04/12/08.  
105 The Arid Lands Environment Centre, section entitled Beyond Nuclear Initiative, 
http://www.alec.org.au/eng/projects/beyond_nuclear_initiative, site accessed 04/12/08.  
106 Jim Green, Maralinga: a Host of Indiscretions, Short-cuts and Cover Ups, 
http://www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/maralinga.html, 04/05/00, site accessed 12/12/08 
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the pits. Parkinson notes the cause of the explosion as unknown.107
   
 Green’s article 
comments on a possible answer: 
Avon Hudson, who worked at Taranaki during the Vixen B nuclear trials, has plausible 
explanations for the explosion. In late 1960, he saw a box of explosives dumped by a British 
soldier into a pit at Taranaki. Several months later, Hudson witnessed the burial of a 3000 
pound pressurised hydrogen gas cylinder.108
 
 
Hudson is the co-author of the text Beyond Belief which adopts a very clear 
stance against the conduct of the British atomic tests109
 
 It certainly seems plausible 
that the ISV procedure, which involves buried electrodes supplying strong current into 
the pit to produce tremendous heat, could cause such material to explode. If heated 
enough, any gas in cylinders can expand to the point where the tank explodes, no 
matter what the properties of that gas are.  Hydrogen, however, is also highly 
flammable. Explosives themselves can be detonated by a variety of means, depending 
on their type.  
 The article goes on to state: 
  
When Hudson first heard of the March 1999 explosion, he was concerned about the potential 
for further explosions and the possibility that someone would be hurt or killed should another 
explosion occur. He contacted the establishment media, who showed no interest, and he 
contacted the office of Senator Nick Minchin, the Minister for Industry, Science and 
Resources, but did not receive a return call.110
 
 
This is of interest as Parkinson was of the opinion that ISV technology was 
highly suited for the clean-up of the ‘burial pits’ at Maralinga and he regretted that 
other strategies were adopted instead.111
                                                 
107 Parkinson, Maralinga, pp. 146-156. 
 Like Parkinson’s book, however, Green’s 
article certainly makes a powerful case that, despite the claims of  the Australian 
Government, the clean-up of the Maralinga site was far from ‘world’s best practice’.  
108 Jim Green, Maralinga: a Host of Indiscretions, Short-cuts and Cover Ups 
http://www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/maralinga.html, 04/05/00, site accessed 12/12/08 
109 Cross and Hudson, Beyond Belief. 
110 Jim Green, Maralinga: a Host of Indiscretions, Short-cuts and Cover Ups, 
http://www.geocities.com/jimgreen3/maralinga.html, 04/05/00, site accessed 12/12/08 
111 Parkinson, Maralinga, pp.94-98 
  
 
219 
 The two main issues  relating to the tests covered by Green’s online archive 
are the Maralinga clean-up and whether the tests involved deliberate radiation 
experiments on servicemen. 
In 2001 a short article that suggests that atomic bombs were to be tested on 
military servicemen appeared in the British medical journal The Lancet . The article 
was titled ‘Australian Nuclear Test Veterans Produce Evidence for Compensation.’112 
It states that there was scheduled for October 1959 a series of tests to be code-named 
‘Operation Lighthouse’ and that these tests would involve further use of an ‘I-Force’. 
The article states that researcher Ann Munslow-Davies was given unnamed 
documents about the upcoming tests by an unnamed ‘senior veteran’. The first 
volume of the South Australian health study titled ‘Dosimetry’ refers to the work of 
Munslow-Davies.113 This, as discussed in Chapter Six, is one of the studies that did 
not make a clear link between possible exposure to ionising radiation from the tests to 
increase cancer incidence and cancer mortality. The article concludes with the line: 
‘Time may be running out for the veterans because many of the people involved in 
weapons tests in Australia have already died.’ There is no mention of the fact that the 
link between radiation from the tests and such deaths has yet to have been 
scientifically demonstrated, nor is there any real evidence that the experiments for 
‘Operation Lighthouse’ would be any different from those of ‘Operation Buffalo’ of 
1956, which was examined by the McClelland Royal Commission.114 In any case no 
trials of an atomic weapon took place in Australia after 1957, thus the ‘Lighthouse’ 
tests scheduled for 1959 did not take place.115
                                                 
112 Bebe Loff,  Stephen Cordner, ‘Australian Nuclear Test Veterans Produce Evidence for 
Compensation’, The Lancet, Vol 357, Issue 9270, June 2001, pp. 1775-1775 
 Content exploring a similar theme can 
be found in an article from Scotland’s The Sunday Herald, 20 May 2001, which 
included: 
113 Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia, Volume I, ‘Dosimetry’. 
114 Loff and Cordner, ‘Australian Nuclear Test Veterans Produce Evidence for Compensation.’ 
115 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Britain’s Nuclear Weapons, British Nuclear Testing, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 16/08/10. However, the Australian 
military evidently still required data on the likely effects of nuclear blasts. On 18 July 1963  a joint 
Australian, UK, US and Canadian experiment code named ‘Operation Blow down’ aimed to simulate 
the blast effects of a 10 kiloton airburst by detonating 50 tons of TNT at the surface at a remote site in 
Queensland known as Iron Range. No atomic device was present and there was no radiation risk during 
this experiment. Dummy soldiers were in range of the blast, with actual observers 3.2km away at an 
altitude higher by 198 meters.  Australian Screen, section titled ‘Operation Blowdown 1963, 
http://aso.gov.au/titles/sponsored-films/operation-blowdown/clip1/, site accessed 16/08/10. This 
experiment is also explored in ABC Television, Australian Story, Fortress Australia. See also National 
Archives of Australia: Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority; ‘Report on Operation Blowdown 
by witness for the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority’, A5628 /660, 1962-1965. 
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The revelation, which is bound to damage relations between Britain and Australia, was 
greeted with widespread shock and horror yesterday. "It shows a complete lack of morality," 
said Sheila Gray, the secretary of the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association. "It was 
inhuman to even consider it. It would have been diabolical."  
Relations between Britain and Australia have already been strained by the disclosure in the 
Sunday Herald last month that two dozen soldiers tested protective clothing by crawling, 
marching or driving through a fall-out zone three days after a nuclear test at Maralinga in 
1956. This contradicted repeated assurances by British ministers that servicemen had never 
been used as radiation guinea pigs.116
 
 
Again, these claims about ‘Operation Buffalo’ were examined during the 
McClelland Royal Commission and appear to have later been exaggerated, with a 
reliance on ‘unnamed documents’. The article reports that an unnamed member of the 
British Ministry of Defence stated that the operation would have been conducted in 
accord with the safety standards of the time and would be concerned with blast-effects, 
not irradiation. Articles such as these fail to consider the ranges at which ‘initial’ or 
‘prompt’ radiation is a factor, nor do they cite any firm evidence about exposure to 
fallout. As Ivor Surveyor stated of the research of Sue Roff, it is also inappropriate to 
present material covered by the McClelland Royal Commission, thus having been in 
the public domain since the mid 1980s, as newly uncovered. Also of concern is the 
vague nature of the references, citing unnamed ‘documents.’ It seems as though the 
possibility of the discovery of ‘secret documents’ makes for interesting reading 
though it is not possible to substantiate such claims.   
Though usually not considered a reliable source due to its user-contributor and 
user-editor format, it is of use to consider the Wikipedia entries on the tests due to the 
source’s extreme popularity and accessibility in the contemporary era. It is known to 
suffer at times from inaccurate or poorly sourced data. It can be, however, a valid 
resource in that it provides a brief overview on a given subject and present points of 
view and information for readers to evaluate and verify with other sources. It offers 
details of previous atomic tests in Australia, those at Emu Field and the Monte Bello 
islands. At present it incorrectly states that the Maralinga tests began in 1955, the 
actual year being 1956. The entry cites the claims of Roff that servicemen were 
                                                 
116 The Sunday Herald, 20/05/01, published online, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/is_/ai_n13958643, site accessed 12/12/08. 
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exposed to fallout. Also of interest is that the entry cites that cobalt metal pellets 
discovered after the Tadje 1 test later resulted in fears that Australia had been 
involved in the development of a ‘cobalt bomb’. As discussed in Chapters Two and 
Three concerns about Australian involvement in development of a ‘cobalt bomb’ 
actually go back to 1953.  
One individual who has published a significant amount of material on atomic 
matters in Australia is Tim Sherratt, a Research Fellow of the history program, 
ANU’s Research School of Social Sciences and author of a 2003 PhD thesis titled 
‘Atomic Wonderland: Science and progress in twentieth-century Australia.’117
 
 His 
website, titled Discontents features a section on the tests. Of note are two essays 
which explore the role of three Australian scientists in the testing programme. One 
essay was titled ‘Australian Scientists at the British Atomic Tests’ and it featured the 
following: 
the Australian government was keen to share in the political prestige of the A-bomb, and had 
insisted that press releases make particular note of Australian involvement. The three 
scientists so privileged were Ernest Titterton, Alan Butement and Leslie Martin - men whose 
reputations are now on trial.118
 
 
It would seem these scientists’ ‘reputations are on trial’ due to the many 
sources in the public domain which suggest the testing programme was risky and 
poorly conducted. The second essay is titled ‘a Political Inconvenience, Australian 
Scientists as [sic] the British Atomic Tests 1952-53.’119
                                                 
117 Timothy Paul Sherratt, ‘Atomic Wonderland: Science and Progress in Twentieth-century Australia ’, 
PhD, ANU, Canberra, 2003. 
 It offers considerable strategic 
assessment in the form of analysis of the reasons why Britain undertook its atomic 
deterrent programme, and the implications of this development. One such implication 
was the effect on relations between the US and the UK and the significance of the 
McMahon Act.  Sherratt examines the political implications of the presence of 
Australian scientists at the ‘Hurricane’ tests, suggesting the role of the role of 
Australian scientists at the tests was public and political rather than scientific. Their 
scientific skills were under utilised due to the presence of an existing highly 
118 Discontents, section entitled Australian Scientists at the British Atomic Tests, 
http://www.discontents.com.au/words/science_show.php, site accessed 20/12/08 
119 Discontents, section entitled a Political Inconvenience, 
http://www.discontents.com.au/words/political.php, site accessed 21/12/08. 
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specialised British team, ensuring: ‘Australian involvement was no necessity as far as 
the technical operations were concerned’120
And later that: ‘The most influential factor in the determination of British 
atomic policy was the hope of re-establishing co-operation with the United States.’ 
Sherratt suggests that due to the American distrust of Australian security, the presence 
of Australians at the tests was a threat to possible future co-operation, so it was in 
Britain’s interest to limit Australian participation. However, the tests were dependant 
on Australian ‘goodwill’ and that ‘the exploitation of Australia’s vast spaces would 
hardly have been palatable to Australian authorities without at least a pretence of 
collaboration, and so the British were forced to concede some scientific 
representation.’
 
121
It is certainly the case that The United States had expressed concern over 
security leaks in Australia.
 
122 Sherratt’s view that the British government needed to 
balance the acceptance of Australian scientists at the tests against the possibility of 
alienating the United States seems accurate. Had there been co-operation on atomic 
matters between the US and UK, the British testing programme would have not been 
deemed necessary.123
Sherratt’s Discontents website also features an essay that offers an analysis of 
atomic issues in Australia. The paper is titled ‘On the Beach-Australia’s Nuclear 
History’. The focus is not solely on the tests, with much commentary being presented 
on other issues such as the possible Australian use of atomic power. Towards the 
conclusion there is a section on testing. It mentions the ‘Black Mist’ associated with 
‘Totem 1’: 
 
…mysterious cloud that descended upon aboriginal communities to the north-east of the test 
site, causing vomiting, diarrhoea, skin rashes and sore eyes. The long-term health effects have 
never been determined.  
 
This acknowledges that the ‘mist’ is something of an unknown quantity. The 
paper also states: 
 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid.  
122 American concerns over security leaks in Australia, apparent after the ‘Venona Affair’ were 
explored in ABC Television, Australian Story, Fortress Australia. 
123 Paul, Nuclear Rivals. 
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But what of the interests of the Australian servicemen carelessly exposed to dangerous levels 
of radioactivity. Or of the aboriginal people, relocated, irradiated and ignored. Attempts to 
clean up the Maralinga range continue, but the stain can never be removed. Health and 
freedom were sacrificed for the protection of democracy, and in the name of progress.124
 
 
Again, that people were widely exposed to dangerous levels of radioactivity is 
contested.  Yet it is a tragic fact that Aboriginal people were certainly relocated and 
ignored.  
In 2005 another documentary film source commented on the atomic testing 
issue was released, titled Australian Atomic Confessions.125
The film is distributed by Video Education Australia and is aimed at late 
secondary aged students and tertiary students. Education resources such as this have 
the power to be tremendously influential; such a film may be a student’s first 
introduction to the atomic testing issue. It is not an unbiased account, taking a very 
clear anti-nuclear stance. It does not acknowledge that many of the issues raised in it 
are contested nor does it formally refer to health studies.   
 The film was produced by 
the NSW Film and Television Office. A central theme of the film is that the people 
indigenous to the testing areas stand to suffer twice from atomic issues; firstly from 
the tests and now from a proposed nuclear waste dump.  
 Australian Atomic Confessions refers to events at all three testing sites. Royal 
Australian Navy (RAN) serviceman and Order of Australia Medal recipient Max 
Kimber is interviewed. Kimber is the president of the Ex-Services Atomic Survivors 
Association and was present at Monte Bello during ‘Operation Hurricane’ in 1952 and 
later returned to the site in 1953. He states that during his 1953 service he walked 
around in shorts and tee shirt while scientists wore protective equipment. He also 
states that he suffered from cancerous growths in later years.  
 Aboriginal woman Marry Torres, who was at Jubilee Station, WA at the time 
of ‘Operation Hurricane,’ states that there was a ‘noticeable haze’ after the test. 
Torres also states that her husband died of cancer in 1962, that she herself was 
diagnosed with cancer in 1963 and that there were some 12 cancer-related deaths 
                                                 
124 Discontents, section entitled On the Beach: Australia’s Nuclear History, 
http://www.discontents.com.au/words/nuclear_history.php, site accessed 20/12/08. 
125 Video Education Australia, Australian Atomic Confessions, NSW Film and Television Office, 
NSW, 2005. 
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among Aboriginal people of her age group from Derby and Broome, WA, during this 
time period.  
 Another serviceman interviewed is Barry Neyle, formerly a navigator with the 
RAAF. He offers that following the ‘Hurricane’ test the aircraft he was aboard flew a 
triangular pattern for 12 hours, following which samples of radioactive particles were 
gathered from canisters mounted on the wingtips. Neyle states that during ‘Operation 
Hurricane’ servicemen were not informed that they should take measures such as 
more frequent showers. He also states they were not advised to not conceive children 
in the first 12 months after possible radiation exposure. Neyle also reports that the 
Monte Bello islands have never been cleaned and that only obvious debris has been 
removed. He identifies a contradiction; according to his claims the Government has 
stated that no harm resulted from the tests, even though there are warning signs at 
Monte Bello advising visitors to not stay longer than one hour, to not raise the dust 
and to not eat food there. In relation to later Monte Bello tests, the film reports the 
yield of the 19 June 1956 ‘Mosaic G2’ as 98kt, a clear example of how myths related 
to the tests are perpetuated.   
 Neyle later comments that following his activism he received a letter from 
then Prime Minister John Howard which restated the official position that the tests 
presented no hazard. Neyle comments that one need not be an ‘intellectual genius’ to 
realise that if cloud sampling aircrew had to hand over their clothes, navigational 
equipment and boots to be buried at the Woomera airfield and that four Lincoln 
aircraft were later cut up because they were too contaminated to be cleaned, then 
‘there must have been something wrong.’ 
 Neyle adds that the tests saw much of the country exposed to fallout, 
especially after the ‘Totem’ tests at Emu Field.  The narrator points out that there 
were Aboriginal people living in this area at the time. Following this is a discussion of 
the ‘Black Mist’ phenomena, featuring interviews with Karina Lester, daughter of 
Yami Lister, about the circumstances surrounding her father’s blindness.  
 Yami Lester himself is then shown discussing the Aboriginal creation story 
associated with that area, which relates to the Nyintjiri, the ‘black lace monitor lizard’ 
people. Lester states that Wallatinna was an important site to the local Aboriginal 
populace, until ‘15 October 1953,’ the date of the ‘Totem 1’ test. Lester’s account 
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suggests that the fallout from the tests drifted ‘60 or 70’ miles to Wallatinna. The 
‘official history’ by Lorna Arnold places this distance at 107 miles126
Symonds reports 173 km,
 while  
127
 An army serviceman, Allen Batchelor, who was a Lieutenant at the time and 
retired as a Major, claims within Australian Atomic Confessions
 which also equates to approximately this distance. Again, 
the contested nature of the causation of Yami Lester’s blindness is not discussed as 
the documentary aims to highlight the negative consequences of the tests. 
128
 Another comment about  severe fallout contamination in Australian Atomic 
Confessions is from Neyle, who states that severe ‘hotspots’ with a very great risk 
from inhalation and ingestion of radioactive particles occurred at Lismore and Dubbo 
in NSW and that this is cited in the ‘official government book’ A History of British 
Atomic Tests in Australia.
  that increased 
fallout from this test was the result of the cheaper plutonium employed. I have seen no 
evidence to support this. 
129 It is not stated with which test this fallout is connected. 
A fallout trajectory map is superimposed over Neyle as he speaks, this diagram is not 
found in Symonds’ book and I am unable to find the reference to this contamination,  
Neyle asserts that test participants ‘felt later that we were lambs on the altar of British 
science.’130
 Another serviceman interviewed was former army Lance Corporal John 
Hutton.  He details his experiences working in the Maralinga forward area. He states 
the hours were long and generally spent working in shorts and boots though in certain 
areas protective clothing was worn, and after entering such areas decontamination was 
required. He details what was referred to during the McClelland Royal Commission 
as the ‘Pom Pom’ incident.  He states that while in a decontamination caravan near 
the ‘Marcoo’ crater he sighted an Aboriginal man, carrying two or three spears, 
animal pelts and a ‘billy’ water can, walking in the ‘dirty’ area. Hutton states he later 
learned this man was Charlie Milpuddie who was present at the site with his wife Edie 
and two children. Hutton suggests that Charlie Milpuddie was attempting to collect 
water which had accumulated in the crater due to the ‘glazing’ of the sand due to the 
atomic blast, making the crater surface waterproof. The possibility that the 
 
                                                 
126 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship, p. 74. 
127 Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia, p. 191 
128 Video Education Australia, Australian Atomic Confessions. 
129  Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia. 
130 Video Education Australia, Australian Atomic Confessions. 
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Milpuddies were collecting water was not addressed in the McClelland Report.131 
Hutton discusses how this incident was kept secret to allow the testing programme to 
continue. He states that under the Official Secrets Act, breaches of this security could 
have resulted in 30 years jail or a firing squad.132
 Hutton refers to the minor trials, in particular the burning of plutonium and 
scattering it with TNT. He expresses considerable concern about beryllium dust from 
both major and minor trials and suggests the presence of beryllium in these 
experiments was kept secret. That beryllium is employed within an atomic bomb  has 
long been public domain knowledge, but its role within the ‘initiator’ of such devices 
has only become known to the public more recently, though it is difficult to ascertain 
as to when.  
  
 Australian Atomic Confessions comments on hospital records allegedly 
missing from the Maralinga hospital. Bachelor recounts his experiences as a then 
Lieutenant and second in charge of the engineers working on ‘Operation Antler.’ He 
states that 30 minutes after the ‘Tadje’ test (notorious for its inclusion of cobalt pellets, 
though the film does not mention this) engineers were required to measure residual 
radioactivity ‘50 yards’ from ground zero.  He suggests this was a means to ascertain 
whether the Tadje device was a suitable ‘primary’ for a radiation explosion bomb. 
How residual radioactivity is relevant to this is not discussed. He states there are no 
dosage records from the Maralinga hospital. 
 Hutton claims that he is the only person who has a hospital record from 
Maralinga, only accessed so they would ‘stop paying him’ (this is not really 
explained). He states he found his record in 1978 which he says is the same year other 
records went missing. He suggests that the missing records constitute information on 
‘12 or 15, 000 sick people.’ Hutton later comments that when seeing other veterans he 
is always shocked to hear of who has been lost due to cancer. He states ‘for God’s 
sake no one’s dropping dead of heart attacks. They’re all dying of cancer.’ 
 On the matter of missing or incomplete documentation, the McClelland Report 
recognised the difficulties of finding all official contemporary documentation after 40 
years, and that although the Royal Commissions Terms of Reference was ‘enormous’ 
and that every reasonable effort had been made to find relevant documents ‘it is 
                                                 
131 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I. pp. 319-322. 
132 Video Education Australia, Australian Atomic Confessions. 
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inevitable that some documents will never be found and others will continue to come 
to light.’ The Royal Commission nevertheless found ‘…no reason to believe that there 
are documents of major significance or which could significantly alter any of its 
findings which have not yet been discovered.’133
Australian Atomic Confessions 
 
134 produced in 2005 suggests that atomic 
veterans are waiting for a mortality study to be realised so that veterans’ entitlements 
can be realised. This, as discussed in Chapter Six, occurred in 2006.135 The definition 
of their service as ‘hazardous, non-warlike’ has however not yet been realised. The 
position of the veterans, as outlined in the documentary, is perhaps best surmised in 
Neyle’s quotation of ‘we didn’t betray our country, sadly, our country betrayed us.’136
Kevin Buzzacott, Arrabunna elder and International Nuclear Free Future 
award recipient, suggests that ‘nobody can touch a country and destroy a country and 
walk away and get away from it.’ Former Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and current 
South Australian Premier Mike Rann is shown discussing the tests, in particular how 
some things that were acceptable in the 1950s and 1960s are not acceptable now and 
that what is acceptable now may not be acceptable in the future. He speaks of 
dispersed radioactive materials at test sites and his doubts about the success of clean-
up operations. Rann also discusses his personal interest in seeing Australian nuclear 
veterans receive compensation. 
 
 The documentary discusses the emerging issue of a proposed nuclear waste 
dump in South Australia. One figure who discusses this, as linked to the tests, is 
David Noonan from the Australian Conservation Foundation. He states in reference to 
the tests: ‘Australia is the only society, we understand, to have ever provided its own 
uranium to an overseas nuclear weapons state to make into weapons to then bomb 
back on their own land.’ 
This bears great similarity to the commentary of John Pilger from the 1985 
film A Secret Country,137
                                                 
133 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I. p. 8. 
 again showing how contested beliefs are perpetuated.  
Noonan’s comment, though similar, is less extreme than that of Pilger. Within 
Australian Atomic Confessions, Noonan demonstrates a clear anti-nuclear stance. He 
suggests that the medical isotopes produced at the Lucas Heights research reactor 
134 Video Education Australia, Australian Atomic Confessions. 
135 Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia. 
136 Video Education Australia, Australian Atomic Confessions. 
137 Ronin Films, A Secret Country, the First Australians Fight Back. 
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could instead be imported or produced in cyclotrons, thus negating the need for the 
reactor and the need for a waste dump. He also highlights the close historical ties 
between civil and military nuclear programmes.   
Karina Lester also vocalises her opposition to the proposed waste dump, as 
does Rebecca Bear-Wingfield an academic and Kokatha people spokesperson from 
Adelaide. Bear-Wingfield also reports that her mother was exposed to radiation 
during the atomic tests, and that she has suffered from birth defects in the form of an 
additional ovary and the inability to bear children. As a whole, the film is a useful 
source for creating awareness of the perceived injuries that have resulted from the 
atomic testing programme and other Australian nuclear issues. As to be expected from 
a film constructed from an anti-nuclear viewpoint, it largely fails to acknowledge that 
many of the issues referenced are contested. The film is intended for use in teaching. 
Teachers making use of it should approach it with awareness of its political contend 
and nature to ensure that their students realise that many of the issues discussed within 
it are contested. It is clear from the film, however, that various injuries have indeed 
resulted from the tests. The suggestion that governments have continued to promote a 
stance that the tests did not result in harm is not reflected in the findings of the 
McClelland Royal Commission. As previously noted this film was released one year 
before the South Australian health study in 2006 which led to Australian nuclear 
veterans and other potentially affected parties receiving compensation for the 
treatment of all forms of cancer.138
An emerging issue concerning British atomic testing has been the impact of an 
England and Wales High Court decision, before Mr. Justice Foskett, the final hearing 
of which occurred on 6 February 2009. The case, between ‘A.B. & Others –and- 
Ministry of Defence’ pertained to rights for compensation for British nuclear veterans. 
An influential health study to the case was conducted at New Zealand’s Massey 
University.
 The definition of the service of such veterans as 
‘hazardous, non-warlike’ has not yet been realised and this remains a key issue, as 
does the possibility of a South Australian nuclear waste dump.  
139
                                                 
138Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia. 
 Though this study did not pertain to the tests in Australia, the attention 
it received prompted action from Australian nuclear veterans. A news story broadcast 
139 M.A. Wahab et al, Elevated Chromosome Translocation Frequencies in New Zealand Nuclear Test 
Veterans.’ 
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on the ABC programme The National Interest on Radio National on 12 June 2009140 
offered comment on this. In introducing the issue, the presenter Peter Mares echoed 
Australian Screen archivist Damien Parer’s claim that attention to this issue could 
largely be attributed to the 1981 Documentary Backs to the Blast.141 Mares 
paraphrased Parer’s comments in saying ‘The film prompted a House of Lords 
enquiry in Britain and a Royal Commission in Australia.’142
Mares stated that 28 years after Backs to the Blast, Australian nuclear veterans 
are still awaiting fair compensation and acknowledgement of the risks to which they 
were exposed. The radio story was thus also titled Backs to the Blast.  Mares states 
that the recent English High Court decision has given these veterans new hope of a 
resolution to their case. Former Democrats leader Lyn Alison was interviewed, as was 
‘Operation Hurricane’ veteran Lewis Rice. Alison stated that the court decision paves 
the way for a class action by veterans. One consequence of the decision, Alison 
outlines, is the removal of the statute of limitations which had stipulated that claims 
must be lodged within three years of initial discovery of injury. This is, according to 
Alison, a consequence of the Massey University study, which she dates at 1997. 
Alison also comments on other health studies being ignored even though they showed 
elevated rates of cancer. As discussed in Chapter Six, it is open to debate as to 
whether these increases were due to test participation.  
 This is a clear example of 
how references to the tests are echoed by later commentators and of how myths, 
legacies and legends are established as the notion of the film being a catalyst for 
formal enquiry cannot be established.  
 Rice outlined his participation in ‘Operation Hurricane,’ and recounted later 
stomach cancer and skin cancers and he acknowledged that it is difficult to link these 
to test participation. Rice explained that Australian veterans are pursuing recognition 
of their service at the tests as ‘hazardous, non -warlike’ which would allow the 
allocation of DVA health Gold Cards, which at present have to be awarded on an 
individual basis.  He refers to the Department of Veteran Affairs’ Review of 
Veterans’ Entitlements, known as the Clarke Review after its principal author, retired 
NSW Supreme Court Judge John Clarke, QC. This report outlines the nature of 
                                                 
140 ABC Radio National, ‘Backs to the Blast’. The National Interest, broadcast 12 June 2009, 
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/nationalinterest/stories/2009/2596786.htm, site accessed 16 June 2009. 
141 Australian Screen, section entitled Backs to the Blast, an Australian Nuclear Story, (1981), 
http://australianscreen.com.au/titles/backs-blast/, site accessed 29/05/09. 
142 ABC Radio National, ‘Backs to the Blast’. The National Interest, broadcast 12 June 2009, 
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/nationalinterest/stories/2009/2596786.htm, site accessed 16 June 09. 
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various types of hazardous but non-warlike service. Volume II, Chapter 16 of the 
report pertains to the atomic tests.143
 During the programme, the then Minister for Veterans Affairs, Alan Griffin, 
called Radio National to discuss these issues, especially the review of the Clarke 
report’s recommendations by the current government. Minister Griffin pointed out 
that only one recommendation of the Clarke Review pertains to atomic test veterans 
out of 109. Indeed, of the 907 pages of this report, the section pertaining to the tests 
constitutes 28 pages.
 
144 Mares states that veterans only intend to give DVA to the end 
of June 2009 to address this issue in some fashion before they launch a class action of 
their own.145
Alison then stated that Justice Foskett addressed whether the experiences of 
veterans at the Pacific Tests differed from the experiences of Veterans in Australia. 
Alison suggested Foskett found these experiences to not differ significantly. This is 
open to debate.   
 Griffin stated that action will occur, but not under a time constraint set 
by veterans as a result of a court case that occurred in another country. Griffin 
commented on how the levels of risks faced by veterans is heavily contested. He 
referred to an unnamed study under the previous Government which found that levels 
of radiation exposure among veterans were similar to those experienced during 
medical procedures such as CAT scans. Griffin did not deny there is a possibility of 
risk associated with the atomic tests but contested that there is ‘an argument about it’ 
and that studies have been inconclusive. Mares then pointed out that one study, that 
conducted at Massey University, did have a more firm conclusion in terms of 
outlining risk. Griffin then correctly pointed out that this study pertained to the tests in 
the Pacific, not in Australia, where the weapons concerned were of a far higher yield.  
 The ABC has also reported that South Australian Premier Mike Rann had also 
expressed his support for potential compensation claims that may be made by 
Australian nuclear veterans.146
                                                 
143 John Clarke, QC, Report of the Review of Veterans’ Entitlements, Department of Veterans’ Clarke 
Report), 
 This issue is complicated, and it is relevant to refer to 
http://www.dva.gov.au/pensions/clarke/report.htm, site accessed 17/06/09.Affairs, Canberra, 
2003. DVA, section entitled Report of the Review of Veterans’ Entitlements (Clarke Report), 
http://www.dva.gov.au/pensions/clarke/report.htm, site accessed 17/06/09. pp. 371-399. 
144  Ibid. 
145 This is in progress, as reported by the ABC News, broadcast on 6 July 2009, Atomic Test Veterans 
Launch Class Action, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/07/06/2618078.htm, site accessed 
05/11/09. 
146 ABC News, broadcast on 8 June 2009, Rann Backs Maralinga Compo Push 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/06/08/2591802.htm site accessed 10/06/09.  
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the Massey University study, though it does not pertain to the Australian tests, and the 
court brief pertaining to Justice Foskett’s High Court case. Lyn Alision dated the 
Massey University study at 1997, the court brief states that the relevant study was 
‘accepted for publication in Cytogenetic and Genome Research in 2007.147 The Study 
was published in 2008.148 The court brief explores testing operations inclusive of 
those in Australia.149 It is clear that the Massey study was a tremendous influence on 
the court’s decision on veterans of all British tests, although this study pertained to 
‘Operation Grapple’ only. This distinction is all the more difficult to make by the fact 
that the ‘Lead Cases’ considered by the High Court involve some individuals involved 
in both the ‘Grapple’ and the Australian tests.150
Time will tell how this case, subsequent cases and subsequent studies will 
impact those concerned with British atomic testing in Australia. At present, the DVA 
includes on their website the statement: ‘The Government has made a commitment to 
further consider the recommendations of the Clarke Review that were not acted upon 
by the Howard Government.’
  
151
It will be interesting to see how the DVA eventually deals with the 
recommendations for veterans’ entitlements. The implications of the British Queen’s 
Bench court decision under Mr. Justice Foskett have yet to be fully realised.  The 
ABC reported on 6 July 2009 that the class action by Australian nuclear veterans 
against the Australian government has commenced. The action involves ANVA 
president Ric Johnstone.
 
152
                                                 
147 British and Irish Legal Information Institute, section entitled England and Wales High Court 
(Queen’s Bench Decisions), AB & Others –and- Ministry of Defence, February 2009, 
 On 15 October, 2009, the 56th anniversary of the ‘Totem 
1’ test at Emu Field which has been linked to the alleged ‘Black Mist,’ The Coober 
Pedy Regional Times reported that the website of the ANVA has been mysteriously 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2009/1225.html, site accessed 17/06/09. 
Paragraph 407, p 87. 
148 Wahab et al, ‘Elevated Chromosome Translocation Frequencies in New Zealand Nuclear Test 
Veterans.’ 
149British and Irish Legal Information Institute, section entitled England and Wales High Court 
(Queen’s Bench Decisions), AB & Others –and- Ministry of Defence, February 2009, 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2009/1225.html, site accessed 17/06/09., Paragraphs 586-
602, pp. 129-132. 
150 Ibid, Paragraph 626-866, pp.136-173. 
151 Department of Veterans Affairs, section entitled Reconsideration of the Recommendations of the 
Clarke Review that Have Not Been Acted 
Uponhttp://www.dva.gov.au/pensions_and_compensation/pensions_and_rates/clarke_review/Pages/ind
ex.aspx , site accessed 04/11/09. 
152 ABC News, broadcast on 6 July 2009, Atomic Test Veterans Launch Class Action, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/07/06/2618078.htm, site accessed 05/11/09. 
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shut down.  The Coober Pedy Regional Times  reports that the site had been hosted by 
Telstra, at http://www.users.bigpond.net.au/anva/,  and quotes Ric Johnstone  in 
stating ‘Now Telstra tell us that we can no longer have our free space and have 
offered no explanation.’153  It is not possible to make firm comment on why the site is 
no longer available through Telstra. Shortly afterwards, however, on 28 November 
2009, the site was re-hosted by ‘sandersonsite’.154
Throughout this chapter, there are examples of claims being presented as 
historical truth. For example, that the documentary Backs to the Blast
 With this class action in place, and 
with further information certainly be emerge, the tests remain a contentious issue. 
155
 Consequently, there are various false beliefs about the tests which still have 
currency, including the notion that Australia was an ‘innocent victim’ of the tests; 
 prompted a 
House of Lords of Enquiry in the UK and the McClelland Royal Commission in 
Australia. Other claims discussed include that atomic-bomb laden planes were 
deliberately crashed, that atomic bombs were burned, that those engaged in typical 
military duties in the Maralinga village were used as part of a broad-scale study into 
the effects of radiation, that large tracts of desert were to be vitrified, that cancer 
incidence and mortality was definitely increased in Australia due to atomic tests and 
even that the tests were an act of genocide. The presentation of unsubstantiated claims 
as ‘history’ has occurred unintentionally in the case of poorly handled facts, 
intentionally to serve an agenda either against or for the tests and how they were 
conducted, or merely where the real truth has been lost.  Due to the poor handling of 
facts a great many contested issues concerning the testing programme have been 
(perhaps unknowingly) presented and re-presented in the public domain as the 
uncontested truth, despite what is on the public record to the contrary. A possible 
reason for this is that with there being verified consequences of harm from the tests, 
other claims seem likewise as plausible, and thus myths are perpetuated.  One 
problem with this situation is that those seeking acknowledgement or compensation 
for the wrong doings of the testing programme have left themselves open to easy 
counter-argument. Another consequence is that those who conducted the testing 
programme may have been had their actions misinterpreted and misrepresented. 
                                                 
153 The Coober Pedy Regional Times, 
http://cooberpedyregionaltimes.wordpress.com/2009/10/15/nuclear-veterans-disappointed-as-their-
website-is-closed-down/, site accessed 25//11/09. 
154 Ibid, site accessed 03/12/09.  
155 Composite Films, Backs to the Blast. 
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there is much evidence to suggest that Australia had its own agenda concerning 
nuclear weapons. Whether military servicemen and associated civil contractors widely 
suffered from increased incidence of ailments such as cancer is a belief that remains 
contested.  There appears consensus that Aboriginal people were displaced by the 
tests, that individual examples of contamination did occur and much land was also 
polluted. However one belief that can now be rejected is the Menzies-era doctrine 
which suggests the tests were utterly harmless. The next chapter will explore how the 
very same issues have been presented, or at times misrepresented, within fictional, 
pop-cultural and artistic sources
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Chapter Eight: The tests in fictional, pop-cultural and artistic sources. 
 
This chapter reviews some fictional, artistic and pop-cultural sources which 
refer to atomic testing issues and related Australian security concerns. Such forms of 
expression are influential in shaping public understanding of social issues. Australia’s 
reliance on ‘great and powerful friends’ and the ‘invasion anxiety’ of the nation’s 
populace has long been a theme in popular sources and fiction. There are the 
‘invasion novels’ of the late 19th and early 20th centuries1 and much more recent 
narratives such as the series of books by former school teacher John Marsden 
beginning with Tomorrow, When the War Began of 19932  and also sources which 
closely mirror historical events such as  the  2006 film Kokoda directed by Alister 
Grierson.3
Chapters  Two and Three have noted that Australian  parliamentary debate and 
print media at the time of the atomic tests demonstrate some level of fear that 
Australia would be the testing site for a ‘cobalt bomb’, widely believed to be a 
doomsday device. Australian author Nevil Shute referred to these devices in his novel 
On the Beach
 
4
The narrative details how nuclear fallout, from ‘cobalt bombs’ employed in a 
full-scale global war, is causing the end of all life on planet earth. Due to its southern 
location, Australia is the last nation still habitable. The Co-60 particles from the 
bombs continue to drift southwards and the story explores humankind confronting the 
inevitability of its demise. The nations that have been Australia’s ‘powerful friends’ 
exist only in the form of a few American navel vessels and some British and 
American servicemen. This highlights that such nation states are mere political 
 which was first published in 1957, the year a test in Australia occurred 
involving cobalt pellets, the year of the last test in Australia and the year during which 
Britain’s hydrogen bomb testing programme, ‘Operation Grapple’ began in Christmas 
Island. The publishing company, Heinemann, was based in London. This was a 
popular book which is very often associated with the issue of humankind’s possible 
eradication resulting from nuclear weapons. 
                                                 
1Such sources are discussed by David Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-
1939, UQP, St Lucia, 1999, pp. 98-112. 
2 John Marsden, Tomorrow, When the War Began, Pan MacMillan, Chippendale, NSW, 1993. 
3 Palace Films, Kokoda, directed by Alister Grierson, 2006. 
4  Nevil Shute, On the Beach, Heinemann, London, 1957. Also MGM, On the Beach, directed by 
Stanley Kramer, 1959 and Platinum Disc, On the Beach, directed by Russel Mulcahy, 2000. 
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constructs. The message is that the life of all humans is of more importance than the 
ideological struggles between world powers. The book alludes to the fact that the war 
responsible for the contamination involved the bombing of the US and the UK by 
Egypt, following a conflict between Egypt and Albania. Due to the fact that the 
aircraft used were sourced from the USSR, the USSR was the target of the West’s 
strategic response. The inclusion of Egypt in this picture may be a reference to the 
Suez crisis of 1956. The narrative also refers to an additional conflict between the 
USSR and China.  
The book is relevant to the atomic testing issue not only in that it references 
the ‘cobalt bomb.’ The author’s obvious concerns about humanity and the reality of 
conflict in a post-thermonuclear world are echoed within the parliamentary debates of 
1952-57 discussed in Chapter Two, primarily from statements made by members of 
the ALP.  The book explores how halting nuclear proliferation and preventing the use 
of such weapons is a global concern and it also attributes a central role to Australia. 
On the Beach was released as a film in 1959, staring Fred Astaire, Gregory 
Peck and Eva Gardner. The film employs the iconic Australian folk song ‘Waltzing 
Matilda’ as its theme. On the Beach was released simultaneously in major cities 
across the world, including Moscow.5 A later version was released as a film for 
television in 2000, though the narrative did differ somewhat and it made no reference 
to the ‘cobalt bomb’ which, by this time, was known to be unviable or feasible as a 
weapon.6 Another famous reference to such a device, though the narrative refers to 
the fictional ‘cobalt thorium-g’ bomb, was in the 1964 Stanley Kubrick film Dr. 
Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.7 This film was 
partially inspired by the 1958 Peter Bryant novel Red Alert.8  The title character of 
this film, Dr Strangelove, is rumoured to be modeled on Herman Kahn, author of On 
Thermonuclear War and Thinking About the Unthinkable,9
                                                 
5 MGM, On the Beach. 
  formerly of the RAND 
6 Platinum Disc, On the Beach 
7 Columbia Pictures, Dr Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, directed 
by Stanley Kubrick, 1964. 
8 Peter Bryant, Red Alert, ACE Books, New York, 1958. 
9 Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1961 and Thinking 
About the Unthinkable, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1962. 
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(Research and Development) Institute.10 Indeed, during the film there is a reference 
that Strangelove represents the BLAND Institute.11  This would not be the last 
Columbia Pictures film to include a character that appears to be based on Kahn. Later 
in 1964 the film Fail-Safe directed by Sidney Lumet was released. The film was 
similar in content yet without the satirical element.12  The film was based on a 1962 
novel of the same title by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler.13 One character, 
Professor Groeteschele (played in the film by Walter Matthau), was a political 
scientist employed to give strategic advice to the US Military, who during the film are 
seen facing a crisis involving the accidental deployment of strategic bombers armed 
with thermonuclear weapons targeted against Moscow. The (fictional) ‘Vindicator’ 
bombers depicted in the film carry ‘Bloodhound’ nuclear air-defence missiles.14 Other 
fictional works have depictedAustralia after a nuclear apocalypse. Australia after a 
nuclear war features as the setting for the 1981 film Mad Max II and its 1985 sequel.15
Music has always been a significant element of the public representation of 
social issues. An example related to atomic testing is the song Maralinga (Rainy Land) 
by Paul Kelly, which appeared as track 18 on the Album Gossip released in 1986
 
16 
and it is likely the song was a response to the issues raised in during the Royal 
Commission. The lyrics repeatedly refer to Maralinga as ‘a rainy land’ but also states 
in its first verse that there is ‘no thunder in our sky’ which is interesting considering 
that the name ‘Maralinga’ means ‘thunder’. It refers to the blindness of Yami Lester, 
and the rain associated with the ‘Black Mist’ which, as discussed previously, is 
allegedly connected with Emu Field and not Maralinga.  Other verses refer to the 
tragic incident which occurred at Maralinga at the site of the Marcoo detonation. This 
was the contamination of the family found camping in the Marcoo crater in 1957.17
                                                 
10 The RAND institutes motto is ‘Objective Analysis, Effective Solutions’, the organisation describes 
itself as ‘a non-profit organisation that addresses the challenges facing the public and private sectors 
around the world,’ The RAND Corporation,  
 
http://www.rand.org/, site accessed 10/17/09. 
11 Columbia Pictures, Dr Strangelove or How Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. 
12 Columbia Pictures, Fail- Safe, directed by Sidney Lumet, 1964. 
13 Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler, Fail-Safe, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1962.  
14 Columbia Pictures, Fail- Safe, directed by Sidney Lumet, 1964. The Nuclear Weapon Archive, 
British Nuclear Testing: Operation Antler,  The ‘Indigo Hammer’ device which was intended to form 
the warhead for this ‘Bloodhound III’ nuclear air-defence missile (actually developed to be launched 
from the surface) was tested in Australia during ‘Operation Antler’ at Maralinga on 25 September 1957 
in the test ‘Biak.’  http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html , site accessed 20/03/09 
15 Warner Brothers, Mad Max II, directed by George Miller, 1981.  
Warner Brothers, Mad Max III, directed by George Miller and George Ogilvie, 1985. 
16 Festival Mushroom, Paul Kelly, Gossip, 1987. 
17 Cross and Hudson, Beyond Belief, pp. 74-75. 
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The lyrics include the chorus: This is a rainy land, this is a rainy land, no thunder in 
our sky no trees stretching high but this is a rainy land’18
Paul Kelly has been a songwriter and performer of great influence in Australia 
and this song represents a clear example of how the issue of atomic testing has been 
reflected in popular culture, as it presents elements of the tragic discourse of 
Australia’s atomic testing experience. Folk songs such as this are an important means 
of presenting an issue to a wide audience. They are a significant element of ‘myth 
making’, where ‘myth’ is not used in the sense of an untruth but rather an element of 
cultural significance forming part of the identity of a group or nation. 
 
 A similar influence has been Midnight Oil.  Of relevance is their song 
Maralinga, with its chorus of: ‘In the wind, the ashes fly, the poison crown, the 
charcoal ground’.19  Australian rock band The Drones released a song titled Jezebel 
on their 2006 album Gala Mill. The song details the issue of Sr-90 from fallout 
allegedly contaminating Australian milking cows during the atomic tests. 20
The issue of British atomic testing in Australia formed the theme of a 2009 
episode of the Channel 9 fictional drama series Sea Patrol (season three, episode 
seven). The episode was titled Half Life. Within the narrative, naval servicemen of the 
HMAS Hammersley (fictional) are called to assist the survivors of a helicopter crash 
on ‘Victory Day Island’ which was a (fictional) British test site in the 1950s. It is 
stated in the programme that the island was the site of a test of a 50kt fission bomb. 
The fictional island could perhaps be equated to the actual Monte Bello test sites of 
operations ‘Hurricane’ and ‘Mosaic’ in 1952 and 1956. 
 
In the episode there are references to lingering radioactive contamination. 
Crew members from the Hammersley are informed they should stay on the Island no 
longer than two hours. There are references made to the possible effect of radiation 
exposure to their fertility. One crew member jokes that the island may be home to 
‘two headed rabbits and three legged wombats.’ It emerges that the crew of the 
crashed helicopter were seeking to document evidence of a conspiracy associated with 
the weapons test; that a B-25 aircraft that had been officially reported as being lost at 
sea in the 1950s had actually crashed on the island and that the aircrew were exposed 
to the test.  
                                                 
18 Festival Mushroom, Paul Kelly, Gossip, 1987. 
19 Columbia Records, Midnight Oil, 10, 9, 8.7,6,5,4,3,2,1, 1982. 
20 Shock Records, The Drones, Galla Mill, 2006. 
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Crew of the Hammersley find the charred outline of a human form on an old 
concrete blast shelter. Later, the B-25 is discovered, containing the remains of one of 
the aircrew. The graves of other aircrew are also discovered on the island.21
Other fictional, artistic and pop-cultural sources comment directly on issues 
raised during the McClelland Royal Commission. A prominent example is the film 
Ground Zero, of 1987, directed by Bruce Myles and Michael Pattinson and written by 
Mac Gudgeon and Jan Sardi. 
 This is 
significant as it is an example from a pop-culture source which shows mistrust of the 
Australian government of the Menzies era, that such a cover-up would be made. 
22
Denton’s first hint of the sinister events to come is a mysterious answering 
machine message, in which a voice which sounds electronically altered tells him to 
watch the news that night. The news story pertains to a break-in into a building where 
documents relevant to the McClelland Royal Commission are being held. Shortly 
after, Denton surprises two men in the process of robbing his own home. All that is 
taken during the break-in is some of his father’s old films. He later learns that his 
sister suffered a similar home break-in. Further enquiries allow Denton to learn that 
another item was scrubbed from the ‘running sheet’ of the news broadcast. Denton 
learns that the missing news item was a story about an aircraft being unearthed and 
that the tape of the story was confiscated from the television station by ASIO. This 
was achieved by a ‘D-Notice’, by which the government can request that news 
content be edited on the grounds that it may present a risk to national security.
 It is a significant film in the discourse of Australia’s 
atomic testing experience. It depicts much of the debate concerning the atomic tests 
and for this reason substantial analysis of its content is presented in the following 
pages. The movie centres on the theme that the Australian public were not informed 
about sinister aspects of the tests. It draws from factual elements of Australia’s testing 
experience but is mostly fiction. It is set as the McClelland Royal Commission was 
drawing to a close. Colin Friels plays the main protagonist, Harvey Denton. Denton is 
a cameraman, as was his late father Carl Denton (Peter Sardi), who worked with the 
Australian Army for the British during the tests. 
23
To get some answers, Denton makes an enquiry at the offices of ASIO. 
  
                                                 
21 Channel 9, ‘Half Life’, Sea Patrol, broadcast 29 June 2009.  
22Avenue Pictures, Ground Zero. 
23 Australian Press Council, Section Entitled The D-Notice 
System ’http://www.presscouncil.org.au/pcsite/apcnews/may00/dnote.html, site accessed 19/05/09. 
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Jack Thompson plays ASIO officer Trebilcock, who has the stolen film, which turns 
out to be incomplete, on his desk and warns Denton to forget all about the issue. 
Trebilcock informs Denton that his father was murdered and that his body was found 
aboard a Canberra jet bomber aircraft that was buried amid other debris. Ground Zero 
in fact opens at a floodlight scene in the desert at night, as the bomber is exhumed and 
examined by men in protective suits holding Geiger counters. 
  
Exhumed Canberra aircraft, Avenue Pictures, Ground Zero. 
 
Denton is informed by Trebilcock that this aircraft flew through the atomic 
cloud after a 1953 test and was so radioactive it had to be buried in 1954. It was later 
exhumed for the McClelland Royal Commission, hence the discovery of Denton’s 
father’s body. Trebilcock states that the film in their possession indicates nothing of 
the reason for the murder. Denton visits a hearing of the McClelland Royal 
Commission, in which eye witness testimony suggests that servicemen found the 
bodies of Aboriginal people killed by the tests. The witness states that a British officer 
advised that they forget all about the rumours they had heard. The witness said the 
officer ‘spoke to us like they all spoke to us…like a little pommy turd speaking to the 
colonials…telling us what we had to do, or else.’ The witness also reports that the 
threat here pertained to punishment for any breach of the Official Secrets Act; 
potential jail time or even execution. The same hearing contains the testimony of 
Aboriginals speaking of the ‘Black Mist’ and resulting sickness and death.  
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 Denton goes to the film laboratory where his father first developed his films, 
enabling him to get an inventory of the footage. This leads him to an army film library; 
the location of an incomplete copy of the film which was stolen. Denton sneaks into 
the archive and accesses a computer terminal to find that the relevant films are now 
declassified and on loan to the McClelland Royal Commission, except for one which 
was related to the ‘Totem 2’ test of 27 October 1953. The incomplete film shows the 
X200 village after a ‘rapid departure’ as discussed in Chapter Five, raised in Tame 
and Robotham’s Maralinga 24and rebutted in Symonds' A History of British Atomic 
Tests in Australia25and by the McClelland Royal Commission as documented in the 
McClelland Report26
 Ground Zero then returns to another scene of the McClelland Royal 
Commission in which a meteorologist (Bob Hornery) is admitting that he was advised 
during the tests to lie about an atomic cloud being a rain cloud. He also suggests that 
there was an unexpected wind change which leads such a cloud to drift through 
settlements. Denton speaks to Aboriginal lawyer, Walamari (Bob Maza), describing 
the film he had seen. Walamari advises Denton that the film was of X200, a top secret 
‘village’ destroyed by the British after the bomb tests. As documented in Symonds’ 
book this was not the case. It was later reused.
 which is explored in Chapter Six.  The film shows the inside of 
a Nissen hut in which there are  playing cards left on tables, half smoked cigarettes in 
ashtrays and even a vinyl record left still spinning on a turntable. The inference is that 
servicemen fled the village due or perhaps even suddenly died in it to the unexpected 
drift of a fallout-laden atomic cloud. The footage cuts to an end with a point-of-view 
shot of the cameraman just about to open the door to another Nissen hut.  
27
As the action unfolds it soon becomes clear that agents of British intelligence 
are all too prepared to kill again to preserve the secret of their government’s past 
misconduct. After an attempt on his life, Denton hides out in a hotel room. A news 
broadcast related to the McClelland Royal Commission is airing on the hotel 
television. Within it the voice of test veteran is heard speaking of a cancer rate among 
veterans ‘four times greater than the civilian population.’ This is fiction. The news 
reader announces that they are to speak with a man who claims he has evidence 
 
                                                 
24 Tame & Robotham, Maralinga, p.163-165. 
25 Symonds, A history of British Atomic Tests in Australia, pp. 219- 220. 
26 Commonwealth of Australia, the Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I, pp. 224-226. 
27. Symonds, A history of British Atomic Tests in Australia, pp. 219- 220. 
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against the British. When he speaks, Denton recognises the voice as the man who left 
the mysterious message on his answering machine. The man is test veteran Prosper 
Gaffney (Donald Pleasence), and Denton travels to the desert to speak with him to get 
some answers. Gaffney speaks about the tests, explaining how a ‘mushroom cloud’ 
cost his Aboriginal companion, Charlie (Burnham Burnham), his eyesight and the 
lives of many friends. Gaffney also explains how similar contamination caused his 
own throat cancer, and that his work at the time was selecting the testing sites. 
Gaffney deeply regrets his involvement and bitterly states ‘we were having the time 
of our lives, splitting the mighty atom for Queen and country’ and ‘the day of 
retribution is upon us and we shall burn, burn in hell, for eternity.’  
Denton and Gaffney recover a copy of a film which had been hidden in a cave 
in the desert by Denton’s father. Denton holds the film aloft in triumph just as the 
British become more and more desperate to preserve their secrets by making attempts 
on both Gaffney and Denton’s lives with an automatic-weapon toting helicopter. After 
surviving the chase, the two find an American military base, prompting Gaffney to 
state ‘nothing changes…only the accents and the bloody uniforms.’  
Throughout the film there are various other allusions to Australia’s complex 
relations with powerful allies. These include snippets of news footage of Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke and American President Ronald Reagan discussing the ANZUS 
arrangement and the US Pine Gap military installation. Gaffney and Denton flee from 
an identification check by the American military, prompting another deadly chase, in 
which Gaffney sacrifices his life to allow Denton’s escape. Before this, Gaffney tells 
Denton that it was not his voice on the answering machine. The viewer is left to 
wonder about the truth of this. 
 Denton rushes the film to a hearing of the McClelland Royal Commission. It 
is found to apparently be ‘fogged’ blank, having apparently been erased due to 
exposure to Co- 60, which may be an allusion to the ‘cobalt bomb.’ Denton doubts 
this, thinking the film has been swapped. He is advised to have himself examined by a 
doctor due to handling the film. 
 Denton eventually finds the lost footage at the end of one of his father’s home 
movies, one which was in transit through the postal system at the time of the break-ins. 
Denton was in the process of transferring his father’s home movies onto video tape 
for his sister, who had found another film and sent it by mail. The footage starts where 
the incomplete film ended; it shows that the Nissen hut is full of the bodies of 
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Aboriginals killed by the tests. This conspiracy has in actuality been rejected by the 
McClelland Royal Commission.28
 The final credits begin with a list of Australian veterans who have died of 
cancer ‘at Maralinga’ (Monte Bello and Emu Field not mentioned). Also included is 
the statement: 
 
 
There are no “Death or Injury” statistics available for the Aboriginal Population. At the time 
of the tests the Aboriginals were included in the wildlife census along with the emus and 
kangaroos. Estimates have placed the Aboriginal dead at thousands. The genetic effects of this 
‘Legacy’ are still to be felt amongst families of future generations. The tribal lands at 
Maralinga are still too radioactive to permit inhabitation for another 25,000 years. 
 
It is difficult to ascertain whose estimates these are. I have seen no other 
reportage which suggests there were thousands of deaths from the tests. The claims 
about the contamination are consistent with other sources, though this predates the 
MARTAC clean-up.29  As for the figure of  ‘25,000 years’  other reports such as that 
from GreenNet have  referred to contamination at Maralinga lasting  250,000 years,30 
This confusion could be explained by the large number of radioactive isotopes that are 
likely to be found at an atomic test site and variations in their half-life. The issue of 
hereditary damage remains poorly understood. Pu-239, the isotope most suited for the 
manufacture of weapons, has a half life of just over 24,000 years.31
The Umbrella Aussie DVD edition of Ground Zero, released on 29 March 
2003,  features an interview with actor Jack Thompson, who speaks on how appearing 
in the film appealed to him as he sees himself as ‘something of an activist in the 
community.’ Thompson speaks of Aboriginals ‘incinerated’ by the tests 
 
and that it is almost certain that Aboriginal people in the are near ground zero were 
affected by radiation, as were a lot of servicemen. Thompson reports having 
witnessed old films of servicemen with their backs to the explosion and then turning 
to clap and cheer and ‘all we thought how wonderful it was that we have been 
selected by the British Empire to be the testing ground of their atomic weapons.’ 
                                                 
28 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol II, pp. 430-432. 
29 Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test 
Sites at Emu and Maralinga (Australia) 2003. 
30 GreenNet, section titled Nuclear Issues; Maralinga, 
http://www.green.net.au/humpsnotdumps/maraling.htm, site accessed 04/12/08. 
31 Parkinson, Maralinga, p. xviii. 
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There is no firm evidence of such ‘incineration’, though the fact that 
Aboriginal people had to be removed and their land contaminated is a very real 
consequence of the tests. The effects of the tests on servicemen and Aboriginal people 
are still open to debate. It is likely that the servicemen depicted in films such as those 
mentioned by Thompson were outside the range of initial or ‘prompt’ radiation,32
Thompson later comments on the poor treatment of Aboriginal people and the 
callous nature of the Australian government of the era. He discusses how in hindsight, 
Australian involvement in the tests and the Cold War seems naïve; he likens this to 
the (then) current Australian involvement in the ‘War on Terror.’ He states ‘we were 
naïve then and naïve now’. The same edition features a commentary by the directors, 
who state that the environment at the time of the McClelland Royal Commission was 
such that the issue of atomic testing was ‘fertile material for a drama.’ 
 
though lack of  knowledge about such matters may explain why claims of deliberate 
exposure to military servicemen have been so consistent. 
Ground Zero should be considered a work of fiction that makes use of some 
factual information. Though it does highlight some real issues, it greatly exaggerates 
many claims of negative conduct by the British and Australian governments during 
and indeed after the tests. Despite this, it still forms a potent social commentary in 
that it encourages the viewer to consider the risks associated with the tests and the 
complex nature of Australian relations with its powerful allies. Though the events of 
Ground Zero are largely fiction, it is built in the reality of global security concerns, 
global power balance and nuclear contamination. Additionally, the secrecy and lack 
of certainty about the extent and danger from fallout means that it is not easy for the 
general viewer to judge where fact ends and fiction begins.  
Dorothy Johnston’s novel Maralinga, My Love33
The book was published in 1988, shortly after the McClelland Royal 
Commission. Its content shows that Johnston, a former English teacher, is aware of 
 is a fictional narrative. 
Within this genre, it very successfully presents issues related to Australia’s atomic 
testing experience in a balanced manner. It shows acknowledgement of where various 
allegations are contested or open to debate. In doing so, it imparts a sense of how 
poorly Australia’s experiences of atomic weapons testing are understood. 
                                                 
32 As was the case of the ‘Indoctrinee Force’ present at ‘Operation Buffalo’ at Maralinga in 1956, 
Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol I, p. 335-346. 
33 Dorothy Johnston, Maralinga, My Love, McPhee Gribble Publishers, Fitzroy, 1988. 
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the material outlined within the McClelland Report or at least material arising in 
response to it. I corresponded with Johnston to enquire what source material 
influenced her work. Her reply stated that she read the transcripts of the Royal 
Commission ‘till my eyes crossed’, attended hearings of the Royal Commission where 
cost permitted, conducted numerous interviews, visited testing sites, including a 
‘cattle property over which the mushroom cloud had passed.’ Johnston acknowledged 
the contribution of her partner, Paul Malone, who was a journalist with the Canberra 
Times newspaper in the mid 1980s.34  The book35
There is a reference to the earlier Emu tests causing a ‘Black Mist.’ Falconer 
is discussing the phenomena with a friend, Bob Gillan. Gillan’s wife, Joy, is 
convinced such a mist killed trees in her garden. Falconer comments ‘I do know a bit 
about fallout, though…it doesn’t kill trees just landing on them. Not this far from 
where the bomb went off. It just doesn’t make sense.’ Falconer states that he did find 
some very low levels of radiation in the area where these trees supposedly died.
 largely centres on the experiences 
of an Australian sergeant Graham Falconer engaged in health physics work at 
Maralinga. The novel begins as he is about to marry his fiancé, Deborah. The year is 
1956, after the Emu tests and just as ‘Operation Buffalo’ is beginning at Maralinga. 
36
Throughout the novel there are references to Aboriginal people being found 
unexpectedly within ‘dirty areas.’ The book addresses the contamination of an 
Aboriginal family found camping in and near the crater from the Marcoo test. 
Falconer and a man named Tank Foley, also engaged in work concerned with the tests, 
rush the family to a decontamination shower. They are, of course, frightened and 
confused, as they are required to shower until there are no more signs of 
contamination. The novel details how all surfaces touched by the contaminated family 
were also later scrubbed clean and alludes to the fact that their dogs were shot.
  
37
Though the names are different, the events of the contamination of a family 
are consistent with those explored within the McClelland Report, with the exception 
that the latter records how this family, the Milpuddies, suffered a stillbirth, and this is 
not raised in the novel.
 
38
                                                 
34 Electronic Mail Correspondence, 14/06/09. 
 
35 Johnston, Maralinga, My Love. 
36 Ibid, pp.52-53. 
37 Ibid, pp. 77-83. 
38 Commonwealth of Australia, the Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol 1, pp. 319-321. 
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The novel also portrays Falconer as the man who found the Co-60 pellets eight 
months after the Tadje test. He is described as finding the pellets to be extremely 
radioactive and collecting them in a tobacco tin and taking them to a monitoring 
station. Those in the station are alerted to his approach as their own equipment detects 
the radioactive pellets. Falconer asks whether the presence of the cobalt meant that the 
British were experimenting with making a ‘dirty bomb,’ 39  of which the alleged 
‘cobalt bomb’ would be a form. Falconer, when later asked about how the cobalt was 
disposed of, remarks: ‘The poms took it home. Flew it in a special plane fitted with 
lead containers. Nothing if not thorough when it’s a question of their backyard.’ The 
experiences of the man who actually found these pellets, health physicist Doug 
Rickard, are discussed in Robert Milliken’s No Conceivable Injury40 and also in Sue 
Rabbitt Roff’s article ‘The Glass Bead Game: Nuclear Tourism at the Australian 
Weapon Test Sites.’41
After the last ‘major trials’, Falconer is later shown discovering unexpectedly 
high contamination of plutonium at the site of the Taranaki test.
  
42 This is based on 
factual events, the contamination that resulted from the ‘Vixen B’ minor trials. The 
novel states ‘there were high levels of contamination where there shouldn’t be, that 
much seemed clear. And Graham was convinced that this contamination had not been 
present at the time of the major trials.’43
This indicated just how secretive the minor trials were. Falconer is seen 
discussing with the British why the restricted areas were being extended, even though 
the ‘major trials’ had ended. He receives no explanation.
 
44  The novel proceeds to 
comment on how the British were ‘sneaky’ enough to conduct small, undetectable, 
trials after an international agreement to end atmospheric tests.45
 Falconer later voices his opinion on this contamination:  ‘...the Brits were in 
such a hurry to piss off home that they left it for me to find. They cleaned up a bit, but 
not properly. That’s our job. But sometimes we find things they don’t want us to find. 
Same here. They finish one lot of experiments, do a half-arsed job of cleaning up and 
 
                                                 
39 Johnston, Maralinga, My Love, pp. 130-133. 
40 Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, p.229. 
41 Roff ‘The Glass Bead Game’, pp.297-300. Within the acknowledgement section of Johnstone’s 
novel, Rickard is named as ‘Richards.’ Johnston, Maralinga, My Love, Acknowledgements. 
42Ibid, pp 153-154. 
43 Ibid, p.156. 
44 Ibid, p. 159. 
45 Ibid, p.164. 
  
 
246 
nick off again. They’re about to repeat the whole business here.’ He later comments 
‘…if people go there who don’t know what precautions to take, who don’t even know 
it’s there! It’s got a half-life of 24,000 years. How can we predict what will happen in 
a hundred years, let alone thousands?’ and also ‘The British’ve been so bloody 
careless! They are so careless. Australia really is a colony to them, a rubbish dump, a 
bit of desert to do what they like with’.46
The book also examines, through the perspective of Falconer, the inadequate 
measure of ploughing the contaminated areas of Taranaki as an attempt at a clean-
up.
 It is not stated what particular contaminant 
has a half-life of 24,000 years, but it is quite likely a reference to Pu-239. 
47 Shortly after, Falconer is approached by Tank Foley for help in compiling 
Foley’s service report. Foley is pursuing compensation after having been diagnosed 
with terminal cancer.48
Johnston’s novel handles this controversial issue in a very responsible manner. 
Falconer is later shown to discuss Foley’s cancer, which we learn is of the bone 
marrow. Falconer discusses the possibility that it may not be related to his experiences 
at Maralinga and that proving that it was will be difficult.
  
49
After the first clean-up attempts, the novel shows that the concrete caps over 
the burial pits of Taranaki were soon compromised by burrowing rabbits.
 
50 Falconer 
is not satisfied, and continues to make official enquiries. He is shown to explain that 
diluting the plutonium in the soil through ploughing is an inadequate measure, and 
how plutonium presents a risk when inhaled.51It should be noted that this novel was 
written before the MARTAC clean-up, which, arguably, addressed many of these 
concerns.52
Shortly after Falconer’s discussion about the inadequate clean-up measure, 
Tank Foley is dead.
 
53 The final chapter closes as Falconer is discussing with his wife 
the issue of Foley’s compensation which was, ironically, awarded posthumously. 
Falconer says ‘Why be bitter, love? I’m sure Tank’d see the funny side.’54
                                                 
46 Ibid, pp. 172-173. 
 
47 Ibid, p. 190. 
48 Ibid, pp. 197-198. 
49 Ibid, pp. 204-205. 
50 Ibid, p 215. 
51 Ibid, pp. 236-237. 
52 Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test 
Sites at Emu and Maralinga (Australia) 2003. 
53 Ibid, p. 248. 
54 Ibid, p. 260.  
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There is a potential danger in presenting real social issues within fictional 
narratives. It can be difficult for the reader to separate the verifiable elements from 
those with no factual basis. Jack Thompson states in his interview that he was 
attracted to working on Ground Zero as he sees himself as an activist. As is expected 
with a thriller, a dramatic interpretation, many of the elements depicted are entirely 
fictional. Thompson’s comments suggest he is not entirely informed about the degree 
to which these events are real. We can see here an example of a narrative contributing 
to the establishment of ‘myth’, in the broader sense of this word. In sources such as 
Ground Zero the distinctions between fact and fiction are not ‘signposted’; and the 
reader may retain a lasting impression which is quite erroneous but with factual 
elements. 
Maralinga, My Love lacks the same mainstream impact but succeeds 
wonderfully in informing a potential readership of the actual risks and consequences 
of the tests and how much remains poorly understood. It achieves this by basing the 
narrative on verified events and not rumours and conspiracies. In many cases 
throughout the novel, only the names of those concerned with key real-world events 
differ from the historical reality. The changed names of key figures in Maralinga, My 
Love, or the presentation of issues rejected by the McClelland Royal Commission in 
Ground Zero are both examples, to varying levels, of the ‘safety net’ offered by 
writing fiction. In an essay titled ‘Writing the past: History, literature and the public 
sphere in Australia’, Mark McKenna stated: 
 
In history there’s no safety net, and that safety net is the novelist’s source of comfort into 
which they can always fall if need be. The novelist ultimately is not responsible to historical 
sources. Fiction’s truth is the truth of the human heart and the human condition, a truth made 
possible by the position of the author as the omniscient creator of the narrative, unbound by 
the shackles of historical accuracy, unfettered by what actually happened. 
 
He later concluded: 
 
As writers and teachers and students we have an obligation to remember the distinction 
between history and fiction. Fiction has historical elements, history has fictive elements, but 
fiction should not be claimed as history. Most of all we owe that distinction to our readers.55
 
 
                                                 
55 Mark McKenna, ‘Writing the past: History, literature and the public sphere in Australia’ in Drusilla 
Modjeska (ed) The Best Australian Essays, 2006, Blank Ink, Melbourne, 2006, pp. 96-110. 
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McKenna warns that the presence of this ‘safety net,’ though allowing for the 
construction of entertaining, engaging narratives, holds dangers should fiction be 
presented as history. His lecture was largely in response to the novel The Secret River 
by Kate Grenville.56
Inga Clendinnen also addresses the debate concerning the links between 
history and fiction, also using The Secret River as an example, in an essay titled Who 
Owns the Past?  Clendinnen is critical of Grenville who effectively claimed that as a 
novelist, she was better situated to impart appreciation of complex issues than 
historians.  A novelist may be able to create a sense of empathy in a reader by use of 
dialogue, yet such dialogue is subject to the conditions of the author’s own 
experiences and not just the source material consulted. A historian, Clendinnen offers, 
will refer to the exact words from the time period under examination.
 This novel centred on the events of a 19th century Aboriginal 
massacre. It drew considerable debate as it featured evidence from an earlier massacre 
incorporated into the story of one 20 years later. This is an example of the ‘safety net’ 
of fiction. Ground Zero has such a net, but Thompson’s comments about the issues 
depicted in the film do not.  
57
It can be argued that fictional sources are valuable for aiding the 
understanding of real world issues if there is ‘signposting’ of where the narrative 
departs from actual events. Such a narrative is also a valid means to integrate the 
human experiences of those concerned with an event and the broader, strategic picture. 
It must be noted that such dialogue will always reflect the experiences of the author, 
and this must be taken into consideration. Representations stated to be factual 
histories can also never be regarded as wholly objective sources though they are 
constructed according to different methods and purposes than works of fiction. 
 
Whenever fiction draws into controversial settings as story elements there is 
potential for misrepresentation. Yet so too is there potential for furthering popular 
understanding and awareness. Fiction does not ‘need’ to refer to or reflect on real 
world events for it to achieve its goals.  Problems arise, however, when fictional 
material is presented or regarded as a factual account.58
                                                 
56 Kate Grenville, The Secret River, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 2005. 
  
57 Clendinnen, ‘The History Question.’  
58 The balance between the role of the historian and writers of fiction has been explored in a book titled 
Is History Fiction? by Anne Curthoys and John Docker.  They examine the use of literary devices such 
as metaphor in shaping historical understanding and the pitfalls associated with these approaches. Ann 
Curthoys and John Docker, Is History Fiction?. 
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The tests remain a prominent theme within Australian cultural expression. 
Since 2005 a group of artists and performers known as Big hART have been running 
a series of live performances including Pitjantjatjara language workshops titled 
Ngapartji Ngapartji which means ‘I give you something, you give me something’ in 
that language. The performance was written and directed by Scott Rankin and co-
created by Trevor Jamieson, whose father and people were removed from his 
traditional lands to allow atomic testing.  
The audience is invited to learn elements of the Pitjantjatjara language while 
Jamieson tells the story of his people and how they were affected by the tests. This 
concept of reciprocation -language for the story- relates to the performance’s title. 
Jamieson recounts the attitudes of the British and Australian authorities of the time. 
He offers his perspective on how they regarded the testing sites with the words: 
‘…test a Cold War toy or two, there’s nothing out there in Spinifex country, just flora 
and fauna at the world’s end.’ The performance contrasts the experiences of 
Aboriginals affected by the tests with those of Japanese people affected by the atomic 
strikes against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.59
There is a website associated with the project, which contains a section 
entitled ‘atomic history’ which offers a brief overview of the tests. It makes mention 
of the ‘Black Mist,’ and states: 
 
 
During the mainland tests many army personnel were deliberately exposed to the blasts, to 
gauge the effect of radiation on troops. The testing range boundaries were not properly 
monitored, allowing people to walk in and out. Any signs were in English, which the local 
Indigenous population could not read. Fallout from the ground blasts led to massive 
contamination of the Australian interior; and the fallout from Maralinga even reached 
Adelaide and Melbourne. Some places are still heavily radioactive, due principally to the 
presence of 22 kilograms of plutonium, the most toxic element known to humans. The test 
area remains unsafe for habitation for the next 250,000 years. 60
 
 
Here is another example of how the claim that servicemen were deliberately 
exposed to radiation has been repeated despite the lack of a clear evidence base. The 
comments regarding the presence of 22 kilograms of plutonium and the sites being 
unsafe for the next 250,000 years are, evidently, drawn from sources dating before the 
                                                 
59 ABC Sunday Arts, Ngapartji Ngapartji, broadcast 7 September 2008.  
60 Ngapartji Napartji, section entitled Atomic History, http://www.ngapartji.org/content/view/26/59/, 
site accessed 03/07/09.  
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MARTAC report of 2003, which suggests that this plutonium has been removed or 
entombed and that the area is now clean,61 though this view is disputed by 
Parkinson.62
Another performance interpretation is that of Bangarra Dance Theatre, who in 
2009 staged a production titled X300 about the Maralinga tests. This was part of a 
broader project entitled True Stories.
 There is also variation in the half life of various isotopes of plutonium 
and indeed other radioactive elements.  
63
Another work of fiction which bases its narrative around atomic testing in 
Australia makes use of a diary format. This is Alan Tucker’s 2009 book Atomic 
Testing: the Diary of Anthony Brown, Woomera 1953. 
  
64
Anthony suffered from polio as a younger child and as a consequence has 
impaired use of his legs. His mother, formerly a nurse, is shown to be over protective. 
Anthony thrives in the desert environment and makes new friends and his father is 
pleased to see him engage in sport and exploration of the bush. His mother is not 
stimulated by life in Woomera and life consisting only of domestic duties and 
recreation. The family learn of the impending atomic tests at Emu Field. Anthony’s 
mother is the only character who is apparently concerned with their potential human, 
environmental and political effects. Anthony’s father and other characters readily 
accept the words of Prime Minister Menzies that the tests are safe and vital to the 
British Empire. This divide in attitudes results in conflict within the family, with 
Anthony’s mother returning to Adelaide to renew her nursing qualifications.  
 The diary recounts the 
experiences of 13 year old school boy Anthony Brown, who moves to Woomera with 
his family as his father is enlisted in the Australian army as a mechanic working on 
the rocket range.   
The events in the diary explore the secrecy surrounding the atomic tests and 
missile and pilot-less aircraft development. Anthony is questioned by Commonwealth 
Police after it is discovered that he drew pictures of rockets for his classmates, 
inspired by photos ‘borrowed’ by another boy from his scientist father. Elements of 
                                                 
61 Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test 
Sites at Emu and Maralinga (Australia) 2003 
62  Parkinson, Maralinga. 
63 Bangarra Dance Theatre, section entitled True Stories Regional Tour 2009, 
http://www.bangarra.com.au/diary/true.html#about, site accessed 03/07/09 
64 Alan Tucker, Atomic Testing: the Diary of Anthony Brown, Woomera 1953, Scholastic Press, 
Gosford NSW, 2009. 
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the diary also reflect the belief that assisting in the British atomic deterrent 
programme may ensure that Australia receives its own atomic weapons. 
Following the detonation of ‘Totem 1’ the diary details rumours of the ‘Black 
Mist.’ The book is intended for young readers and highlights the divide in attitudes 
about the tests, the fears of the Cold War and of communism and Australia’s 
perceived need for ‘great and powerful friends’ and/or its own nuclear deterrent.  
Mostly, however, it explores how living at Woomera during the time of the ‘joint 
project’ may have affected a typical Australian family.65
The story of those affected by the inland South Australian tests is also 
expressed in picture book form within the 2009 book Maralinga, the Anangu Story by 
The Yalata and Oak Valley Communities with Cristobel Mattingley. The book 
explores the traditional way of life of the local people and how it existed for 
thousands of years. The book discusses the arrival of white settlers, the establishment 
of mission communities such as Ooldea and Yalata and the work of individuals such 
as Daisy Bates in working to have a positive effect on the Aboriginal way of life.
 
66
The book then contains quite detailed commentary on the atomic tests. The 
book details that Menzies requested that Ooldea’s status as an Aboriginal reserve be 
revoked, and that politicians and scientists who were ignorant of the importance of 
this testing areas to the Aboriginal people, regarded it as ‘uninhabited’ and that they 
‘knew nothing of its richness in tradition and law.’ The book states that Aboriginal 
people were not recognised by the Commonwealth Constitution of 1901, and this was 
the reason why when Native Patrol Officer MacDougal tried to explain the 
significance of the area to officials, and the consequences of the intrusion of the tests, 
Chief Scientist of the Weapons Research Establishment, WAS Butement, responded: 
‘He [MacDougal] is apparently placing the affairs of a handful of natives above those 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations”’
  
67
The book includes discussion of the McClelland Report and its exploration of 
Butement’s which remarks reflected poorly on some official attitudes at the time of 
the tests,
 
68
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
 in its listed sources. Maralinga, the Anangu Story also explores the ‘Black 
Mist’ phenomenon, deaths of the elderly and frail, illness and the blinding of Yami 
66 The Yalata and Oak Valley Communities with Cristobel Mattingley, Maralinga, the Anangu Story, 
Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest NSW, 2009. 
67 Ibid, pp. 36-37. 
68 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol 1, pp. 308-311. 
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Lester.69
 
 It does not indicate that there is hot controversy over the possible harmful 
effect of fallout at this distance. The book also recounts the ‘Pom Pom’ incident and 
details later health complaints in the Milpuddie family: 
Charlie was almost blind when he died of heart failure and pneumonia in 1974. Edie’s 
daughter Rosie developed a heart condition and lost her first baby, a daughter, in 1973. Her 
second daughter was born with heart problems and congenital dislocation of the hips. Her son 
was born with a club foot.70
 
 
It is important to remember this family was actually found in a crater formed 
by a ground burst. The book offers comment on the extent of contamination at test 
sites and the various clean-up operations that have been undertaken.71
Though separating fact from fiction is a difficult process, fictional, artistic and 
pop-cultural sources are significant elements of the discourse of Australia’s 
experience with atomic testing. Such sources have done much to shape public 
understanding of relevant issues. As with all sources, problems arise when contested 
issues are presented as self-evident fact. The final chapter will discuss in further detail 
the issue of ‘signposting’ where narratives deviate from actual historical events. It 
will also offer comments on the material discussed in each chapter and reflects on the 
experiences in presenting this material, and highlight where new findings concerned 
with the tests may be presented in the future 
 Perhaps what 
stands out most about Maralinga, the Anangu Story, however, are the wonderful 
paintings and photographs.  
                                                 
69 The Yalata and Oak Valley Communities with Cristobel Mattingley, Maralinga, the Anangu Story,, 
pp. 39-44. 
70 Ibid, pp. 44-45 
71 Ibid, pp. 46-47.  
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion.  
 
Nuclear weapons are the most potentially destructive innovation ever achieved 
by humankind. It is easy to see why the development of the first bombs occurred; 
allied powers held a sincere fear that Hitler’s scientists would get there first. This led 
directly to Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein’s famous letter to then U.S president 
Franklin D. Roosevelt,1 bringing the potential nuclear threat to his attention. Yet even 
after the capitulation of Nazi Germany, development of the bomb continued. It would 
be employed twice against a different enemy, Japan, establishing the popular belief 
that it was the bomb that ended the war. There is also a counter-belief, that the main 
influence behind the Japanese decision to surrender was the entry of the Soviet Union 
into that theatre of conflict.2  The very day the second atomic bomb was dropped on 
Nagasaki, 9 August 1945, Soviet forces had invaded Manchuria and engaged Japan’s 
Kwantung army.3
  In any case, following the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
‘nuclear genie’ was out of the bottle.  There could be no denial that atomic weapons 
were feasible and extremely potent. It was hoped these new devices may deter war. 
This brings to mind the example of Alfred Nobel, of Nobel Prize fame. For civil use, 
he invented dynamite, and envisioned it might bring about an end to war. He is 
famously quoted as saying:  
 
 
Perhaps my factories will put an end to war even sooner than your Congresses; on the day 
when two army corps will be able to annihilate each other in a second, all civilised nations 
will recoil with horror and disband their troops.4
 
 
This was unfortunately far from the truth. The threat from Nazi Germany did 
present an unusual circumstance and a perceived need for a weapon of mass 
destruction. After it became clear that the bomb would not be needed against the 
                                                 
1 Leo Szilard Online, section entitled Einstein’s letter to Roosevelt, August 2, 1939, 
http://www.dannen.com/ae-fdr.html, site accessed 31/03/09. The decision to develop and use the 
atomic bomb is explored in Herken, Cardinal Choices, pp. 3-33. 
2 This is discussed in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2007, California, and in numerous other sources.  
3 Robert J.C. Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 
1954, p. 154. 
4 Nobelprize.org, section entitled War and Peace in the Thinking of  Alfred Nobel 
http://nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/biographical/articles/tagil/index.html, site accessed 31/03/09 
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Nazis, Polish-born Manhattan project scientist Joseph Rotblat became one of the 
world’s more vocal anti-nuclear commentators.5 In 1939, after publishing new 
research into the structure of the uranium nucleus and the possibility of nuclear fission, 
physicist Otto Frisch wrote to his mother, including in the letter: ‘I feel as if I had 
caught an elephant by its tail, without meaning to, while walking through a jungle. 
And now I don’t know what to do with it.’6 In the same year physicist Otto Hahn 
stated to a group of assembled colleagues on 30 April: ‘I only hope you physicists 
will never construct a uranium bomb. If Hitler ever gets a weapon like that I’ll 
commit suicide.’7 Later, in August 1945, colleagues of Hahn were concerned he may 
commit suicide while in a British internment camp due to his contributions to science 
that had perhaps helped enable the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.8
Outside a situation where the world is threatened by a great evil, can the 
development of such a potent destructive force as a nuclear weapon be rationalised?   
 
Nuclear weapons, though they may be intended to have a ‘deterrent’ value and keep 
‘peace’, are capable of destroying humankind, the works of humankind, and the 
natural environment of this planet, and thus the testing of such weapons in Australia 
generated considerable debate. 
By the time Prime Minister Menzies agreed to allow testing in Australia, the 
bomb had already been ‘born.’ However, the Americans were soon to test a far more 
powerful device and the USSR and Britain would soon follow.  The power of a fission 
bomb is limited: only a finite number of fissions can possibly occur before the device 
comes apart. Even if the device is ‘boosted’ with fusion ‘fuel’ there is a limit to the 
potential yield.  Yet its development allowed for a far more destructive innovation. 
There is no theoretical limit to the power of the hydrogen bomb; the size is 
determined by the amount of fusion ‘fuel’ included. 
 Such devices show the power which made ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ 
(MAD) a reality. The threat of MAD may have prevented total warfare between the 
capitalist and communist world powers, but as the contents page of The Nuclear 
                                                 
5 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, section entitled Sir Joseph Rotblat: A Legacy of Peace (1908-2005) 
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/09/01_krieger_sir-joseph-rotblat.htm, site accessed 
31/03/09.   
6 Jungk, Brighter Than 1000 Suns, p. 71. 
7 Ibid, p. 81. 
8 Ibid, p.201. 
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Weapon Archive states, ‘The past is prologue.’9
A central issue this dissertation explored is the extent to which commentators 
have referred to events about which little can be truly known as though the historical 
truth is self-evident. It is important to define why this is a problem and to suggest 
possible means for its resolution. Many writers making such assumptions have 
published material in print media sources and online. Many detail negative allegations 
about the atomic tests without stating that there are opposing viewpoints. This may be 
a deliberate tactic of persuasive writing in some instances, or it may be a product of 
reliance on other, inaccurate material.  
 The nuclear weapons story is not 
complete and there is still potential for a tragic ending.  
One contribution of conducting a study of the development of debates 
surrounding the atomic tests is that obvious factual errors can be highlighted. In 
regard to highlighting such errors, challenging the specifics of allegations of harm 
from the tests may be seen as denying these claims and therefore an unpopular cause. 
Yet demonstrating that some of these claims are contested or inaccurate does not 
imply that one is apologising for, or defending the atomic testing programme. Indeed, 
while some allegations are unfounded it is clear that there is significant, verifiable 
evidence of harm from the tests that should be upheld as pivotal and not obscured or 
linked to less supportable allegations.   
It is difficult to ascertain the origins of some beliefs about the tests, such as the 
discrepancies in reportage of the yield of the 19 June 1956 ‘Mosaic G2’ detonation, 
where the 1985 books Clouds of Deceit by Joan Smith and Fields of Thunder by 
Denys Blakeway and Sue Lloyd-Roberts both claimed a yield of 98kt for this test, 
apparently sourced from unknown documents revealed by the British,10
  The belief that tests would result in no harm, promoted in statements made 
by the Liberal Party during the Menzies era,
 while most 
sources place the yield at ~60kt.   
11 has been utterly rejected, as has the 
belief that during the course of its independent nuclear deterrent programme, Britain 
had surpassed the US.12
                                                 
9 Ibid, 
  Other rejected beliefs include that, as discussed in 
parliamentary debates and the media in 1953, Australia was to be the testing site for a 
http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/, site accessed 20/03/09. 
10 Smith, Clouds of Deceit, p. 27, p.122;  Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts Fields of Thunder, p. 98. 
11 Numerous examples are discussed in Chapter Two. 
12 Numerous examples are discussed in Chapter Three.  
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‘cobalt bomb’, a belief which still seemed to have currency in the 1980s.13 Also, the 
‘educated guesswork’ from the 1982 book Maralinga by Adrian Tame and F.P.J 
Robotham that suggested tests in South Australia resulted in the hurried evacuation of 
a ‘village’ used by servicemen.14  No evidence exists to suggest that the tests resulted 
in immediate deaths, though the long-term effects of factors such as fallout are more 
difficult to offer comment on. Also, there is little to suggest that, as it has been 
claimed,15
The issue of fallout contamination across Australia, including Sr-90, has been 
the subject of considerable debate.
 such contamination may have been deliberately engineered so as to 
observe its effects on people. 
16 An example of a study which suggested such 
contamination occurred led to Hedley Marston’s 1958 paper ‘The Accumulation of 
Radioactive Iodine in the Thyroids of Grazing Animals Subsequent to Atomic 
Weapons Tests.’17 There has been controversy surrounding the validity of this study, 
in particular whether Marston’s inference that the presence of I-131 in animal thyroids 
was also indicative of likely absorption of Sr-90 by bone tissue, and whether its 
findings were suppressed from the attention of the public, which the McClelland 
Royal Commission had found was not the case.18
 An example of one claim of harm from the tests that it is very difficult to 
offer firm comment on is the blindness of Aboriginal man Yami Lester and the issue 
of the ‘Black Mist’, which was apparently first brought to the attention of the public 
in 1980 in media coverage
   
19 and reinforced in 1982 by Tame and Robotham.20
                                                 
13 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 17 September 1953, Session 1951-53, p. 
317. Discussion of fears in Australia of a cobalt bomb can be found in Titterton, Facing the Atomic 
Future, pp. 253-254. See also the writing of Douglas Wilkie in The Sun, Melbourne, 15 October, 1953, 
p.3. Such devices are not documented in the McClelland Report’s exploration of the presence of Co-60 
pellets at the site ‘Tadje’ at Maralinga. Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Commission 
into British Nuclear Tests in Australia Vol, I, pp. 388-393. 
  The 
14 Tame & Robotham, Maralinga, pp.163-165.  This book also voiced speculation about the use of 
Maralinga for experiments into the ‘cobalt bomb’, p.111, p.236.  
15 An example being the claims of Sue Rabbitt Roff, ABC, Evidence Uncovered about Maralinga 
Experiment, http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/stories/s295331.htm, broadcast 11 May 2001, site accessed 
25/11/08. 
16 Claims of such contamination can be seen in the parliamentary debates discussed in Chapter Two, 
press coverage discussed in Chapters Three and Four, books discussed in Chapter Five and other 
responses in chapter Seven.  
17 Marston, ‘The Accumulation of Radioactive Iodine in the Thyroids of Grazing Animals Subsequent 
to Atomic Weapons Tests’ 
18 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol II, 434-438. This controversy has been reported in numerous sources, such as: Two 
opposing representations can be found in Lorna Arnold, A Very Special Relationship; Cross, Fallout. 
19 Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia, 177-8 
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factors of confusion surrounding this issue such as the large distance from the test site 
and the apparent site of the contamination, Wallatinna (173km, as explored by the 
McClelland Royal Commission)21
It was also alleged that the tests resulted directly in the deaths of Aboriginal 
people, such as claimed by servicemen Patrick Connolly.
 are seldom discussed. The lack of firm scientific 
findings on the matter and the dramatic nature of the story ensure its continued 
currency in the debates of the tests.  
22  Connolly had also 
claimed there had been a secret hospital established to treat Aboriginal people 
affected by radiation and that he had been warned by ASIO to cease making these 
allegations. When subpoenaed to appear before the Royal Commission on 1 May 
1985, his claims were rejected.23 The hiding of the bodies of Aboriginal people killed 
by the tests was the subject of the fictional 1987 film Ground Zero, which also 
alluded to a hurried departure of a ‘village’ used by servicemen.24
Debate in Australia had emerged with the announcement of the upcoming 
‘Hurricane’ test of 3 October 1952. Parliamentarians were vocal on the subject and 
this material was echoed in the press commentaries of the era. Differing views on the 
tests can be seen in the books of William Grayden Adam and Atoms (1957)
 The claims that the 
tests directly resulted in immediate deaths and that this ‘village’ was hurriedly 
evacuated have been rejected.    
25  and 
Oliver Howard Beale (1977), This Inch of Time. Though off the public record, an 
official response into the damage caused by the tests can be seen in the 1968 Final 
Report on Residual Radioactive Contamination of the Maralinga Range and the Emu 
Site, the principal author of which was N. Pearce.26  Growing concern about the tests 
saw a renewed increase in media attention in the early 1980s, with a prominent 
documentary response being the 1981 Backs to the Blast.27
                                                                                                                                            
20 Adrian Tame & F.P.J. Robotham, Maralinga, pp. 143-145.  Other accounts include: Cross & Hudson 
Beyond Belief, pp. 22-4;  Smith. Clouds of Deceit pp. 123-124; Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, pp. 
121-124, 129-130, 309, 321, 323; Blakeway & Lloyd-Roberts, Fields of Thunder, pp.4, 107-11. A 
denial of harm resulting from the mist can be found in Arnold, A Very Special Relationship, pp. 73-77. 
 This time period saw 
21Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol 1 pp. 186-194. 
22 Blakeway and Lloyd-Roberts Fields of Thunder, pp. 120-121. 
23 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia, Vol II, pp. 430-432. 
24 Avenue Pictures, Ground Zero. 
25 Grayden, Adam and Atoms. 
26 N. Pearce, Final Report on Residual Radioactive Contamination of the Maralinga Range and the 
Emu Site. 
27 Composite Films, Backs to the Blast. 
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numerous reports and studies aiming to come to terms with the consequences of the 
tests28 culminating in the McClelland Royal Commission of 1984 and 1985.29
The events and issues of the tests were the subject of many books in the 1980s. 
These included books that aimed to highlight allegations of damage
  
30 and other, 
official histories31 which both apparently had their origins as responses to increased 
debate surrounding the tests.32 Subject matter from the Royal Commission was 
prominent in Ground Zero33 and in later fictional, artistic and pop-cultural sources. 
From the late 1980s to the present, studies continued to emerge concerned with 
epidemiological factors associated with British tests, in Australia and elsewhere34 and 
2003 saw the release of the MARTAC report into the clean up of testing sites in South 
Australia35 which was followed by a 2007 response by nuclear engineer Alan 
Parkinson,36  which challenged the notion that the clean-up was ‘world’s best 
practice.’  Since 1998, medical sociologist Sue Rabbitt Roff has presented a series of 
articles which clearly aim to highlight the negative consequences of the tests, 
predominantly in the journal Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 37
                                                 
28 Aboriginal Health Unit, A Survey of Diseases That May be Related to Radiation Among 
Pitjantjatjara on Remote Reserves; Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council, British Nuclear 
Tests in Australia; a Review of Operational Safety Measures and of Possible After Effects; Donovan, 
Survey of Health of Former Atomic Test Personnel, Kerr, et al , Report of the Expert Committee on the 
Review of Data on Atmospheric Fallout Arising From British Nuclear Tests in Australia. 
 which lack the 
neutral tone of scientific studies. The discourse of Australia’s experience with nuclear 
29 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia. 
30 Tame and Robotham, Maralinga; Blakeway and Lloyd Roberts, Fields of Thunder; Milliken, No 
Conceivable Injury; Smith, Clouds of Deceit.  
31 Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia; Arnold, A Very Special Relationship. 
32 Ibid, see the ‘forward’ to each volume, respectively found on p. iii, p.ix.  
33 Avenue Pictures, Ground Zero. 
34 Darby et al, ‘A Summary of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer in Men from the United Kingdom 
Who Participated in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes’; Muirhead et al, ‘Follow up of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer 1952-98 in Men from 
the UK Who Participated in the UK’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes’; Darby et al, ‘Further Follow up of Mortality and  Incidence of Cancer in Men from the 
United Kingdom Who Participated in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and 
Experimental Programmes.’; Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia; 
Wahab et al, ‘Elevated Chromosome Translocation Frequencies in New Zealand Nuclear Test Veterans. 
35 Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test 
Sites at Emu and Maralinga. 
36 Parkinson, Maralinga.  
37 Roff, ‘The Glass Bead Game: Nuclear Tourism at the Australian Weapon Test Sites’; ‘Blood Money: 
The Duty of Care to Veterans of UK Nuclear Weapons Tests’; ‘Project Sunshine and the Slippery 
Slope: The Ethics of Tissue Sampling for Strontium-90’; ‘Under-ascertainment of Multiple Myeloma 
Among Participants in UK Atmospheric Atomic and Nuclear Weapons Tests’; ‘Establishing the 
Possible Radiogenicity of Morbidity and Mortality from Participation in UK Nuclear Weapons 
Development.’  
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weapons testing continues to develop, and with the dismissal of obvious myths, 
emerging representations have improved in quality. 
However, problems remain. For example; when well-intentioned 
commentators make use of inaccurate data, it is all too easy for detractors to focus on 
such shortcomings in order to reject their entire line of argument. If such a claim is 
presented as fact, then the validity of other claims made by that author may be called 
into question. This concept extends not only to facts such as names and dates but to 
broad attribution of motive to those responsible for the tests and whether the 
experiments demanded a callous disregard for life in the testing area. 
Where such claims are incorrect or not supported, they may create an 
illegitimate level of mistrust for the Australian and British governments. This mistrust 
is apparent, for example, in the willingness for people to accept some of the more 
unusual allegations about the tests. These include the claims that the ‘Indroctinee 
Force’ of ‘Operation Buffalo’ was comprised of mentally handicapped people.38
Also of concern is an apparent failing of members of the current generation to 
appreciate the fears of the Cold War. There were very real concerns that the use of 
atomic weapons would become the reality of warfare in modernity.
 This 
claim and numerous others were rejected by the McClelland Royal Commission of 
which had a vested interest in exposing as many concerns with the tests as possible as 
a means to secure adequate compensation from the British.  It is also apparent that 
there is confusion in the public domain between the respective notions of training 
servicemen to operate in a theatre with nuclear weapons (and thus be able to train 
others for similar environments), and using such servicemen as ‘guinea pigs’ into the 
effects of radiation.  
39
                                                 
38 Reported in Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear 
Tests in Australia, Vol I, p. 346. The report notes that several witnesses made this allegation before the 
McClelland Royal Commission. 
 Thus, some 
considered it responsible, even morally necessary, for Britain to pursue the option of a 
nuclear deterrent. One of the common arguments employed to support atomic testing 
in Australia was that the USSR would continue their tests even if the British were to 
stop. It is easy to downplay the fears of previous generations in hindsight. We have 
the benefit of the knowledge that a nuclear exchange did not occur as a result of the 
Cold War.  
39 An example of such discussion can be found in Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, 
Hansard, 9 October 1956, Session 1956, pp. 1286-1287. 
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It is likely that some inaccurate reporting on the tests was and continues to be 
due to intellectual dishonesty. This may be the case both among those who benefit 
from downplaying any perceived risks and those who seek to highlight them. The 
official Menzies-era Liberal Party line of ‘no conceivable injury’ was questioned at 
the time as my study of newspaper reportage demonstrates. When evaluated in 
hindsight, the notion of the tests causing no harm is not at all valid. Even though some 
alleged instances of ‘injury’ remain unproven, there is sufficient evidence to verify 
that some measure of harm occurred. Likewise, those who argue that the tests 
positively caused increased cancer incidence and mortality may do so being well 
aware that this view has not been supported by medical studies. 
It is also probable that various commentators are simply not aware of the facts 
that are on public record, thus they present their belief as if it was factual. Most 
commentaries suggest the management of the tests was a British affair, with Australia 
basically providing the sites and logistical support. Opposing this view is Lorna 
Arnold, who suggests the tests involved a spirit of co-operation between Australia and 
the United Kingdom.40
Whatever the case, these human experiences should be linked to analysis of 
the broader strategic picture.  How did the tests in Australia impact on the global 
balance of power?  The experiments held in Australia allowed Britain to draw near 
again to the USA and USSR in strategic weapons technology. These experiments 
added to information involving not just the fission bombs tested here, but the far 
larger thermonuclear devices tested as part of ‘Operation Grapple’. These required 
fission ‘triggers’, and knowledge of the behaviour of fast-fusion neutrons which was 
partly gained in Australia due to ‘Operation Mosaic’. 
  It is possible that Liberal Party officials who stated that the 
tests were harmless were not aware of the extent of the damage when making their 
claims; they may have not been granted access to the relevant data. Just as officials 
who may have been persuaded to believe a convenient fiction to be truth, so too those 
who contend the tests are positively linked to cancers may have accepted conjecture 
to be factual evidence. 
41
The view that Australia was merely the site for the testing programme and 
stood to gain nothing from these experiments may be a marginalisation of the 
  
                                                 
40 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship.   
41 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled British Nuclear Testing: Operation Mosaic: 1956, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKTesting.html, site accessed 15/02/08; Milliken, No conceivable 
Injury, pp.189-207; Smith, A Very Special Relationship, pp 109-113. 
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country’s role. Were 1950s Australians unknowingly exploited colonials or did 
Australia have some measure of influence in this aspect of world affairs?   After all, 
since 1942 the Australian government had been responsible for its own foreign 
policy.42
Inaccurate reporting of the events of the tests cannot aid public understanding 
of the issue of nuclear proliferation in modernity. It is necessary to form a clear 
understanding of why nation states pursue the nuclear-deterrent option and what 
factors could cause a future arms race. This can be linked to fears about the 
development of weapons of mass destruction in countries such as North Korea and 
Iran in the contemporary era or the arms race between India and Pakistan. The end of 
the Cold War is certainly not the end of the threat of nuclear warfare. 
 
A perception of Australian need for ‘great and powerful friends’ continues to this day, 
especially in regard to Australian support of the US. The arguments which supported 
atomic weapons and the allowance and continuation of atomic testing in Australia 
indicated the ‘realist’ perspective to international relations was prominent in the 
formation of the policies of the Liberal government of Prime Minister Menzies.  
 That perspective suggests, as stated by Hans Morgenthau, that: ‘International 
politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of 
international politics, power is always the immediate aim.’43 The desire to assist in the 
atomic weapons programme of an ally, or especially the desire to acquire such 
weapons for one’s own country, is certainly suggestive of the desire for power. It 
could be stated that Australia’s exploration of the atomic weapons option may have 
been ‘realism’ but it was perhaps not realistic. The anti-testing perspectives of the 
ALP at the time of the tests, evident in the examples of parliamentary debates 
discussed in Chapter Two, indicate the prevalence of the ‘internationalist’ 
perspective’ among their members. This perspective, according to J.A. Camilleri, is 
‘designed to promote the interests of the international community.’ 44
                                                 
42 Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, section entitled Statute of Westminster Adoption 
Act1942, 
 Anthony Burke 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080520090259/http://www.aph.gov.au/library/handbook/constitution/wes
tminster-act.htm, site accessed 16/11/10. For analysis of the complex nature of Australian-UK relations 
during the 1940s see Waters, The Empire Fractures. 
43 Morgenthau in the section entitled ‘political power and international morality’ in Kinsella and Carr 
(eds), The Morality of War, p. 24. 
44 Camilleri, An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, p. 10.   Also on the matter, Hugh Smith, 
suggests that the ‘internationalist’ approach, as it has been associated with the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP), ‘produces sympathy for the ideals of the United Nations and for the objectives of Peace and 
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spoke of a ‘binary code’ between ‘realism’ and ‘internationalism’ between the 
policies of Evatt and Menzies.45
 This ‘binary code’ can be likened to the balance between strategic assessment 
and sources which explore the human experience. In relation to the tests, which 
though not occurring in time of total war were certainly of military significance, there 
are abundant sources which explore the ‘strategic’ and the ‘human’. Two examples of 
works which, respectively, represent these aspects of the tests are Lorna Arnold’s A 
Very Special Relationship
 
46 and Len Beadell’s Blast the Bush.47
Chapter Two explored debates on the tests within the Senate and House of 
Representatives of Australia’s federal parliament.  Critics of testing were frequently 
accused of playing into the hands of communists and as explored in Chapter Four, the 
major Newspaper of the CPA, The Tribune was clearly against the continuance of the 
tests.  The question of an Australian nuclear deterrent was also discussed at times in 
parliament, as was the possible marriage of atomic weapons to missiles tested locally. 
  Both these examples 
reflect positively on the events of the tests. 
The links between the origins of the Woomera Rocket Range under a Labor 
Government and the allowance of atomic testing under Menzies was deliberately 
blurred by Liberal members, and the distinctions argued. The risks to the environment 
and to human beings were debated and the ‘cobalt bomb’ issue was also raised. Again 
and again, the Liberal Party denied any risks associated with the testing programme, 
and those who questioned the tests were even labelled ‘anti-British’ and in some cases 
‘pro -Russian.’ The Liberal party gave the impression that Australia had a moral 
obligation to allow these tests to take place, so that Britain would better be able to 
deter the threat of the Soviet Union.  
Many statements opposing the tests were made by the Leader of the ALP,  
H.V. Evatt. It should also be noted that interpretations of Evatt’s views on nuclear 
disarmament are open to debate. Evatt had publicly made statements in favour of the 
cessation of testing of atomic weapons and proceeding towards atomic disarmament, 
typified by his statement in the House of Representatives 15 May 1956 on whether 
testing should cease and disarmament begin: ‘this is the view of this party and of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Disarmament.’ Smith, ‘International Politics and Foreign Policy’ in F.A. Mediansky (ed) Australia in A 
Changing World, p. 30. 
45 Burke. In Fear of Security, p226 
46 Arnold, A Very Special Relationship. 
47 Beadell, Blast the Bush. 
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British Labour Party, the New Zealand Labour Party and of every man and woman of 
goodwill in every country of the world. We are proud to hold it’48
However there is likewise evidence to suggest that in a world in which atomic 
weapons were to be a reality, Evatt also wished for Australia to have access to such 
technology.
.  
49  He had also expressed concerns that the Acheson-Lilienthal report and 
thus the Baruch plan, the American 1946 proposal to the UNAEC outlining a possible 
model for nuclear disarmament, were more intended to protect the US and preserve 
American strategic supremacy than to facilitate real international disarmament.50
The print media sources explored in Chapter Three clearly illustrated just how 
poorly journalists and thus the Australian public were informed. Newspapers showed 
a lack of awareness of the type of weapons tested, their level of sophistication 
compared to those of the Russians and Americans, even what number of tests had 
occurred up to a given point. The tests were promoted as exciting events; the pictures 
and headlines were extremely dramatic.  There was also some analysis of the broader 
strategic situation, such as the problems associated with the lack of co-operation 
between the US and the UK.  The links between the missiles tested at Woomera and 
atomic warheads were also explored, as was the fear that Australia would be the test-
site for a ‘cobalt bomb.’ The overall impression, however, is of a poorly informed 
public and the beginnings of a trend that would last to this day- the presentation of 
speculation as uncontested truth.  
   
The Tribune, newspaper of the CPA, explored in Chapter Four, provided 
coverage of a very different tone to the mainstream press. The human and 
environmental damage of the tests was the focal point, as was the considerable 
amount of anti-testing activism among churches, workers groups, unions and others. 
The Tribune was commendable in particular for highlighting the plight of the 
Aboriginal people in areas affected by testing. However, its insistence that the Soviet 
Union always stood for peace and disarmament51
                                                 
48 Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 15 May 1956, Session 1956, p. 1398. 
 is questionable.  Richard Rhode’s 
Dark Sun documented that the head of Stalin’s ‘Peoples Commissariat for Internal 
49 Buckley et al, Doc Evatt, pp.  283-302. 
50Ibid, pp. 315-318. 
51 The Tribune’s stance that the USSR desired disarmament and peace is evidenced by the following 
examples of the paper’s reportage: The Tribune, Sydney, 29 October 1952, p.2; 11 January 1956, p.2; 
19 March 1956, p.2; 14 August 1957; p. 3. 21 August 1957, p. 1. 
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Affairs’ (NKVD), Lavrenty Beria,  was ready to execute key Soviet scientists if their 
atomic deterrent programme had failed. 52
 Chapter Five explored popular secondary histories of the tests that have been 
published in book form. A ‘spectrum’ of views was presented ranging from those 
‘official histories’ of the tests, to those which sought to highlight their risks and 
consequences. Some of these works were published coinciding with the McClelland 
Royal Commission of 1984 and 1985, as a response to increased public debate, rather 
than being published at such a time so as to take advantage of the commission’s 
findings. The earliest example, Tame and Robotham’s Maralinga,
  
53 contained 
allegations involving the current president of the ANVA that were convincingly 
refuted in Symonds’54
Chapter Six explored report material leading up to, produced during and 
responding to the McClelland Royal Commission, and other relevant studies. Most 
notably the McClelland Report.
 official history and by the Royal Commission.  It is clear that 
the impact of many of these books suffered from a willingness on behalf of their 
authors to speculate and to present contested issues as self-evident fact. It is apparent 
that books published about the tests largely do not indicate that key issues are 
contested. 
55
 The 1968 Final Report on Residual Radioactive Contamination of the 
Maralinga Range and the Emu Site, which became known as the Pearce Report
 This reported the issues discussed during the Royal 
Commission, such as the recommendations that Britain pay for the rehabilitation of 
testing areas, and the rejections of various conspiracy claims. Such claims are still 
referenced in some later sources as though they are not contested. The issues explored 
in the reports, have been referred to in brief in other chapters, in the context of how 
the reports have influenced or failed to influence the development of debates 
surrounding the tests. 
56
                                                 
52 Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 366. 
, 
once a ‘restricted’ document, clearly outlines the heavy contamination that occurred at 
Maralinga, in particular Taranaki. This was reinforced by the later Rehabilitation of 
Former Nuclear Test Sites at Emu and Maralinga (Australia) 2003 or MARTAC 
53 Tame and Robotham, Maralinga. 
54 Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia. 
55 Commonwealth of Australia, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in 
Australia. 
56 Pearce, Final Report on Residual Radioactive Contamination of the Maralinga Range and the Emu 
Site. 
  
 
265 
Report.57 This report outlined the final clean-up of the range. The clean up, and the 
report, were heavily criticised.58
 Another report to receive criticism was the Australian government 
commissioned British Nuclear Tests in Australia, a Review of Operational Safety 
Measures and of Possible After Effects, or AIRAC 9, of 1983.  The report was 
criticised due to the lack of time available to its expert panel to compile it, their 
reliance on other report-oriented materials and lack of willingness to explore 
anecdotal evidence from those present at the tests. This is the report that contained 
analysis which denied the possibility of harmful radioactive contamination from 
‘Totem 1’ causing sickness in the form of the ‘Black Mist.’
 
59
 Chapter Six also examined various epidemiological studies, especially those 
concerning incidence of cancer. None of these studies has shown a conclusive link 
between participation in the tests and increases in cancer incidence and mortality.
 
60
 The study which led to compensation for Australian ‘Nuclear Veterans’, 
Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia,  did find increases in 
cancer incidence and mortality in test participants against a civilian control group- yet 
the increases were not attributed to radiation. It was deemed that cigarette smoke, 
asbestos and benzene were the likely carcinogens, and suggested that such exposure 
was a common element of 1950s military life. 
 
This is of great significance as it is very often claimed that the tests did have this 
tragic result. However, the fact that the studies did not clearly demonstrate this link 
does not disprove it. It has often been claimed in sources with an activist agenda that 
the tests resulted in elevated rates of cancer and this is not evidenced by such health 
studies.  
61
                                                 
57 Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee, Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test 
Sites at Emu and Maralinga (Australia) 2003. 
  New findings continue to emerge 
58 Parkinson, Maralinga. 
59 Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council, British Nuclear Tests in Australia; a Review of 
Operational Safety Measures and of Possible After Effects. 
60 Darby et al, ‘A Summary of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer in Men from the United Kingdom 
Who Participated in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes’; Darby et al, ‘Further Follow up of Mortality and  Incidence of Cancer in Men from the 
United Kingdom Who Participated in the United Kingdom’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and 
Experimental Programmes; Aboriginal Health Unit, A Survey of Diseases That May be Related to 
Radiation Among Pitjantjatjara on Remote Reserves; Donovan, Survey of Health of Former Atomic 
Test Personnel;  Muirhead  et al, ‘Follow up of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer 1952-98 in Men 
from the UK Who Participated in the UK’s Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests and Experimental 
Programmes’; Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia.  
61 Gun et al, Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests in Australia. 
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regarding the possible genetic effects from British nuclear tests, in particular from the 
large-scale thermonuclear tests in the Pacific.62
 Chapter Seven explored online resources, journals, documentaries, and 
popular sources, especially those which take an anti-nuclear stance. Of particular 
significance are examples of anti-testing activism, and the chapter considers how 
commentators on the tests have responded to the issues raised in relevant earlier print 
reportage, parliamentary debates, books and studies. One key notion explored is that 
numerous examples of activism have lessened their impact due to a reliance on 
inaccurate data. There are evident and clear consequences of the tests, such as the 
removal of Aboriginal people, the contamination of land, and health complaints.  
 
There is room for debate about the link of health complaints to the tests but 
even the fact that involvement in the tests caused concern about such injury is in itself 
a severe consequence. One of the prominent debates explored within the chapter is the 
lack of understanding of the long-term effects of low doses of radiation. The notion of 
a ‘safe dose’ is contested. That little is certain about such long-term effects is a potent 
argument against the conduct of the tests.   
The Massey University study63  and the  2009 England and Wales High Court 
case pertaining to ‘AB and Others and the Ministry of Defence’ before Mr. Justice 
Foskett64
 Chapter Eight reviewed how Australia’s experience with nuclear weapons has 
been explored within examples of pop-cultural and fictional sources, which have done 
much to shape public perceptions of the tests.  The depiction of Australia’s experience 
with nuclear weapons in some works of pop-culture and fiction has been a blend of 
 both have had an impact on the issue of nuclear testing in Australia that has 
yet to be fully realised, despite this case and study being centred on thermonuclear 
tests in the Pacific. Many of the accounts discussed in Chapter Seven show how 
contested beliefs have been continually repeated as self-apparent fact, despite 
evidence of conflicting views being on the public record. A possible reason for this is 
that there are verified instances of harm resulting from the tests and in light of this, 
other claims appear plausible, and myths are thus perpetuated.  The manner in which 
information is presented may also be carefully manipulated.  
                                                 
62 Wahab et al, ‘Elevated Chromosome Translocation Frequencies in New Zealand Nuclear Test 
Veterans.’ 
63 Ibid 
64 British and Irish Legal Information Institute, section entitled England and Wales High Court 
(Queen’s Bench Decisions), AB & Others –and- Ministry of Defence, February 2009, 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2009/1225.html, site accessed 03/08/10 
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facts, supposition and conspiracy theory. It has been possible to plausibly embellish 
the facts because of the lack of openness at the time of the tests and the near hysteria 
over issues of nuclear capability during the Cold War. 
  The nature and justification of the tests is still hotly debated and very little is 
agreed upon.  At the time of the tests, the media and thus the public were poorly 
informed. In the wake of this poverty of information has been seen a worrying 
tendency for contested issues to be presented as self-evident fact.  
Much is still unknown; for example the link between test participation and 
illness has not been proven in epidemiological studies. However, much is evident. 
Contamination of the testing sites cannot be denied, nor can the displacement of 
Aboriginal people from these areas. The long-term consequences of the tests remain 
poorly understood.  
 Though the tests occurred decades ago, the story is not yet over and the 
mysteries of the 1950s remain in Australia’s collective psyche.  New information 
continues to emerge, for example studies into potential genetic damage from the tests 
may yield further findings. Other health studies, without the methodological concerns 
of their predecessors, may be conducted. More archived material relating to the tests 
may come to light; other witnesses may come forward and new sources may create 
renewed public interest. It is certainly the case in the study of history that new sources 
can and should change the fashion in which older sources are viewed.  
 This dissertation has explored how the events and the issues concerning 
British atomic testing in Australia have been presented to the public and how these 
debates have developed over the years. It has involved the review of a wide variety of 
sources, none of which can individually provide an accurate picture. I see great 
potential, however, for the use of literary fiction to explore the tests, which could aid 
greatly in informing the public about the extent to which the events and issues of the 
tests are contested. A fictional literary work could never claim to present ‘the truth’ 
but such a narrative would be of great use in situating a readership to appreciate real 
life issues. The value of such a source would be greatly enhanced, of course, if the 
distinction between 'fact' and 'fiction' is properly 'signposted'.  
 The separation of fact and fiction in the instance of an issue of emotional 
significance such as the atomic tests is not a simple task. Problems have arisen where 
heavily contested issues have been presented as self-evident truth and the agenda of 
prominent commentators is varied.  
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  Some commentators have sought to downplay the risks of the tests, others to 
demonstrate them. In many cases the material, unintentionally or otherwise, has not 
been accurate.  The acceptance of less plausible claims indicate, at times, an extreme 
trust and also distrust of official British and Australian conduct. All such accounts can 
be considered in some sense, a narrative.  
 Any historical narrative, fact or fiction, can allow an audience to appreciate 
the experiences of those connected to a historical event, as well as the broader picture 
of what factors dictated that experience. This, I believe, is a rather obvious truth. The 
significance of this pales when contrasted with what such a narrative can do to inspire 
a readership to want to find out more.  This 'inspiration' to spread appreciation of our 
history and heritage is perhaps more significant than the 'knowledge' imparted from 
any single work.  
The atomic tests staged in Australia during the 1950s were a very significant 
episode in the country’s history. That such tests were allowed to occur suggests much 
of the complex nature of Australia’s relationship with its allies. It is clear that the tests 
resulted in harm, the full extent of which is unknown, despite numerous reports and 
studies spanning many years.  
However, commentators on the tests have all too often presented personal 
belief and speculation as uncontested truth. Public understanding of the tests has been 
hindered by instances where information is missing, has been exaggerated, fabricated, 
misunderstood and misrepresented.  
In the five decades since the tests the debates surrounding them have ebbed 
and flowed, influenced by sources of varying epistemologies, agendas and audiences. 
The time since the tests has seen changing perceptions about ‘truth’ in history, 
responses against approaches to international relations which promote the acquisition 
of power at any cost, and changing attitudes regarding human and environmental 
damage. With the release of new studies and documents, the quality of representations 
have improved, although there remain problems in the manner by which accounts of 
the experiences of those affected by the tests make use or fail to make use of the 
information that has been released in the public domain.  
An aspect of this is the divide between sources which consider the human 
element and those which attempt to achieve an objective scientific distance or those 
which consider the broader strategic implications of the Cold War. In the 
representations of the tests that this thesis has explored I have charted the emergence 
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of various myths and falsehoods, some of which have been rejected and others that 
have been persistently repeated. The tests had some very real consequences, and in 
light of this, some incredible claims have seemed plausible and worthy of repetition.  
In writing this thesis I have endeavoured to make a careful consideration of 
the objectivist science-based material on the tests as well as those which consider the 
human element. Though many details relevant to the tests remain outside the public 
domain and the full story of the tests cannot yet be written, it is my hope that this 
study will contribute to the search for a balanced and reasoned analysis of the debates 
surrounding the British atomic tests in Australia and how these debates have 
developed.  
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Appendix I. 
 
Letter of  20 September 1956 from Minister for Supply Oliver Howard Beale, 
Lib, to Mr. John Joseph Brady, Gilford, Western Australia, A.L.P. Member of 
Legislative Assembly (MLA). From Australian Parliament, House of Representatives, 
Hansard, 10 October 1956, Session 1956, p 1332, in which the letter is unsigned.  
 
I have now had an opportunity of reading the speech made by Mr. W. Grayden, 
M.L.L., in the Legislative Assembly on 15th August, and appreciate your courtesy in 
forwarding this with the letter of 21st August. 
At the outset let me say that I share you anxiety that nothing should be done to jeopardize the 
welfare and precarious living of the native. This has always been in the forefront of our minds 
in planning operations both in respect of the rocket range at Woomera and of the atomic 
weapons proving ground at Maralinga. 
 We have tried not only to protect the natives from any hazard associated with the 
operation of these ranges, but also to disturb their normal mode of living as little as possible, 
and to impose no unnecessary restriction on their movements. 
My department has worked in close-co-operation with the Department of Native Welfare both 
in South and Western Australia, and the helpful attitudes of both States have been appreciated. 
You might like to have a brief outline of the measures which have been put into operation for 
looking after native welfare in the area nearer to Maralinga, and this I have set out below- 
 
1. Two or three mobile ground patrons operate between Tarcoola and Ernabella to keep a 
check on the location and movement of all natives in this area. 
2. There are also scientific teams operations east towards Mabel Creek and up to 120 miles of 
our base on the Emu claypan. These teams, while not specifically for native patrol, are briefed 
to report any indication that natives are in this area. 
3. These patrols are in daily contact with each other, with Natives affairs Officer Macaulay at 
the Meteorological Station in the Rawlinsons, and with the Maralinga and Woomera Ranges. 
4. While there is not the slightest danger to the health of natives in and around the station 
properties in central South Australia arising from the tests at Maralinga,, it is considered 
politic to keep regular checks on the radio-active ‘back-ground’ in these areas, and in addition 
to the large number of air sampling stations distributed throughout the Australian continent, 
there are sampling devices located at each of the station properties referred to above.  Not only 
do these supplement the data obtained from the main continental sampling system, but they 
provide specific confirmation that no significant radio-active material has fallen on the nearby 
inhabited areas. 
5. Before any major test is conducted at Maralinga, extensive low level aerial reconnaissance 
over a wide sector centred on Maralinga and extending out about 200 miles from the firing 
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area is made with meticulous care. This will detect the presence of any natives not previously 
accounted for. In the event of any natives being discovered in locations which might give rise 
to public anxiety, the tests would be held up until the natives were clear of these areas. 
6. The only area in which the radio-active contamination following a test might reach a level 
prejudicial to heath, is in the near vicinity of the firing sites, and this area will be constantly 
supervised by the range authorities. 
Although radio-active material will fall outside this area, it will be of such low intensity as not 
to be a health hazard. Further, it will decay rapidly with time and could not possibly be a 
danger to any natives who might subsequently move into the area. 
7. As part of the scientific plan to assess the effectiveness of the nuclear devices tested at 
Maralinga, extensive aerial and ground survey of the radio-active ‘fallout’ are made with 
highly sensitive measuring instruments to distances of more than 100 miles from the firing 
sites. These measurements provide additional confirmation that the scientific predictions were 
realized and that no harmful radioactive material was deposited on areas used by human 
beings or live-stock.  
 
The initiation and direction of the above measures is the direct responsibility of the 
Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee, which consists of eminent Australian scientists and 
which is present in person at each of the major trials at Maralinga.  
I trust the foregoing information will not only inform you of the extreme care with which we 
are planning all these operations, but will enable you to reply to any uninformed criticism that 
these highly important and essential British Commonwealth defence operations are 
prejudicing native life and welfare in Australia. 
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Appendix II: Further details on two aspects of nuclear weapon design: 
 
Mosaic G2 and the uranium tamper: 
 
The high yield of the 19 June 1956 Mosaic G2 test at Monte Bello, Western 
Australia was due to the performance of its uranium tamper. The verb ‘to tamp’ refers 
to the act of packing material down- a pipe smoker tamps tobacco into the bowl of 
their pipe. When making espresso coffee, one tamps the coffee grounds into the filter 
through which the water passes. Within an implosion fission device, a ‘tamper’ is a 
component which surrounds the core, allowing it to hold together longer while the 
fission reaction occurs. This results in a greater number of fissions before the core 
inevitably comes apart, thus more energy yielded and a more efficient reaction.1
 The fission reactions for these tests were ‘boosted’. The fission reaction 
‘ignited’ a fusion reaction due to inclusion of solid fusion fuel- Lithium 6 Deuteride 
(Li-6D). According to The Nuclear Weapon Archive, the arrangement of the Mosaic 
G2 device was most likely similar to that of Edward Teller’s proposed ‘alarm clock’ 
design or the Soviet ‘layer cake’ design for a single-stage boosted fission weapon. 
Both these countries explored this concept along the path to the more powerful multi-
stage, radiation implosion devices which have come to be known as thermonuclear, or 
hydrogen, bombs. 
 For it 
to be effective, such a tamper must be made of very dense metal. For the first Mosaic 
test, this material was lead.  
 In the case of the Mosaic devices, the yield produced resulting from the fusion 
of light elements was negligible. The yield for G1 was low enough, 15Kt, for it to be 
deemed safe for G2 to be tested with a tamper of natural (i.e. non-enriched) uranium 
metal,2
 In the years leading to the development of the atomic bomb, it had been 
discovered that uranium-238 (U-238) was not suitable material for an atomic bomb as 
it was not ‘fissile’. Within natural uranium, however, there is a small percentage of 
the lighter isotope uranium-235 (U-235). When uranium is ‘enriched’, at great 
 atomic number 92, atomic weight 238.  
                                                 
1 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Introduction to Nuclear Weapon Physics and Design: 
Implosion Assembly, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq2.html, site accessed 15/02/08. 
2 Ibid, section entitled ‘British Nuclear Testing: Operation Mosaic: 1956.’ 
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expense, to increase the percentage of U-235, it would fission very easily. Such 
enriched uranium formed the basis of the device dropped on Hiroshima.3
However, the fusion of light elements was known to produce very high energy 
neutrons-approximately 14.1 mega (million) electron volts (MeV). While allowing 
insight into how to ‘boost’ the power of a fission device using fusion ‘fuel’, Dr. 
Penney had intended the Mosaic test to show something of the behaviour of the high-
energy neutrons produced from a fusion reaction.
 
4
 Thus, not only did the uranium tamper of Mosaic G2 hold the core of the 
device together longer to allow more fissions, further fission occurred within the 
tamper. This contributed to much of the yield of the device. The most powerful 
atomic weapons yet designed also make use of  this effect- a fission device, known as 
the ‘primary’ is used to bring about the necessary reaction in fusion fuel through the 
process of ‘radiation implosion’ (which warrants its own explanation) within the 
‘secondary’. The ‘secondary’ is also ‘tamped’ with natural uranium, which itself 
undergoes a fission reaction due to the high energy fusion neutrons. Such devices are 
known as fission-fusion-fission weapons. Even though it also functions in holding the 
device together, the uranium metal tamper also produces much of the weapons’ yield. 
As stated by The Nuclear Weapon Archive: 
 This data was of great use in the 
development of the multi-stage weapons later tested as part of ‘Operation Grapple’, 
Britain’s hydrogen bomb tests. Although not causing a chain reaction, high energy 
neutrons from a fusion reaction can cause fission to occur in U- 238, which though 
not ‘fissile’, is ‘fissionable.’ 
 
neutrons that escape from the fusion fuel can also contribute greatly to bomb yield by 
inducing fission in the highly compressed fusion tamper. This extra boost can release most of 
the explosion energy, and commonly accounts for half of the yield of large fission-fusion-
fission bombs and can reach at least 85% of the total yield.5
 
 
Kenneth S Krane’s Introductory Nuclear Physics states: 
  
                                                 
3 Ibid, section entitled ‘Fission Summary’, site accessed 05/08/08. Also Kenneth S. Krane, Introductory 
Nuclear Physics, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1986, pp. 520-527. 
4  Milliken, No Conceivable Injury, p. 206. 
5 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Basic Principles of Staged Radiation Implosion, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Library/Teller.html site accessed 15/02/08/,  
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The fast neutrons released in the fusion fuel can be used to add additional energy to the 
explosive by surrounding the fusion fuel with a casing of U238, which fissions with fast 
neutrons. The operation and energy release in a thermonuclear weapon are thus dependent on 
a fission-fusion-fission cycle. About half the yield of a typical strategic weapon may come 
from the final fission process.6
 
 
  
Within an atomic device, the fission reaction is responsible for the majority of 
the fallout. The most powerful nuclear explosion to date, the Russian test of 30 
October 1961, known as the ‘Tsar Bomba’ (king of bombs) test, featured a non 
fissionable tamper made of lead.  It was a very ‘clean’ design as such a high 
percentage of its huge yield, upwards of 50 megatons, was due to the fusion of light 
elements. Yet this device was tested in its ‘low yield’ form. Had it featured a uranium 
tamper, it would have yielded closer to 100 megatons (equivalent to a staggering 100, 
000, 000 tons of TNT. For comparison, the device which destroyed Hiroshima was 
equivalent to ~12, 500 tons of TNT). 7
 
  The use of a uranium tamper in this device 
would have produced a disastrous amount of fallout.  From The Nuclear Weapon 
Archive: 
The effect of this bomb at full yield on global fallout would have been tremendous. It would 
have increased the world's total fission fallout since the invention of the atomic bomb by 
25%.8
 
 
The effect of fusion neutrons on a uranium tamper was also a significant factor 
in the radiological disaster associated with the American ‘Castle Bravo’ test of 1 
March 1954. In this test, quantities of the isotope Lithium 7 (Li-7) in the solid ‘fusion 
fuel’ behaved unexpectedly. According to the Nuclear Weapon Archive: 
 
This isotope was expected to be essentially inert, but in fact it had a substantial reaction cross 
section with the high energy neutrons produced by tritium-deuterium fusion. When one of 
these high energy neutrons collided with a lithium-7 atom, it could fragment it into a tritium 
and a helium atom. Tritium was the most valuable fusion fuel, being both highly reactive and 
                                                 
6Kenneth S.  Krane, Introductory Nuclear Physics, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1986. 
p.554. See also, Titterton, Facing the Atomic Future, pp. 240-242. 
7 The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Thermonuclear Weapons Design and Later 
Subsections,  http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-5.html#Nfaq4.5.2 site accessed 15/02/08/, 
8Ibid, section entitled The Soviet Weapons Program: the Tsar Bomba, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/TsarBomba.html, site accessed 15/02.08. 
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causing extremely energetic fusion, so this extra source of tritium greatly increased the 
weapon yield. 
 
 This energetic fusion, in addition to contributing to the yield, resulted in the 
release of high energy neutrons causing further fission in a uranium tamper. As a 
consequence of this, the test ‘ran away’ to 15 megatons, the largest test by the United 
States to this day.   The archive also states that the Bravo test created the worst 
radiological disaster in US history. Due to inaccurate weather forecasting, failure to 
postpone the tests, the high yield and lack of evacuation of likely affected areas, 
Marshallese Islanders and U.S. servicemen were ‘blanketed by the fallout plume,  also: 
  
The Japanese fishing vessel Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Fifth Lucky Dragon) was also heavily 
contaminated, with the 23 crewmen receiving exposures of 300 R, one of whom later died - 
apparently from complications. This incident created an international uproar, and a diplomatic 
crisis with Japan. 9
 
 
The use of a uranium tamper in a weapon incorporating a fusion reaction (i.e. 
in either a thermonuclear or a boosted fission design) can greatly add to the yield and 
also fallout of the device. This effect was at the centre of a controversy in Australia 
that surrounding the yield of the Mosaic G2 test. 
 
The ‘cobalt bomb’ and the notion of a ‘doomsday device’ : 
 
The ‘cobalt bomb’ has been mentioned several times in this thesis, they have 
at times been considered a potential ‘doomsday device’. Writing in a paper that 
explored the implausibility of an Armageddon scenario involving cobalt bombs, 
Professor Desmond Ball of the Australian National University’s Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies stated that ‘As far as is known, only one bomb with a cobalt 
element was ever tested- A British device tested at Maralinga on 14 September 
1957’.10
                                                 
9The Nuclear Weapon Archive, section entitled Operation Castle, 
   
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/Castle.html, site accessed 04/03/09. 
10 Desmond Ball, ‘The Probabilities of “On the beach”: Assessing ‘Armageddon Scenarios’ in the 21st 
Century’ 
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/wp/wp_sdsc_401.pdf, Working Paper No. 401, SDSC, May 2006, 
site accessed 03/03/08. 
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The notion of the ‘cobalt bomb’ is attributed to the Hungarian physicist Leo 
Szilard,11 who was a key contributor to the American wartime Manhattan project. The 
idea is that an atomic device is jacketed in natural cobalt (Co- 59) and neutrons 
emitted as a consequence of the atomic reaction breed the isotope Co- 60, which is 
distributed by the blast as fallout. Co-60 is a strong emitter of gamma rays, with a 
half-life of ~5.27 years.12 Though there is no information within the public domain to 
suggest that a ‘cobalt bomb’ has ever been developed, there is no doubt that neutrons 
from an atomic explosion can breed the Co-60 isotope. As an example, cobalt 
impurities in construction steel from the city of Hiroshima showed traces of Co-60 
after the atomic bomb strike13 and this is a far cry from a jacket of pure cobalt around  
an atomic device.  Enhanced fallout bombs, referred to as ‘salted’ bombs, formed the 
inspiration of the doomsday devices discussed in later fictional sources such as On the 
Beach14 and Dr Strangelove- Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Bomb.15
There have been numerous references within the literature of international 
strategic affairs to such a 'doomsday machines'. The notion of the 'doomsday machine' 
originates from what may have been a morbid reference from Herman Kahn, author of 
Thermonuclear War and also Preparing for the Unthinkable.
  
16
 
 As analyst David Pahl 
suggests in the following quotation, this is the genesis of the notion of ‘MAD’, or 
'mutually assured destruction'- the balance of terror that has arguably prevented global 
war in the 'post-thermonuclear' world: 
During the 1950s there was a story circulated about a fictional 'doomsday machine'. This 
machine was, so the story goes, a huge nuclear device which was so powerful that it could 
destroy the earth. This Doomsday Machine was designed to explode if any nation used nuclear 
weapons to attack another nation. According to the story, the Doomsday Machine was an 
                                                 
11 Szilard’s morbid but not entirely serious proposal of such a bomb is discussed in James Shepley and 
Clay Blair Jr., The Hydrogen Bomb; The Men, The Menace, The Mechanism, Jarrolds, London, 1955, p 
101. 
12 The realities of fallout and ‘salted’ weapon are discussed in Mark A. Harwell, Nuclear Winter: the 
Human and Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War, Springer Verlag, New York, 1984, pp. 69-
83 with specific reference to 'salting' p. 72.  ‘Salted’ bombs are discussed in the Nuclear Weapon 
Archive, section entitled Cobalt Bombs and Other Salted Bombs, 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq1.html#nfaq1.6, site accessed 03/0308. 
13 G.D Kerr, F.F.  Dyer, J.F.  Emery, J.V. Pace III, R.L. Brodzinski, and J. Marcum, Activation of 
Cobalt by Neutrons from the Hiroshima Bomb. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 01 Feb 1990. 
14 Shute, On the Beach, Also MGM, On the Beach,  and Platinum Disc, On the Beach. 
15 Columbia Pictures, Dr Strangelove This film refers to the doomsday device as being a (fictional) 
‘cobalt thorium-g’ bomb. 
16 Kahn, On Thinking About the Unthinkable and On Thermonuclear War. 
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effective peacekeeper because all nations understood that they would be committing suicide if 
they attacked with nuclear devices- even if the attack were successful, the Doomsday machine 
would explode and destroy the earth. 
By 1965, a short twenty years after the first man-made atomic explosion, there were enough 
nuclear weapons in arsenals around the world to make the Doomsday Machine story a reality. 
Ironically, the story line for the fictional tale had, in a way, became the basis for a tenuous 
peace between so-called world superpowers.  Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) had 
replaced the Doomsday Machine as the theme for a peaceful co-existence. In effect, MAD 
meant: 'If you fire at me, I will retaliate swiftly and heavily. I may be dead after the exchange, 
but then, so will you.' 17
 
 
Though the ‘cobalt bomb’ never became a reality, it had been feared during 
1953 that such a device would be tested in Australia, as referenced in the print media 
and parliamentary debates references in chapters Two and Three. Also, cobalt metal 
was included as an experiment in the 14 September 1957 test ‘Tadje’ as part of 
‘Operation Antler’ at Maralinga. 18
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 David Pahl, Space Warfare and Strategic Defence, Bison Books, London, 1987, p.10. 
18 Desmond Ball, ‘The Probabilities of “On the beach”: Assessing ‘Armageddon Scenarios’ in the 21st 
Century’,http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/wp/wp_sdsc_401.pdf, Working Paper No. 401, SDSC, 
May 2006, site accessed 03/03/08.   See also Titterton, Facing the Atomic Future, pp. 254-245. 
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Glossary  
 
AAEC: Australian Atomic Energy Commission 
 
ADF: Australian Defence Force. 
 
AIRAC: Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory Council 
 
Alarm clock: name given to a single-stage fission and fusion weapon incorporating 
layers of solid fusion ‘fuel’ (see ‘layer cake’) 
 
ALP: Australian Labor Party 
 
ANSTO:  Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation. 
 
ANVA: Australian Nuclear Veterans Association 
 
ANZUS: Australia New Zealand and United States (Treaty) 
 
ARL: Australian Radiation Laboratory. 
 
ARPANSA:  Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency. 
 
ASIO: Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. 
 
Atomic: Pertaining to the atom. 
 
AWRE: Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (UK.) 
 
AWTSC: Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee. 
 
Black Mist: Name given to the alleged cloud of radioactive or toxic particles resulting  
from the test ‘Totem 1’ of 15 October 1953, Emu Field, South Australia. 
 
‘Bloodhound’: British ‘Surface to Air Guided Weapon.’ 
 
‘Blue Danube’: British tactical nuclear weapon. 
 
BNTVA: British Nuclear Test Veterans Association. 
 
Core: See ‘pit’. 
 
CP: Country Party. 
 
CPA: Communist Party of Australia. 
 
Critical mass: The smallest amount of fissile material required to sustain a fission 
chain reaction.  
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CSIRO: Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation  
 
DEST: Department of Education, Science and Training  
 
DRE: Department of Resources and Energy  
 
DVA: Department of Veterans’ Affairs 
 
Epidemiology: the study of incidence of disease or ailment among large populations. 
 
ESATA: Ex-Services Atomic Survivors Association 
 
Fallout: Radioactive or toxic particles distributed by an atomic explosion. 
 
Fissile: Material capable of undertaking a fission chain reaction. 
 
Fission: Nuclear reaction in which the nucleus of an atom is split into smaller parts. 
 
Fissionable: Material capable of undertaking a fission reaction, also including  
material which will only fission exposed to high energy neutrons, but not able to 
maintain a fission chain reaction.  
 
Fusion:  Nuclear reaction in which nuclei join together to form a heavier nucleus.  
 
Geiger counter: (also known as a Geiger-Müller counter) device which measures 
ionising radiation.  
 
Half life: The time taken for a given substance experiencing decay to decrease by half.  
 
HER: High Explosives Research (early code name for UK nuclear weapons project) 
 
HEWA: High-Energy Weapon Archive.  
 
HMSO: Her Majesties Stationery Office (UK). 
 
Hydrogen Bomb: Staged radiation implosion device involving nuclear fusion.  
 
Implosion:  The act of focusing explosive energy inwards to compress matter. 
 
‘Indigo Hammer’: British small yield thermonuclear ‘primary’ stage and intended 
warhead for a ‘Surface to Air Guided Weapon.’ 
 
Indroctinee Force or ‘I Force’: Small force of military servicemen tasked to observe 
the effects of an atomic weapon to gain operational experience in the potential use of 
such devices. 
 
Induced radiation: The process by which a material becomes radioactive following 
exposure to another radiation source.  
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Initial radiation:  Radiation released at the moment of detonation of a nuclear device.  
 
Initiator: Component of an atomic weapon which ‘initiates’ the chain reaction by 
rapidly releasing neutrons. 
 
Internationalism: International relations approach aimed to promote the interests of 
the international community. 
 
Ionising radiation: Radiation of sufficient energy to detach electrons from atoms or 
molecules.  
 
ISV: In situ vitrification: 
 
Jindivik: Pilot-less jet aircraft tested and used at Woomera. 
 
Kiloton: (kt) Unit of measurement of explosive power, equivalent to 1000 tons of 
TNT.  
 
Layer cake:  Name given to by USSR for a single-stage fission and fusion weapon 
incorporating layers of solid fusion ‘fuel’ (see ‘alarm clock’) 
 
Levitated core: core featuring an ‘air gap’ to allow a more efficient implosion to occur.  
 
Lib: Liberal Party. 
 
Lithium-6 Deuteride (Li-6D):  Compound of the isotope Lithium 6 and Deuterium 
(heavy hydrogen) employed as fusion ‘fuel’ in a thermonuclear reaction. 
 
Lucas Heights: The NSW site of the Australian research reactors HIFAR and OPAL  
 
MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction. 
 
‘Major Trial’: Atomic test involving an atomic explosion. 
 
‘Minor Trial’: Test of components of an atomic weapon without an atomic explosion. 
 
Manhattan project: The American-led wartime effort to produce the first atomic 
bombs. 
 
MARTAC: Maralinga Technical Assessment Committee 
 
Megaton: Unit of measurement of explosive power, equivalent to 1,000, 000 tons of 
TNT.  
 
MLA: Member of the Legislative Assembly. 
 
MVD: Ministry of Internal Affairs (USSR) 
 
Neutron: sub atomic particle with no electric charge. 
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NPT:  Non-Proliferation Treaty (nuclear weapons). 
 
NRPB: National Radiological Protection Board (UK) 
 
Nuclear: Pertaining to the nucleus of the atom. 
 
Nuclear veteran: Military service personnel present at an atomic test. 
 
Nuclei: Plural of ‘Nucleus’ 
 
Nucleus:  The centre of the atom.  
 
OPAL:  Open pool Australian lightweight reactor. 
 
‘Orange Herald’: Proposed British nuclear missile warhead.  
 
Pit: The core of fissile material within an atomic device.  
 
‘Pixie’: Light atomic device intended as a ‘Surface to Air Guided Weapon’ warhead.  
 
Prompt radiation: See ‘initial radiation.’ 
 
PTBT: Partial Test Ban Treaty. 
 
RAF: Royal Air Force 
 
RAAF: Royal Australian Air Force 
 
Radiation implosion: The process used to compress the secondary stage of a 
thermonuclear device.  
 
RAN: Royal Australian Navy. 
 
Realism: International relations approach in which all of a given nation’s interaction 
with other nations is intended to further its own power base.  
 
‘Red Beard’: British tactical nuclear weapon. 
 
Reflector: Component of an atomic device employed to ‘reflect’ neutrons back 
towards the core. 
 
RN: Royal Navy. 
 
TAG: Technical Assessment Group. 
 
Tamper: Component of an atomic device employed to lengthen the period of time the 
core holds together, additional fission may occur within the tamper. 
 
TNT: trinitrotoluene (explosive) 
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UKAEA: United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. 
 
UNAEC: United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. 
 
SAGW: Surface to Air Guided Weapon. 
 
Salted bomb: A type of atomic device intended to produce enhanced fallout via the 
inclusion of elements such as cobalt. 
 
Sub critical: Below the smallest amount of fissile material required to sustain a fission 
chain reaction. 
 
Super critical: In excess of the smallest amount of fissile material required to sustain a 
fission chain reaction. 
 
Target response item: Item exposed to an atomic detonation to gauge the effects of 
such weapons on similar objects. 
 
Thermonuclear:  Process by which the heat, radiation and pressure from a fission 
chain reaction in the ‘primary’ stage of a weapon begins a fusion reaction in a 
‘secondary’ stage.  
 
USAF: United States Air Force 
 
VENONA: US intelligence operation concerned with security leaks in Australia 
between 1943 and 1948  
 
WMD: Weapons of mass destruction. 
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